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PREFACE 
This dissertation is the fruit of forty years experience. 
In 1969, following my first year of law school, I joined the Peace Corps and was 
sent to the state of Espirito Santo, Brazil. After training as a community organizer, I was 
assigned to a rural electrification cooperative, where I worked for nearly two years. 
Espirito Santo in the late 1960s was classed as the second poorest state in Brazil. 
Yet it did not have the wide-spread miserable poverty1 that one saw in other, supposedly 
richer states. The answer to this apparent contradiction, I came to realize, was that 
Espirito Santo was a state of small farmers. The people, while having less per capita 
money income than in most other Brazilian states, had land, food, work, family, and 
dignity, and the wealth of these things was more evenly distributed than was generally 
the case in Brazil.2 I learned a lesson and filed it away for future reference. 
In 1978 I returned to Brazil as a lawyer for a large international law firm, working 
in Rio de Janeiro and representing multinational companies. The experience was, for me, 
a radicalizing one. As a Peace Corps Volunteer I had seen poverty but had accepted it 
'That which Brazilians refer to as miseria. 
2This kind of wealth formed the basis for further development: the sons and daughters of many of these 
farmers went on to become teachers, accountants, and university graduates. Sadly, however, large scale 
development funded by outside forces, which has turned Espirito Santo today into one of the wealthier per 
capita Brazilian states, also brought the problems of inequality and miseria. By the end of the century, 
Vitoria, the formerly quiet capital of the state, had the highest murder rate in Brazil. 
v 
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more or less as the people themselves did ~ as an unfortunate reality. As a lawyer in 
Rio de Janeiro I realized that poverty did not just happen but was the result of ~ or, at 
least, was aggravated by — a legal and economic system that largely worked to the 
advantage of the rich.4 
This realization was particularly brought home to me by an assignment I had in 
1980. A large Canadian company had taken advantage of the government FISET 
program5 to invest in reforestation projects. As was the case with most multinationals, 
the company did not run the reforestation projects itself but invested the money through 
independent reforestation enterprises established to capture such funds. The Canadian 
company had heard reports that one of the enterprises receiving its funds was engaging in 
ft 7 
grilagem and the Canadians were genuinely concerned. A Canadian lawyer and I were 
sent to Santa Catarina to investigate. 
3Many of the people, indeed, went further, accepting poverty fatalistically as a vontade de Deus - the will 
of God. It was in part to change this vision of "the will of God" that the Church became so actively 
involved in promoting base community groups which helped the poor analyze the socioeconomic causes of 
poverty, engage in self-help projects, and view God as a God of justice rather than accept fatalism. This 
was the practical side of the "Theology of Liberation." I have long contended that the translation of this 
theological approach - Teologia de Liberagao - as "Liberation Theology" was unfortunate — the term 
"liberation" in American English had come to be identified with Communist movements. "A Theology of 
Freedom" would have been a more accurate translation. 
4This is not to deny that there were and are validly populist elements within the Brazilian legal system. The 
labor courts, for instance, generally favor the rights of workers over employers. The OAB - the official 
Brazilian Bar Association - has been a strong advocate of human rights, as are many judges and members 
of the Ministerio Publico (the prosecutors in the Justice Department). Brazil is a complex and multi-
faceted country. However all of these populist forces are aware that they are working within a system that 
generally favors the ruling classes. It is still too early to judge the long term impact of the Workers' Party 
(PT) and the Lula government. 
sThe program, which allowed companies to use funds that would otherwise be paid for taxes to invest in 
reforestation, is discussed in more detail in Chapter III. 
6The illegal or unethical seizing of land. 
?Although there is a great deal of valid debate about the role of multinationals, it has been my experience 
that multinationals (I have worked principally with American, Canadian, and British ones) are honest in 
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We found no evidence that grilagem had occurred. In retrospect, I realize that we 
were very naive; to this day I do not know whether or not we were hoodwinked by the 
local company. However, even though we found no evidence of illegality, the process I 
saw in practice forced me to think about the negative effects of government policy. As I 
later wrote: 
Brazilian ecologists were concerned about deforestation, so the government 
instituted a program under which companies received a tax break for investing in 
reforestation. The companies bought rural land from subsistence farmers; 
assuming the companies paid market value for the land, or at least the price the 
farmer asked (to a subsistence farmer who has never had to pay for food or rent, 
$1000 seems like a fortune), the farmer received enough to support his family for 
a few months in the city. After that, the former farmer, without trade skills and in 
an overburdened job market, ended up unemployed in the slums. Meanwhile, his 
land, which formerly produced food for his extended family and a little extra for 
the local market, was taken out of food production and food shortages began to 
increase... Finally, the company planted trees, but varieties which it could 
harvest most quickly, such as Pinus Eliotis, which ruin the soil. Thus in place of 
one problem - deforestation - several were created: family displacement, 
unemployment, urban slum growth, food shortages, soil denutrition (Powers 
1987b, 288-289). 
their dealings, treat their Brazilian employees fairly, and are scrupulous about obeying Brazilian law. 
Indeed, one of the points that radicalized me was that it was the structure of law itself — and not 
disobedience of the law — that helped the rich to get richer, the poor to get poorer. 
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It was also around this time that I became deeply interested in the response of the 
Catholic Church to the Brazilian agrarian question. In 1980, the Brazilian Catholic 
Bishops published "The Church and Land Problems." This document, which was 
adopted by a nearly unanimous vote of the bishops at their annual assembly, took a strong 
stand in favor of land reform.8 I was impressed by the logic and strength of the bishops' 
stand. 
In 1985 my wife and I, with our two daughters, went to work for the Franciscan 
Friars in the northern part of the state of Goias, a region which in 1989 was formed into 
the new state of Tocantins. We worked with the Catholic Church in Tocantins for seven 
years. In addition to pastoral duties, we helped to organize base ecclesial community 
groups (CEBs)9, rural workers unions10, and groups of small farmers who were struggling 
to stay on their land. Our work involved not only legal rights, but helping to organize 
small scale production and looking toward rural development in general. 
Tocantins is a frontier area in the southeastern corner of legal Amazonia, an area 
primarily of savanna land of limited fertility. In the 1980s it was a region of violent land 
conflicts (as it continues to be, to some extent, today). The 1986 murder of Father 
Josimo Tavares, a priest actively involved in promoting land reform, was only the most 
8 Igreja e Problemas da Terra, Document approved by the 18th Assembly of the CNBB, 2/14/80 
9 In CEBs neighbors gather to pray, read scripture, and discuss the issues touching their lives in light of 
gospel, seeking to understand the socio-economic and political factors which affect them and to find viable 
means of resolving common problems. The movement started in Espirito Santo in the early 1960s and 
spread throughout Brazil, having the greatest impact in rural areas and urban slums. 
10 The Sindicatos do Trabalhador Rural; their membership includes not only salaried workers and day 
laborers (boia-frios), but also small landowners, share croppers, and posseiros. 
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visible of many acts of repression by landowners and speculators. In Tocantins we 
witnessed grilagem on virtually a daily basis.11 
As a member of the Church's statewide land commission (CPT), I was able to 
examine not only the conflicts that our team was directly involved in but those 
throughout the state and in neighboring states.12 We soon discovered that, in areas where 
small farmers won their battle to get or retain land, they needed support in learning how 
to make the land more productive. Through working with small scale production, 
appropriate technologies, and organization of family and community based agro-industry, 
we became increasingly involved in what would now be called sustainable agriculture 
(although the term "sustainable" was not widely used at the time). 
My experience with sustainable rural development increased when, in 1992, I 
became director of Catholic Relief Service's program in the drought-ridden Brazilian 
Northeast. The key elements of CRS's program were legal rights for small farmers 
(principally through the CPT13) and projects to help subsistence farmers in the semi-arid 
11 In our region, grilagem followed a fairly standard procedure. Agents of interests trying to seize the land 
would arrive with pieces of paper they claimed to be titles, would show these to the posseiros, telling them 
that the posseiros were invaders without any right on the land. They would then offer an "indemnification" 
if the posseiro would sign a waiver of his rights and leave peacefully, saying that, if this were turned down, 
the posseiro would receive nothing. Many would succumb to this. Pressure on those who remained would 
then escalate with police threats, court orders, burning of crops and houses, and killing of one or two key 
leaders; by that time, most posseiros, even if they knew their rights, abandoned the area. 
12 Due to geographical affinities and eclessial politics, our state commission included not only Tocantins 
but the Prelacy of Sao Felix do Araguaia in Mato Grosso (whose bishop, Dom Pedro Cassidaglia, was 
highly respected throughout Brazil for his strong positions on social justice) and the Diocese of Conceiao 
do Araguaia in the state of Para (whose bishop, Dom Patricio Hanrahan, courageously supported land 
reform efforts despite frequent death threats). Para was, and continues to be, the single most violent region 
of land conflicts in Brazil. It was there that Sister Dorothy Stang was murdered in 2005. 
I3CRS provided support to CPT Regional Northeast I (Pernambuco, Paraiba, Rio Grande do Norte, and 
Alagoas) and, to a lesser extent, CPT Regional Northeast III (Bahia and Sergipe). We also worked with 
three diocesan CPT groups (Cajazeiras and Campina Grande in Paraiba and Mossouro in Rio Grande do 
Norte) and with CETRA, an organization in Ceara formed by Catholic lay people to support agrarian 
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zones better catch, store, and use water.14 Shortly thereafter my wife became director of 
GARD Brasil, an NGO working with rural cooperatives, community-based cashew nut 
processing, and rural women's groups. Together, and in conjunction with such groups as 
the World Food Program, Oxfam, and a number of the best Brazilian NGOs, we became 
actively involved in working toward sustainable rural development in the semi-arid 
Northeast (see, e.g., Jordao; Forum Nordeste). 
The situation in the Northeast was different from Tocantins. The region is one of 
the oldest in Brazil, and the rural population is dense. Repression of rights of small 
landowners and farm workers tended to be (with some exceptions, such as the state of 
Alagoas) subtler and more sophisticated than the gunmen used in the Amazon region. 
The presence of large irrigation and development projects pressured small farmers 
economically, pushing them onto marginal lands. The richest lands near the coast have 
been held as large sugar plantations since the 16th century. 
This is the experience I brought to my doctoral studies. Research during those 
studies allowed me to more fully place my experience within the context of a larger 
Brazilian legal, cultural, economic, and political structure. The research has not been 
easy - the materials, though voluminous, are often hard to come by, and vary widely in 
quality. However, preparation of this dissertation is one step in an ongoing process and, 
while far from definitive, has enabled me to gain insights and confirm or question 
conclusions originally drawn on the basis of my experience. 
reform. We made a number of small grants to other groups working for rural legal rights, including a small 
seed loan to the Movimento dos Sem Terra (MST), which was then relatively new to the Northeast (having 
been founded in the South of Brazil). 
l4We had water projects with MOC in Feira da Santana, Bahia; CAATINGA in Ouricuri, Pernambuco; 
PAT AC in Campina Grande, Paraiba; the Institute of Human Ecology in Recife, and Caritas Ceara. 
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ABSTRACT 
AN INITIAL EVALUATION OF MARKET-BASED LAND REFORM IN BRAZIL: 
CAN IT CREATE SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES? 
by 
Arthur Powers 
University of New Hampshire, May, 2010 
Land reform is a burning issue in Brazil. Redistribution of land through government 
expropriation has proven to be difficult and expensive as unwilling landowners can hold 
up the process for years, or defeat it, in the courts. In 1997, the World Bank, at the 
request of the Brazilian Government, approved Land Reform and Poverty Alleviation 
Pilot Project 4147-BR - known in Brazil as the Cedula da Terra. This program instituted 
a market based approach to land reform through which eligible agricultural workers could 
form associations and obtain subsidized financing to purchase land from willing sellers. 
As there was no previous work that comprehensively brought together the historical and 
legal roots of land in Brazil from a land reform perspective, this study initially sets out 
that history. It then asks the question: Is market-based land reform potentially an 
effective instrument to redistribute land to working farmers in a socially, 
environmentally, and economically sustainable manner? In order to answer that question, 
case study research was carried out in seven Cedula da Terra land reform settlements in 
northern Bahia. Sustainability was defined as land reform settlements being socially, 
economically, and environmentally viable for a minimum one generation. Data from the 
case studies was analyzed and placed in the larger context of Brazilian land reform 
history. The primary finding is that viable settlements can be developed through market-
based land reform where sufficient support is provided. Additional recommendations are 
provided as to factors that tend to increase the success of such settlements. 
xxi i 
CHAPTER I 
OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH 
Introduction 
Land reform is a burning issue in Brazil. Hardly a week goes by without a 
significant land reform story appearing in newspapers and on television. It is discussed 
by political parties during elections, by social and developmental organizations, by the 
public at large. 
It is an even more pressing issue to the large number of landless farmers, to the 
multitude of farmers with too little land (minifundistas), to young adult children of small 
farmers who would themselves like to have land, and even to a certain sector of the urban 
poor who envision returning to the land. And it is perceived as a threat by some large 
and medium-sized landholders, and even by some small landholders who fear it may 
touch their own land holdings. 
Discussion of land reform in Brazil can be traced back to the 18th Century. The 
issue became more vital as population grew and frontier lands diminished, reaching a 
peak in the 1950s and 1960s. The Estatuto da Terra, a good land reform law, was 
enacted in 1964. 
But despite the ongoing discussion, a good law, and repeated favorable 
declarations on the part of academics and politicians, actual land reform in Brazil has 
1 
been disappointing. Up until the 1990s, political, social, economic, and legal (and 
illegal!) factors had combined in such a way as to keep land reform programs at a 
minimal - almost token - level. The number of families settled on the land was minute in 
comparison with the number of families needing land, or the number leaving the land due 
to economic or other pressures - some of which involved fraud and violence {grilagem). 
Expropriating land - except where the landowner wished it to be expropriated - became 
an expensive, extended process that could be stalled for years. 
Then, in the mid 1990s, with the support of the World Bank, a new approach was 
tried. What came to be called "market-based" land reform (MBLR)15 was experimented 
with in the Northeastern State of Ceara and quickly expanded throughout the country. 
The essential principal of this approach was that, rather than the government 
expropriating land for distribution to landless farmers, the government financed the 
purchase of land (from willing sellers) by groups of landless farmers. 
The approach almost immediately became controversial. It was viewed by some 
as being too closely tied to the capitalist system, as unduly burdening the farmers with 
land payments, and/or as an attempt by the Cardoso administration to undermine the 
power of the land reform movement - most notably the Movimento Sem Terra (MST). 
Some feared that it whittled away the underlying concept of land reform as seeking 
justice, undermining the concept that the landless have a right to land, and unduly 
rewarding large landholders who sold their land under the program. Others feared that 
the associations of landless workers required to be formed by the program would be non-
authentic, paper groups established by politicians in their continuous effort to corral the 
15 Borras Jr. (2003, 1) and Wolford (2007, 244) prefer the term "Market-Led Agrarian Reform" (MLAR), 
distinguishing it from "State-Led Agrarian Reform" (SLAR); Domingos (2002, 3) prefers "Market-assisted 
agrarian reform" and Pereira (2007,1) calls it "'Market-Assisted' Land Reform" (MARL). 
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rural vote. Opposition to the program reached such a pitch that, in 2002, a conference 
organized by NGOs in Washington D.C. to discuss market-based land reform was 
required (in order for key land movements to participate) to change its title from an 
International Seminar on World Bank Market-Based Land Reform to an International 
Seminar on Negative Impacts of World Bank Market-Based Land Reform. It became 
almost de rigueur in center-left circles to be opposed to the World Bank approach. 
The objections set forth by opponents of the program, although often politically or 
ideologically driven, were not without basis. They will be discussed in more detail in the 
last chapter. At the same time, one would occasionally encounter field workers who had 
a highly favorable impression of the market-based approach. An essential question thus 
arose: Is market-based land reform potentially an effective instrument to redistribute land 
to working farmers in a socially, environmentally, and economically sustainable manner? 
This is the primary research question posed by this study. 
Theoretical Context: Policy 
Policy may be very roughly divided into stages of planning, implementation, and 
evaluation. In this sense, the current study primarily deals with the implementation stage 
of market-based land reform. This is useful, but also somewhat artificial.16 Planning, 
implementation, and evaluation are deeply interrelated. Increasingly it is recognized that 
the three must take place as part of a whole process and not linearly or even, necessarily, 
divided by time (e.g., Layzer 2002, 15-16). A series of feedback loops are created: thus 
we plan (often in a participatory manner with the target population), begin to implement, 
16 Patton & Sawicki (1993, 366) suggest that separating the planning and implementation processes too 
greatly can lead to serious dysfunctions in implementation. 
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do initial monitoring/evaluation, modify the plan, implement, monitor/evaluate - as three 
aspects of the policy process. This, at least, is the ideal. In practice, the need for 
governments and donor agencies to approve detailed written projects prior to funding and 
implementation, as well as other internal dynamics of governments and donors (discussed 
below), can seriously limit the ideal model. 
Policy sciences have been compared to trying to change a tire on a moving 
vehicle. Unlike laboratory sciences, or natural sciences dealing with a slower pace of 
change, policy sciences seek to examine, propose, plan, evaluate in the midst of rapidly 
ongoing and changing human society. Furthermore, the policy process itself is likely to -
indeed, intended to - have an impact on the very movement of the object (society) that it 
is examining. The policy scientist is thus required to help study, plan, and implement in a 
moving, open-ended, and highly complex situation with many players. Almost all 
planning and implementation will have unexpected spin-offs, both good and bad; poor 
17 
planning or implementation is likely to have very negative impacts as well. 
All of these factors are considerably increased in the 'third world' for several 
reasons. Policy has been defined as "a social process of authoritative decision making by 
which the members of a community clarify and secure their common interests." (Clark 
2002, 6) In the 'third world,' those who are the target population of the policy process 
may be less able to fully participate or make themselves heard for a number of reasons: 
lack of organization, inexperience in dealing with policy questions, limited ability to 
articulate their needs, vast differences between policy makers and target populations in 
17 Clark (2002, 33-34), based on Lasswell (1971, 14-33), sets out a useful process for mapping this 
complexity, including seven categories: participants, perspectives, situations, base values, strategies, 
outcomes, effects. 
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terms of education, wealth, world view, power.18 There may be, as in Brazil, a history of 
the more powerful and educated planning on behalf of the poor - with a mixture of 
motivations, not all of them benign.19 Tremendous inequalities in the society lead to 
distortions in implementation, so that policies often unintentionally end up benefiting 
those who are better off due to the underlying socio-economic dynamics (it is like trying 
to row a boat in a straight line with all the weight on one side of the boat). Finally, 
because target populations often live very close to the edge of survival, policy errors can 
have a much more serious negative impact on them than might be the case in more 
affluent societies. 
None of this is intended to denigrate the intelligence, capacity, or resilience of the 
'third world' poor - all of which are, in my experience, tremendous. However, the policy 
and development games were invented by the formally educated classes, and the poor are 
therefore playing in our court. It is not surprising that they do so at some disadvantage. 
This is part of the background within which this study is carried out. 
Notes on Implementation 
Based on work by Laswell (1971, 27-29), Clark (2002, 59-70) presents seven 
decision functions of the policy process: intelligence, promotion, prescription, invocation, 
application, appraisal, termination. Of these, invocation has most to do with the 
implementation stage. 
18 Regarding rural development, there may also be urban bias: "...most [development planners] have only a 
very shaky understanding of rural life in... developing societies." (Gardner and Lewis 1996, 63) 
19 When international experts or donor agencies are involved, there is an additional cultural gap (beyond 
that between the target population and the educated elite) between countries and languages. 
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Prescription is the stage that sets forth the rules under which a policy will be 
carried out. Invocation is the first step toward acting in accordance with that prescription 
to carry out the policy: setting up administration, allocating people and resources, 
deciding who will be accountable and who will enforce the prescriptions. Arrangements 
for invocation should be 
...effective, practical, and complete ways of executing the prescription. Do 
the arrangements make adequately clear exactly what the invocation 
activities will be in different contexts or under different contingencies and 
who will be held accountable to follow the rules? ... Are the people who 
carry out invocation adequately skilled, and do they receive ongoing 
training? Are the organizations adequately staffed, and do they have 
sufficient resources? To whom should they turn... if they run into problems 
in carrying out their invocation activities? How can the invocation function 
be appraised as a basis for improving it? (Clark, 65-66) 
While offering insights into implementation, invocation is really more concerned with the 
decision process leading to implementation than with implementation itself. 
In the United States, implementation may depend largely on government bodies 
and elected officials (Sargent, et al. 1991, 42-43; see Clark, 65-8). Formal procedures 
90 take on a highly significant role. While formal rules, roles, and regulations are certainly 
20 For Sargent, et al. (43), implementation includes three essential steps "The first and most important is 
identifying and adopting specific implementation procedures. The second is for the appropriate 
jurisdictions to enact bylaws or ordinances.... The third is delegating the responsibility of evaluating 
implementation to the planning commission, a citizens advisory group, or a community organization." 
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a factor in Brazil, they are not the mainstay of implementation. Implementation involves 
(but is not limited to) whether, to what extent, and how these formal factors are actually 
carried out. This may be due to a cultural practice of treating written rules as an ideal 
somewhat divorced from practical life (see discussion in Chapter III). In any event, in 
Brazil the essence of implementation is, I believe, in the key factors which I have 
developed and set forth below (see Table I-A). 
Implementation can be many layered. In the market-based land reform program, 
for instance, an international donor (the World Bank) developed the basic methodology 
that it intended to try out in several countries. It then approached the Brazilian 
Government, first via a pilot program, then a fuller program, which was designed without 
significant civil society input; in a sense, this stage was beginning to implement the 
World Bank program. The Brazilian Government then began implementation (invocation 
and application) by enacting regulations, empowering the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, 
making arrangements with financial institutions, etc. Then the program was moved out 
to the states that were to help administer it, and state technical units (STUs) were 
selected. Finally, at the local level, individual land reform projects were carried out. 
There are therefore at least three layers (federal, state, local) of implementation involved, 
each with its own issues, opportunities, and problems (World Bank 2000). 
Key Factors21 
In my experience, the following are key factors in program implementation: 
Authenticity of participation. Almost all commentators recognize the role of 
participation in successful implementation. A World Bank study showed that "...two 
21 These Key Factors are revisited in light of the Cedula da Terra program in Chapter VI. 
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thirds of projects that included significant participation of the local population were 
successful, in accordance with Bank criteria, and only one tenth of projects without 
participation were successful" (Stiglitz 1998, 12). In an increasingly complex society, 
participation of the target population and others can help provide a wider range of talents 
and knowledge for making implementation more effective. In situations of rapid change 
and/or instability, a good participatory and collaborative base can help manage that 
uncertainty and reinforce the ongoing capacity to adapt to change (Wondolleck & Yaffee 
2000, 15-6, 19, 29).22 
Concepts of participation range from it being the essential first element, as in 
Escobar's "unmaking" development (1999), the politics of place (Gibson-Graham 2004) 
or the Brazilian Base Community movement (e.g. De Gregori 1971), to being a useful 
tool for carrying out donor agency policy (see Stiglitz; Gardner & Lewis 1996, 110-13). 
It has been suggested that both top-down and "strictly bottom-up" approaches are prone 
to failure and that the best approach is to gear participation to intended results, possibly 
through use of backward mapping (Patton & Sawicki 1993, 307). In order for 
participation to be meaningful, it "requires a larger context of trust" between the target 
population and those working with them23 (Tendler 1997, 6). However, pseudo-
participation - i.e., projects in which the implementers go through the motions of 
participation without being willing to significantly modify programs in light of 
participatory input - can be counter-productive, increasing stakeholder resistance and 
22 Mention of change should not obscure what Layzer (348) has referred to as "remarkable persistence of 
the status quo." The two are not necessary contradictory: plus 9a change, plus c'est la meme chose. The 
tendency of essential power structures and patterns of distribution to endure is indeed remarkable. 
23 Wondolleck & Yaffee (6-7), noting the negative impact on project implementation of a growing distrust 
of government and institutions, have found that participation can also help to create and/or increase trust. 
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dissatisfaction (Wondolleck & Yaffee, 102). 
Participation can also be more or less authentic. While lack of authenticity often 
arises from "top-down" agency or government approaches, it is not limited to these. 
Third parties (politicians, irresponsible NGOs) can create less than authentic community 
groups to seek funding or to hasten implementation, and even community or association 
leaders can intentionally or unintentionally misrepresent or pass misleading information 
to their groups for a number of reasons, such as political or ideological differences with 
the government24 (Valadez & Bamberger 1994, 176-7; see Martins 2000a and 2000b). 
Some essential questions with respect to participation include: 
• When does participation start? Generally, the earlier, the better (e.g., 
9 S 
Wondolleck & Yaffee, 103). Participation at the design stage is often ideal, 
bringing target population and other impacted party input to bear early on, and 
helping them to feel they have a stake in the project (see below). This is not only 
a design question, but an implementation one as well - participation facilitates 
subsequent implementation. The market-based land reform program requires 
target population participation at the very beginning of the local implementation 
stage - the first step in the actual land reform process is target population 
identification of the land to be acquired (World Bank 2000). However, failure to 
have civil society participation at the national design stage was one of the factors 
that created strong resistance to the program. 
24 In the case of market-based land reform, something like this may have happened between MST 
leadership and its followers. In my own experience, the CPT worker who followed us at our site in 
Tocantins discouraged settlers from participating in a favorable government financing program because she 
was ideologically in conflict with and distrusted the government (her advice, possibly erroneous, was in 
good faith). 
25 "Community development has a tendency to become largely cosmetic unless it involves the active 
participation of the community in the planning stages of the project." (Gardner & Lewis, 121) 
9 
• Whom does participation include? This study focuses primarily on target 
population participation, but successful implementation also includes 
participation of other stakeholders, including those responsible for implementing 
the program,26 members of the community surrounding the program,27 and other 
28 
people who may be impacted by or have an impact on the program. In the 
market-based land reform program, this is recognized at the state and local levels 
through expressions of hope that rural workers unions and NGOs will actively 
participate (World Bank 2000). 
• How is participation achieved? This will vary with the size of the project and 
29 
target population, the number and diversity of groups involved, etc. Whereas in 
a local land reform area, all of the target population is able to participate actively, 
this would not be true of programs that operate on a larger scale - in which some 
type of representation must be called for.30 However, at the back of the 
26 "Zeleny suggests a process of formulating alternatives, reassessing goals and objectives, and involving 
the people who will implement the final decision in the decision-creating process. This potentially time-
consuming work aims at gaining a consensus on a decision so that fewer people have to be convinced to 
implement it. Zeleny believes there is little advantage in making fast, efficient, optimal decisions that 
require such enormous effort to implement that they become obsolete or suboptimal before they are put in 
place." (Patton & Sawicki: 366) 
27 An excellent example of this was provided by Pe. Anibal Gil, a Catholic priest who opened the first 
AIDS hospice in Brazil. Knowing that such hospices often encounter resistance from neighbors, he spent 
considerable time visiting and talking with neighboring residents and businesses before opening the 
hospice. As a result, the community not only tolerated the hospice but actively supported it, providing 
donations, visits, and volunteers. 
28 However, there may be potentially impacted groups whose participation might be counterproductive. In 
land reform projects, for example, certain landowner groups may be hostile to the basic goals and may try 
to sabotage them through participation. However, my tendency is, at least initially, to try to be inclusive to 
the degree practical. One sometimes finds allies in surprising places. 
29 Clark (39-40) distinguishes between issues that impact only one group (singular) and those that impact 
more than one (plural). 
30 There are excellent materials available on actual techniques of participation. Wondolleck & Yaffee (168-
171) note the importance of fun, hope, hands-on activities (rather than mere abstractions), and non-
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implementer's mind, it is good to remember the doctrine that has emerged out of 
politics of place - nobody has a right to 'speak' for other groups. (Gardner & 
Lewis, 23-24) 
• Is participation authentic? This is a multi-faceted question. Are the 
representatives and organizations what they claim to be - do they really speak for 
their constituents or are they essentially a fiction or a front (either intentionally or 
unintentionally)? Even if they are not such a front, has the group represented 
really gone into the matter in enough depth so that the constituents understand the 
issues and have expressed their real feelings and thoughts? Key at all stages is 
the need to assure that no group is (inadvertently) dominated by those who are 
most informed, most powerful, or most articulate (Valadez & Bamberger: 176). 
Rural Brazilians tend to defer to people who are more educated, urban, or locally 
influential; even among themselves, those who are more timid or less 
experienced tend not to participate. Patience, knowledge of the community, and 
structured group dynamics can help to remedy this (e.g., De Gregori 1971). 
Ownership. Closely related to participation, is the important factor of whether the 
target population takes 'ownership' of the program - whether the beneficiaries really feel, 
believe, and act as though the program is their own. King-Powers (1975) relates an 
incident that illustrates this. In her community, the local priest decided to start a water 
filter campaign to counteract the constant problem of intestinal parasites. The people 
humored the priest, engaged in the campaign, and then used the clay water filters to store 
beans. Where the target population does not take ownership of the program, 
monetary rewards for efforts (awards, etc.) The Community Building Institute, Viva Rio (a Rio de Janeiro 
NGO) and others have developed interesting facilitating techniques for complex community negotiations. 
See also Susskind 1993-4, 1997, and 1999. 
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implementation - even, as if in this case, it appears to be successful - is not likely to 
attain stated goals. 
Ownership becomes even more important in dealing with holistic local programs 
and the increasing trend toward local management of environmental resources31 (Ascher 
1995, 10-12; Camarotti & Spink 2000, 8-10). This aspect was well considered in the 
market-based land reform program where, in addition to actual land ownership, the 
landholder associations were given considerable responsibility for selection of land, 
negotiation of purchase, and administration of the settlement areas (World Bank 2000). 
Adequate statement and communication of goals. This is a very tricky issue, 
aspects of which will be discussed in more detail below in the section on internal 
dynamics of the aid industry and governments. There has been a strong move in recent 
years to results-oriented or performance-based management (used synonymously). In the 
positive sense, this approach seeks to focus government agencies and NGOs on their 
objective (the results they wish to obtain) rather than on simply inputs (i.e., the budget) 
and the administrative process (Wholey 2003, 44-55). The danger of this approach is that 
it can push toward simplistic or checklist objectives, and that these can override the 
qualitative and organic aspects of the program32 (Mark 2003, 185-6). The former director 
of World Food Program in Brazil, Mark Latham, frequently commented that it is 
unfortunate that donor agencies have to work with the project format at all, as it would 
probably be preferable to simply accompany the evolving situation, placing resources 
31 "The rural community is seen as the conservator of its own resources, habitat and culture. Local citizens 
are directly involved in the control of community assets as they plan for the retention, enrichment, and 
equitable use of those assets for present and future generations." Sargent, et al.: 5 
32 This is particularly the case when management models are imported from the business sector which, 
almost by definition, has much more simplistic goals. 
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strategically in small increments where they would help influence the organic social 
process in positive directions. 
But clearly some objective must be kept in mind. Even the Latham approach 
presupposes an objective - in his case, food security. The overall objective of the Base 
Community Movement, for instance, was very broad - to enable neighbors to form 
community groups in which they would discuss issues and take action based on their felt 
needs. But even there, when an action was to be taken, a more specific objective needed 
to be stated by the group. 
Participation, then, again becomes key. If results-based management is to work, 
the desired results have to be in tune with the needs and thoughts of the target population, 
especially, and of other key stakeholders (See Wholey, 44, 46). Communication among 
implementers, target population, and other stakeholders is vital. 
Adequate time frame - Also closely related to the question of participation is the 
time frame the development agency allows for the project. Authentic participation, 
especially among relatively uneducated rural populations, requires considerable time and 
patience to develop. A rule of thumb in Brazil is that it takes three years to develop an 
authentic community organization capable of carrying out a major project. Many NGOs 
and church agencies respect this time frame, allowing projects to develop at an organic 
pace that may go more or less slowly, depending on circumstances. These agencies allow 
the project funding and objectives to be led by the community growth pattern, waiting as 
the community takes each step in the process. Government and major donor agencies, on 
the other hand, tend to be budget and statistic driven, pushing for results within a preset 
time frame, and the end product is often unauthentic community groups and statistical 
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results that, in practice, leave much to be desired. Note that time frame may not only be 
related to participation (although this may be the single most important factor), but also 
to other factors: agricultural, education, and health projects, for instance, may take longer 
to successfully achieve than originally contemplated, as all are, at least in part, dependent 
on organic processes. Even projects that lean toward the technical end of the spectrum 
may be delayed due to social, political, or economic issues, on the one hand, or technical 
and logistic problems, on the other. 
Awareness of local social, cultural, and political complexities. "Local categories 
and contextuality are central to problem solving" in the policy sciences (Clark, 118). 
Programs can fail because implementers are not fully aware of the complexities of the 
local situation. Gardner & Lewis (63) tell of a fish-farming project that, while technically 
sound, nearly failed because the first world technicians did not understand the network of 
family and commercial ties that surrounded the project. The network of family, friends, 
and feuds in a rural community - including a land reform settlement - can take outsiders 
unaware. Outsiders often mistake those who enthusiastically support their program for 
leaders, whereas they may be innovators, eccentrics, or sycophants. And program 
managers may mistakenly rely excessively on those locals who share their political or 
ideological views (Valadez & Bamberger, 177). 
The extent of local knowledge needed may depend on project objectives. In 
Tocantins, as church workers involved in agrarian reform and also responsible for 
promoting many aspects of community welfare, our knowledge of these local 
33 "No administrative system is capable of representing any existing social community except through a 
heroic and greatly schematized process of abstraction and simplification.... There abstractions and 
simplifications are disciplined by a small number of objectives...." (Scott 1998, 22 -23). Clark (3) notes 
the tendency of problem solvers to "simplify, misconstrue, or overlook..." 
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complexities had to be extensive. Land reform settlements - being relatively holistic -
would require nearly the same depth of knowledge, but other types of programs - for 
instance, a vaccination campaign - might be carried out with more limited knowledge of 
specific local contexts. This being said, there is a growing awareness that all programs 
should be approached within a holistic context.34 
Unawareness leads to surprising results. When, as part of an emergency 
community-based anti-drought program in the Northeast, we encouraged the formation of 
seed banks, we generated an unexpected reaction (unexpected because we were unaware 
they existed) from regional seed salesmen, who sought to undermine the seed banks by 
offering farmers free seeds. In this case, in part because of prior participatory 
groundwork with farmers discussing economic issues and the value of organization, the 
dynamics of the situation worked out relatively well. 
Internal workings of aid industry and government. As noted above, the dynamics 
of the "aid industry" and government tend to drive project time frames.35 This can be due 
to a number of factors. Bi-lateral agencies such as USAID often have budgets that, if not 
used in a certain time frame, are lost. Development contractors of the beltway bandit 
variety usually contract to perform a task in a fixed time period and, especially where 
they have won the contract on the basis of bidding, have tight budgets. Government 
agencies often wish to implement projects prior to elections or during the term of the 
34 Kathy Kohm and Jerry Franklin (quoted in Wondolleck & Yaffee, 15) speak of "Appreciating the 
complexity of systems and managing for wholeness rather than for the efficiency of individual 
components..." Although they were speaking of forestry, the quote also applies to social and economic 
undertakings. 
35 Gardner and Lewis (68-75) provide a useful discussion of aid industry dynamics. 
1 5 
administration.36 Where projects are financed by foreign entities such as the World 
Bank, the government may be concerned that delays may affect foreign loans. Where 
staff salaries are involved, delays may lead to significant cost overruns. Delays may also 
affect equipment obsolescence, quality, maintenance, and warranties (Valadez & 
Bamberger, 19-20). 
Furthermore, agencies are often accountable to groups (first world donor 
countries and taxpayers, congressional committees, corporate and private donors) that 
have a limited understanding of development issues and/or require quantitative results. 
The pressure to "show results" is often reflected in project implementation. Depending 
on how this pressure is handled, it may exert a negative impact on the quality of 
implementation (see discussion of monitoring below). 
It is not surprising, therefore, that NGOs and Church groups are often much more 
able to take a more patient and organic approach to implementation. They usually have 
highly committed, relatively low-cost staff, who are not paid on a per-project basis. They 
also have a sense of mission, and mission statements, that include mention of the type of 
patience and organic approach needed, and to which their donors (often individuals or 
similarly minded groups from the first world) fully subscribe. Frequently, church groups 
and NGOs such as Oxfam and Save-The-Children enjoy the implicit trust of their donors, 
who prefer qualitative results in accordance with the entity's mission to time frames and 
statistics. Finally, such groups tend to work on a smaller scale than the larger donor 
agencies, and thus can more fully accompany projects at a less demanding pace. 
36 Ascher (1999, 18-19) correctly points out that governments do not have motives - government officials 
do. These may be a mixture of personal, economic, and political, and the motives of one person or group in 
the government may conflict with those of others. 
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Resources - Human, Technical, Financial. This point is, perhaps, so obvious that 
it should not need mentioning. Yet programs continuously fail due to inadequate 
resources. "Inadequate" may or may not mean "insufficient" in terms of quantity - often 
there are sufficient but inappropriate resources. For instance, in Brazil, many agricultural 
extension workers have been trained and are oriented toward working with large 
commercial farms; assigned to work with land reform settlements, they are almost 
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completely unprepared. Local program managers may be untrained, uninterested, 
understaffed. For instance, INCRA - the Brazilian Government's Agrarian Reform 
Agency, was throughout the 1970s and 80s used as a place to find jobs for people with 
political connections who were of no particular use elsewhere; when we were working in 
land reform in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it was very difficult to find INCRA staff 
seriously interested in land reform, yet the agency was in charge of administering land 
reform projects (it improved notably under the Cardoso and Lula governments). In the 
Brazilian Northeast, state governors have similarly used government social agencies for 
patronage jobs (Tendler, 8). 
In terms of financial resources, excess funding can be worse than insufficient 
funding for many community-based projects. Funding received too early, too easily, or 
in too great amounts can drown the natural growth process of a community organization, 
lead to dissention and/or the attempt to carry-out inappropriate projects, and attract 
outside opportunists. Part of the negative reaction to market-based land reform on the 
37 Tendler (1997, 74-101), in her case study of agricultural extension service in Ceara, points out the value 
of customized, user driven technical service over "top down" standardized service. Interestingly, in that 
case, it was the state extension workers who provided the customized service, and NGO-Cooperative 
workers who took a more standardized, top-down approach. 
1 7 
part of the MST and CPT was based on a fear of incipient community groups being 
overwhelmed by resources. 
Ongoing monitoring. Monitoring is a vital element of implementation (Wholey 
2003, 43-44; Valadez & Bamberger, 18). Sargent et al. (73) include evaluation as one of 
the three essential steps of implementation. Wholey (45-46) notes that, equally important 
to monitoring, is using the results of that monitoring to improve program implementation. 
When this is done, monitoring allows implementers both to continuously refocus program 
efforts to better achieve goals and to better adapt to changing situations. 
The criteria by and way in which monitoring is done is extremely important. 
Approaches taken reflect, to some extent, the split mentioned above between those who 
seek formal or statistical objectives and those who seek organic and qualitative 
objectives.38 In my experience, the most effective monitoring is done by those who have 
an underlying sympathy with program objectives and experience in the area, but stand 
enough outside the program to be able to see it with fresh eyes and ask outsider 
questions. The evaluator also needs to be able to review objective criteria in light of the 
people and communities participating, appreciate qualitative differences, and recognize 
positive and negative spin-offs. It is important that the evaluator be viewed by program 
implementers and target population as a resource and not a threat. 
In addition to outside monitoring (and where outside monitoring, for budget or 
other reasons, is not available), implementing staff, target population representatives, and 
other stakeholder representatives, need to engage in self-monitoring of the program. This 
38 This is, of course, not a pure either/or question. Almost all programs and evaluators seek both. Although 
I favor the more qualitative/organic approach, an evaluation that ignores objective measurements altogether 
would, in most cases, be inadequate. Certain types of programs, however, such as human rights initiatives, 
are very hard to measure or evaluate quantitatively in any meaningful way. 
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can be done through regular reviews of process, and review of interim steps or objectives 
to be accomplished, with a discussion of whether and how they have been achieved or not 
achieved. 
Provisions for maintenance. In Brazil maintenance is a major problem. This is 
true of simple maintenance of buildings and machines - throughout Brazil one encounters 
hospitals that were never staffed, school buildings inadequately staffed, machines in 
storage rooms because nobody knows how to maintain them or find spare parts. It is also 
true at a more sophisticated level of providing (or not) continuity and sustainability for 
programs beyond the donor stage. Implementation that does not include plans and 
provision for maintenance or continuity is inadequate and is likely to result in projects 
that begin to unravel shortly after the implementing team leaves the area. The sense of 
ownership, mentioned above, through creation of a genuine participatory process, is 
certainly the first step to building a constituency that will insure program maintenance 
(both on the more sophisticated level and, consequently, on the simple maintenance 
level). Additional steps can be taken to assure this process, such as through 
institutionalizing or encouraging replication of these participatory processes. 
(Wondolleck & Yaffee, 115-7) 
Concluding Thoughts On Theoretical Context for Policy 
Clark (118) provides a wonderful table of the skills and talents needed by the 
policy-oriented professional. Among these are an ability to deal with uncertainty and "an 
open learning process," an interdisciplinary and integrative approach, a holistic view, an 
39 In Tocantins, we used to say that it was easy to be a rural pastoral worker. One only had to be an 
agronomist, medical doctor, theologian, community organizer, psychologist, educator, mechanic, lawyer.... 
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ability to solve problems in a manner that is "process-like, yet empirical, systematic." I 
would add humility. 
Table I-A - Key Factors Listed, with advantages and disadvantages 
Key Factor Advantages if present Dangers if absent 
Authenticity of Participation Basis for most of the factors 
below; opens possibility for 
project reaching felt needs of 
target population; secures 
stakeholder support 
Irrelevant projects that will 
meet indifference or 
resistance from target 
population & other 
stakeholders 
Ownership Program effectiveness and 
continuity vis-a-vis target 
population 
Project not internalized by 
target population, likely to 
end when implementers leave 
Adequate Statement & 
Communication of goals 
Implementers, target 




Adequate Time Frame Program allowed to fully 
develop in accordance with 
target population needs 
Truncated programs with 
partial, inadequate, or merely 
formal results 
Awareness of Local Social, 
Cultural, & Political 
Complexities 
Program integrated into local 
reality 
Blindsided 
Awareness of Internal 
Workings of Aid Industry & 
Government 
Implementers and target 
populations aware of factors 
that can influence the program 
- can plan accordingly 
Target population and 
implementers likely to find 
themselves in conflict with 
donors and flinders 
Resources - Human, 
Technical, Financial 
Ability to carry out well-
rounded implementation 
Inadequate or inappropriate 
personnel or technical input; 
shortage or excess of funds 
Ongoing Monitoring Ability to continuously adapt 
implementation to ongoing 
reality 
Walking in the dark 
Provisions for Maintenance Program will carry on after 
initial stages 
Program will begin to 
unravel once implementers 
leave 
This discussion emphasized participation. This is in part due to my experience as 
a community organizer. But, in an increasingly complex world, where people are dealing 
with potential conflict over limited natural resources, I firmly believe that participatory 
solutions offer the best road to meaningful design and implementation of programs, as 
well as for their adaptation to changing circumstances and endurance over time. Only if 
we successfully learn to work in participatory and collaborative manners will we be able 
2 0 
to create the social structures necessary to deal with complex human and environmental 
issues, and avoid the choice between self-seeking individualism or collective repression 
posed by the "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin 1968). 
Theoretical Context: Development and Land Reform 
Background 
As will be discussed in Chapter III, the 1950s and early 60s witnessed an active 
campaign in Brazil for agrarian reform. Large landholdings and "backward" agriculture 
were seen by opinion leaders as constituting a barrier to modernity and progress. 
However, the land owning classes continued to be powerful, and reaction to the agrarian 
reform movement was one factor which led to the military dictatorship of 1964-85. The 
military dictatorship promoted the modernization of agriculture.40 
Thus it has been said that "...the so-called 'conservative modernization' of 
agriculture was born with the defeat of the movement for agrarian reform" (Delgado 
1996, 218). Ramos (1999, 189) quotes Alberto Passos Guimaraes: "... there are only 
two options for market economy countries: agrarian reform or the strategy of 
'conservative modernization.' Brazil chose the latter." As Griffin (144) phrases it, "The 
green revolution represents an attempt to substitute technical change for institutional 
change."41 
Certainly the military government opted for modernization and, despite enactment 
of a model Land Statute in 1964, made no serious move toward agrarian reform. 
40 Defined as the growing use of industrially manufactured inputs (Powers 2006, 7) 
41 The pattern of attempting to avoid agrarian reform by effecting technical agricultural reforms is long 
standing in Brazil, dating back at least to the 1780s. See Chapter III. 
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Twenty-one years of military rule changed the climate for agrarian reform in three 
important ways: (1) suppression of active agrarian reform movements cut off advocacy 
for over two decades; (2) subsidization of urban elite purchase of rural land removed 
pressure from that sector for agrarian reform; (3) the modern agriculture model convinced 
the great mass of society - including most decisions makers - that the small farm was a 
relic of past eras, thus turning agrarian reform into a peripheral issue as opposed to a 
basic step necessary to remove barriers to development (Powers 1999). 
By the late 1980s, interest in land reform seemed to be limited to the Church, a 
few academics, and the Workers' Party; the still incipient Movimento dos Sem Terra 
(MST) - created under the wing of the Church - was just beginning to be heard.42 But by 
the mid-1990s, interest in agrarian reform revived - including on an international level 
(SDDimensions 2000). Fernandes notes (1998, 224) that in each decade different aspects 
of the agrarian question emerge; he saw the question in the 1990s being the 
democratizaton of land holding, with the government pressured on one hand by the 
powerful ruralista bloc,43 on the other by the growing actions of the MST, which 
undoubtedly kept (and continue to keep) the issue in the public eye. In economic terms, 
the fall of land prices - brought about in part by stabilization of the economy and the 
possibility of greater returns from other investments - was a major factor favoring 
42 de Janvry (3) provides a summary of the dominant approaches to rural development up until 1980: in the 
1940s, community development programs to mobilize rural people toward democratic forms of 
government; the 1950s, diffusion of technological knowledge through extension workers; the early 60s, 
land reform; the late 60s, new technologies of the Green Revolution; the 70s integrated rural development 
seeking to democratize the new technologies to smaller farmers while preserving peasant structures. "As 
the limits of dealing with poverty via rural development became increasingly evident, the strategy of basici 
needs was put forward as an instrument to improve welfare among the masses of dispossessed peasants and 
the rapidly rising numbers of rural workers." 
43 Landowners and their allies in the Brazilian national congress. 
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agrarian reform.44 Fear of MST land occupation is another "cost" to landowners and, 
given low land values, might reduce their resistance to land reform, making expropriation 
by the government an attractive alternative.45 Serious enforcement of the Rural Land Tax 
(an unrealized goal of Lula's government) could also make large landholders more 
amenable to land reform (Fernandes, 225-227; Alston, et al., 1999, 202).46 Other tax 
incentives can be considered that encourage sustainable agriculture and land distribution 
(Graziano da Silva, 67-68). 
Also favoring a new attitude toward agrarian reform was a growing sense that 
highly mechanized, commercial agriculture can result in environmental problems and 
can, in the long run, prove to be expensive. The system demands large amounts of 
capital while producing often beyond the capacity of the market to absorb, making the 
system very vulnerable (Powers 2006). Mechanization also reduces jobs, displacing or 
marginalizing rural workers. (Benjamin, et al., 1998, 82-84) 
At the same time, the viability of small farms gained more recognition in Brazil. 
For instance, Barros, et al. (2000), in an extensive analysis of 1985 agricultural census 
data, show that in the Northeast - with the exception of very small minifundios, profits 
44 The government was known as paying well for land, and is required to indemnify the landholder based 
on the value of the land and improvements. Clemente (5) quotes Cesar Jose de Oliveira, director of 
INCRA in Rio Grande do Norte: "The methodology for appraising real property in this country has to 
change. It is absurd. Do you think that, in this country, the legislation was enacted to benefit the worker?... 
Who buys land in this country is INCRA because the market for land is inactive. Imagine the bargaining 
power of who has R$ 1 million in hand to buy a farm. But when INCRA appraises it, everything enters in. 
It is the rigor of the law. The legislation very much benefits the landowners, and this is the problem." 
45 There have been numerous reports in the press of landowners arranging with the agrarian reform agency 
- INCRA - to purchase their land, and allegations of inflated prices paid. INCRA has been accused of 
using outdated appraisal methods, such as paying more for deforested land "as if this were an 
improvement;" the Lula administration is seeking ways of changing these policies (Clemente 5). MST 
land invasions increased 62% during the first six months of 2003 (Marques 2003a). 
46 However, per recent negotiations regarding tax reform, the levying of rural land tax may be passed to the 
municipio. (Lyra 2003). In many localities where landowners are powerful, this may militate against 
serious collection of the tax; it would seem to considerably reduce the utility of the tax as a policy tool. 
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per hectare decline as rural properties grow larger. In addition, attention was drawn to 
other positive economic aspects of small farms: 
Even if the productivity of family-based agricultural work were inferior to large-
scale mechanized production - which is not the case - there are other 
advantages... the concentration of income being less, consumer expenditures tend 
to be distributed throughout the population, increasing the market for commonly 
used goods, produced internally, often locally (Tubaldini 1998) 
It seemed as though many factors were coming together to make land reform once again 
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an attractive policy. 
But there were still issues, not least of which was that many land reform projects have 
not been successful. This is partly because land reform had been carried out on poor 
quality land and/or lands located far from markets, this latter pattern being one which 
even the well-intentioned Lula government found itself forced into (see below). Also 
contributing to failure has been lack of infrastructure, technical support, financing, and 
the broader supports (education, health, etc.) which help families to function. 
Alternative Modes of Development 
Given the current situation, what paths are open to Brazil for future agricultural 
and rural development? Critiques of Brazilian modern agricultural have been discussed in 
detail elsewhere (Powers 2006), and are summarized here. These include claims that the 
4 7 Claims were made that more land was distributed between 1994 and 1998 than in the entire proceeding 
30 year period (Helfand and Rezende, 256-257). These figures have been widely questioned, the main 
critique being that they represent in large part recognition of land rights of posseiros (squatters) who were 
already on the land. Even if these figures are correct, however, they - as well as the stated goals of the 
Lula government (see below) - represent only a small fraction of the 2.5 to 5.3 million families who need 
land (World Bank 2000, 2; Stedile c. 1999, 2; NEAD 2001) 
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modernization of agriculture and the growth of "agro-industrial complexes" has displaced 
many small farmers (including renters and share-croppers), marginalized others or 
subjected them to the domination of agro-industrial companies, reduced the bargaining 
power and earnings of farmers, distorted community life and work relations, disvalued 
traditional rural life and knowledge, maintained (if not increased) land concentration, 
pushed small farmers into marginal lands with negative ecological consequences, led to 
anti-ecological practices of mechanization and use of chemicals, promoted monocultures, 
made agriculture at the same time over-productive and highly vulnerable to market 
changes and pests, promoted oligopolies in the input and output sectors, and led to 
treating land as a commodity to be used rather than as a resource to be nurtured and 
husbanded. 
While it is tempting - and sometimes useful - to focus on fertilizers, pesticides, 
and machines, it is really the underlying mentality behind them that is of concern. 
Placide Rambaud noted that agriculture is evolving toward a "dictatorial regime of 
numbers" (Almeida 1999, 32). Not only are these the numbers of accounting and 
management, but the very mentality of GDPs and markets - the mentality that sees 
economics as an end in itself, with people serving economics rather than vice versa, or -
at best - as the most important discipline in ordering human life. Questioning this 
mentality is one of the basic tenets of the movement(s) toward alternative development: 
First, alternative development is formulated based on a fundamental critique of 
the strict economic rationale that inspired the dominant thoughts and policies 
regarding development. Against the idea that economy is an independent sphere 
of social life, whose functioning requires the sacrifice of non-economic goods and 
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values - social (e.g., equality), political (e.g., democratic participation), cultural 
(e.g., ethnic diversity) and natural (e.g., the environment) - alternative 
development underlines the necessity of treating economics as an integral and 
dependent part of society, subordinating economic objectives to the protection of 
these goods and values. (Souza Santos and Rodriguez 2002, 46) 
Insofar as different social groups and actors question modernization, both in the 
agricultural sphere and in society as a whole, the precariousness and fragility of 
the system appear with greater clarity, tending toward a reevaluation of the social 
responsibility that touches upon the construction of the future. (Almeida, 32) 
But where does this questioning lead us? Asking his key question, "alternative to 
what? " Graziano da Silva (1999, 55) states: 
There is an almost general agreement that the value of the movements for an 
'alternative agriculture' is in creating a new social conscience about production in 
its widest sense.... Unfortunately, it is here that the waters begin to part.... 
A myriad of proposals for rural development have been put forth, ranging from 
almost complete negation of and resistance to the modern agricultural system, on the one 
hand, to substantial integration of small farmers into that system, on the other. The very 
term "development" - even "sustainable development" - has been rejected by some due 
to their identification of that term with concepts of economic growth. Noting that infinite 
growth is not an ecological possibility, they prefer to speak of alternatives to 
development rather than of alternative development (see, e.g., Souza Santos and 
Rodriguez 2002, 53-54; Escobar 1995; 215). 
Where does one start amongst this myriad of proposals? One starting point is 
suggested by Jalcione Almeida (1999, 151 et seq.). Modern economy, in Brazil as 
elsewhere, is given to periodic crises - and these crises have tended to be magnified in 
48 
Brazil by the contradictions and vulnerabilities within the national economy. Almeida 
notes "...the capacity that certain marginal regions and small units of agricultural 
production have to resist the crises with a [relatively] small social cost...." He attributes 
this to the flexibility of small family farms in seeking out alternatives: 
...to the extent that one increases the range of possible choices within a productive 
structure (it is clear that those choices are intimately linked to the possibilities of 
the market, whichever that may be), the degree of autonomy also increases. Thus, 
the greater the number of activities in which the farmers engage (up to a certain 
limit, obviously)... the more one can admit the hypothesis that a great level of 
autonomy is attained, at least in the case of family structured [farms]... as long as 
the equilibrium among activities is one of the conditions of the stability of the 
microsystem. (152) 
This ability to survive - born out in the statistics that show a continued presence of 
small farmers - is a real starting point for examining possibilities of rural development. 
Focused on this, there are those who advocate a resistance to the modern system to the 
point of having been accused, often unfairly, of wanting a virtual return to romanticized 
historical patterns of rural life. More often what such groups advocate is a revaluing of 
small-scale traditional agricultural experience, preserving and revalidating traditional 
knowledge and insights (which are often viewed as being more ecologically sound than 
modern ones), but also incorporating new "appropriate" technologies and techniques that 
48 "One of the implications of uneven development is the continuous reocurrence of crises...." de Janvry (2) 
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can facilitate work, helping farmers and land to be sustainably more productive 49 Much 
valuable and creative work has been done in this area, especially by the NGOs loosely 
associated in the PTA system.50 
But such small farming does not come without a cost. Moreira (1999, 30-31, 120, 
189) points out that the modern small farmer often works with a theoretical profit of 
zero,51 and that the ability to reproduce this way of life is threatened. There is an 
implication here that, as the present generation of farmers dies off, it will be more 
difficult for their children to follow in their footsteps - or event to want to follow in them 
(see, e.g., Carneiro, 1999). Noting that small-scale agriculture entails "...high risk... 
with very low profitability and frequent bankruptcies" (188), Moreira is skeptical about 
how far the alternative agriculture movement can really change Brazilian agriculture: 
We will be challenging the notion, currently diffused, that ecological 
sustainability tends to revalidate "peasant" knowledge and practices, guaranteeing 
to the family forms of agriculture better competitive conditions and better 
conditions of life. We will be formulating the argument that the owner-worker 
(family agriculture) in contemporary intercapitalist competition has a restricted 
space for technical progress and for economic and cultural valuing. (181) 
49 Escobar (219) notes that creative use of hybrids of traditional and modern technologies, techniques, 
organizational methods, and skills has helped "many 'traditional cultures' survive through their 
transformative engagement with modernity." He also (96-97) provides an excellent description of the 
peasant model of human-land relationship that can serve as the basis for such hybrids. 
50 Much of the literature generated originates in the South of Brazil, where there is a strong pattern of 
relatively successful small family farms. However, in the more difficult, semi-arid climate of the 
Northeast, groups related to PTA such as CAATINGA in Ouricuri - Pernambuco, PATAC in Campina 
Grande -Paraiba, and MOC in Feira de Santana - Bahia, do outstanding work in helping small farmers 
survive and thrive, both through use of appropriate techniques and technologies and, perhaps even more 
important, use of appropriate organizational, management, and educational skills. 
51 In other words, that there is little or no profit or land rent as such, and the return may not theoretically 
compensate the value of the family labor expended; however, the family produces its subsistence. 
2 8 
He argues (197) that market forces tend to push non-modernized family farms towards 
low returns. Even in the case of reduction of mechanical and chemical inputs due to 
ecological factors, "...the dynamics of operation of the (imperfect) markets do not 
guarantee that the benefits of these new practices will be allocated to the family farms." 
In the case of non-modernized family agriculture, its permanence in the market is 
attributed to an economic irrationality on the part of the small [farmer], due to a 
supposed "peasant" culture, that does not expect profit or return on the land. 
Moreira also indicates (190) that, with adequate capitalization for tools and 
infrastructure, this very willingness to work without profits or land rents can provide a 
competitive advantage to the family farm. But he see the emphasis on appropriate 
technologies and traditional knowledge and folkways as tending to discourage small 
farmers from focusing on the larger political and social critiques necessary to bring about 
more substantial change (e.g., 194-195). 
Similarly Graziano da Silva (1999) argues that focusing on appropriate technologies 
is not enough. He agrees that, even where such technologies result in savings, these may 
not accrue in the long run to the farm families: 
...a certain technique X or Y, appropriate (or not) to a certain social class... does 
not absolutely guarantee that the surplus retained by the members of that class be 
greater or lesser. It can... cause a greater surplus to be generated.... But as the 
distribution of this surplus within the capitalist system necessarily involves 
relations of exchange with other economic agents... what generally occurs is an 
increase in the degree of exploitation in measure as there in an increase in surplus 
generated. (58) 
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While acknowledging that technology affects human and economic relationships, he 
does not believe that it is the primary cause of those relationships and that there is no way 
to "think about technological policies in the abstract." The use of alternative 
technologies as a "strategy of resistance" may have some short term success for 
individual farmers, but in the long run it will lead to the impoverishment of rural families. 
The road of "technification" necessarily puts small producers into the 
intercapitalist competition, as much in the market for [their] products as that of 
inputs. Their capacity to survive comes to be determined by the intercapitalist 
competition in these markets. It is a "race" whose rhythm is produced by 
accumulation and, no matter how one runs, there are few who manage to at least... 
survive as small producers. The majority, in a situation which is unfavorable 
from the start, go on falling relatively behind until they find themselves obliged to 
abandon the race, thus confirming the excluding nature of capitalist 
modernization in the countryside. (59) 
The key, he believes, is "organization of the campones sectors in a manner that permits 
them greater bargaining power vis-a-vis large-scale capital and ...appropriation of at least 
part of the greater surplus which they come to produce." (169-179) 
De Janvry (1981, 263) believes that rural development programs "implemented 
within current agrarian structures can have only an extremely narrow clientele of upper 
peasants." Even this depends on favorable trade terms, which he thinks are difficult to 
52 Regarding technology, Graziano da Silva (167-169 ) notes that two general approaches are usually 
thought of: (a) developing adequate technologies for small farmers or (b) "adequating" the condition of 
small farmers so that they are able to absorb available technologies. On an official level, Brazil has 
generally opted for the latter, by trying to provide subsidized rural credit to small farmers. 
3 0 
achieve "because unfavorable terms of trade are directly linked to the structure of 
disarticulated accumulation through cheap-food policies and the lack of effective 
demand: the one a prerequisite for cheap labor, and the other its immediate 
consequence." Writing in 1981, he believed that the focus of development had shifted 
from rural to urban areas and that it is necessary for small farmers and rural workers to 
forge alliances with urban workers in order to work for changes in agriculture and 
elsewhere. (267-268) 
Souza Santos and Rodriguez (47-51) emphasize that alternative development should 
have its collective beneficiaries as primary actors, being essentially a bottom-up, rather 
than top-down, movement.53 They outline six factors which they feel to represent basic 
currents of alternative development: 
• associative forms of production 
• ecological awareness and focus on sustainability 
• inclusion of women 
® financial resources for peripheral populations, e.g., micro-lending 
• access of these populations to resources such as land and housing 
• a focus on local action 
On this last aspect, while respecting the need for local action, they believe that it is 
not sufficient and that meaningful action should be "ambitious in terms of scale" - able to 
act locally, regionally, nationally and globally. Solidarity generated in one community 
should reach out to other communities. They cite the Mondragon network of 
cooperatives in Spain as an example of such interconnection. (37-41, 53) Among their 
53 The Brazilian sociologist, Jose de Souza Martins (2000), criticizes MST leaders, most of whom are not 
small farmers, for claiming to speak for small farmers. 
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conclusions (64-67), two are particularly worth noting: 
Alternatives of production are not only economic: their potential for emancipation 
and their prospective for success depend, in good part, on the integration they 
achieve among processes of economic transformation and cultural, social, and 
political processes.... The success of alternatives of production depends on their 
insertion in networks of collaboration and mutual support. 
They also note that alternative forms of development must be judged according to 
gradualist and inclusive measures. "If the only criterion for evaluation of success of non-
capitalist alternatives is the short term radical transformation of society... then none of the 
alternatives we have examined is worth the effort" (72). 
Paul Singer (2002, 83-87) further elaborates the concept of solidarity economics. 
A solidarity undertaking "negates the separation between work and instruments of 
production" - i.e., is worker owned. He is strict in his interpretation, stating e.g. that a 
cooperative that employs non-members cannot be considered a solidarity undertaking. 
However he notes that, in practice, many entities (e.g., cooperatives) born in solidarity 
may evolve out of it, or may vacillate in the degree of real self-governance by workers, or 
may - by implication - be more or less authentically self-governing. He attributes these 
difficulties in part to the fact that such undertakings are inserted into the capitalist system, 
capitalism being not only the largest current mode of production, but its principles 
"molding the legal and institutional superstructure in accordance with its values and 
interests." Nevertheless (86-87), 
Even being hegemonic, capitalism does not prevent the development of other 
modes of production because it is incapable of inserting within itself all of the 
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economically active population.54 Solidarity economy grows in function of the 
social crises that the blind competition of private capital causes periodically in 
each country. But it only becomes viable and a real alternative to capitalism 
when the majority of society, who are not owners of capital, become conscience 
that it is in their interest to organize and produce in a manner in which the means 
of production belong to all those who use them to generate a social product. 
With respect to Brazil, Singer discusses the efforts of the landless movement (MST) 
to implant collective land holding through agricultural production cooperatives (CPAs).55 
He concludes that the CPAs "show themselves, as a form of organizing the economy of 
land reform settlements, superior to small property holdings," with greater income, an 
average of 10% greater capitalization, and a better standard of living. Nonetheless, most 
CPAs failed "possibly because the majority of land reform settlers prefer small scale 
production... even when it results in a lesser standard of living and greater risk...." As of 
1997, only 1.21% of land reform settlements were in the form of CPAs. (103-105, 115) 
Interestingly, Singer seems to consider this decision on the part of the land reform 
settlers to be essentially irrational, the final implication of his chapter being that a 
younger, less culturally bound generation will find collective production more acceptable 
54 This seems to contradict the theory that capitalism's internal dynamic, causing it to seek to continuously 
expand, ultimately destroys all noncapitalistic modes of production (de Janvrey, 9-12). However, I believe 
that Singer is not so much questioning the overall expansionist dynamic of capitalism as stating that, in 
practice, the capitalist system leaves gaps (due, in part, to internal contradictions and to disarticulations 
with social and environmental reality) which can be filled by alternative modes. Moreira (193) makes 
much the same point. 
55 These experiences on land reform settlements are illustrative but not representative. Moreira (157) 
correctly notes that "...family agriculture and rural land reform settlements presuppose distinct social 
processes. Whereas the first refers to social forms already constituted and, as such, already integrated and 
subject to the competitive logic of this integration, the notion of rural land reform settlements is associated 
with the social and political process of access to land and the constitution of new social forms of productive 
organization and social integration." 
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(115). It is ironic that we have here an echo of the skeptical Moreira's statement that 
small farming is economically irrational, especially as alternative development - or 
alternatives to development - are supposed to consider non-economic values to be at least 
equal to economic ones in structuring society. In fact, family ownership as a non-
economic value may be very rational indeed. One is reminded of G. K. Chesteron's quip 
that "Anything worth doing is worth doing poorly" - i.e., that there are certain things one 
wants to do for oneself or one's family, even if someone else could do them more 
efficiently - and of Samuel Popkin's (1979, 267) insistence that small farmers do indeed 
make rational decisions: 
Why do good fences make good neighbors? One answer is that building a good 
fence requires collective effort, and sharing the effort with neighbors helps to 
develop workable patterns of interaction which lead to sustained interaction and 
collective benefits. Good fences also make good neighbors because they establish 
precise boundaries, and thus ease the difficulties of accounting between peasants 
and help settle the conflicts which need to be resolved for cooperative patterns to 
develop between peasant households. 
It is my experience in working with the landless that owning their own parcel of land 
is a fundamental value and goal for the vast majority of them. The studies Singer cites, 
and others (e.g., de Janvry 267), verify this. In practical terms, therefore, any economic 
plan for small farmers in Brazil needs to respect the basic underlying premise of family-
owned and operated farms. 
Based on this premise, three elements seem to me to be essential: 
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1) Psychological reinforcement of small farmers as a class. "I don't know anything" is a 
comment one frequently hears from subsistence farmers when one starts working 
with them. Such farmers as a class have tended to be looked down upon by Brazilian 
society, which sees them as archaic, marginal, uneducated. Only those who can't do 
anything else would be subsistence farmers. Carneiro notes that it is not the 
modernization of agricultural, per se, that is largely responsible for young people 
leaving farming, but the confrontation with modern values generally, in which small 
farming is not seen as an option that can help them reach their goals. In order to 
survive as a class, small farmers need a sense of their importance, their role in society 
- of being essential (as they in fact are) rather than marginal, of possibilities of 
success. 
2) Appropriate education. The best strategy for small farmers in Brazil is the growing 
recognition that small farms are, at least in some areas, more efficient than large ones 
- even in a strictly economic and agricultural sense (e.g., Barros, et al., 2000; 
Tubaldini 1998; Netting 1993). When environmental and social costs are taken into 
account (and Brazilians in general are increasingly aware of both), the degree of this 
efficiency increases even further - e.g., small family farms tend to better nurture the 
land and provide more jobs.56 While I am a great advocate of appropriate 
technologies, they really make sense only in terms of what Brazilians might call 
appropriate "capacitation" - a term that implies something more holistic and integral 
S6 "My contention is that smallholder intensive systems achieve high production, combine subsistence and 
market benefits, transform energy efficiently, and encourage practices of stewardship and conservation of 
resources." (Netting 1993, 320) 
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than mere training, an education - whether for youth or adults - that helps the learner 
to more fully realize his or her potential in his or her undertakings. If small farms are 
in fact to be more productive and sustainable than large ones, small farmers have to 
have access to information, skills, techniques, technologies, etc. (i.e. know-how). 
3) Organization. Almost all commentators mention the need for organization, both on a 
production-marketing level (e.g., associations, cooperatives) and on a socio-political 
level. The former is very difficult; anyone who has seriously worked in community 
organization in Brazil knows that it takes at least three years of solid effort for a 
community to reach a level at which serious association work is possible, and that 
such work is fraught with problems. Political organizing - at least on the level of 
marches and protests - is easier, the problem arising of creating and maintaining 
viable long-lasting political groups that can work within and, when the opportunity 
57 presents itself, administer government positions. 
Important here is the building of a consensus that questions the ultimate efficacy of 
the currently dominant schools of economics and recognizes the importance of social, 
cultural, and environmental values that are being distorted by policies arising out of the 
current economic mindset. Brazilians are already far closer to questioning these values 
than are, on the average, Americans - so the building of such a justification, based in part 
on a realistic analysis of the strengths of family agriculture - is not a mere pipe dream. 
There is, among other things, a growing recognition that legal structures need to, and in 
57 When working with land issues in Tocantins (1985-92), we found that leaders - once they showed their 
potential - were often co-opted by the landowning class through offers of political jobs, favors, etc. 
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fact do, allow for the protection of values (e.g., the social value of property) not 
necessarily advocated by the modern economic schools, and that they can and should be 
used to protect those values (Sodre de Carvalho 2003). 
It is also important to avoid certain fetishes. While it is positive to recognize the right 
of people to express their needs and desires, and while landless workers and small 
farmers are intelligent and rational beings, pure bottom-up development very rarely 
occurs. It is almost never the "poorest of the poor" who organize for change, but those 
poor who have something to gain or lose. And they almost always require a catalyst -
often in the form of a church or movement organizer - who has had an opportunity for 
training and study. Furthermore, one of the reasons the poor are poor is that they lack 
certain forms of know-how needed to effectively operate in the world. Manipulation of 
the poor by movement leaders interested in their own ends must be avoided. But 
development needs to be seen as a synergy among the poor, middle-class workers and 
trainers, intellectuals, development agencies, and others acting in good faith. 
The type of rigidity reflected in Singer's definition of solidarity should also be 
avoided. In every community I have ever known, there are some people more interested 
in issues, more willing to assume responsibility, than others. Not everyone wants to be a 
small farmer, some would rather sign on as hired hands. Not everyone wants to be an 
active participatory member of the cooperative, some would just as soon be hired to do 
their job and go home at closing time. At least in Brazilian culture, these options need to 
be recognized and taken into account when considering forms of alternative development. 
Any realistic scheme for small scale farming must also deal with markets. "The 
essence of the difference between small and large farmers is in the market opportunities 
3 7 
they confront." (Griffin 142) 
"Small farmers often find it more difficult to market their output. Because the 
marketable surplus is low, they are more likely to have to use middlemen to 
transport, process and sell their produce. Their costs of marketing therefore tend 
to be higher and the prices they receive at the farm gate lower. Of course where 
they are able to sell their produce directly to the final consumer, small farmers 
may receive a higher price than the larger farmers." (ibid.) 
Direct marketing - e.g., through farmers' markets - is thus a very viable option where 
possible. Cooperative transport, processing, marketing, and even exporting can be 
undertaken.58 Organization of producers to negotiate and/or compete with processing and 
marketing oligopolies is also vital. 
Finally, it must also be noted that rural development is not limited to agricultural 
activities. The growth of non-agricultural rural employment is a factor of tremendous 
importance, to the extent that it has been stated that "... increase in opportunities for 
income generation in rural areas [is] the central challenge of any poverty reduction 
project" (Vieira 2000, 106). Demand for such non-agricultural rural labor - and for 
government incentives to increase such opportunities - has increased. While it is evident 
that non-agrarian activities will not, in and of themselves, resolve the problems of rural 
development, they are a factor that needs to be contemplated in rural development 
programs as both a potential supplement to agricultural family incomes and as a way of 
decreasing migration, especially among the young. (Forum do Nordeste 1993; Bacelar de 
Araujo 2000, 303; Graziano da Silva 1999; Carneiro 1999, 113-114; Jank 2000, 124) 
S8 MOC in Bahia has done this successfully for small-scale sisal producers. GARD in Recife actively 
promoted family and community based cashew nut processing. 
Applying Development Theory 
A statement quoted earlier in this chapter warrants repeating: "... there are only 
two options for market economy countries: agrarian reform or the strategy of 
'conservative modernization.' Brazil chose the latter." (Alberto Passos Guimaraes, 
quoted in Ramos 1999, 189; see Escobar, 114) 
Failure to have carried out an agrarian reform is undoubtedly one of the root causes of 
the economic disparity and poverty in Brazil today. 
... where the evidence exists, the persistence of poverty does indeed correlate with 
the unsatisfied land-hunger of the rural population. In Brazil... rural poverty is 
seen as the end-product of the inability to ensure sufficient access to land in order 
to make possible an adequate livelihood. (Sobhan 1993, 104) 
Indeed, as mentioned above, due to the close interaction of rural and urban economies 
and the anticipated displacement of workers from the countryside into the cities, the 
failure to carry out agrarian reform not only is a cause of rural poverty but of urban 
poverty as well, creating barriers to development in both sectors (Sobhan 1993). Tania 
Bacelar de Araujo (286 et seq.) places land concentration as the first of five major factors 
causing poverty in Brazil.59 
Griffin (1999, 16) notes that income inequalities are increasing in developing 
countries, and that they especially do so in situations of significant economic growth. He 
believes that highly concentrated land holdings are an important factor. 
The balance of recent evidence suggests that the degree of inequality is not 
closely related to the level of income per head, as we once thought, but to factors 
59 The others are the strong oligopolies in the urban economy, the government's economic orientation and 
policies, the precarious level of education, and the tax system. 
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dependent on the strategy of development that is followed. These factors include 
the distribution of productive assets (particularly land).... [I]t is possible to 
prevent large income disparities emerging... by adopting a development strategy 
that places high priority on an equal distribution of agricultural land, universal 
access to primary and secondary education, labour-intensive methods of 
production and a pattern of international trade that reflects the relative availability 
of resources. 
De Janvrey (1981, 7) believed that the agrarian question "is but a symptom of the 
nature of the class structure in the periphery and of the particular process of capital 
accumulation it undergoes."60 Rural development programs, if involving adequate 
technology and remunerative market practices, can help the upper elite of small 
("peasant") farmers. However, "For the majority of semiproletarianized peasants, rural 
development could be effective only after implementation of massive redistributive land 
reforms." (263) In 1981 he wrote a statement that could be a summary of the MST's 
position today: "...redistributive land reforms and rural development programs conducted 
by (and not for) peasants can be useful departing points in a struggle for democracy and 
articulation." (268) 
However, a large scale agrarian reform in Brazil is hardly conceivable without 
government action. Jose de Souza Martins (2000, 22) has stated - I believe correctly in 
the current context - that those who would negate state administration of agrarian reform 
are essentially negating the possibility of that reform occurring. 
Such a large scale land reform is not likely to happen in Brazil in the near future. 
60 Escobar (130) explicitly goes beyond what he feels to be de Janvry's overly functionalist view. 
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While the Lula administration has taken significant steps to help small farmers and is 
strongly committed to land reform, it is caught in the network of political, legal and 
economic forces which have inhibited land reform by prior governments.61 The 
announced goal of the government for 2004, for instance, was to locate 60,000 families 
on the land - little more than 1% of those who need land, and the budget for 2004 
would permit the settling of only about 27,000 families. Like prior administrations, 
Lula's administration is finding itself pushed toward colonization of the Amazon as an 
answer: the government has made available federal and state company lands for land 
reform settlements, but most of the lands are located in the North (i.e., the Amazon), 
whereas the landless are seeking land in the South, Southeast and Northeast (Taves 2003) 
At the rate land reform is currently being carried out, social and economic pressures 
pushing toward reconcentration of land holdings may well cause there to be little or no 
net change in the overall structure of landholding (Martins, 23). 
De Janvry (3) noted that, when the complexity and limits of rural development 
strategies become apparent, governments and development agencies tend to turn toward 
basic needs approaches to development, assuring basic food, clothing, and shelter. It 
could be argued that the Lula government's Zero Fome program - a commitment to end 
hunger in Brazil - is just that: something of a retreat from the complexities of issue such 
as land reform to an issue which is less controversial. On the other hand, Zero Fome can 
be seen as a potentially brilliant strategy which unites and motivates Brazilians behind an 
61 "No planner begins with a tabula rosa.... Policymakers are surrounded by constraints." (Griffin, 25) 
62 The goal for the 2004-2007 pluriannual plan was settlement of 148,000 families on the land; these are the 
families already in landless "camps" (acampamentos). It is contemplated that 0.6% of available funds will 
be spent on "agrarian reorganization" - those funds come from the projected government budget (73.6%), 
the official banks (10.5%), state companies (8.5%), development funds (4.2%), contributions from private 
enterprise (2.1%), and other sources. (Breve 2003) 
issue on which virtually all agree (that hunger should be eliminated), leveraging past 
work that was done through the Citizen's Anti-Hunger movement founded by the late, 
almost legendary, Betinho.63 The basic needs can be extended to health care and 
education, and beyond to work and production. 
Implicit within [the basic needs approach] is greater economic and political power 
in the hands of the poor. This, it is thought, often requires a redistribution of the 
ownership of productive assets, and in particular land reform. (Griffin 1999, 30) 
The basic needs approach allows the achievement of "a widely agreed upon, high-priority 
objective in a shorter period, and with fewer resources..." (Paul Streeten, quoted in de 
Janvry, 256) and, as such, may be exactly what Lula needed to establish credibility in the 
social field as a basis for further action.64 
In any case, large scale land reform in Brazil will depend on the development of a 
national consensus in favor of such a change.65 Thus the importance of the "new 
consciousness" which, as noted above, so many of the students of this area of discussed 
(e.g., Graziano da Silva; Souza Santos; Vieira). 
63 Betinho - Herberto de Souza, a sociologist, with impeccable leftist credentials, who was dying of AIDs 
contracted in a blood transfusion (he was a hemophiliac), was a widely-loved, charismatic leader who did 
much to heal wounds between conservatives and leftists. Together with the Catholic Bishop, Dom Mauro 
Morelli, he was a leader of the movement to impeach President Collar (1993); following the impeachment, 
rather than disband the movement, they decided to focus the movement on ending hunger, encouraging the 
formation of thousands of local end-hunger groups and, with the support of Lula and of Itamar Franco's 
government, the founding of a national food security council. One of Betinho's great contributions to 
Brazil was his insistence that there is no conflict between helping the poor (formerly viewed as a 
conservative response) and helping the poor fight for their rights (formerly viewed as a leftist response); he 
noted that hungry people are seldom able to successfully fight for their rights. 
64 The importance of this approach in practice is noted in our case studies with reference to the bolsa 
escola/bolsa familia. Martins (91-92) criticizes those who point out that distributing basic essentials to the 
poor would be less expensive than carrying out land reform. He notes that this ignores both the dignity of 
the poor (who would be turned into a beggar class by such a program) and the need for true social 
transformation. 
65 At the 45th Assembly of the CNBB in 2007, Bishop Mauro Montognoli of Ilheus, in an official statement, 
noted that "The political will is lacking to carry out [agrarian] reform " (Cangao Nova Noticias 2007) 
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Escobar (1995, 56) deals with this aspect of development most folly. He notes (5) 
that discourse about development essentially builds the world in which development 
takes place: "... a certain order of discourse produces permissible modes of being and 
thinking while disqualifying and even making others impossible." 66 
Development relies on setting up the world as a picture, so that the whole can be 
grasped in some orderly fashion as forming a structure or system.... The need to 
compose the world as a picture is central to all theories of economic development. 
Thus it is essential to build new terms of discourse - "...changing the order of 
discourse is a political question that entails the collective practice of social actors and the 
restructuring of existing political economies of truth." This can be a slow process, or it 
can happen rapidly. Changing the underlying structures is, of course, more difficult. 
"The process of unmaking development... is slow and painful, and there are no easy 
solutions or prescriptions." (Escobar, 216-217) 
According to Escobar (216), the first step in effecting this transformation "is the 
breakdown of the basic organization of the discourse...." The title of Jose de Souza 
Martins' book (2000) might, therefore, be taken as a sign of hope: "Agrarian Reform: 
The Impossible Dialogue." 
Martins' thesis is that communications between the various social movements, the 
government, and other players with respect to agrarian reform has broken down largely 
66 "...discourse results in concrete practices of thinking and acting through which the Third World is 
produced." (11) "Social power of this kind has an insidious way of encroaching upon the most recondite 
corners of social life, even in inconspicuous ways. This is no less true in those arenas in which life itself is 
at stake, such as in the arena of food and hunger.... I will examine... how today's practices in nutrition, 
rural development, and health care came into existence not as a result of improved consciousness, scientific 
progress, or technological refinements, but rather as effects of power brought about by the probelmization 
of hunger in the context of the pervasive economization of subsistence." (101) 
4 3 
because these groups have (to borrow Escobar's terminology) different 'pictures' of what 
agrarian reform is or should be. He sympathetically critiques the Catholic Church's view 
of agrarian reform (noting that the Church's primary interest is a pastoral one) because 
the Church has not fully realized that its picture of agrarian reform is based on what he 
calls a "simple mercantile" economic system (others, he notes, call this 'subsistence' 
agriculture, but this he thinks a misnomer): 
This is a terminal economy that survives in some societies, and also in ours, in a 
residual manner only because it has become irrelevant to modern and global 
economy.... Although it is fundamental for the survival of hundreds of thousands 
of persons who at this time have no alternatives for survival.... It is a 
contradictory survival whose drama and whose relevance a parish or grass-roots 
pastoral religious worker can understand, but a government economist generally 
fil cannot, at least without great effort and fatigue. (32) 
Noting that the Church rightly sees a link between this type of agriculture and 
community/family structures which are supportive of human dignity, Martins 
acknowledges that these structures - and the concern with reaching out to those excluded 
by the modern process - are significant values. However he critiques the Church - and 
even more so the MST - for at times developing this moral question into a degree of 
Manichaeism through which modern agriculture is viewed as evil, leading toward an 
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attitude of negation to all that is modern. He believes that the appropriate response is 
67 Although Martins was writing during the Cardoso administration, relations regarding agrarian reform 
between the Lula administration and the MST and certain wings of the Church are not necessarily better 
(e.g., Pereira 2003; Marques 2003) 
68 During the nine years I spent working for the Church in land reform and rural rights, I myself at times 
experienced this negative reaction to modernity; although it needs to be transcended, it arises out of a 
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an attitude that seeks transformation "...that would insert the poor into the new economic 
order and, at the same time, preserve for them the dignity and way of life, gradually 
adding to and fortifying it, getting them out of poverty and cultural deprivation." (32-35) 
Martins is a brilliant writer and an insightful, balanced thinker. His comments - as 
they were intended to - have provoked controversy. In places he overstates his case. Yet 
most observers would agree with the essence of what he says: that a new consciousness 
must be a process of transformation and not simply a retreat into old patterns. 
The greatest importance of the movement for a sustainable agriculture is not in its 
'production for production' but in its 'production for a new conception' of 
economic development. The principle contribution of this movement is... in the 
creation of a new social conscience with respect to relations between humans and 
nature, in the production of new philosophical, moral, and even religious values, 
and in the nurturing of new legal concepts, in short, in the production of new 
political and ideological forms.... (Graziano da Silva, 65) 
Souza Santos and Rodriguez note that the movement toward alternatives to development 
has already made significant contributions in working toward a new discourse, having 
managed to impact World Bank and even IMF policy. 
A new consensus cannot be woven out of thin air. Thus the importance, 
mentioned above, of developing and diffusing serious data which shows that small farms 
are viable and - in certain respects - superior. The possibilities for making society aware 
of the advantages of small agriculture are very real. Thus Tania Bacelar de Araujo, a 
highly respected economist from the Northeast, states: 
history of experience of that which Griffin noted: that modernization and technological advances in a 
highly unequal society tend to further marginalize the poor. The Church is therefore suspicious of 
modernity with some reason. 
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Some day Brazilian society will understand that, even the questionable (financial) 
allocative efficiency of business agriculture cannot compensate for its absurd 
distributive inefficiency. Brazilians will perceive that, in all developed countries, 
rural economy and family agriculture had and continue to have a socio-economic 
and political importance that is greater than business agriculture that is based on 
salaried workers. (303) 
Similarly, Netting (1993, 323) thinks the evidence indicates a probable increase in 
small-scale farming because: 
(1) Historically... the denser the population becomes, the smaller and more 
numerous the farms become. (2) Financially, the economics of scale... do not 
really apply to any sustainable kind of food production - when you count all the 
costs, it is cheaper to raise a zucchini in your garden than on your megafarm. (3) 
Socially, people are beginning to understand that they really are what they eat, 
and we are demanding quality foods that megafarms can't supply. 
Netting's comments on farms and population have an empirical basis. Large farms 
tend to have a higher output per worker and are, thus, labor saving. Small farms, 
however, as noted above, tend to have a higher output and a higher profit per acre. 
The agronomic reasons for this are by now pretty clear. First, small farmers use 
more labour-intensive methods of cultivation for any given crop. They devote 
more time and are more careful in land preparation, weeding and harvesting.... 
[S]mall farmers cultivate a higher proportion of their land.... [T]he cropping 
ration tends to be higher on small farms. That is, because of greater use of 
multiple cropping techniques, small farmers obtain more harvests per year than 
large farmers. (Griffin, 141) 
At an earlier period in Brazilian history, these factors were seen by some as militating 
against small farms - Brazil, it was argued, has an abundance of land and therefore 
cannot be expected (as is the case with, e.g., Holland) to be concerned with production 
per acre. But such an argument is no longer convincing, especially in light of the 
growing realization of the social and environmental elements of the issue. 
Development and Land Reform - Conclusion 
When I first came to Brazil in 1969 as a Peace Corps Volunteer, an older ex-pat 
told me that, if I were thinking of ever writing a book on Brazil, I should do so during the 
first six months I was here. After the first six months, he said, I would realize that Brazil 
is far too complex to ever put adequately into words. 
Fortunately or unfortunately, the six-month book was never written. Forty years 
later, I find myself struggling with trying to capture at least a small portion of the 
dynamic of the country. Part of the 'picture' (Escobar's picture) for me, however, is 
undoubtedly based on my first experiences as a community organizer among small-scale 
farmers in Espirito Santo (no doubt building upon Jeffersonian values I brought with me) 
- I was deeply impressed by their dignity, self-sufficiency, and sense of community. Yet 
I have known Brazilians of good faith who have another picture of rural Brazil - of 
sweeping fields of soy or rice and large harvesters saving the back-breaking work of 
hand-harvesting (I have harvested rice with a scythe, and it is very hard labor). 
Within the complexity of Brazil, it is important - as Escobar (98) puts it - "to 
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make explicit the existence of a plurality of models of the economy." But, he notes, this 
in itself is not enough. 
What needs to be studied... is the mechanisms by which local cultural knowledge 
and economic resources are appropriated by larger forces (mechanisms such as 
unequal exchange and surplus extraction between center and periphery, country 
and city, classes, genders, and ethnic groups) and, conversely, the ways in which 
local innovations and gains can be preserved as part of local economic and 
cultural powers. 
This is a process that is currently ongoing in Brazil - seeking to make possible the 
"impossible dialogue" - in a manner that will give voice and opportunity to the rural 
population, especially the rural poor. There is urgency here - yet there is also a rhythm 
to rural life in Brazil, an "historic" patience that has outlasted predictions of the demise of 
the small farm and, I suspect, will continue to do so for a long time. The dialogue on 
development is an important one but, while it is ongoing, millions of small farmers and 
thousands of union leaders, pastoral workers, extension workers, and community 
organizers keep making the decisions which result in the hybrids and transformations 
needed for small farms to survive and thrive. 
Note On The Economic Paradigm 
Redistributive Paradigm - Background 
Griffin (1999) describes six basic economic paradigms: monetarism, open 
economy, industrialization, green revolution, redistributive strategies, and socialist 
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strategies.69 In this section we examine the pros and cons of land reform within the most 
applicable of these, the redistributive paradigm. We will then critique that analysis from 
the point of view of discourse analysis, especially as developed by Escobar (1999). 
In the 1950s, development was largely associated with growth. It was assumed 
that economic growth would benefit the population at large. However, in the wake of the 
dramatic growth made possible through the green revolution, it was discovered that such 
growth tended to widen the gap between the wealthy and the poor. Furthermore, there 
was evidence that, at least with respect to large sectors of the poor, growth negatively 
affected their welfare in real terms. (Griffin 164-6) 
Typically, during the 1960s, the poorest 20-40 percent of the rural population was 
found to be worse off than previously. And the decline in real income was found 
to be concentrated on particular classes or occupational groups, namely landless 
farm workers, small peasant cultivators who supplemented farm income by off-
farm employment and plantation workers. (Griffin 166) 
The development community therefore began to focus on the effects of growth and 
on the distribution of benefits. One of the positive results of this focus was recognition of 
the "heterogeneity of poverty" - i.e., that not all the poor are alike. It was noted that 
much poverty is rural,70 that there can be an "urban bias" in development,71 and that 
certain groups, regions, family profiles, etc., tend to be negatively impacted by growth. 
69 Brazil has experimented with four of these - monetarist, open economy, industrialization, and green 
revolution. It has not seriously attempted either redistributive or socialist strategies. 
70 "Poverty in Brazil has a strong regional and rural dimension. About 48 percent of the Brazilian poor 
(16.5 million people) live in rural areas, and the incidence of rural poverty is more than double that for 
large cities and other urban areas." (World Bank 2000, 3) 
71 Urban bias has been a definite factor in Brazil (e.g., Graziano da Silva 1999, 123). 
The challenge thus became to design poverty alleviation policies in which the proposed 
action would rationally connect with the target populations. (Griffin 166-7) 
Within the rural sector attention tended to focus on land tenure arrangements, the 
role of co-operative institutions and the organisation of large scale, labour-
intensive public works projects. Once these topics began to be probed, however, 
it became impossible to stop because the analysis inexorably raised questions 
about the equity of existing arrangements, the degree of inequality in the 
distribution of income and the extent of concentration in ownership of productive 
assets. (Griffin 168) 
In the 1970s, the World Bank Development Research Centre analyzed several 
models of development, including two redistribution strategies: redistributing 2% p.a. of 
total income for 25 years (a) directly to the poor (consumption redistribution) or (b) into 
investment projects to benefit the poor (income redistribution). The models concluded 
that consumption redistribution would, in the long run, actually significantly decrease the 
per capita consumption of the poor, whereas income redistribution had "considerable 
potential for raising income in low-income groups... [and] can achieve substantial 
improvements in patterns of asset concentration over time."72 (Griffin, 168-9) 
Griffin points out, however, the high political cost of the income redistribution 
model, which required long-term action during which the per capita consumption of 
middle and upper income groups would decrease significantly. Furthermore, he notes 
that, as much of the planned investment would be in terms of public investment (roads, 
72 Significantly, a third redistribution strategy, asset redistribution, which the Bank planned to analyze in 
the 1970s, "was quietly forgotten." (Griffin, 168) 
5 0 
irrigation, drainage), the redistributive effect might not be as planned: 
In practice... the non-poor often gain disproportionately from public investments 
because the distribution of benefits reflects not the distribution of population but 
the distribution of ownership and control over economic resources. (Griffin, 170). 
Furthermore, market forces work so that "Following intervention... distribution of 
income tends to return to the pre-intervention distribution." (Griffin, 171, quoting Irma 
Adelman). 
These evident fragilities in the income distribution approach led the development 
community to seek more effective strategies. In the mid-1970s, the ILO, based on earlier 
work by the Indian Planning Commission, pioneered a redistribution strategy known as 
the "basic needs" approach.73 
Basic needs is not really about things at all.... It is about giving priority in 
development to the needs and desires of poor people. This is reflected in three 
features of the approach which effectively convert it into a strategy: a 
preoccupation with ensuring that essential public services are available to the 
73 de Janvry (1981, 258): "The basic-needs approach... has absolutely no theoretical foundation; nor does it 
really need one, being, as it is, nothing more than institutionalized charity...." Yet, later (262) he admits 
that it can be seen according to one of two "diametrically contrasted interpretations," either "...constraints 
on growth imposed fundamentally for purposes of political legitimization - itself legitimized as 
humanitarian concern - and hence to reproduce class positions, or they can be seen as [having] the 
objectives of social and structural changes aimed at reconciling growth and distribution." In other words, 
the basic needs approach can be essentially charity aimed at easing and legitimizing the existing structure, 
or structural change aimed at changing it. This distinction is important now in Brazil, as Lula's "Zero 
Hunger" program follows a basic-needs approach; there seem to be elements of both the charitable 
(humanitarian) and structural (including proposed land reform and basic education), although the latter is 
less stressed publically (perhaps for political reasons). Under the important unifying work undertaken by 
Herberto de Souza (Betinho) and the anti-hunger campaign in the early 1990s, Brazil (including the left) 
rejected the dichotomy between charity (assistentialism) and structural change, recognizing that hunger and 
other basic needs must be dealt with through a combination of immediate relief and medium-term structural 
change. Betinho's argument is, inter alia, that hungry, destitute people are not able to fight for their rights 
as citizens. 
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poor, an emphasis on the participation of the poor in the development process and 
recognition of the centrality of a major redistribution of income and wealth in 
favour of low-income groups." (Griffin, 172) 
There is, however, a chicken-and-egg problem here. The necessary elements of the 
basic needs approach are most difficult to achieve in countries where there is great 
disparity of power and wealth. Participation of the poor in public policy making, for 
instance, is difficult in rural communities dominated by wealthy landowners. 
Redistribution of assets thus becomes important. And, particularly because so much 
poverty in third world countries is generated by rural poverty, land is key. 
The unequal distribution of productive assets is a major cause of widespread 
poverty and it is for this reason that strategies that give priority to the satisfaction 
of basic needs tend to emphasize land reform and other measures to improve the 
distribution of income and wealth. It is possible to imagine alternative ways of 
reducing mass poverty and satisfying basic needs within a reasonable period of 
time, but historical record indicates that the countries which have been successful 
in this respect have in common an equitable distribution of productive assets, 
especially land. (Griffin, 177) 
Griffin believes that an incremental approach to redistribution (such as the World 
Bank's income redistribution approach), based on redistribution of the increments of 
growth, will not produce substantial development. Redistribution of assets, and 
especially of land, is required. It is best that this happen at the beginning of the economic 
growth cycle, as growth without redistribution tends to increase disparity and worsen the 
position of the poor. Adelman summarized the ideal here as "redistribution before 
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growth." (Griffin, 171, 179; seede Janvry 1981, 257) 
Taiwan and South Korea are cited as countries in which redistribution occurred prior 
to growth. In both, land was largely owned by the Japanese prior to World War II. Upon 
removal of the Japanese, land was redistributed in a relatively egalitarian, small peasant 
system. Subsequent growth promoted equality, so that the Taiwan household income 
Gini coefficient fell from 0.558 in 1953 to 0.289 in 1976. (Griffin 179-81). 
Griffin's analysis is supported Rehman Sobhan's (1993) study of the impact of 
agrarian reform in 27 countries. Sobhan distinguishes among (a) radical land reform, 
usually resulting from revolution (e.g., China, Cuba, Vietnam) or war (e.g., Taiwan, 
South Korea), (b) non-egalitarian land reform effecting social transition (e.g., Mexico, 
Bolivia, Peru), and (c) non-egalitarian land reform without social transition (e.g., 
Honduras, Panama, India, the Philippines).74 Brazil, quite correctly, is not on his list. 
Non-egalitarian land reform effecting social transition may have a significant impact 
on the country yet not really provide balanced rural development. 
The insufficiency of this redistribution has permitted differentiations within 
agriculture to persist.... In the case of Mexico, Bolivia and Peru, despite the 
degree of social upheaval, the end-product of their agrarian reforms appears to be 
a class of impoverished minifundist farmers and another of landless agricultural 
workers providing cheap labour on capitalist holdings which have become 
74 De Janvry (1981, 207-8, 263) refers to all land reforms that expropriate some land as redistributive, and 
radical land reforms as "massive." His conclusions with respect to the capacity of land reform effecting 
broad-based change are similar to Sobhan's - only massive land reform would achieve this. 
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75 dominant throughout Latin America outside Cuba. (Sobhan, 41) 
The only countries where the rural economies have diffused technology, 
maximized use of the rural labour force, provided virtually universal access to the 
usufruct of the land, achieved sustained and equitable growth and provided an 
expanding market for rural and modern industry are those which have effected 
radical agrarian reforms. (Sobhan, 115) 
But such radical agrarian reform can generally occur only where imposed by the 
government (de Janvry, 257; SDdimensions 2000, 4). It "can succeed only where the 
power of the existing rural-based elite is either transferred or eliminated." 
(SDdimensions, 4) 
Pros and Cons of Brazilian Land Reform within the Redistributive Paradigm 
By the redistributive criteria set forth by Griffin and Sobhan, it would hardly seem 
worthwhile to undertake agrarian reform in Brazil. A radical agrarian reform or general 
displacement of the landowning class is not going to occur. With the possible exception 
of the most radical wing of the landless movement,77 almost all proposals for Brazilian 
75 It is important to make at least a passing mention here to de Janvry's insightful analysis of the problems 
of "social disarticulation" (final goods go to exports and luxury goods for the elites, and market expansion 
is therefore divorced from real wage increases) and "functional dualism" (the goal of cheap food requires 
cheap agricultural labor, made possible through an abundance of minifiindistas and landless agricultural 
laborers who can be hired on an as need basis; such labor is cheaper than slave or serf labor, but requires 
state action to keep labor from organizing. However, such a labor system keeps the rural poor from 
entering the consumer class and therefore decreases potential markets). 
76 De Javry (263) agrees: "For the majority of semiproletarianized peasants, rural development could be 
effective only after implementation of massive redistributive land reforms." 
77 Jose de Souza Martins (2000 [1], 25) notes that some of "Those who fight for the rural workers want an 
agrarian reform that is confiscatory and punitive for the latifundio," a position he thinks is pointless and 
ahistorical. He notes the danger of thinking of the land struggle as "a holy war," the "manicheism" of 
5 4 
agrarian reform are based on the redistribution of unproductive or saleable land, and few 
propose widespread expropriation of productive large landholdings, much less complete 
elimination of the rural elites. "The era of radical agrarian reforms... is over." (Kay 
1998, 28; see de Janvry, 222) 
Are there, then, reasons within the redistributive paradigm for carrying out non-
radical land reform in Brazil? 
Sobhan would probably, reluctantly, say that there are not. He recognizes the 
enormous need for land reform in Brazil (127). He also notes that, as in Latin America 
generally, large landownership has become intertwined with urban commercial and 
political power interests, and that "Agrarian reform would thus demand a social 
revolution hitting not just at the balance of power in the countryside but also at the 
prevailing configurations of state power." The only attenuating factor is that, due to the 
presence of huge landholdings and relative abundance of land, even a radical reform 
could allow for farms of up to 500 hectares, permitting capitalist agriculture to 
continue.78 "Latin America ... thus emerges as perhaps the only region where agrarian 
reform is still feasible within the prevailing relations of production." (128) 
However, he notes that the "political mobilization to realize radical reforms... 
seeing it as a straggle between good and bad ([1], 25), and the mistake of not seeing the inevitability of 
government management of agrarian reform (2000 [2], 22). 
78 Kay (1998, 27-8) believes that non-radical land reforms in Latin America, by "hastening the demise of 
the landed oligarchy and clearing away the institutional debris which prevented the development of markets 
and the full commercialization of agriculture," have most benefited commercial farmers. Escobar (1995, 
126) notes that Columbian land reform in the 1960s "had the primary objective of compelling landowners 
with large plots to adopt more efficient forms of cultivation." Similarly de Janvy (202): "All twentieth-
century land reforms in Latin America except the Cuban and possibly the Nicaraguan ones have had the 
ultimate purpose of fomenting the development of capitalism in agriculture." There is also a long-standing 
argument that agrarian reform, by weakening the power of the large landholders, benefits the urban 
financial sectors in the "intercapitalist" struggle with urban financial and industrial elites (e.g., Moreira 
1999, 162-3) 
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remains elusive." Rural workers are now a minority in Brazil. The social dynamics for 
mobilizing to carry out radical reforms are probably not present. (133-34) 
Development programmes may continue, with perhaps more effectiveness to 
reach out to the poor than hitherto demonstrated. Where surplus land exists, as in 
parts of Latin America... these may be incorporated in land distribution as distinct 
from agrarian reform, though limits to this will obviously be set.... 
This study remains at its conclusion firmly committed to its central premise, 
that if the goal is to eliminate rural poverty and accelerate all-around economic 
developments, there is no alternative to a radical agrarian reform which 
redistributes land widely enough to incorporate the bulk of the landless and land-
poor. .. and which thereby totally eliminates the current as well as any potential 
new dominant class in the countryside." (138) 
Griffin believes that "Redistributive strategies... represent a genuine alternative to 
growth-oriented strategies in countries which attach priority to reducing quickly the most 
acute forms of poverty and to creating an egalitarian society." Redistribution of 
productive assets, "particularly land," is only part of a five point approach that includes 
(ii) creating institutions that allow local people and active role in planning and managing 
social and economic programs, (iii) investment in education, nutrition, health, social 
services, and infrastructure, (iv) opting for employment intensive development, and (v) 
"sustained rapid growth of aggregate income per head."79 (188-89) 
79 See also Kay (20): "While agrarian reform may be a precondition for sustainable development, it is not a 
sufficient condition." 
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But, even with rapid growth, Griffin believes that redistribution has to take 
something from the more affluent classes: "a strategy which places the entire burden of 
redistribution on the margin is likely to fail." (179) He notes that the political pre-
conditions necessary for taking such measures cannot be ignored (188); in Brazil they 
would be enormous. 
Thus, as Sobhan stated, absent radical agrarian reform, there may be other reasons 
for land reform, but these do not fall within the strict redistributive paradigm. However, 
a possible exception to this statement will be discussed in the conclusion below. 
Escobar's Discourse Analysis 
In Encountering Development (1995), Arturo Escobar critiques development theory, 
a dream, as he puts it, that "progressively turned into a nightmare" (4). Essentially, his 
position is that the 'first world' (and, to some extent, 'second world') invented the very 
concepts of the 'third world' and 'development.' Speaking of the period of the 1950s -
70s, he notes: 
Even those who opposed the prevailing capitalist strategies were obliged to couch 
their critique in terms of the need for development.... In short, one could criticize 
a given approach and propose modifications or improvements accordingly, but the 
fact of development itself, and the need for it, could not be doubted. 
Development had achieved the status of a certainty in the social imaginary. (5) 
Building on concepts developed by Michel Forcault, Escobar focuses "on the dynamics 
of discourse and power in the representation of social reality... [and] unveiling the 
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mechanisms by which a certain order of discourse produces permissible modes of being 
and thinking while disqualifying and even making others impossible." 
Thinking of development in terms of discourse makes it possible to maintain the 
focus on domination... and at the same time to explore more fruitfully the 
conditions of possibility and the most pervasive effects of development. 
Discourse analysis... gives us the possibility of singling out 'development' as an 
encompassing cultural space and at the same time of separating ourselves from it 
by perceiving it in a totally new form.... 
To see development as a historically produced discourse entails an 
examination of why so many countries started to see themselves as 
underdeveloped in the early post World War II period, how 'to develop' became a 
fundamental problem for them, and how, finally, they embarked on the task of 
'un-underdeveloping' themselves by subjecting their societies to increasingly 
systematic, detailed, and comprehensive interventions. As Western experts and 
politicians started to see certain conditions in Asia, Africa, and Latin America as a 
problem - mostly what was perceived as poverty and backwardness - a new 
domain of thought and experience, namely, development, came into being, 
resulting in a new strategy for dealing with the alleged problems.(5-6) 
Discourse - the way we envision and talk about things - not only builds a model of 
reality but, in turn, helps to create that reality (130). Like its predecessor, colonial 
discourse, development discourse "created an extremely efficient apparatus for producing 
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80 knowledge about, and the exercise of power over, the Third World."0" "The fact that 
most people's conditions not only did not improve but deteriorated over time did not 
seem to bother most experts." (5, 9) 
Citing a number of statements and actions by the World Bank and others, Escobar 
(162) shows how First World standards and values are presupposed in development 
theory and programs. He notes that talk of'"Extending the benefits of development' to 
rural areas overlooked the fact that a majority of the people in the modern sector - the 
poor urban classes - did not enjoy the fruits of development." Development experts 
"would not entertain the idea that too much interaction with the modern sector was the 
source of peasants' problems." 
The rural development discourse repeats the same relations that has [sic] defined 
development discourse since its emergence: the fact that development is about 
growth, about capital, about technology, about becoming modern. Nothing else. 
More recently, Escobar (2004, 15-16) briefly sketched how the development 
'dream' became a nightmare: 
The development project was an invention of modernity. What was called 
modernization was precisely the process to bring about modernity - the ensemble 
of values, institutions, economic systems and social relations that originated in 
Europe in the seventeenth century... to... the 'Third World.' Development was 
the name given to the strategy of modernization. This... was commonly 
80 Of course, colonial and first world powers are not the only ones who may be guilty of intentional or 
unintentional manipulation of discourse. Jose de Souza Martins (2000 [1]), a highly respected Brazilian 
sociologist, believes that middle class leaders and pastoral agents in the MST and other movements tend to 
ideologize the land struggle in a manner that is alien to the way the workers themselves think. He criticizes 
the MST and CPT for failing to dialogue with the government and recognize the plurality of post-
dictatorship Brazil. [Martins [2] 13-15, 22] 
presented as a benign process. While it was believed that it entailed a certain 
level of dislocation and destruction of traditions, in the long run development was 
seen as inevitable and beneficial.... My argument is that modernity is essentially 
about displacement... and that displacement, to put it bluntly, has grown out of 
hand. 
In the 1980s, the response to development theory appeared as recognition of the 
multifaceted voices and realities of'third world' people themselves. 
[A] relatively coherent body of work has emerged which highlights the role of 
grassroots movements, local knowledge, and popular power in transforming 
development. The authors representing this trend state that they are interested not 
in development alternatives but in alternatives to development, that is, the 
rejection of the entire paradigm altogether. In spite of significant differences, the 
members of this group share certain preoccupations and interests: an interest in 
local culture and knowledge; a critical stance with respect to established scientific 
discourses; and the defense and promotion of localized, pluralistic grassroots 
movements. (Escobar 1995, 215) 
However, Escobar takes this a step forward, citing the need for a breakdown and 
restructuring of the discourse itself. 
[C]hanging the order of discourse is a political question that entails the collective 
practice of social actors and the restructuring of existing political economies of 
truth.... This transformation demands not only a change in ideas and statements 
but the formation of nuclei around which new forms of power and knowledge 
might converge.... Social movements and antidevelopment struggles may 
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contribute to the formation of nuclei of problematized social relations around 
which novel cultural productions might emerge. The central requirement for a 
more lasting transformation in the order of discourse is the breakdown of the 
discourse... that is, the appearance of new rules of formation of statements and 
visibilities. (216-17) 
He views local communities, operating in light of worldwide phenomenon, as vitally 
important. But he notes that "unmaking development... is slow and painful, and there are 
no easy solutions or prescriptions." (217) 
Thought along these lines by Escobar, Wendy Harcourt, and others, has led to 
interesting concepts of the "politics of place" which "gives priority to the local level 
without abandoning other scales of activism and organization. What one might say about 
the global scale of their activities is that it exists to facilitate success at the local level. 
They speak of "...extending the idea of a politics of ubiquity by emphasizing its 
ontological substrate: a vast set of disarticulated 'places' - households, social 
communities, ecosystems, workplaces, organizations, bodies, public arenas, urban spaces, 
81 
diasporas, regions, occupations... connected through webs of signification." (Gibson-
Graham 2004, 31) 
Discourse Analysis, the Redistributive Paradigm, and Land Reform in Brazil 
One of the reasons I chose to discuss the redistributive paradigm is that it is, in some 
81 Interestingly, one of the places this happened earliest in Brazil was in the Catholic Church, through a 
myriad of local groups, communities, etc., notably including the Base Community Movement. Starting in 
the late 1960s, the movement developed into an estimated 100,000 autonomous base community groups by 
the mid-1980s. 
6 1 
senses, one of the standard development paradigms that least suffers from the discourse 
related domination critiqued by Escobar. The paradigm calls for radical change which 
can, at least in theory (the land reforms in Mexico, Cuba and Nicaragua might be cited), 
emerge from grassroots movements for change. It seeks to empower the poor by handing 
over to their control productive assets - especially land. As presented by Griffin, 
especially in his discussion of the basic needs approach, the input and participation of the 
poor is essential to the process.82 
Yet there is a marked difference between the redistributive paradigm and "unmaking 
development" as conceived by Escobar. Partly it is scale: the redistributive paradigm 
contemplates changing national economies on a macro-economic level, either through 
foreign intervention (Japan, Taiwan, Korea) or state action, whereas the unmaking of 
development focuses on local communities working out their own destinies within the 
global context. Partly it may be displacement: Escobar criticizes development for its 
dislocation and destruction of tradition, and indeed, as noted above, he and other 
commentators have found that, in Latin America, land reform has often served to 
83 
destructure traditional patterns the countryside and open it to commercial farming. But 
mostly the difference between the two concepts is the underlying assumption: the 
redistribution paradigm essentially relies on economic growth; the alternatives mentioned 
by Escobar cast significant doubt on this assumption. 
82 "Basic needs is not really about things at all.... It is about giving priority in development to the needs 
and desires of poor people." (Griffin, 172) 
83 It can, of course, be argued that - by placing and/or preserving small farmers on the land - redistribution 
also avoids dislocation. 
84 On this point, I have considerable sympathy with Escobar. When I first moved to Brazil in 1969,1 was 
assigned as a rural cooperative worker in the state of Espirito Santo, then considered (per GDP) the second 
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The difference in practice is even greater. The concept of 'participation' used by 
entities like the World Bank is, in practice, deeply different from that envisioned by 
Escobar. 
In the World Bank we drew up meticulous and systematic studies of evidence of 
the importance of participation. The results were surprising. In one study, of 121 
rural water storage projects, financed by the Bank, two thirds of projects that 
included significant participation of the local population were successful, in 
accordance with Bank criteria, and only one tenth of projects without participation 
were successful. (Stiglitz 1998, 12)85 
It is my experience that, while large development agencies recognize the value of 
participation and that "changes cannot be imposed by external agents" (Stiglitz, 13), 
participation is basically seen as making more effective programs which the agency itself 
judges to be valid. This can be accomplished on a more or less authentic level - i.e., the 
agency can (or not) be genuinely open to community input and the organic pace of 
development. Even in the best case, however, this is not the grassroots, local 
development Escobar is talking about. And generally the 'best case' does not prevail: 
86 
projects tend to be driven by agency (or government) goals, budgets, and time frames. 
Certainly an initial review indicates that this was the situation with the Bank financed 
poorest state in Brazil. It was a region of small, independent farmers who had little money but abundance 
of food, dignity, and family comfort. It is now a relatively developed state, has far more "miserably" poor 
(to use the Portuguese term) people than before, and has the highest murder rate in Brazil. 
851 have retranslated this passage from Portuguese, but I believe it captures the essence of his statement. 
86 In 2007, I was contacted by a development company (beltway bandit) bidding on a USAID project 
intending to establish thirty fully representative community (town level) councils in the interior of Angola 
in a period of 15 months (including program start-up and wind-down). I told them I thought this time 
frame highly unfeasible. 
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Brazilian market-based land reform project that is the topic of this study. It is widely 
recognized that the program was almost entirely developed by the World Bank and the 
government, and presented as a fait accompli. This is not only true in Brazil - Kay (28) 
notes that market-based land reform has generally "...been much driven from above by 
the State and international agencies." Furthermore, while the program sought to 
incorporate, through the settlement associations, the type of participation Stiglitz wrote 
about, the time frames and processes tended to create associations of highly questionable 
authenticity. 
Economic Paradigm - Conclusions 
Where does this discussion leave us with respect to the value of agrarian reform in 
Brazil? The reality is, of necessity, more complex than any single development model 
can portray. 
It is the very movements that Escobar speaks of that succeeded in putting land 
reform back on the government and World Bank agendas. "First and foremost land 
reform is back on the agenda because rural populations have put it there." This expressly 
includes the MST. "The world's rural populations will continue to force land reform on 
the development agenda because it is necessary if they are to meet their food and 
development needs." (SDdimensions, 1-2, 10) 
While, as Martins notes, it is unrealistic to believe that land reform can take place 
without the government, and the revolutionary land reform still envisioned by some 
activists is not likely to occur, land reform can help produce spaces of the sort that 
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Escobar and Gibson-Graham write of. Cristobal Kay (22-3), in his evaluation of Latin 
American land reforms, notes, with respect to non-radical reforms, that their "greatest 
contribution... may lie in the stimulus given to institution building in the countryside.... 
[Ajgrarian reforms encouraged a greater organizational and participatory presence for the 
peasantry in local and national affairs. " 
Thus grassroots movements can make use of government and World Bank programs 
to help create the spaces they need and the power to include themselves in local and 
national dialogues. The reality of the situation, however, is likely to emerge as a surprise 
to the movements as much as to the government: while the ideologies and values of the 
movements are undoubtedly formative for the people involved in the land struggle, it is 
highly doubtful, and indeed not desirable, that the small farmers emerging after the 
struggle will simply reflect those ideologies and values. Rather, spaces will have been 
created in which those farm families will be able dialogue in new ways regarding their 
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future. The results may be, in some respects, more "conservative" than some current 
leaders of movements may expect. 
The criteria for judging the results of these spaces created by agrarian reform should 
be gradualist and inclusive, especially insofar as they truly represent alternatives to 
development. In other words, success will not be immediate, and the standards of 
success should be varied and broad. Sustainability is an ongoing process that requires not 
only change on the farm but synergy with other sustainable efforts and structures. 
87 This is an ambiguous term, and may include positions that are or are not politically conservative, e.g., 
regarding family structure, property rights, approaches to change, conservation of land. Small landowners 
are capable of organizing radically to defend their rights (e.g., the U.S. Grange movements), often engage 
in cooperative action and sustainable land practices, but also have an ownership stake in society and often 
resist radical change. But the key is that they enter into the socio-political dialogue, are more able to look 
after their interests, and are less open to political manipulation (by right or left) than the landless poor. 
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(Santos & Rodriguez 2002, 72-73). 
Finally, as indicated above, there is an aspect in which even the redistributive 
paradigm may be applicable to land reform in Brazil. This is not at the national level, but 
at the local level, where whole communities and regions may be impacted by agrarian 
reform. 
One of the findings of the study was that, despite the logic of isolated 
expropriations that characterized Government intervention during the post-1985 
democratic period, there turned out to be a concentration of land reform 
settlements that, even though not necessarily in contiguous areas, caused the 
regions studied to come to hold one third or more of the settlements and of the 
settlement population in their respective states. The study showed that in 89% of 
the settlements studied, the initiative for the expropriation request came from the 
workers and their movements in the context of "crisis," such as that of the cocoa 
crop in southern Bahia; of the sugar crop in the Northeast Zona da Mata (closing 
the sugar refineries); of the cotton crop in the interior of Ceara (intensified by the 
occurrence of major droughts); the bankruptcy of the large state subsidized 
undertakings in the south of Para; the great increase in land value and strong 
migratory flux around the Federal District; the crisis in the reproduction of family 
agriculture in the South of the country. In these contexts, which provoked the 
outbreak of conflicts over the possession of land, the first expropriations carried 
out stimulated the pressure for new expropriations, culminating in the creation of 
various settlements in the same municipality or in neighboring municipalities, 
causing the formation of 'reformed areas' that serve as a counterpoint to the logic 
of isolated expropriations and end up creating a new dynamic in the regions in 
which they are found. This, in itself, is one of the impacts that the settlements 
go 
have provoked. (Leite c. 2001, p. 2) 
We have here an interesting blending of state expropriation resulting from crisis and 
conflict and affecting a locality in the manner of a redistributive reform, driven by the 
actions of the landless and their movements themselves, and creating both a new type of 
space and the articulation and institutions mentioned by Escobar and Kay. This, I 
believe, is a partial picture of what successful land reform in Brazil can accomplish. 
Structure of this Study 
Any approach to understanding the agrarian reform issue in Brazil must take into 
account a wide variety of factors, some perhaps unique to Brazil, and many of which may 
seem to defy logic. I initially adopted an historical approach to the question in order to 
build toward a more complete understanding of factors presently at work; this is reflected 
in Chapter III. Chapter IV examines more closely economic factors between 1970 and 
2005, focusing particularly on the development of the complex of activities that impact 
agriculture, and viewing these in light of development theory. Chapter V examines 
closely the "market-based" approach to sustainable rural development, particularly as it 
was carried out in the Cedula da Terra program in the State of Bahia. Chapter VI 
presents seven case studies, carried out in 2006, of settlements created under the Bahian 
88 This impact occurred where we worked for the Church in Caseara, Tocantins. We worked with 35 
families who, after much struggle, were able to win title to the land they had occupied. Their success had 
such a dramatic affect locally, that - after we left the town in 1990 - the conservative mayor (PFL) 
provided municipal trucks to help other families occupy land. Last we heard, there are now at least six land 
reform settlements in the area. 
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Cedula da Terra program. Chapter VII presents an analysis of the case studies, along 
with certain conclusions and recommendations. 
The two poorest regions of Brazil are the Northeast and the North (the latter is 
basically the Amazon region). Land ownership and settlement patterns are much older 
and more important in the more populated Northeast than in the Amazon region, where 
the economy has been based on extraction of natural resources from the forest and where, 
until recently, land ownership patterns were of less importance (Prado Junior, Formagao, 
123). In the eastern portion of the Amazon (Mato Grosso, Tocantins, Para, Amapa, and 
Maranhao89), many of the settlers are migrants from the Northeast and elsewhere in 
Brazil and land patterns tend to follow those of the region from which the migrants come. 
For these reasons, this dissertation focuses especially on land patterns in the Northeast, 
and it is that region that the case studies were carried out. 









Map I-A: States and Geographical Regions of Brazil. North - green; Northeast - blue; 












RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
The research framework provides for an initial evaluation of the market-based 
land reform program in Brazil, as carried out under the Cedula da Terra Program in the 
State of Bahia. It has been correctly pointed out that full evaluation of the impact of an 
agrarian reform program probably requires a thirty-year period, and even then may not be 
conclusive (Kay 1998). But public policy is not an exact science - decisions have to be 
made on the best evidence available. Such decisions always entail a degree of 
uncertainty; "Our task is to reduce that uncertainty" (Meadows 1998, 7). 
Much of my own experience has been in what has come to be called 
"empowerment evaluation" (Fetterman 2003), working with community groups and 
NGOs, in an intentionally affirmative manner, to help them clarify their mission, take 
stock of their current position in light of that mission, and adapt plans to bring future 
actions into closer accordance with desired goals. This experience was useful in carrying 
out the case studies, especially in the context of providing and obtaining feedback from 
stakeholders.90 However, the primary purpose of the study itself is an initial, and 
inevitably partial, evaluation of the strengths, weaknesses, successes, and failures of the 
GoBAVorld Bank program, and it is intended to share results with those structuring the 
program and those who critique it. 
90 Lockwood (1993, 164) strongly argues "that fieldworker-respondent relationships matter." We agree: 
being able to establish a personal relationship in the interview process is essential to the free flow of 
communication. The experience of the interviewers in empowerment evaluation and their deep familiarity 
with the region and with small farmers helped to establish the necessary rapport. 
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Values are imperative to undertaking evaluation, both in terms of the evaluator 
recognizing his or her own values (Crano, 155) and in the sense of setting up "criteria of 
merit" (Scriven 2003, 32-34; see Valadez & Bamberger 1994; Margoluis & Salasfsky 
1998, 107 et seq.), which set forth characteristics that a good project of the type being 
studied should have. I have set forth below a statement of these two sets of values in 
Tables II-C and II-A respectively (Patton & Sawacki 1993, 188-91). It seems clear that 
there needs to be some degree of sympathy between the values of the evaluator and the 
goals of the program. It is also necessary that the evaluator be competent to evaluate the 
program in the context of the culture in which it is being carried out (Guzman 2003; 
Devereaux 1993). 
One of the salutary results of the natural resources movement is to reject the 
notion, prevalent in some postmodern circles, that reality is merely a social construct -
that "there is no reality except that created by people as they attempt to 'make sense' of 
their surrounds" (Guba & Lincoln 1989, 12-13) or that "what is commonly called 
scientific truth only represents ideological claims" (Donaldson & Scriven 2003, 8). 
Environment forces us to come to terms with real limits and possibilities - no amount of 
social construct is going to bring back depleted natural resources. As Thomas D. Cook 
has stated, the planet on which we live is itself an evaluator (Ibid., 11). Both existence 
and values are rooted in reality (e.g., Crano 2003, 155). 
That being said, it is also true that reality is very complex and not readily 
comprehensible to the evaluator. A certain skepticism is therefore justified as to the 
ability of any single evaluation method to capture the whole picture (Worthen, Sanders, 
and Fitzpatrick 1997; Patton 1997; Guba & Lincoln). This calls for humility on the part 
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of the evaluator, an openness to consensual models, a willingness to use a wide range of 
instruments and input, and an ability to deal with ambiguity and uncertainty, (e.g., Guba 
& Lincoln; Haas & Springer, 43; Meadows) 
[P]rojects operate in highly complex economic, social, administrative, and 
political environments that make it difficult to assess the extent to which 
successful (or unsuccessful) outcomes were the result of project design and 
management. It is often hard to tell whether the higher incomes of small farmers 
were a consequence of the rural development project being assessed or whether 
they were caused by national agricultural pricing policies, varying credit rates, or 
rapid urban growth... or some other factor. (Valadez & Bamberger, 76) 
For this reason, in the present study, as broad an understanding as possible is needed 
of the Brazilian conjuntura - the socio-economic-political background of events (H. J. 
Souza 1999; Marsden & Oakley 1990). In researching, I found that there is no 
comprehensive historical study in Brazil dealing with land from a land reform 
perspective, and considerable research was required to develop a historical model that 
places current efforts in perspective; this study is set forth in Chapter III. Similarly, a 
review of more recent historical economic developments relating to Brazilian agriculture 
was required, and this is set forth in Chapter IV. 
Valadez & Bamberger (8-10) discuss three models of evaluation used in developing 
countries: (1) those where inputs can be measured on the assumption that inputs will lead 
to outcome (e.g., vaccination campaigns), (2) those which "focus on the cost-
effectiveness of the delivery systems and accessibility to the intended target groups," and 
(3) those "based on the notion that the principal objective of social development should 
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be to help indigenous communities or underprivileged groups (such as... landless 
laborers...) develop the organizational capacity and knowledge needed to identify and 
satisfy their own needs." While the current study involves some aspects of the second 
model (e.g., relative cost of land under the program, facility of delivery), it is primarily 
concerned with the third model. Again, this type of evaluation involves complexity, 
requiring flexibility and a variety of instruments (Ibid.) 
Sustainability and Indicators 
When we speak of sustainability of a land reform program, we need to consider 
both environmental and socio-economic sustainability. The standard for the former is 
really perpetual: are the land and other natural resources being used in such a way that 
they, and the surrounding environment, will not deteriorate over time? I am not an 
environmental scientist and the measures/indicators used in this area are basic ones 
arising from my experience in rural development: are legally required reserves being 
maintained? do agricultural practices maintain the soil and avoid harm to the 
surrounding environment? what is the situation regarding water resources? 
With respect to socio-economic sustainability, time horizons are less distant. No 
one expects a land reform settlement to last forever. A settlement that meets the needs of 
its residents for twenty or thirty years may well be considered successful. Bittencourt, et 
al. (1999) identified eleven factors that affect the success of land reform settlements: 
the natural quality of the land and environment 
the origins and prior occupations of land settlement dwellers 
the socio-economic context surrounding the land settlement 
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basic infrastructure and social services 
farming/livestock systems and the productive infrastructure 
the organization of the productive infrastructure 
availability of rural credit 
technical assistance 
political organization and institutional relationships 
agricultural and monetary income 
internal differences among the settlement dwellers 
In the Northeast, they found that the first of these (poor land and lack of water) tended to 
be the primary cause of weak results in land reform, accompanied by lack of credit and 
technical assistance, and poor organization. In strong land reform settlements, the 
organization of production was the most important factor (Ibid., 50-51). 
Ieno and Bamat (1998), measuring quality of life in land reform settlements in 
Paraiba, looked at many of the same factors - rural production, education, health, internal 
organization. In addition, they developed questions geared to discovering land settlement 
dwellers' subjective view of their own quality of life. Many of these questions were used 
in our study. 
Sustainability Measures 
Introductory note on indicators. A few basic comments on indicators are included 
here as a reminder. The choice of indicators is highly important and requires a 
knowledge of and feel for the subject of study. All indicators work toward producing a 
comprehensible model of a more complex reality, and inevitably truncate that reality in 
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some manner. Poorly chosen indicators produce distorted results. New information can 
lead to changes in indicators - a researcher of a complex reality such as land reform 
settlements must walk the line between allowing indicators to evolve while keeping the 
research reasonably disciplined. Settlement dweller input in developing indicators is 
helpful where it can be achieved (Meadows 1998). 
Sustainability measures. Table II.B sets forth indicators for socio-economic and 
environmental sustainability. I seek here to develop appropriate measures of 
sustainability applicable for each indicator; in other words, these measures are more 
specific indicators that aggregate into the indicators set forth in the table (see, e.g., 
Meadows, 22-23). This is done with respect to each indicator below. In developing these 
measures, I have drawn on my own experience as well as the work of others, including 
factors that specifically affected the success of land reform settlements, either 
independently researched (Ieno and Bamat 1998; Bavaresco 1999; Bittencourt 1999; 
Carvalho 1999; Xavier 1999), or drawn from data from the First Census of Agrarian 
Reform91 (Schmidt, Marinho & Rosa 1998; David, Waniez & Brustlein 1998; 
Bergamasco & Ferrante 1998; Barreira & Paula 1998; Riedl & Navarro 1998; Abelem & 
Hebette 1998; Carneiro, Andrade & Mesquita 1998), and ecological indicators such as 
the nineteen indicators developed by the Ministry of the Environment for measuring the 
likelihood of environmental degradation in the Northeast (MMA 2004). 
These sustainability measures are discussed in detail below. A chart summarizing 
them is set forth in the conclusion. 
91 INCRA/CRUB/UnB (1996-7) 
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• Quality of life assessment 
o Dweller opinions 
o Neighbor/family links 
o Access to schools, health care, churches, etc. 
o Community identity, celebrations, etc. 
• Community Association (existence, functions, settler participation, 
view of settlers, etc.) 
• Micro-economic viability 
Environmental 
sustainability 
• Agricultural methods 
• Forest or other reserves 
• Water 
• Environment surrounding settlement area 
Socio-Economic Sustainability 
Quality of life assessment 
o Dweller opinions 
o Neighbor/family links 
o Access to schools, health care, churches, etc. 
o Community identity, celebrations, etc. 
Many of the questions in the interviews are geared to assessing dweller opinions as to 
their own quality of life.92 The underlying premise here is that dweller satisfaction with 
their life in the settlement is a strong indicator of whether they will stay on the land and 
actively work to better the community. Some of these questions relate to a feeling of 
ownership with respect to the settlement - did they participate in the organization of the 
group and/or the purchase of the land, do they contribute to the functioning of the 
community, do they hold leadership positions? Also important is a sense of belonging: 
do they participate in various groups? Open ended questions about hopes for their future 
and the future of their families can bring to light to what extent the settlement plays, in 
92 In addition to its value as a tool for determining settlement sustainability, settler views of quality of life 
touch on their sense of well-being, which, as Meadows (66) points out, is the ultimate end of development. 
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their eyes, a role in that future. Questions as to whether, all things being equal, they 
would sell their land or move to another settlement, help identify their feelings. 
Qualitatively, the answers to these questions have to be viewed in light of tone of 
voice and non-verbals, and must be drawn out slowly. Rural people in Brazil tend to be 
initially positive (although a positive answer can come in many grades of enthusiasm or 
lack thereof), but are more likely to share real feelings after the first half hour or so. It 
was also important to have a sampling where both husbands and wives are interviewed; it 
is our experience that, where both members of the couple are not positive, the family is 
far less likely to remain on the land.93 
Neighbor and family relations were also drawn out through questions. The 
underlying premise here is that close ties with neighbors and the presence of extended 
family are key elements in creating a sense of belonging and satisfaction with life. 
Family ties are highly important in Brazilian society generally and in rural Brazil 
especially.94 
Access to schools, health care, churches and other services were drawn out through 
questioning and observation. Leite et al. (2001, 6) found that, in the settlements they 
studied, 90% of children 7-14 were in school - this would seem to be a reasonable 
benchmark. The availability of secondary school education (much rarer in rural areas) 
can also be an important factor. Availability of healthcare - usually precarious in rural 
Brazil - can be significant; settler feelings with respect to health care may be as 
93 INCRA/CRUB/UnB (1996-7) noted that approximately 12% of the families in the 1996 Agrarian Reform 
Census were headed by women. 
94 We observed in Tocantins, where many settlers did not have family, the resilience of the community in 
creating "family" through a series of godfather/godmother - co-godfather/co-godmother relationships. 
These may be created through the Church (at baptism, Is' communion, confirmation, or weddings) or 
through folk traditions (e.g., dancing around the fire on the Feast of St. John); in either case, the 
relationships are meaningful and are taken seriously. 
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important as objective information. Churches (Catholic and Protestant) are almost 
always formed by the people themselves; however, the availability of priests and pastors 
is worth noting, as are possible religious divisions in the community. Other services 
(bank services, registries, etc.) are of less urgent importance; many of these may be 
accessed through the community association. 
Finally, community identity can be an important aspect of settler loyalty, ownership, 
and sense of belonging. Does the community celebrate certain days (e.g., the anniversary 
of founding) or identify itself in other ways (a soccer team, special symbols, a strong 
feeling about the community name, etc.)? 
Community Association. The market-based land reform program places considerable 
emphasis on the role of settler associations in the purchase of land and successful 
operation of the settlement (World Bank 2000). I believe that the authenticity, credibility 
and effectiveness of these associations are important to settlement sustainability.95 These 
were judged both through objective analysis (what is the association doing, what 
programs does it have, what is the degree of participation, what types of facilities and/or 
equipment does it have?) and questions geared to finding out dweller's opinion of and 
participation in the association. One key question was aimed at discovering whether the 
dwellers see the association as principally a means for getting credit (or other outside 
services) rather than as an essential element of the community itself. In addition, having 
worked in Brazil with community groups since 1969, and working with two fellow 
interviewers with similar depth of experience, we used our own experience to gain a 
sense of the authenticity of each association. 
95 Early evaluations of the market-based land reform program raised significant doubts as to the quality of 
the community associations (Schwartzman 1999, 2, and 2000, 7; Xavier 1999, 22) 
Micro-economic viability. Ultimately, the micro-economic viability of a land reform 
settlement is decisive with respect to its socio-economic sustainability. Such viability is 
not unrelated to other factors; for instance, strong loyalty to and participation in the 
settlement, and a strong association, can be factors that make an otherwise non-viable 
settlement function.96 However, in the end, if settlers cannot at least meet their basic 
needs while living on the land, the settlement will fail. 
Some of the factors here are objective: how much and what is produced, how and 
where is it marketed, what prices are obtained, are there plans for alternative marketing, 
is there any actual or contemplated processing of produce, how much of local settlement 
consumption is raised on the land? The basic land quality and parcel size, and the type 
and quality of technical assistance (both at the beginning and ongoing) are important. 
How do farmers view their labor,97 and what types of labor patterns are used? 
Certain indicators look toward possible hidden vulnerabilities and long-term trends 
that could affect micro-economic sustainability. What are the cost, source, and type of 
inputs used? What type of mechanical equipment is used? With respect to this 
equipment, what is the age and condition, the cost/source of servicing and spare parts, 
and is a reserve fund maintained for repair/replacement? What are the sources/costs of 
energy? (see Tschirley 1996; Schmidt, Marinho and Rosa 1998, 41) 
Less objective factors include a sense of creativity in the community, leadership able 
to look for and seek alternatives, a collective willingness to overcome difficulties. 
96 Antonio Fernando da Silva, for instance, mentioned a land reform settlement which "by any objective 
standard... should have failed." It had poor land and few resources, but "the people are so determined, they 
are making it work." Interview, January 31, 2006. 
97 In Tocantins (1985-92) we found that small farmers generally did not allocate any value to their own and 
family labor when calculating the costs of production. 
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An important factor may be how many settlement dwellers have employment 
(permanent, temporary, seasonal) off the land, and whether this is of a type that draws 
QO 
their energy away from farming their land or otherwise. Other economic activities such 
as handicraft production, food processing, and small-scale commerce are also noted. 
Environmental Sustainability 
Agricultural methods. The line between socio-economic and environmental 
sustainability is an artificial one. It is for convenience rather than a hard and fast 
division. Clearly there can be no long-run socio-economic viability if the settlement is 
not sustainable ecologically. I am not an environmental scientist and environmental 
analysis, per se, is not the object of this study. However, a 'reasonable probability that 
the land will remain productive for at least one generation would be the minimum 
necessary for declaring a land reform settlement sustainable by any criteria. 
Agricultural methods are closely tied to both micro-economic viability and 
environment. Many questions related to crops and production serve as a basis for both. 
Measures of agricultural methods include the following: What type of plowing and 
planting is used? Are steps taken to avoid erosion? Is a system of crop rotation and/or 
fallow fields followed? Are various crops raised synergistically or is there a tendency 
toward monoculture? What types of fertilizers are used? Are pesticides used, and - if so 
- which ones? Are organic farming methods used? What is the source and type of 
seeds? What animals are raised and under what system (e.g., grazed and/or ration-fed)? 
Are fields burned or plowed under? 
98 Leite (2001, 3-4) found that 79% of settlers 14+ yrs/age worked only on their land, 11 % partly on their 
land, 1% entirely off the land, and 9% - presumably retirees - did not work; 69% of family income came 
from land produce, 17% from government pensions, and 14% from outside jobs. 
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Questions relating to these issues were included in the study. We found the most 
relevant areas to involve the synergy and variety of crops/livestock and the question of 
organic/non-organic agriculture. 
Forest or other reserves. Natural reserves in the Northeast can include forests, 
grasslands, and/or caatinga - the desert-like growth in the semi-arid region. Key 
measures include: What are the legal requirements for maintaining reserves on the land, 
and are they being followed? Are other reserve measures being taken? What is the 
attitude of settlers to natural areas: i.e., are they seen to have positive value, to be a 
resource (in what way?), to be a hindrance to expansion or development? Are there 
ecological education programs in the community and/or schools? What is their content? 
Water. Earlier studies have found that nearly two-thirds of land reform settlers have 
problems with water (Schmidt, Marinho & Rosa, 39; Leite, 6). This is a significant issue 
in the Brazilian Northeast. Key measures include: What is the source of the families' 
water for drinking, washing, and stock raising? Is any form of crop watering or irrigation 
used? Are water sources (wells, streams, springs) abundant all year around, or are there 
dry periods? What are water sources during dry periods? Is there salinization detected? 
Has the settlement worked with water cachements (see, e.g., Jordao 1995) or other 
appropriate technologies for catching and/or preserving water? 
Environment surrounding settlement area. The environment of the settlement is part 
of the environment of the surrounding area. Thus it is important to have some 
understanding of this wider environment. Key questions here include land use in nearby 
areas, the types of agriculture engaged in (e.g., wide use of pesticides or of irrigation), 
whether there is significant burning of fields, whether there are other factors 
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(desertification, mining, urban development, pollution) that may significantly affect the 
settlement during the next twenty-five years. What is sought is a broad picture, with an 
awareness of possible warning signals of environmental circumstances with potentially 
significant impact for the community being studied. 
In the current study, our examination of the surrounding areas was rapid, based on 
personal observation, discussions with technical advisors and settlement dwellers, and 
our own prior knowledge of the region. We did not identify any factors that raised 
serious issues affecting the viability of the communities studied, but a more in depth 
study could be made of river water quality, water tables, and long term climate trends, the 
last especially in the most marginal semi-arid region (e.g., Veneza). 
Sustainability - Conclusion 
The ideas set forth above are charted below. Our study did not seek answers to all 
the measures, especially in those categories most closely related to environmental 
analysis. But these measures are mentioned here as a guide to possible future analysis. 
Table II-B Land Reform Settlement Sustainability Measures 
Indicators Measures99 
Quality of life assessment "Ownership" 
• Dweller opinions • Participated in organization of group? 
• Neighbor/family links • Participated in land purchase? 
• Access to schools, health care, • Perceived role in community 
churches, etc. • Leadership or other roles* 
• Community identity, Belonging 
celebrations, etc. • Participation in groups/activities 
• Family/friend network 
Future 
• Perceptions 2 yrs./lO yrs./20 yrs. 
Willingness to leave/sell 
Husband/wife dynamic & attitudes 
Community sports teams, symbols, name 
Unity/divergence 
99 Where possible, measures marked with an asterisk should be graphed over time (Meadows: 38) 
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Community Association (existence, 
functions, settler participation, view of 
settlers, etc.) 
Activities & programs* 
% and quality of participation* 
Facilities & equipment* 
• Source of these important (excellent facilities & 
equipment may come from political patronage rather 
than association authenticity) 
Dweller opinions 
• Do dwellers view association as simply a mechanism 
for obtaining credit or other benefits? 
Micro-economic viability Land quality 
Parcel sizes 
Type, quantity & quality of crops & livestock* 
Type/costs of inputs* 
• Fertilizers & pesticides 
• Seeds (do they have a seedbank?) 






Marketing practices and alternatives* 
Local processing (present and/or planned)* 
Local consumption v. purchased consumption* 
Other sources of income* 
• Labor (daily, temporary, seasonal) 
• Small scale manufacturing or commerce 
• Pensions 
• Government or NGO work projects101 
Agricultural methods Base information: 
• Arable land per capita 
• Soil quality and tvpes 
® Field/pasture size and placement 
Soil treatment 
• Co-planting & alternating crops 
• Rotating crops - fallow areas 
• Crops appropriate for soil 
• Organic residue 
• Fertilizer (see also below) 
• Erosion 
• Soil degradation 
Crops & livestock* 
100 In our experience, almost all smallholding communities have some form of cooperative labor. 
Generally this takes the form of trading days of work (e.g., gathering in small groups to plant and harvest) 
and of mutirdes - "barn raising" style activities, where neighbors gather together to work on a specific 
large project, usually including a meal and some form of social/festive activities as well. 
101 Work projects are common in the Northeast, especially during drought periods. In the ones we 
organized through WFO/Catholic Relief Services during the drought of 1993, communities chose projects 
(usually construction of rainwater cachements or cisterns) and farmers received food for working on these 
projects. This allowed most of the farmers to remain with and support their families, rather than 




• Crop/livestock mix 
• Harmony w/natural biodiversity 
• Orientation 
• Conscious use of sustainable methods 
• If not, what? 
• Intensity/carrying capacity 
• Crops/ha. 
• Livestock/ha. 
• Methods per se 







• Pesticides (which pests? appropriate?) 
• Seeds (do they have a seedbank?) 
• Tools & Equipment 
• Ownership 
• Source 










Technical Assistance & Education 
• Who provides technical assistance? 
• Agricultural extension services 
• Are farmers actively involved? 





Hired (permanent, temporary, occasional, seasonal) 
Forest or other reserves Base information: 
• Natural environment 
• Flagship species* 
• Mapping of reserves and linkages 
Reserves 
• Legal reserves 
• Other reserves 
Settler attitudes/behavior 
• Perceived value of reserves 
• Vegetable products 
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• Firewood 
• Medicinal plants 
• Materials for construction, artisan work, etc. 
• Other 






• Materials and presentation 
Locale and audience 
Water Base Information: 
• Annual rainfall and rainfall patterns 
• Water table level 




• Volume of use 
• Treatment 
• Washing & other household uses 
• Sources 
• Volume of use 
• Runoff & recycling 
Agricultural water: 
• Crop watering 
• Sources 
• Volume 
• Where used 
• Periodicity 
• Irrigation 
• % of arable land irrigated 
• Mechanism used 
• Cost 
• Energy consumption 
• Salinization or waterlogging 





Environment surrounding settlement area • Current land use in surrounding area 
• Socio-economic or environmental patterns 
• New highways or railroads 
• Urban growth 
• Major irrigation projects 
• Tourist development 
• Mining activity 
Trends in climate change 
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It is important to focus on the issue for which indicators are being developed; if this 
is not done, one risks an "overload of information" (Tschirley 1996, 4). Indicators should 
be "robust" (i.e., able to portray the reality the describe) without attempting to be 
exhaustive (Vieira 2000, 56). In the present case, the goal is to determine whether the 
agrarian reform settlements are sustainable for agricultural purposes for at least a 
generation (± 25 years). This question is distinguishable from, although not unrelated to, 
other important environmental questions such as preservation of native caatinga growth 
and natural (as opposed to agricultural) biodiversity. 
To the extent possible, it is important to look at indicators over time. In agriculture, 
trends over time can reveal important patterns. Similarly, it is important to recognize 
stock and flow indicators; often, stock indicators will be the most easily identifiable, but 
may be most meaningful with respect to the flow they illustrate (Meadows 1998, 12, 28). 
Drawing up sustainable development indicators is "an enormous challenge." 
(Tschirley: 2) The challenge is augmented for farm environment indicators; 
environmental information is often gathered for other purposes and/or relates to broad 
geographic areas, making it difficult to relate it to individual smallholdings or even 
groups of smallholdings (Hamblin 1996, 2). In the present case we start with the farm 
and look outward, rather than vice versa. For example, see what pesticides farmers 
actually use, rather than working back from general data on pesticides found in local 
rivers. While not pretending to divorce land reform settlements from the surrounding 
environment, this seems the best method for focusing on those elements that will most 
directly affect the land in question. 
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However, it is important to have an understanding of the general environment in 
which the settlements operate. This environment affects the local farms and can provide 
indications as to agricultural practices that might present potential long-term 
environmental risks. 
Table II-C - Evaluator Values 
Evaluator Background North American, Catholic, male, 30+ years 
experience in Brazil, trained community organizer, 
13 years experience working with Brazilian 
subsistence farmers (mostly with CPT/Church), 
political sympathies with Catholic wing of PT 
(Workers' Party) 
Values • Catholic Social Doctrine, especially 
concerning the right of the worker to own 
the instruments of his trade and his land 
(CNBB 1980; Pontifical Justice & Peace 
Council 1998) 
• Jeffersonian concept of positive value of 
small farmers in society 
• Distrust of capitalism, especially in terms of 
large accumulations of capital 
• Preference for organic farming 
• Distrust of motivation of large fertilizer, 
seed, and pesticide producers 
• Belief in the value of solidarity, community, 
neighbor and extended family ties 
• Belief in a link between moral integrity and 
community solidarity 
• Belief in the importance of environmental 
sustainability 
Research Site 
Research was carried out at seven Cedula da Terra settlements in the State of 
Bahia. Selection of the land reform settlements was made by the research team based on 
information provided by professionals working in land reform. As set forth in the 
Overview of Case Studies, we selected settlements in the northern portion of the State, 
primarily in the semi-arid region, because (1) this region is among the most challenging 
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in Brazil to carry out land reform and agriculture generally, (2) the semi-arid Northeast 
encompasses the largest and poorest rural population in Brazil, and (3) our research team 
had experience with and an affinity for the semi-arid Northeast. We also selected 
settlements that were considered to be relatively successful because we believe that there 
is a need to study successful projects in developing countries in order to add to the 
knowledge of locally appropriate best practices (Tendler 1-8, 1997) 
Five of the research sites are located in what is officially the Semi-Arid micro-
region of Bahia, and two (Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista III) close to that region on the 
western edge of the neighboring North Coastal micro-region. Beyond a narrow coastal 
strip that was originally Atlantic rain forest, the interior of northern Bahia is dry. Climate 
ranges from fairly dry in the easternmost settlements we studied (Nova Lusitania and Boa 
Vista III) to drier - 600-700mm/annual rainfall - in the westernmost (Fazenda Veneza). 
The natural vegetation of the Semi-Arid region is caatinga - sparse, low-lying 
bush made up of cacti and thorny scrub. There is a six-month dry season during which 
no rainfall occurs, and every several years this is extended into longer drought periods. 
One such period was ending at the time of our visit, and the importance of rain was 
emphasized by many interviewees. 
Stock raising (cattle, goats, sheep) has historically predominated in the caatinga 
area, along with subsistence farming. The soil is relatively good, and manioc, black 
beans, and small amounts of corn (maize) grow well. The region is one of small and 
middle sized farms and larger ranches. 
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Methodologies 
The most significant aspect of this research was the field work carried out in 
seven land reform settlements, especially those aspects involving evaluation of quality of 
life, socio-economic sustainability, and the authenticity and effectiveness of community 
associations. Questionnaires were used based on those successfully employed in earlier 
studies (Ieno & Bamat), but they were used with caution. It is my experience that rural 
people in Brazil reveal their thoughts and feelings through a patient process of 
conversation. Simple answers to questionnaires tend to "elicit atypical roles and 
responses" (Webb 2000, 1; see Lockwood 1993), especially as rural Brazilians may 
answer in manners they think they ought to answer or in manners that they believe will 
please the questioner. It is essential to observe the way language is used in responses and 
accompanying non-verbals (Webb 128, et seq.). Thus questionnaires need to be seen 
more in terms as a guideline to the interviewers (what are we seeking to find out?) than a 
tool to be used rigidly with rural settlement dwellers. Use of open-ended questions and 
allowing interviewees to tell their story are important (Seidman 1998, 12-13). 
Worthen, Sanders, and Fitzpatrick (163) quote Elspeth Huxley, who lived in rural 
Africa: 
The best way to find things out... is not to ask questions at all. If you fire off a 
question, it is like firing off a gun - bang it goes, and everything takes flight and 
runs for shelter. But if you sit quite still and pretend not to be looking, all the 
little facts will come and peck round your feet, situations will venture forth from 
thickets, and intentions will creep out and sun themselves on stone; and if you are 
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very patient, you will see and understand a great deal more than a man with a gun 
does. (The Flame Tree of Thika, 272) 
For these reasons, a number of open-ended questions were provided in the 
questionnaires and the three interviewers, all of whom have years of experience in the 
rural Northeast, listened to settlers' stories rather than pushing for answers to individual 
questions. The result of this method is that conversations tended to veer toward matters 
of concern to the settlers, and not all questions on the questionnaire were necessarily 
answered by every interviewee. 
In fact, when one is willing to listen, rural Brazilians tend to be very forthcoming 
about their situation, expressing their thoughts and feelings more readily than most North 
Americans do. We found the settlers of the seven settlement areas to be open in this 
manner. 
Our method followed a pattern. Equipped with introductions from CDA program 
officials who were trusted by the communities, we initially (except in the case of Nova 
Lusitania) made contact with the technical advisors. In one case (Moita Redonda) the 
technical advisor accompanied us in our initial visit to the settlement; in other cases, they 
introduced us to settlers or sent word that we would be coming. Arriving at the 
settlement, we would meet with a group of settlers - the meetings were usually called by 
association leaders (in Nova Lusitania, by a church leader), but were generally open to all 
who wanted to attend. Sitting in a circle, we would introduce ourselves, present our 
credentials, and explain that we were visiting the settlement as part of an evaluation for a 
doctoral thesis. We would then ask those present to introduce themselves, and would let 
the conversation evolve. These meetings lasted for one to two hours, and were generally 
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followed by an invitation to visit the fields and/or association facilities (schools, casas de 
farinha, the bolacha factory at Boa Vista III, etc.), which we did. 
During the group meeting we would state our interest in interviewing individuals, and 
we were usually approached by several people who were interested in being interviewed. 
Following our visit to fields and association buildings, we three interviewers then divided 
up, generally starting with the people who had expressed an interest, and began 
interviewing. We found no shortage of people who were willing to talk to us - in fact, 
we did not encounter anyone in any of the communities who refused to be interviewed. 
Generally the interviews took place in the interviewees' home, although a few were 
interviewed in their fields, at neighbor's homes, or elsewhere. Rural Brazilians are 
highly social people, and interviews were seldom isolated one-on-one undertakings. 
There were often others present, and where those others (especially husbands or wives, 
but also older children, relatives, and neighbors) actively participated in the interview, 
their responses were also recorded. Interviewees were generally eager to show us their 
homes, house lots (vegetable gardens, fruit trees, poultry, pigs), and other undertakings -
in one case, for instance, the small candy shop they operated in their home. 
Selection of interviewees was generally random - each interviewer would go from 
house to house, usually in different sections of the settlement. We attempted (and 
succeeded) to get a range of interviewees, with a good mixture of men and women of 
varying age groups. Where possible, we sought out for interviewing certain individuals 
who were recognized as formal or informal leaders, but we also always included a 
number of interviewees who did not have leadership roles. 
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Especially regarding the authenticity and effectiveness of community organizations, 
there is a degree of "connoisseurship" (Eisner 1991; Worthen, Sanders, and Fitzpatrick, 
128-9; see Meadows, 7) - the ability of one with years of experience to have an educated 
sense of what is going on. In this case the three interviewers, all of whom have training 
and 15+ years experience in community organization in rural Brazil, had a sense as to the 
level of authenticity of a given community group. The presence of a female interviewer 
was important as women observers, conversing with women in rural communities, tend to 
learn more about certain dynamics of community life than do male observers talking with 
either male or female settlement dwellers. 
Micro-economic information, important to judging the sustainability of land 
settlements, was approached sensitively (see Christensen 1993). On the whole, settlers 
were very open with information, but the interviewers never pushed for answers where 
interviewees seemed reluctant to provide them. 
Especially with respect to issues involving quality of life, associations, micro-
economic viability, agricultural practices, environmental reserves, and surrounding social 
environment, rapid rural appraisal techniques were used as appropriate (Margoluis and 
Salafsky 134; Valadez and Bamberger 151-152, 210-213; National Environmental 
Secretariat of Kenya 1991). 
To the extent possible, information learned in these ways was triangulated with other 
information, such as statistics as to the numbers of people leaving the land settlements, 
information on loan repayments, observations of neutral local observers, etc. However, 
our time frame did not allow as much triangulation as we would have liked. 
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Analysis of Data 
Our team began to analyze data on-site. Following introductory meetings with 
settlers and the subsequent tour of settlement facilities, the team would meet briefly to 
discuss issues that had arisen and to detail our interview strategy. We would then 
separate and begin interviewing. In most cases, we worked separately in the interview 
process, although occasionally two of us would be present at an interview (at times this 
happened when two of us chanced to arrive at the same home, or when two of us were 
visiting a facility or field together and an opportunity to interview arose; however, it also 
occurred in some cases where we felt that an interviewee had particularly important 
information to provide and/or a dual perspective (often male/female) might be helpful). 
At least once or twice during the day, I would seek out my team members to 
briefly exchange information - who we had interviewed, who needed to be interviewed, 
any unusual or interesting facts we had gleaned, anything we thought needed to be further 
examined. In all of the settlements, the interviewing extended over at least two days 
(three days in Boa Vista III, Moita Redonda, and Biritinga); although interviewing often 
went on until relatively late (8 p.m.), we would always convene in our quarters to discuss 
what we had learned that day and plan for the next. 
This on-site analysis allowed us to go back to interviewees and verify questions or 
inconsistencies. It also allowed us to identify people we should interview - for instance, 
individuals frequently mentioned by other settlers, or those mentioned as being in 
opposition to the current association leadership. 
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Both during and toward the end of our visits we would return and discuss our 
findings with community leaders, clarifying factors we had not fully understood. Among 
those who were very helpful in this respect were Adilson, past President of Vila Canaa, 
and his wife Veralucia; Erico, President of Fazenda Veneza; Petrus, a leader in Nova 
Lusitania; Railda, a leader in Passos da Esperan9a; Antonio Sales, President, and Josi, 
Treasurer of Biritinga; and Walmir, President, and Israel, Treasurer of Moita Redonda. 
The first community we visited was Vila Canaa on March 16, 2006. We then had 
further contact with the technical advisor, interviewed the local CAR manager, and did 
one day of interviewing at Fazenda Veneza before returning to Vila Canaa on March 19 
(we finished up at Fazenda Veneza on March 20). This allowed us to approach these two 
communities with more perspective than if we had completed our interviewing at Vila 
Canaa before visiting another community. 
After these first two visits, we returned to our base for four days before going out 
to the next two: Passos da Esperan^a (March 27-28) and Moita Redonda (March 29-31). 
We took similar break periods before visiting Nova Lusitania (April 5-6) and, for 
personal reasons related to my job, Biritinga (April 18-20). We then went back to 
Salvador and re-interviewed key CDA personnel (see below) before visiting the final site 
of Boa Vista III (April 28-30). 
During these breaks we were able to initially analyze and discuss the materials we 
had received and to research additional information (e.g., with respect to details of 
programs such as PRONAF that had been mentioned repeatedly in interviews). After the 
first two visits, we also decided to add a question about kinship links within each 
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settlement - whether the interviewee had relatives living in the same settlement (the 
answers we received confirmed that the great majority of settlers did have relatives). 
In four cases (Nova Lusitania, Vila Canaa, Moita Redonda, Fazenda Veneza), we 
were able to discuss our findings with the technical advisor after our visits. We were also 
able to discuss findings in most cases with other local sources of information, although I 
would have liked to have done more of this had we the time. As noted above, on April 
26, having completed all site visits except to Boa Vista III (our visit to that community 
was prompted by these interviews), we returned to Salvador and discussed our findings 
with Berta Veloso dos Passos and Antonio Fernando Silva, CDA agronomists who had 
oriented us in locating possible study sites. On their suggestion, we also interviewed a 
senior CDA agronomist, Dr. Penedo, who was particularly informative as to the sub-soil 
issues in Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista III, but who also responded to a whole series of 
questions we had developed based on our site visits (Berta and Fernando had also 
responded to these questions). 
Following each set of site visits, we reviewed our interview sheets, refreshing our 
memories. Daniel Carvalho prepared a brief (two-three page) summary for each 
community. We organized folders for each community, including a formatted fact sheet, 
all interview responses, signed releases from interviewees, Daniel's summary, 
supplementary documents such as maps and copies of association documents, and cross 
references to interviews made outside of the settlement. 
Returning to the United States, I began the process of analyzing, tabulating, and 
translating key portions of the interviews (both those carried out with settlers and others). 
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I experimented with a tabulation form, but found it not to be very useful. I found the 
most workable method of analysis was to create a complete interview list for each 
settlement, based on the numbered interview forms, and then create a Word document for 
each category of responses in each community. 
Questions had been structured to fairly easily classify the results on a cross-case 
study basis. However, given the free-flowing nature of interviews, material often 
appeared in places other than the response to the relevant question. This was particularly 
true with respect to settler attitudes, matters dealing with the association and collective 
areas, historical information, and economic information. Therefore, each interview form 
had to be combed thoroughly to assure that relavant information for each category was 
recorded in the appropriate Word document. 
Interviewers had been requested to write down direct quotes when they found 
these to be particularly applicable or pertinent. I translated these quotes. These were 
particularly useful in writing up sections relating to settler satisfaction, sufficiency of 
income, views of the future, attitudes toward the MST, and - to a lesser extent -
comments on history and the association. The quotes often communicate settler feelings 
more clearly than a mere summary of the statement or a statistic would do. 
Interviewers also noted non-verbals and made other observations. These were 
noted in the appropriate Word documents. 
Once information had been placed in the appropriate Word document categories, 
it was fairly easy to write up each case divided into those appropriate categories. I then 
did a cross-analysis of case studies. In some cases (attrition rates, number of settlers 
willing to trade or sell, settler response to whether life was better or worse in comparison 
to previous experience) the cross-case analysis could be quantified and charted in a 
meaningful manner. More qualitative analysis was required for other areas, notably data 
related to associations and collective areas, agricultural production, and settler attitudes. 
Where possible, findings were checked against data from other studies. This was 
particularly the case with respect to attrition rates, price per hectare, and price per family. 
However, much of the data available applies to very early (c. 1998) studies of Cedula da 
Terra programs, and other data is questionable. 
Written case studies and analysis were reviewed by Brenda King-Powers, who 
made suggestions and provided additional input based on her experience as an 
interviewer. Daniel Carvalho, our other interviewer, does not speak English, but he 
provided input on several points via telephone and e.mail. 
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Research Goal: To provide an initial evaluation of the viability of market-based 
land reform as a possible instrument for effecting land redistribution in Brazil, seeking to 
identify program strengths and weaknesses, successes and failures. 
Primary Research Question: Is market-based land reform potentially an effective 
instrument to redistribute land to working farmers in a socially, environmentally, and 
economically sustainable manner? 
Secondary Research Questions102 (the essential focus of research is reflected in the 
questions printed in bold; other questions serve to provide background information useful 
to the analysis of the essential questions): 
1) Does the nature of the program, per se, create issues that cause a significant 
philosophical barrier to its acceptance on the part of a significant portion of 
Brazilian society? 
(a) Does the program promote a concept of land as a commodity, rather 
than as a non-renewal environmental resource with which humans live 
in a stewardship relationship? 
(b) Is the program's emphasis on land purchase contradictory to the idea 
that landless farmers have a right to land, which right must be asserted, 
and, if so, does this constitute a significant problem? 
Methods: 
(a) Ongoing review of current literature 
(i) World Bank literature 
(ii) Government publications 
(iii) MST publications 
(iv) Other observers 
(b) Interviews with key leaders 
2) Political issues: 
(a) Does the program significantly impair other forms of land reform 
through transfer of political focus and/or funds? 
(b) Does the program tend to reinforce the power of local elites that have 
been historically opposed to land reform? 
(c) To what extent has the program been used to undercut the action of 
landless movements such as MST? 
Methods: 
(a) Ongoing review of current literature 
(b) Analysis of government budgets and policies 
(c) Questionnaires and interviews with land settlement dwellers 
102 These Secondary Questions are directly linked to questions asked and observations made in the case 
studies. 
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(d) Field observation. 
3) Administrative issues: 
(a) What is the facility of the process from the point of view of the 
purchasing farmers? 
(b) What is the relative quality and value of land purchased, in 
comparison with other land reform procedures in Brazil? 
(c) What is the quality of technical assistance provided? 
Methods: All three issues were examined most closely with respect to the 
settlement areas studied, through interviews with land settlement leaders and 
other local observers and through analysis of publicly available documents on 
land transactions and prices. 
4) Sustainability issues: 
(a) What is the level of overall satisfaction of land settlement dwellers? 
(b) To what degree are land settlement associations authentic and 
effective? 
(c) What is the micro-economic viability of holdings (i.e., extent to 
which potential income exceeds costs, including payments for the 
land)? 
(d) To what extent are agricultural practices environmentally and 
economically sustainable? 
(e) To what extent have environmental reserves been provided for on the 
land? 
Methods: These issues were examined with respect to the settlement areas 
studied. Methods included questionnaires, interviews with land settlement 
dwellers and other local observers, field observation. With respect to issues (c) 





The attempts at Brazilian agrarian reform generally, and the Cedula da Terra 
program specifically, are best understood in their historical context. As there was no 
comprehensive history of Brazilian land from an agrarian reform perspective, in 
preparation for this dissertation I wrote such a history (Powers 1999). I also specifically 
reviewed economic development of agriculture in Brazil during the thirty-five years prior 
to our case studies (Powers 2006). This chapter focuses on the findings of those studies 
most relevant to the subject at hand. 
Brazilian history (since European discovery) may be roughly divided eight 
periods: 
Early Colonial Period, 1500- 1690: the discovery of Brazil by the Portuguese and 
the development of sugar plantations, principally in the Northeast. 
Late Colonial Period, 1690 - 1808: the discovery of gold in Minas Gerais, and the 
shift of economic and political power toward the Southeast. 
1 0 0 
The Monarchy, 1808-1889: the transfer of the Portuguese court (fleeing 
Napoleon) to Rio de Janeiro, and (beginning 1822) the establishment of Brazil as 
an independent monarchy under the descendents of the Portuguese kings; one of 
the last acts of the monarchy was to abolish slavery in 1889. 
The Old Republic, 1891-1930: following a brief rule by a military transition 
government, the republic was established; it was a period of strong state 
governments and a relatively weak federal government; coffee was the single 
most important economic factor. 
The Vargas Government, 1930-1946: a dictatorship headed by Getulio Vargas, a 
civilian; Vargas saw himself as a modernizing force and focused on urban 
industrial matters; the government enacted corporativist labor laws (including 
with respect to rural unions) that are still the basis of Brazilian labor relations. 
The democratic interlude, 1946-1964: a period that witnessed political instability 
(the military serving as a moderating force), construction of the new capital in 
Brasilia, and the rise (especially in the Northeast) of rural worker movements; the 
period ended with very high inflation and a weak, leftist president - Joao Goulart. 
The Military Dictatorship, 1964-1985: begun by moderate military leaders in 
what was expected to be a short transition to stabilize the country, the government 
was taken over by hard-line military; nationalist in outlook, the government 
created high tariff barriers; the initial years saw unusually high GDP growth but, 
with the first oil crisis in 1974, this growth began to unravel and the economy 
slipped steadily over the next decade. 
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The post-dictatorship period, 1985-present, including the presidencies of Jose 
Sarney, a civilian who had been a pro-military government senator during the 
dictatorship and who was (and is) closely tied to large landholdings; Fernando 
Collar, who was impeached, and his idiosyncratic successor, Itamar Franco; and 
two serious presidents (both had been strong members of the opposition to the 
dictatorship): Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1994-2002) of the center-left PSDB, 
who stabilized the currency and introduced both the bolsa familia and Cedula da 
Terra programs, and Lula (2003-present) of the Workers' Party (PT), who 
continued and built upon those programs. 
Our discussion here focuses primarily on the period beginning with the military 
dictatorship. 
In my historical study, which covered the period since 1500, I identified (Powers 
1999, 1-2) nine factors that dominate the debate on land use and rural issues: 
• an agricultural system geared primarily toward exportation 
• the triptych of large landholdings, monoculture, and cheap labor 
• under-use of land, poor agricultural techniques, and ecologically harmful practices 
• land as a source and symbol of power and status 
• a complex relationship among land, commerce, and finance 
• a complex relationship between landowners and government 
• confused land titles and possessory rights 
• violence, corruption, and injustice 
• frustration of efforts to carry out reform 
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Parallel to these factors, and alternative to them (in a certain sense) has been the 
continuous presence of subsistence fanning, sometimes carried out (especially in the 
North and Northeast of Brazil) by farmers without formal title to their land (posseiros) 
and by renters and share-croppers. 
Background of Land Reform 
By the late colonial period, writers in the colony were calling for land reform. 
Among the first of these was Joao Daniel (1722-76), a Jesuit priest working in the north 
of Brazil. He and others argued that a redistribution of land was indispensible to 
resolving the problems of unproductive latifundios and hunger in the country side. They 
saw the land question as constituting a social problem and a situation of profound 
injustice, and as adding to the problems of corruption and violence (Jobim 1983, 39, 
80).103 
Leopoldo Jobim notes that two types of reform were advocated: (1) reforms 
affecting land ownership, involving redistribution of land for social purposes, and (2) 
reforms advocating technical advances to encourage productivity. He refers to these 
respectively as reforma agraria (agrarian reform) and reforma agricola (agricultural 
reform). The Crown was actively interested in reform "as long as it did not touch on the 
103 Luis dos Santos Vilhena, writing in the end of the 18th Century, criticized the morgados, which only 
served "...to rob humanity of many means of subsistence," and "the unending and extremely extensive 
landholdings that have been granted as sesmarias in Brazil" (M. Silva, 65). Dom Marcos Antonio de 
Souza, Bishop of Salvador at the beginning of the 19th Century, saw large landholdings as blocking orderly 
settlement in the interior: "This shows that they are a great obstacle to the propagation of the human 
race...." (F.C.Teixeira Silva, 10-11). 
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problem of distribution of land." It feared alienating landowners and losing its base of 
support in Brazil (Jobim, 28).104 
Jobim (26) notes that the belief during the Enlightenment in the power of reform 
through legislative and administrative measures was "immense," and Ligia Osorio Silva 
mentions (1996, 64), during this period, the Portuguese government's "excessive valuing 
of the role of administrative measures as conductors of social reform." But governmental 
measures advocating reforms were frequently withdrawn under pressure from the 
colonial elite, or were ignored. When actually put into practice, they were often counter-
productive, creating problems rather than resolving them (See, e.g., L. Silva, 65-66).105 
This pattern can be seen in the fate of the royal Alvara of October 5, 1795. The 
Crown was concerned with preventing land grants that would dispossess or cause conflict 
with colonists who were already farming the land as posseiros: 
...on one hand, harm and very grave damage to the Rights of My Royal Crown; on 
the other hand, consequences no less damaging and offensive to the Public Good, 
and the equality with which should be, and should have been, distributed such 
land to their Dwellers, such irregular distribution having reached such a state that 
104 However, M. Silva (1998, 65, 72) notes that some of the large cattle ranches in Piaui were broken up 
during the reforms instituted by the Marquis do Pombal (Portuguese prime minister from 1750 to 1777) 
based on the concept that their sesmarias had been illegally granted. Motta (1998, 123-125) also notes 
largely ineffective attempts by the Portuguese Crown at some sort of land redistribution. In 1753, royal 
Resolutions of April 11 and August 2 provided that "land granted in sesmaria on which there are colonists 
cultivating the soil and paying rent to the sesmarios should be granted to the real cultivators." See also 
below the discussion of the Alvara of October 5, 1795. 
105 Skidmore (1998, 51) notes that Pombal did effect two reforms that impacted Brazil: revising the 
economic administrative structure in a way that required Brazilian legal and customary practices to be 
reinterpreted by judges sympathetic to Portugal's mercantalist ideas, and forming three commercial 
monopoly companies to exploit exports of the Amazon, Pernambuco, and coastal whaling. 
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many of these Dwellers have not been able to obtain ...Sesmarias106... because of 
objections of those without any Right...[trying] to possess themselves without 
Merit, and without legitimate license, to that which should have been validated in 
Titles to their possessions. 
The Alvara not only recognized the right to land of those who actively cultivate it, but 
required, with respect to existing idle sesmarias (or the idle portions of same), that 
ownership be sold or given within two years to someone who would cultivate them, on 
pain of the land being returned (<devoluta) to the Crown. Within a year, the Alvara was 
withdrawn (Motta 1998, 123-125). 
Here we have patterns which continue to be active through the present time: a 
distinction between agrarian and agricultural reform, government reluctance to interfering 
with large landowners, and a tendency to try to resolve issues through the issuance of 
legal and administrative measures elaborated in an intellectual context far from the reality 
on which they are to be imposed, with negligible or negative results. 
The period from independence to the military dictatorship (1822-1964) continued 
to witness frustrated reforms. These included attempts to regulate land in the Law of 
1850,107 the 1890s proposals of Rui Barbosa to distribute land to former slaves, limited 
attempts toward the end of the Vargas government to effect agrarian reform, and active 
but unproductive discussion of land reform in the 1950s. Throughout this time there was 
106 Semarias are a form of land grand peculiar to Portugal - grants were made on the condition that the land 
be developed, and if it was not developed the land would revert to the crown. 
107 Law 601 of September 18, 1850. 
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a growing recognition that land patterns were a barrier to development, accompanied by a 
seeming inability to do anything about them. 
The distinction between agrarian and agricultural reform persisted. A series of 
technocratic solutions to the agrarian problem emerged during the Old Republic, with no 
attempt at meaningful structural change.108 The Vargas government, which showed some 
inclination toward change, would not effect a land redistribution: 
Vargas strongly went against the agrarian interests, brought the latifundios under 
control, incentivized internal colonization, limited the expansion of large 
landowners, promoted small scale family production on the frontier... but 
abstained from promoting... modernization of the agrarian structure or... agrarian 
reform, leaving the traditional latifundio untouched (Linhares and Silva, 129). 
The growth of the peasant leagues in the 1950s,109 together with the new influence 
of rural unions, the increasing concern of the Church, and a widespread opinion that the 
Brazilian land structure was archaic, gave hope for the first time that a solid reform might 
be undertaken. Indeed, some progress seemed to be made and significant legislation was 
pending when the military takeover of 1964 cut the process short. 
Confused Land Titles and Violence 
The background necessary to understand Brazilian land reform would not be 
complete without mentioning conflicting land titles and land rights. From the colonial 
108 Mendonga (1997) presents a thorough analysis of these efforts 
109 The Peasant Leagues began to be formally recognized in 1955. Initially growing out of groups to help 
pay funeral expenses, they were organized by lawyer Francisco Juliao and began to demand a greater voice 
for the rural poor. ( See, e.g., Andrade 1989; Martins, 1995) 
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period onward, Brazil has had a pattern of contradictory and confusing land titles, 
squatters often living on land to which they have no formal title (although they may have 
rights of adverse possession), while there are often more than one title to the property. 
Repeatedly the government recognized possessory rights without reference to the legality 
(or illegality) of the manner in which those rights were obtained. Taxation of land 
transfers often results in land being transferred in fact but not in the registry. This 
situation persists not only on the frontiers of Amazonia and Mato Grosso, but even in 
cities such as Rio de Janeiro and surrounding areas. 
Marcia Motta cites James Holston, who states that "land law in Brazil promotes 
conflict, and not solutions, because it establishes the terms by which grilagem is 
consistently legalized" (Motta 1998, 20-21). Holston's is, she notes, an original thought 
on the subject; it is also a highly insightful one. The continuous process of recognizing 
and subsequently legitimizing posses, no matter from whom or how obtained, rewards 
those who are able and willing to seize land unscrupulously through fraud or violence. 
It has been noted, for instance, that the Law of 1850 ignored customary rural land 
patterns, including the use of communal lands. Teixeira da Silva (1999, 11, 14) has 
produced evidence that, as the majority of people did not understand the law, the elite 
learned to use it as a tool for seizing land by having unregistered land declared devoluta 
(returned to the state) and then registering their own titles to it. 
The great landlords, principally cattlemen, coming from the coastal region, 
managed to register... ample areas of land, as the traditional possessory rights and 
forms of communal occupation were not recognized, managing subsequently, 
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through incredible violence, to seize [the lands of] rural workers and Indians 
(Linhares and Silva 1999, 62). 
Marcia Motta's study of legal cases (1998, 225) leads her to note: 
...the manner in which the fazendeiros — lords and possessors of land ~ 
consecrated their power and prestige, permitting them to forge titles to land, 
falsifying in local registries — with the connivance of registrars and witnesses — 
the origin and extension of their domains. It demonstrates how the Land Law of 
1850 did not succeed in imposing a property title immune to the dubious 
strategies of the great fazendeiros in their efforts to occupy legally public land. 
While violence was a factor throughout the colonial and imperial periods, there is 
some indication that it increased during the Old Republic. 
Violence always was and continues to be a constant presence in the countryside. 
In the first republican decades, however, the episodes of violence... took on 
specific aspects that give the period some of its fundamental characteristics (L. 
Silva, 257). 
Ligia Silva (258-261) also notes that, during this period, family feuds over land or 
political influence were common, as was banditry. Messianic movements, which 
attracted large numbers of people from the backlands, often led to violence. Silva sees 
such movements as a sign of the great numbers of people who could not obtain land. 
"...(N)either the abundance of land nor the existence of favorable legislation were 
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sufficient to counteract the concrete social situation reigning in the backlands, marked by 
violence and coronelismo."no 
Under the law establishing the Guarda Nacional, the Coronel and other "officers 
of the Guarda Nacional could not, when arrested or subject to criminal proceedings or 
when condemned, be placed in common jails," remaining instead under the custody of 
the "sala livre" of the local jail. Leal, writing in the 1940s, stated: 
The role of hired thugs and bandits in local political battles has been very notable, 
although it is diminishing with the development of the Police, who not rarely take 
their place... In political reprisals and crimes and in fights between families, the 
activity of thugs is of the greatest importance (Leal 290, 293).'11 
Thus, with respect to the extremely violent bandits who plagued the backlands during this 
period, it has been noted that "...the struggle of the public powers against the bandits 
constitutes part of the struggle against the impunity of the coroneis who gave them 
coverage" (L. Silva, 261).112 
110 By "favorable legislation" she means the tendency to recognize posse rights. Coronelismo is the system 
through which rural landowners controlled votes in their region - e.g., of their renters, share-croppers, and 
smaller neighbors; the term originated with the coroneis of the Guarda Nacional, which quickly became an 
honorary title for any wealthy person. See Leal. 
111 While many thugs were agregados of landholders, bandits also emerged from among the classes of 
smallholders who had been dispossessed of their land, often acting to avenge the murder of family. The 
greatest of these, Antonio Silvino, whose band was active in the Northeast during the first years of the 20th 
Century, was a Robin Hood figure who robbed only the rich and distributed some of his takings to the poor. 
Arrested in 1914, he was pardoned by Vargas in 1937. 
112 "In 1912, at the Convention of the states of the Northeast, the chiefs of police of the states most affected 
by banditry decided to jointly undertake hunting the bandits, even if, in order to do so, they had to invade 
the property of the coronel." (L. Silva, 261). 
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During the Old Republic, the Vargas era, and after, landless workers and small 
farmers who had lost their land gravitated toward the frontiers and backlands, where they 
entered the forests and wild areas in search of free land. When land became more 
valuable — often in connection with the construction of roads — large landowners would 
move in and take over: 
They would expropriate the land by force, taking advantage of the work done in 
clearing the forest... This is the history of the conquest of land which Jorge 
Amado relates in his stories about the cacau region of Bahia: gunmen, ambushes, 
falsification of titles. This is the history of expropriation and grilagem of small 
farmer's lands in Maranhao... and in the semi-humid part of the Tocantins 
valley... (Mine, 24-25).113 
The violence of thegrileiros was sometimes resisted with limited success.114 
Indians also suffered great violence as the white population moved onto their 
lands. Massacres were carried out by professional Indian hunters and by bands acting 
under the authority of coroneis. Conflicts developed between small farmers and Indians, 
often resulting from state governments selling settlers land within recognized Indian 
areas (L. Silva, 262). 
Subsistence farming 
Subsistence farming has been carried out in Brazil since colonial time by independent 
113 We witnessed the identical procedures in Tocantins during 1985-1992. 
114 For instance, Jose Porfirio led a group in Goias that resisted grilagem throughout the 1950s when their 
land was made more valuable by the construction of the Belem-Brasilia highway. Porfirio was murdered 
during the military dictatorship (Mine, 25). 
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small farmers, renters, share-croppers, and posseiros. As manual labor was looked down 
upon by the Portuguese colonists, most of the early colonial subsistence farms were run 
by those with Indian blood, although later many such farms were run by poor whites, free 
blacks, and slaves. Throughout Brazilian history, rural workers and subsistence farming 
have been looked on as being backward and inferior. 
Current historians recognize, however, that both poor whites and slaves had a much 
more pro-active role during the colonial period and the monarchy than had previously 
been thought, carving out spaces for themselves, generally in subsistence farming with 
the marketing of small surpluses. They have also recognized that subsistence agriculture 
played a far more important economic role than has generally been recognized (Motta 45; 
Gomes 2001, 269 et seq.; Siqueira 1997, 41-43). 
During the Old Republic, there was a great deal of discussion about promoting 
food production so as to provide the basic needs of urban consumers. Some of 
this discussion centered around small farmers. The Ministry of Agriculture, 
Industry and Commerce established a small number of agricultural settlements. 
Technically oriented ruralists promoted a four-pronged approach — colonization, 
modernization of production methods, education, and credit/cooperativism. 
These ruralists tended to view the rural worker as the object of social action, 
rather than as one who could participate in it himself with something valuable to 
offer (Mendon9a 1997, 139-140, 178-181,213). 
This attitude toward rural workers continued to prevail during the Vargas era. It 
was during the 1950s, with formation of the peasant leagues in the Northeast and the 
pioneering adult literacy work of Paulo Freire, that the concept of the rural worker as 
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subject of his own development began to be widely spread among intellectuals. This 
concept was to be a key element in the base community work carried out by the Church, 
beginning in the 1960s (of which more below). 
The Estatuto da Terra: 1964 - present 
Historical background 
On April 1, 1964, a military coup ousted the Goulart government, virtually 
without resistance. While large landowners, concerned about agrarian reform, were 
among those who supported the coup, they were by no means the only source of support. 
The coup was widely approved among businessmen and the middle classes: inflation was 
increasing, the government was deeply in debt, Goulart showed little ability to control the 
situation, often engaging in irresponsible rhetoric.115 Since 1889, when they removed the 
monarchy, the military had stepped in and assumed control of the government 
periodically during crises. It was widely expected that they would do this now, returning 
power to a civilian government after a provisional period. 
Eight months after taking power, the military government, under its first 
president, Marshall Humberto Castelo Branco, pushed through the Estatuto da Terra."6 
While the large landowners complained that they had been betrayed, they were stripped 
of their primary argument — that such a statute was communist: Castelo Branco, who had 
fought with the allies in Italy in World War II, had an impeccable reputation and had 
entered office with the support of the United States. The landowners' representatives in 
115 In this respect, one of the last straws for the military was when Goulart suggested that enlisted men 
should unionize. 
116 Law 4.504 of November 30, 1964 
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Congress resorted to delaying tactics ~ seeking to question everything they could in the 
proposed legislation. But modernizing agriculture was one of the three stated priorities of 
the government (the others were controlling inflation and reorienting international 
117 relations), and it pushed the law through (R. Bueno 1997, 3-6). 
It is not my intention here to analyze in detail the Estatuto da Terra. That law is 
still the basis of Brazilian agrarian reform legislation.118 What we will look at are the 
major developments affecting agrarian reform which have occurred over the forty-five 
years since the Estatuto was passed, giving particular emphasis to the underlying patterns 
mentioned above. 
Suffice it to say here that, while there is debate about many aspects of the 
Estatuto, most observers agree that it is a fairly good law which, if acted upon, could 
serve as a basis for serious agrarian reform. In enacting the law, the government, both 
responding to United States policy and from its own viewpoint,119 saw agrarian reform as 
essential to the modernization of agriculture and the creation of a rural middle class. 
Although the validity of those goals was questioned by the left, the law had an overall 
applicability that made it acceptable to progressive forces. 
117 On the role of the agrarian question in justifying the coups, see Jones; for a leftist perspective on the 
matter, see Mine. The military also provided subsidized financing to the rural sector in general, and started 
the National Fund for Rural Refinancing with USAID funds (Linhares and Silva, 185). Oliveira (1988, 83) 
states that Castelo Branco's Minister of Planning, Roberto Campos, assured landowners that the Estatuto 
would not be acted upon. 
118 There are nearly eighty active laws and decrees that touch upon issues related to agrarian reform; most 
of these were issued after the Estatuto, but a few predate it, going back as far as 1937. 
119 U.S. influence is seen generally in the Alliance for Progress rhetoric and more specifically in the Carta 
de Punta del Este. The Brazilian War College, which provided courses and training for military officers, 
also advocated agrarian reform for modernization. 
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In taking over the process of enacting agrarian reform, the government had 
"seized the flag" from the workers, in a certain sense cutting short their 
participation in the making of the law by delivering it from above. At the same 
time it provided them with a new rallying point, the workers now taking on the 
task of defending the Estatuto (R. Bueno, 6-8, 21). 
While the Estatato da Terra provided the basis for an agrarian reform, the reform 
never took place. After Castelo Branco, who identified with the moderate wing of the 
military, left office in 1967, the government came under the control of the hard liners and 
the emphasis turned to national security issues. 
It is true that the military government did not carry out an agrarian reform: in two 
decades there were only one hundred and seventy expropriations of land, the 
concentration of land ownership increased enormously, as did the proletarization 
of the countryside (more than one million, six hundred thousand small farmers 
were converted into landless workers between 1970 and 1980). The landowners 
during these years oscillated a great deal in their positions. On the one hand, they 
had the government that, in order to maintain their support, threatened them with 
agrarian reform, even if a decrepit one. On the other hand, they had the 
opposition, the workers, the left, the popular movements, talking of a more radical 
agrarian reform and of invading land (Martins 1986, 25). 
In 1985, the military government claimed that, during its twenty-one year 
administration, it had distributed a million titles to land, although the President of INCRA 
later admitted the number was only 560,000. Outside observers acknowledge 470,000, 
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but of these over 300,000 were simply titles issued to long-standing posseiros, 
recognizing the legality of their holdings. Of the remainder, 94,000 were settlements in 
the Amazon, on government lands or on bankrupt rubber plantations that had been 
expropriated in order to build highways (principally the Transamazonica), lands of little 
value, far from markets. Only 76,000 titles (about 3,620 per year) were genuine agrarian 
reform, involving expropriation of latifundios and distribution of land to rural workers 
(Mine, 8-10).120 
The military planned to pass the presidency to a civilian government through an 
election held in a carefully crafted electoral college, meant to assure selection of a picked 
successor. However, when Aureliano Chaves, the civilian vice president of Brazil, who 
identified with the moderate military, objected to the candidates chosen by the hard liners 
and made an alliance with the opposition, many civilian politicians who had supported 
the government followed him. They supported Tancredo Neves, a member of the 
opposition party. Tancredo, a highly respected conservative with close ties to the 
Church, made a commitment to agrarian reform. 
Tancredo died before taking office, and his vice president, Jose Sarney was sworn 
in as president. Sarney, who had been part of the Chaves faction and the former Senate 
leader under the dictatorship, is from a family of large landholders in Maranhao. When 
the Minister of Agrarian Reform, Nelson Ribeiro (nominated by Tancredo and committed 
to agrarian reform) submitted to Sarney a National Plan for Agrarian Reform (PNRA), 
Sarney returned it to him nine times — each version weaker than the last — before 
120 In contrast Mine notes that the rural exodus in 1985 was 1.1 million people per year. 
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approving it.121 The Sarney government made it a practice to delay and lose 
expropriation requests sent to it by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (Martins, 1994, 89-
90).122 
Meanwhile, during the twenty-one years that had passed since 1964, the climate 
with respect to agrarian reform had changed dramatically, in three ways: 
• During the hard line years, organization in the countryside had been severely 
suppressed. Labor leaders were arrested, killed, or forced into hiding; the incipient 
rural labor unions was co-opted and turned essentially into administrative units that 
processed government health benefits for workers. Though the Church committed 
t ^^ 
itself to rural worker rights to a greater depth than previously, and although a 
relative loosening (abertura) of government control after 1979 allowed the rural 
labor movement to begin to revive, a decade and a half had virtually been lost. 
• The military government successfully involved the urban business sectors in land 
ownership. This was done through a series of laws granting incentives to companies 
121 Decree 91.766 
122 Veiga (1990, 73-146) narrates the effort to achieve agrarian reform under the Sarney government. 
Reform was also sabotaged by INCRA functionaries; in 1988, I was at a meeting with the Governor of 
Goias, Henrique Santillo, who was nearly in tears with frustration: he was trying to have a latifundio in 
Goias expropriated, but the process repeatedly reached the President's office with errors of procedure and 
documentation that would make expropriation impossible. 
123 The Church was virtually the only institution in Brazil capable of standing up to the military 
government, and even then at considerable risk. The ecclesial base community (CEB) movement, starting 
in Espirito Santo in the 1960s and spreading throughout the country, organized groups, especially in rural 
areas, to provide mutual self help, understand the current political and economic events, judge them in light 
of Christian standards, and act to change them (ver, julgar, agir); this movement had a strong role in 
changing the fatalism one often encountered in the countryside in the late 1960s. The CEBs were closely 
watched by government police, often harrassed, and organizers were at times arrested or killed. In 1975, 
the Church formed the Land Pastoral Commission (CPT) to provide support to dioceses, CEBs and other 
groups working with land issues. The CPT also helped the rural labor movement as it began to revive in 
the late seventies and early eighties. In 1980, the Bishops came out with a strong document advocating 
land reform. 
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for the purchase of land or for engaging in rural activities. The FISET program 
subsidized corporations that invested in reforestation, the FINOR and FINAM 
programs, subsidized companies that invested in agricultural/stock-raising activities 
in the Northeast and Amazon regions, respectively. Often companies would invest 
through specially formed forestation or cattle-raising enterprises. As criteria for such 
programs were vague, the investments tended to be aimed at low-cost/low 
maintenance efforts: fast growing trees (eucaplyptus, pinus eliotus) for cellulose, 
cattle ranching. The negative impact of these programs on the countryside has been 
widely noted. However, they served to provide the urban elite with a vested interest 
in a concentrated land structure. With growing inflation, the non-agricultural upper 
classes also began buying land for investment and speculation (See, e.g., Aguiar 
1985, 53-58; Moura 1988, 3-4; Powers 1987a, 288-289).124 
• The banner of "modernization" — the government's basis for enacting the Estatuto — 
had fallen. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the model of modern agriculture had 
increasingly changed — in the United States and elsewhere — to large commercial 
farming, mechanized and dependent on commercial fertilizers and pesticides. Those 
who supported "modernization" now viewed the small family farm as a relic. The 
economic argument seemed to be on the side of large landholdings, leaving land 
reform as a peripheral social issue. In essence, the landholders had found a new 
argument against agrarian reform. 
Thus, when the Constitution of 1988 was promulgated by Congress (acting as a 
constitutional convention), the Church, the populists, and the left found themselves 
124 Martins (1994,49) points out that the alliance between large capitalists and landowners dates back to the 
beginning of the Old Republic, but was made stronger by the incentive measures here discussed. 
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advocating a social justice issue with little support from those most interested in 
economic development. 
[T]hey did not manage a solid clause on agrarian reform, this defeat due 
decisively to the conservative congressmen, who were not worried by Vargas 
styled corporativist measures for the urban sector, but did not want to negotiate... 
the rights of property in the countryside. A new organization of rural landowners, 
the Uniao Democratica Ruralista, outflanked the defenders of agrarian reform 
through intensive and effective lobbying. The conservative message was clear: 
guarantees of human rights were inoffensive but threats to land rights were 
another matter (Skidmore, 269-270).125 
The Constitution's vague distinction between productive and unproductive land was 
particularly harmful, "practically annulling the relatively more advanced concepts of the 
Estatuto da Terra." This distinction gave state and local judges grounds (which they 
amply used) for supporting the claims of large landholders, generating "a systematic 
wave of evictions of the occupants [small posseiros] from the land" . (Martins 1994, 90-
91; see also Moura on judicial actions). 
125 The UDR's lobbying was made easier by the fact that a very large percentage of congressmen (the 
"ruralistas") were either landowners or tied to the landowning class. See Martins 1994, 91; Powers 1987b, 
326. Veiga 1990, 7-9, notes that, in the mid-80s, not only the right, but the center and left, largely bought 
into the argument that modernization had made obsolete the economic arguments in favor of agrarian 
reform, a position he finds strange given contrary empirical evidence from other countries. 
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Modernization of Agriculture 
The modernization in agriculture126 that occurred during and after the military 
regime has been analyzed elsewhere (Powers 2006). I outline here a few key points. 
The process began as one focused on technology, seeking to augment the 
productivity of both land and workers. This included purchase, maintenance, and 
operating expenses for equipment (tractors, irrigations systems, etc.) and inputs such as 
hybrid seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides — all of which required increased capital. It has 
been estimated that the value of such costs and inputs rose from less than 15% of the 
brute value of agricultural and livestock (agropecuaria) production in 1949 to 40% in 
1980. At the same time, processing of agropecuaria production became both more 
widespread and more of it took place in Brazil than previously. Even items that were not 
processed — such as truck garden produce — tended to be marketed increasingly through 
modern commercial systems (transportation systems, wholesale centers, supermarkets) 
(Lavinas and Ribeiro 1995, 73-75).127 By 1985, approximately 75% of food was sold in 
supermarkets (Belik 1999, 193-194). 
Agriculture that evolved in this direction became a link in the chain of what has 
been called the "agro-industrial complex" (AIC). The chain does not start with the land, 
but with the inputs to the land, passes through the growing stage, then moves on to 
processing and commercialization. Capital is essential to this chain, so financing 
126 Defined as the growing use of industrially manufactured inputs (Powers 2006, 7). Some authors use the 
term "conservative modernization" (Delgado et al., 1996, 218; Szmrecsanyi and Ramos 1996, 238; Ramos 
1999, 188) 
127 Lavinas and Ribeiro note that, in the 1960s, Brazil opted for a "green revolution" productionist model 
over an agrarian reform model. 
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becomes key ~ sometimes in a subsidized form from the government, sometimes through 
other measures such as pre-planting contracts with processors for sale of the crops. 
Agriculture is subordinated to financial and industrial capital (Lavinas and Ribeiro, 75; 
Mesquita and Brandao 1995, 12.) 
The new system increasingly viewed land as a commodity. Ironically, however, 
this worked against the modern concept of agricultural efficiency in two ways: (1) during 
the inflationary economy that reigned in Brazil from the late 1970s to the mid 90s, land 
compared favorably with other investments and was purchased by speculators with no 
1 
interest in developing its agricultural potential; (2) corporate investors who purchased 
land through tax incentives and subsidies — an attempt to link financial and industrial 
capital more closely to agriculture — had little vocation for agriculture and put only about 
20% of their land into production (Benjamin, et al., 187-188).129 
Modernization of this type was most effective in the newly opening areas of the 
Central-West and in the relatively developed Southeast and South. In this last region, 
where there is a strong European tradition of family farms, such farms were to a certain 
extent included. Nevertheless, most small farmers ~ especially in the less developed 
North and Northeast — were excluded from the process of modernization: 
Those rural producers, the great majority, who were not associated/integrated into 
this process of modernization, but who suffer its consequences, are transformed 
128 "...in addition to a means of capitalist production, land becomes a highly liquid financial asset in a fairly 
unstable market for property titles, gaining value at an accelerated rate, at levels highly competative with 
other financial assets" (Lavinas and Ribeiro, 75). 
129 Although this rate is better than that of other latifundiarios, it is below the rate for small (65%) and 
medium (28%) farms. 
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into the rural poor, into the excluded ones who are no longer producers, except as 
a labor force that lives in want, waiting for the creation of possible modes of more 
stable and promising insertion into economic development, and for whom access 
to land no longer guarantees anything except a level of survival which is less than 
minimal and forces them into various forms of salaried work (Lavinas and 
Ribeiro, 74).130 
As carried out in Brazil, agricultural modernization proved harmful in at least 
three ways. First, it created new, more efficient monocultures (soy, grains, oranges) with 
vast productive capacities but for markets which are highly volatile, dependent on the 
world economic situation, on the exchange rate, and on subsidies.131 
This makes it so that modern Brazilian agriculture is, at the same time, very 
productive and very vulnerable. Pressured by the costs of inputs that are acquired 
on the market, dependent on capitalist calculations and integrated into agro-
industrial complexes, it falls into disorganization easily, in contrast to what 
occurred with the traditional [subsistance] agricultural sector, which was much 
more self-sufficient. The vulnerability of our modern agriculture will only 
130 The last phrase is an overstatement; where subsistence farmers have orientation and mutual support, 
they can achieve a level of well-being perhaps superior to that of most urban slum dwellers, although their 
money income is minimal. 
131131 Jank (2000, 125-6) notes that, while exports stagnated during 1981-92 due to worldwide recession, 
1993-2000 was a "surprisingly" dynamic period for exports, especially key products such as soy, coffee, 
sugar, chicken, and cellulose. The 1990s also witnessed a "profound structural change" in Brazilian agro-
business via opening of the economy and deregulation of markets, requiring both manufacturers of inputs 
and processors to consolidate in order to compete, causing further concentration in the non-agricultural 
components of the AIC. Real prices for crops fell consistently and were 50-60% lower in 1995/98 than 
they had been in 1982/86. By the turn of the century, "The big players in Brazilian agro-industrial 
exports... could be brought together in a large room" (Jank, 123-4, 126-9; Helfand and Rezende 2001, 248-
9, 266-8). 
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disappear when its ties to a powerful internal market are increased (Benjamin, et 
al., 81-83). 
Second, as Brazil opted to modernize via large, mechanized commercial farms 
rather than through smaller productive units, the marginalization of small farmers 
mentioned above forced many rural workers to leave the land. 
Enormous contingents of small landowners were ruined and rural workers were 
displaced — in a process that continues today — moving on to contend for a place 
outside of agriculture, at virtually any [minimal] salary. Those that insist in 
remaining as farmers are systematically pushed out to the most distant areas, with 
the worst lands and the least infrastructure. 
A new dynamic was added to the land conflict, one in which the more powerful forces 
are divided from the poor not only in terms of land ownership and financial power, but 
increasingly in terms of technology (Benjamin, et al., 84). 
Finally, modernization as it has been practiced in Brazil, leads to increasing 
ecological problems. These are due in part to the pushing of subsistence farmers into 
areas unsuitable for sustainable farming: arid lands, river margins, rain forests ~ leading 
to problems of desertification, erosion, deforestation. It is also due in part to the 
problems that plague modern agriculture everywhere — agro-toxins, destruction of 
biodiversity, increasing dependence on chemical fertilizers. But chiefly it is due to the 
continued predatory and expansive nature of Brazilian agriculture — worsened by the 
current view of land as a mere commodity. One is reminded of Sergio Buarque de 
Holanda's observation, with respect to colonial times, that technology simply made bad 
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agricultural methods more devastating (Buarque de Holanda, 49). The comment is 
even more applicable to the high technological capabilities of our own time. 
* 
It was common up until very recently to speak of an archaic Brazil and a new one, 
existing side by side, the rural areas usually (although not exclusively) being part of the 
former, in contrast to the efficient industries of the cities.133 Rural poverty was especially 
identified as being part of the archaic Brasil. While there was some truth to this 
observation, it tended to obscure the reality of the modern situation: with the 
intermingling of the rural and urban elites and the option for agricultural modernization, 
land concentration and rural poverty are not so much a product of archaic practices as 
they are of archaic patterns transformed into modernity. New technologies, the opening 
of transportation, the increased sophistication of financial and commercial networks, 
made it increasingly easier for small groups of the wealthy to dominate larger areas of 
land. While their motives may have been no worse than those of their colonial and 
imperial fore bearers, the capacity of these groups to extend their influence, to eliminate 
the spaces and practices which they see as wasteful or risky (such as adverse possession 
by small posseiros, informal land use, or share cropping), advanced considerably. A 
strong argument can be made that many subsistence farmers in the past, living in relative 
isolation, were better off than the marginalized rural poor today. In any case, those who 
think that the struggle of the rural workers and their allies today is against an archaic 
132 Buarque de Holanda, also noted (51) that frequent change in land ownership served as a disincentive to 
invest in the land's fertility, another factor applicable to modernization. See also, L. Silva, 47-48 
133 Lambert, Os Dois Brasis, is the classic statement of this approach. See also Moraes. For a view that 
refuses this distinction, see Miranda Neto, 45-47 
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system are dangerously mistaken: their struggle today is not against the archaic, but 
against the modern, the new.134 
The Underlying Patterns 
The underlying patterns mentioned above have continued in the period since 
1964. 
• Although the domestic market for agricultural goods grew, the export sector 
continued to be favored. Pressures and incentives to export increased with the large 
negative balance of payments that emerged during the last ten years of the military 
regime (Benjamin, et al., 83-84. See also Skidmore, 251). The great anomaly in 
place since colonial times continued: Brazil became one of the world's foremost 
exporters of food while a large percentage of its own people suffered from hunger 
and malnutrition. 
• Large landholdings continued to be the rule, and land concentration increased (see, 
1 'Xft 
e.g., Hall, 108-120). While diversification occurred so that Brazil was not entirely 
dependent on a single export crop (as in the case of coffee), the plantations/farms 
134 Jose de Souza Martins has developed this thesis; see Linhares and Silva, 142. In traditional, relatively 
isolated farm communities, for instance, farmers would store surplus harvest from good years, thus 
providing for occassional bad years. With the development of transport, however, the pressure to sell 
surpluses increased. Given the vast disparity of wealth, virtually every "modernizing" project - roads, 
irrigation, tourism - results in further marginalizing the poor. See, e.g., Porto, 179 
135 President Cardoso stated with reference to agriculture: "Or Brazil multiplies its export efforts or it will 
not have conditions to overcome its difficulties." He expressed the intention, however, to involve small 
landowners in this process (Lana). Martins (Atraso, 77) notes that the military regime's option to focus on 
the export market rather than the internal market, largely determined by factors outside Brazil, led toward 
promoting large landholdings. 
136 In 1985, at the end of the dictatorship, 0.8% of rural properties of 1000 ha. or more occupied 44% of the 
arable land; this figure probably underestimates true concentration as it is common for the same owner or 
group to own more than one such property. 
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themselves tended to be monocultural. New monocultural export crops emerged 
(oranges,137 soy) as well as the older monocultural crops for export or domestic 
markets (cattle, rice). With adoption by the military government of the Pro-Alcool 
Program (incentivating alcohol-fueled automobiles and subsidizing sugar growers), 
land planted in sugar-cane actually increased (Martins 2000b, 27). Cheap labor also 
continues to be an important factor, despite a limited amount of mechanization. 
Rural wages continue to be low, many rural workers do not have signed work cards 
or receive employment benefits, and cases of de facto enslavement of rural workers 
1 
(often brutally enforced) are regularly reported. 
• Despite the push for more efficient commercialized agriculture, the great mass of 
Brazilian land still tended to be wastefully used, with poor agricultural techniques 
and ecologically harmful practices. Figures from 1989 revealed that only 14% of 
Brazil's arable land was under cultivation; that figure fell to 6.73% on landholding of 
between 1000 and 10,000 ha. and 2.31% on landholdings of over 10,000 ha. 
(Benjamin et al. 1998, 187). Wide scale burning of fields is common throughout the 
frontier areas; during the pre-planting months the smoke over states such as 
Rondonia, Tocantins, and Para is thick enough to interfere with air flights. The 
continued pushing of poor farmers deeper and deeper into the Amazon has had 
negative environmental impact. Widespread land speculation, fueled by economic 
instability, increased the tendency of non-agricultural elements to invest in land, 
137 Oranges were usually processed to concentrate prior to export. One Brazilian orange grower had more 
orange trees than the entire state of Florida. Skidmore, 250 
138 On slave labor see, e.g., Sutton; J.S Martins (Reforma Agraria, 41-44). Brazil's income disparity 
between urban areas and rural (3/1) is the highest in Latin America (BID, Desigualdad, 16). At the end of 
the military regime (1983), only 4% of rural workers had signed work cards (Mesquita, 12). 
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deforesting large tracts in order to claim the land was "productive," but in fact 
increasing the percentage of unproductive land (Almeida and Campari 1995, 1-7; 
Powers, 1987b, 324-325). 
• There has been a change in the perception of the value of land. Nevertheless, while 
the value of land today may now be more an economic symbol than one of social 
status, there still exists in certain parts of the country (the Northeast and Central-
West, for instance) a tremendous prestige in being a large landowner. Certainly the 
large landholder still has power in rural areas where he holds land, and in remote 
areas this power may be considerable. In addition, during times of instability and 
inflation, land offers one of a few safe investments, and is held by the non-
agricultural elite for savings and speculation. Landowners also have had privileged 
access to public resources through credit, subsidies, and co-opting of government 
projects (Costa Filho 1998, 172; Tavares 1999, 230-231; Benjamin, et al., 79, 
Almeida and Campari, 7).139 
• The relationship among land, commerce, and finance grew more complex with the 
landowner status of great corporations, the myriad of (often abused) subsidized 
financing and tax incentive mechanisms, and the greater intricacies of financial and 
commercial markets. With the growth of food processing plants in Brazil, the 
139 In the early 1990s a scandal broke out when it was discovered that many deep water wells drilled by the 
National Department of Drought Prevention Works (DNOCS) were on the property of wealthy landowners, 
including congressmen; the procedure was completely legal. Around the same time, the Catholic Church in 
Ceara undertook a project of locating over 4000 reservoirs built with public funds over the last forty years; 
it was found that many of these were on private lands. The Church advocated for public access to these 
reservoirs. Martins, Atraso, 80, says that, with the reinforced link between urban capital and large land, 
there appeared after 1984 "...a new oligarchic elite, with very modern outward trappings." 
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agricultural-commercial complex of the Empire and the Old Republic has evolved into 
the agro-industrial complex of today (Mesquita and Brandao, 12).140 
• The relationship between government and landowners continues to be complex. 
From 1950 to 1980 Brazil's rural population fell from 70% to 30%. This clearly 
affected the old rural structure, as did opening of the countryside to transportation 
and communications (the military regime recognized this and gave control of 
powerful media to groups — especially TV Globo ~ that could be counted on to 
support positions that maintain the essential economic structure). Furthermore, 
landowners almost ceased to be a class per se: not only had corporate interests (and 
many wealthy urbanites individually) become landowners, but the old landowning 
families — following practices that had begun in colonial times — were increasingly 
important in commercial and financial activities. This is especially true in the North 
and Northeast, where there has been no urban industrial class to speak of and the old 
(e.g., sugar mill) money plays a significant role. The Northern and Northeastern elite 
has become expert in the use of government subsidies, not only in agriculture (e.g., 
Pro-Alcool) but in industry, tourism (e.g., hotel construction), etc. (A member of a 
leading Recife law firm representing the elite told me that only three of their clients 
were real entrepreneurs; the rest dealt almost entirely with government funds.) But 
the old patterns still prevail in the North and Northeast, with elites able to control 
significant rural and poor urban votes, and the representational distribution in 
Congress, which heavily favors the North and Northeast, gives these elites a 
140 Linhares and Silva, 145, note that the role of the agro-industrial complex in knitting together the 
interests of the rural and urban elites. 
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tremendous voice in national affairs (see, e.g., Sodre 2003)141 
• As noted above, confusion of land titles and of possessory rights continues to be a 
problem. In February, 1999, INCRA announced that it had discovered over 18 
million hectares of land in the state of Amazonas that had been illicitly claimed by 
latifundiarios, and that there was strong evidence that at least another 11.3 million 
hectares in the rest of the country was in the same situation. While such problems 
are perhaps most severe in frontier areas, title issues are common close to (and 
within) large urban areas (Lacerda, 2/25/99).142 
• Violence continues to be common in land conflicts. The military government, 
fearing a rural uprising, took brutal repressive action against rural union leaders and 
organizers and encouraged private groups to do the same: 
The military repression... opened the doors for violent action by the large land 
owners through their overseers and gunmen, in hundreds of places throughout 
the country, in the certainty that they would not be punished and, beyond this, 
were allied with the repression that was maintaining order.... Never in the 
history of Brazil was the latifundio so poweful in the use of private violence and 
never were the armed forces so fragile in relation to it as during the military 
141 Although many factors lead to rural emigration, one strong factor has been the eviction of share-
croppers and small posseiros (Moura, 1-3; Powers, Land and Violence). 
142 Identifying such land requires a painstaking search through local registries; judicial action must then be 
taken to reclaim it. As mentioned above, when buying farm land an hour outside of Rio de Janeiro, we 
discovered that almost all local lands were held in posse, often with unregistered changes of ownership and 
confusion with respect to titles. Major litigation is ongoing as to the legal ownership of Barra da Tijuca, a 
huge coastal area at the southern edge of the city of Rio, which has developed during the last twenty years 
into one of the richest neighborhoods in the city; conflicting titles and claims dating back to the 19th 
Century have litigated for years. Oliveira (85) notes that INCRA figures show that, in the mid 1980s, most 
large landowners (96% of latfundios por dimesoes) were not paying land taxes. 
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regime. In a certain manner, it was as if the Guarda Nacional had been reborn 
.... (Martins, Atraso,82-83; see also, Brasil: Nunca Mais, 125-128)143 
Figures for rural workers killed during the military regime are difficult to ascertain. 
In the period immediately following, the figures indicate an increasingly violent land 
conflict; although murders of workers and organizers peaked in the late 1980s, they 
continue to this day, accompanied by almost complete impunity of both the killers and 
those who hire them.144 As noted above, fraud and corruption with respect to land 
• i 145 titles are rampant. 
• Efforts at reform continue to be frustrated. The Church, principally through the CPT, 
has devoted substantial effort and resources to defending the rights of small farmers 
and landless workers; it sponsored (in 1987) a major campaign in favor of agrarian 
reform and continues to be a vocal advocate. Following the military abertura, rural 
union groups and other civil groups, including NGOs, began organizing and 
representing rural workers seeking land reform. The Movimento Sem-Terra (MST -
Landless Workers Movement), organized in 1984 and gaining national visibility in 
the 1990s, has engaged in a policy of more dramatic action, including helping groups 
of landless workers to physically occupy land. The net result of all this, in terms of 
143 Oliveira (31-54) presents a summary of land related violence during 1964-86; for more recent period, 
see CPT publications. 
144 Where there is significant international pressure, as respecting the murder of Sister Dorothy Stang, 
convictions of murderers are more likely (e.g., BBC News 2010) 
145 "The conflict in Pontal de Paranapanema... is, in this sense, just one example. According to information 
collected by the Folha de S. Paulo [a major newspaper], nearly 50% of the region can be considered 
devolutas. All of which indicates that the geneological tree of the land titles, from 1852 until today, is 
incomplete or falsified. The newspaper [states]... 'two fazendeiros of Pontal manage to quickly falsify the 
titles, that have been passed hand to hand with each resale'" (Motta, 224). 
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effective land reform policy and actual land redistribution, has been miniscule.146 
Impact of Development on Small Farms 
It has been noted that the model of rural development adopted in Brazil, 
particularly beginning with the military government, favored large corporate and/or 
absentee owned farms to family farms. The model "caused great inequalities in the 
countryside, as it accelerated the rural exodus, the industrialization of agriculture and its 
"technification" without, however, providing equitable distribution of knowledge and 
opportunity" (Blum 82). This led to the "premature expulsion" of workers from the 
countryside (Veiga 2000, 87; Wood and Carvalho 1994, 226).147 The "expulsion" of 
small farmers from the countryside, though generally an economic phenomenon, was also 
achieved in part through fraudulent and violent practices on the part of those seizing land 
(Powers 1987a, 1987b, 1987c).148 
Although the number of small rural properties did not decrease during the military 
dictatorship, they tended to become smaller - thus less able to support families - and 
offered limited opportunities for the younger generation. Furthermore, the significant 
decrease in renters and share croppers meant that many families were forced to leave 
agriculture or add to the growing number of day laborers.149 These changes placed rural 
146 On MST see Oliveira, 79; 
147 Sobhan (1993,112) notes that disproportionately capital intensive rural development in Brazil results in 
both rural and urban poverty which, in themselves, become a barrier to economic development. 
148 Porto (1997, 177-207) has an interesting discussion of possible connections between technology and 
violence in rural Brazil. 
149 There has been some discussion of rental and share-cropping as alternatives to expropriation for 
affecting agrarian reform. Although such a movement is probably not politically viable, the founding in 
March, 2002, of a rental and share-cropping exchange (bolsa) in Santo Anastacio, Sao Paulo, is an 
workers in a position in which they had almost no bargaining power. Of those who 
stayed in agriculture, many were forced to migrate to other regions (mostly the frontier). 
(Moreira 1999, 28, 39). 
Small farmers who stayed on their land often became suppliers of raw material for 
agro-industry. The strengthening of the oligopolies of the industrial sector of agro-
business (both inputs and outputs) gave agriculture per se less bargaining power and a 
lower percentage of returns. This loss was made up to large landholders through 
government subsidies (especially rural credit), but small farmers tended to lose out. 
(Moreira 1999, 29-34, 39). Writing in 1981, Moreira (1999, 33-34) noted: 
In general, the industries... act as an oligopoly, where competition for agricultural 
raw material rarely was carried out through competition in prices paid to 
producers but through other conditions in the purchase contracts - which tend to 
be generalized in relations between small family producers and the processing 
industry. Among the most usual forms of domination are (a) the furnishing (for 
free or not), of technical assistance, that assumes the double role of binding the 
producer to a certain company, on the one hand, and of demanding and 
encouraging the use of modern inputs, on the other; (b) the furnishing of credit to 
the producer, the company guaranteeing, on the one hand, the sales commitment 
in order to repay the debt and, on the other, the reposition of conditions of 
reproduction of capital from the small producer, and, consequently, his 
technology, (c) fixing the price of the product, established generally without the 
interesting development (Sant'anna 2003; X. Graziano 2003). On the level of modern agriculture, Laurenti 
(2000, 176) notes that the increasing use of rental land by large producers begins to divorce the question of 
land concentration from wealth accumulation. (See also Alston, et al., 1999, 202-203) 
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intervention of the rural labor union, the interests of the company prevailing.... (d) 
after fixing the price of the product, what effectively deetermines the price 
received dpends, fundamentally, on the conditions linked to "classification" of the 
product (which results in different prices) and the measure of payment (weight, 
volume, etc.). This process has been increasingly carried out by the companies. 
Generally, this situation led to a reduction in the surplus value retained by farm families 
(Moreira, 122). 
Another extremely important impact of the modernization of agriculture - or of 
the mentality that promoted that modernization - was to create an attitude that 
mechanized, commercial agriculture is advanced and progressive, and that traditional 
family agriculture is archaic and backward. Small farmers - and especially subsistence 
farmers - were increasingly marginalized culturally, 
... especially dealing with that which, more or less in a confused manner, he 
associates with his identity... and the practices of life and work with which it is 
linked. In these conditions, individuals and groups will remain always at the 
margin of the overall system.... (Almeida 1999, 153) 
Together with an overriding attitude that urban is more advanced, "better" than rural, 
these values undoubtedly had - and to some extent continue to have - a large role in 
causing the young to migrate to the cities.150 (It is interesting, however, that Carneiro 
150 When we lived (1985-92) in Tocantins, a rural state with a population of 600,000, only one public 
middle school in the entire state stressed agriculture as a vocation. Generally the values taught were urban 
ones. The movement of Cooperative Family Agricultural Schools does wonderful work against this trend, 
but they are few and far between (see UNEFAB undated a, b, and c; see also Carneiro Baptista 2003). It 
was only in 2003 that the Federal Ministry of Education, under the new Lula administration and at the 
request of the MST, established a special secretariat for rural education. 
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(1999, 113) found that children of small property owners were less likely to want to move 
to the city than were children of those who did not own land.) 
Who are the small farmers of Brazil? Jank (2000, 124) cites Guilherme Dias as 
classifying three distinct types of Brazilian rural producers: 
• approximately 350,000 who have accumulated almost unrepayable debt and have not 
found a solution, especially in light of the extremely high interest rates in Brazil; 
• about 780,000 who have the possibility of taking a new leap forward based on new 
productive technologies depending on a number of factors: the growth of the 
domestic market, the opening of new export markets, and the bettering of 
macroeconomic conditions and infrastructure; 
• about "four million producers in the process of marginalization;" most of these are 
engaged in "pure food subsistence activity (principally in the North and Northeast 
regions)" but there are also a good number of "small family producers who encounter 
the risk of growing exclusion from the agro-industrial system." 
Although there are family-owned farms in all three of these categories, virtually all 
farmers in the third group are family farms. 
Blum (1999, 69-72) presents another useful classification. He divides agricultural 
establishments into those owned and run by businesses (patronais)151 and those owned 
and run by families {familiares). The latter he divides into three types: 
151 Using terminology from the Estatuto da Terra - the Land Law (4.504 of 1964), he divides these into 
Latifundios and Empresas Rurais. 
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• "Consolidated" - properties semi-specialized and diversified (3-5 income producing 
activities) whose owner lives on the property; they are generally about 50 ha., 
although they may range as high as 200; they use high technology and generally rural 
credit; their gross margin (total receipts minus variable costs) is in the range of 
R$ 15,600 p.a. Their owners are usually enlightened, leaders in the community, able 
to seek technical and financial advice, have good analytical and management skills. 
• "In Transition" - more diversified properties (3-6 income producing activities) whose 
owner lives on the property; generally about 20 ha., although they may range as high 
as 100; use medium level technology; and their total receipts are lower. They are less 
likely to use rural credit, use less technical assistance, and have weaker analytical and 
management skills. 
• "Peripheral" - even more diversified, with 4-7 subsistence activities, the excess of 
which is sold. The owner lives on the property, which is usually less than 20 ha., 
with a range up to 50. Low level of technology is used, and little or no rural credit. 
152 
Income is below one minimum salary per month. 
Although the details of Blum's classification reflect the South of Brazil more than the 
North/Northeast, his three levels make sense. Most family farms in the North and 
Northeast would be peripheral ones, belonging also to Jank's "four million producers in 1 ^ process of marginalization." 
152 Blum's figures on income are clearly wrong - he claims that a monthly minimum salary represents 
RS7800 p.a., when in fact it has never represented more than about R$2600 p.a. 
153 Blum (62-70) provides a good summary of attempts to classify and describe family agriculture, 
including those used by PRONAF and INCRA. He notes that the difficulty in exactly categorizing family 
agriculture should not diminish its importance, but should encourage further study. Note also Porto and 
Siqueira (1997, 33-35), who distinguish between "integrated" and "excluded" small farms but note the 
overall complexity of rural Brazil. 
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Most of these four million, Jank (124) notes, are subsistence farmers, for whom "the 
apparent solution involves mechanisms that guarantee the producer the minimum level of 
income to survive (such as work programs, distribution of food baskets, rural pensions, 
minimum income programs). For the other family producers, the solution involves the 
creation and sustaining of jobs that permit the competitive insertion of large numbers of 
people in agricultural and, above all, non-agricultural activities (rural or urban154)." The 
increasing need for non-agricultural sources of income for rural inhabitants, which 
partially results from the modernization of agriculture (Graziano da Silva, et al. 1999), is 
discussed below. 
Montoya and Guilhoto (2000, 22) state that "the technological development and 
specialization of labor signify for the Brazilian rural producer a process that is necessary 
and beneficent as it permits him, with the same effort of labor, associated with the 
intensification of use of capital, to produce greater income and, therefore, increase in 
social well-being." They note that, from 1959 to 1990, while the rural population 
remained essentially the same (33.16 million/1959, 35.83 million/1990), the per capita 
value of actual agricultural and live-stock produce rose from US$ 89.71 to US$ 925.29. 
These figures are impressive. However, while it cannot be doubted that "for some, 
this process [modernization] brought about a bettering of work conditions, cultural 
awakening, and an important increase in income and salaries, it meant, on the contrary, 
for many, marginalization or social exclusion.... Brazil finds itself increasingly marked 
by inequality and the maintenance of regions and social classes in misery or in conditions 
154 The term "urban" in Brazil applies to small towns - the seats of rural municipalities - as well as to 
cities. 
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close to misery." (Almeida 1999, 30) The results of the policy of modernization have 
been described as: 
... the exclusion and the exodus [from the countryside] of large contingents of 
rural workers and inhabitants, the strong social differentiation, the elevated 
concentration of land and of certain modes of production, pollution and the 
wearing out of renewable natural resources, the decrease in biological quality of 
agricultural products, the increasingly concentrated markets. (Almeida, 31) 
The increase in salaried rural workers has led to discussion of the "proletarianization" 
of rural workers (e.g., de Janvry). 
...the concept of the industrialization of agriculture should not be reduced only to 
alterations in the form of production.... The industrialization of agriculture 
represents not only changes in the relations of Man with Nature but also in the 
social relations of production and with his work tools.... The industrialization of 
agriculture implies the passage from a system of artisan production to a system 
based on manufacturing (with machines and a division between labor and capital) 
and even to large scale industry in some subsectors... And this passage is 
charactarized essentially by the inversion of the role played by the worker who 
passes from the active and integrated artisan role to that of a partial worker 
(specialized in his tools) in manufacturing, until he reaches the passivity of the 
industrial worker who only watches his machine. (Graziano da Silva 1998, 4) 
However, this description may be overstated when applied to Brazil. Veiga (2000, 
104) estimates that, as of 1997, only 26% of agricultural workers were "employees" -
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and this would include many outside of the industrialized model discussed by Graziano 
da Silva. Especially in the less developed Northeast and North of the country, large 
holdings with employees tend to follow older patterns - such as on the sugar plantations, 
th where employment methods are often similar to what they were in the 19 Century. 
It is important to note that "the rural poor are not a homogeneous class" and that 
changes such as new technology effect different rural groups - and individuals -
differently. Rural wage earners, however, tend to be a particularly vulnerable class, and 
the proportionate rise in their numbers speaks to the greater vulnerability of the rural poor 
in Brazil. (Griffin 1999, 136-138). 
Subsistence Farming 
Subsistence farming continues to be important. While still considered by most 
Brazilians as being backward and a block to development, recent scholarship notes that 
subsistence agriculture is not really an impediment to modernization, but provides inputs 
that modern agriculture finds convenient ~ available sources of cheap day labor, raw 
materials and food stuffs that are not profitable for larger commercial farms to produce. 
Analysis has shown that there are many forms of family farm: the "modern family 
farmer" and the "technically qualified small producer" ~ both of which tend to be more 
common in the South - part-time farmers (who hold some type of non-agricultural job to 
supplement income), "lumpesinato" (who have a small piece of land where they live and 
produce a few things, but depend for their livelihood on working as day laborers for 
bigger farms), as well as the more traditional, self-sustaining subsistence farmers (see, 
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e.g., Siqueira, 42-43; Miranda Neto, 45-47).155 
As noted above, small farmers increasingly get pushed onto the least desirable 
lands. Large numbers have been pushed into the Amazon: 
Successive governments have deliberately used the region as a 'safety valve' to 
disarm pressures in other areas.... At the beginning of the 1970s, the Medici 
government, instead of undertaking structural reforms, fed the hope of diverting 
the so-called 'excess' population from the rural Northeast in order to colonize the 
Transamazonic Highway.... More recently, official resettlement projects in 
Rondonia and Acre, as well as private settlement plans in various parts of the 
eastern Amazon, have attempted to attract migrants... (T)he vast majority of the 
settlers have received no help from the government. They abandon their former 
homes, travel thousands of kilometers for land, measure out the lot that they 
claim, construct their houses, chop down the forest by hand, plant and sell their 
harvests... fighting incessantly against a hostile physical and human 
environment.... 
This human effort led to a repeated cycle of occupation and usurpation, as the 
Amazon frontier was pushed ever further inward. No sooner had the small 
farmers completed the exhausting task of clearing the land, the stronger 
commercial interests appeared and evicted them, by legal or violent means, in 
order to set up cattle farms or other businesses (Hall, 108-109). 
155 Benjamin, et al. (87) estimated there were four million traditional subsistence farmers in Brazil, only a 
fourth of whom had any access to credit. 
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The "Power of Backwardness" 
Noted Brazilian sociologist Jose de Souza Martins has eloquently referred to "the 
power of backwardness" that seems to dominate Brazil. By this, Martins does not mean 
the notion that part of Brazil is "archaic" in the sense that Lambert (1973) and other 
earlier writers described it. Rather, Martins is talking about a deeply embedded cultural 
pattern which makes Brazil unique in many ways, one which — at least on a public policy 
level ~ avoids confrontation and seeks to work out compromises, especially among 
powerful groups. 
Part of this pattern is a blurred distinction between public and private property. 
While dating back to colonial times, this is not an "archaic" characteristic, but one which 
is very much alive. It touches upon what is sometimes referred to as corruption, but does 
not end there — many practices (such as a government agency - DNOCS - constructing 
deep water wells on private properties of major politicians) are legal. Although 
Brazilians often think of poor people "selling" their votes to politicians as a key factor 
here (actually, such "sale" is a complex process involving exchanges of favors and 
patronage156), Martins points out that the really important exchanges of favors are not 
between the politicians and the poor, but between the government and the rich. 
Furthermore, he notes that, aside from a small portion of the "Weberian" middle class, 
few Brazilians see such exchange of favors as being essentially wrong. Indeed, both the 
156 In 1999 a law was passed, with Church support, that prohibits the giving, offering, or promising of 
anything of value - including patronage or jobs - in return for votes. Law 9.840 of September 29, 1999. It 
is not clear how effective that law has been in practice, particularly at the local level. 
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labor movement, which was born in the state-protected Vargas system, and academics 
(federal universities — the keystone of Brazilian academia — are government-supported 
institutions with free tuition, the majority of their students coming from upper and middle 
class families) are involved in the system of government favors (Martins 1994). 
While systems of exchange of favors are an essential part of any political system, 
they reach a high level of expectation and commitment ("compromisso") in Brazil. One 
of the privileges — one might almost say duties — of public office is to provide for one's 
family and friends, and very few Brazilians see this as being essentially wrong. The 
external trappings of coronelismo may have changed, but the essential structure — often 
carried over to urban settings — is still very real.157 
A related phenomenon is the flexibility of the elite. Rarely does the political elite 
say "no" — protesting rural workers march to Brasilia, meet with officials, have their 
demands verbally met, go home, and nothing ever happens. It is truly amazing how 
quickly Church and leftist rhetoric is adopted ~ my wife once remarked that, if a stranger 
came to Brazil during elections and saw the television presentations of the various 
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parties, he would think that every candidate was a leftist. 
It would be difficult, for instance, to find anyone in Brazil who would ~ at least 
publicly — admit to being against agrarian reform. Even the UDR — the ultra-right 
157 The electoral system in Brazil is not based on districts; thus federal and state legislators can draw votes 
from anywhere in their states, which increases the power of informal networks. Nepotism and helping 
related groups is common; Brazilians may well complain when a politician "exagerates" in naming too 
many family members to office, but they are basically sympathetic to the practice. On "compromisso" see 
Bezerra, 118 
158 This phenomenon sometimes takes concrete form; at the height of the base community movement, for 
instance, the government encouraged local prefeitos (mayors) to organize "community" associations, which 
were then given government grants. 
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landowners association — always declares itself in favor of agrarian reform. Such people 
will simply say (with some reason) that agrarian reform is more than just distributing land 
— one needs infrastructure, schools, health posts, credit facilities, and so on ~ all of 
which are highly unlikely and place a real reform well out of reach.159 Or they do as the 
Sarney government did — outwardly support the idea and sabotage it through inaccuracy, 
delay, and inefficiency, which are so expected from government in Brazil as to hardly 
raise a stir. 
When it is clear that a change is going to happen, the elite is often able to seize 
leadership of the change to prevent it from running too deeply — what Sonia Mendon^a 
has called "changing in order to remain the same." This is true in the political sphere — 
the prince of Portugal declaring Brazilian independence, the military government 
enacting the Estatuto da Terra, the military regime's vice president making possible the 
election of the opposition presidential candidate. It is also true in the economic sphere — 
for instance, in the uniting of rural and urban elites to modernize agriculture. 
The political system is also expert in co-opting people. One of the difficulties of 
Church and union organization in Tocantins was that, as soon as leaders emerged among 
the people, they would be offered jobs or political opportunities by the local power elites. 
While some resisted the temptation, and a few managed to occupy such posts without 
159 There is a genuine debate as to the importance of land distribution as the basis of agrarian reform. Jose 
de Souza Martins, whose opinion is highly respected, claims that the Church particularly has made a large 
mistake in thinking that land distribution is the essence of agrarian reform - that in itself it is not that 
meaningful. Other writers (e.g. Delgado, 233-234) argue that the agrarian problem is primarily an issue of 
land distribution. It has been my position, and that of most of the Church, that land distribution is an 
essential first step - that having land provides farmers with a base and vested interest to work for necessary 
changes. There is evidence, for instance, that land ownership per se causes rural workers to be more active 
politically. As we discovered in Tocantins, however, once farmers win their land, a whole new stage of 
action is needed, helping them to organize and develop productive capacity. The difference, therefore, 
among people of good faith, is one of emphasis and strategy. 
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losing their focus, for most struggling farmers or landless workers, it was very difficult to 
resist the allure of a paying job (for himself or his wife or grown child) and the political 
compromise that implicitly went with it. 
A final factor is widespread impunity for crimes. Impunity is partly the result of a 
cultural reluctance to call anyone to account for his actions. While scandals rock Brazil 
on almost a weekly basis, a few token actions against a few scapegoats usually ends the 
matter. This attitude extends to perpetrators of rural violence.160 
This set of political characteristics continues to affect rural Brazil. Linhares and 
Silva argue that it is the chief unifying characteristic of Brazilian agrarian history: 
The only common link uniting the diverse historical patterns of the agrarian 
question among us is the continuous presence of the political question, in other 
words, of the domination that excludes the rural population from citizenship, 
generates poverty and extreme violence. Being a long-standing feature of 
Brazilian society, it brings with it the seeds of disorder, as though we had always 
been faced with the same agrarian question, facing the same five hundred years of 
latifundio. 
In fact, agriculture and its responses to the development of the country are not 
archaic; what is archaic is the political system of domination that impedes the 
160 Due to international pressure, the gunman who in 1986 killed Father Josimo Tavares, a CPT priest 
active in land reform, was later convicted of the murder, although the people who hired him never were. 
The gunman escaped from prison after a few months. He was later arrested in Gurupi, Tocantins, for a 
minor crime; when police recognized him, he insisted that he would only deal with CPT lawyers as they 
were the only ones he could trust! The lawyers met with him once, but within three days he had broken a 
hole through the Gurupi jail wall and escaped. 
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workers from participating in the riches of the cornucopia that agriculture creates 
or could create (Linhares and Silva, 145-146). 
Conclusion 
Tania Barcelar de Araujo, a highly respected economist from the Northeast, notes 
that Brazil has been able to internally develop highly sophisticated technology for 
building airplanes and for oil drilling: 
This is the same country in which millions of people go hungry. Not because of 
technical incapacity. Always when the Brazilian elite has made a decision, the 
country has had the capacity to respond, including in agriculture. Up until the 
1960s, for example, the Brazilian savannah lands were considered unsuitable for 
agriculture. Now the are dynamic areas that produce grains competatively, 
including for exportation. The same region that, twenty years ago, was held to be 
hostile to agriculture. Embrapa, a public resarch company, used it technical 
knowledge to correct the soil of the savannahs. There was no lack of technology, 
no lack of organizational skills, no lack of government to supply infrastructure, 
roads, warehouses, telephones... (Benjamin and Araujo, 17). 
In studying the history of land in Brazil, the theme of chaos emerges. Chaos in 
undefined and overlapping land titles, confusion in a plethora of laws that are not 
regulated, decrees that may or may not supersede other decrees, regulations that may or 
may not be valid. Uncertainty when it comes to protecting small landholder's rights, 
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uneven enforcement of laws that do exist. Impunity when it comes to punishing gunmen 
who shoot rural leaders. 
Chaotic situations tend to benefit the strong and unscrupulous, tend to hurt the 
smaller and weaker. Which raises the question that lingers behind every Brazilian 
analysis of the agrarian question: Is the chaos really chaos, or is it planned chaos? 
One notes the frustration, the outrage, on the part of many serious scholars who 
have studied the land issue. One can hear despair in Ligia Silva's comment, "...with 
respect to land matters, nothing appears to have been decided among us in a definitive, 
clear, and uncontestable manner...," in E.C. de Mello's mention of patterns of 
"modernization without change" or Sonia Mendon?a's, "changing in order to remain the 
same." One remembers James Holston's statement that "...land law in Brazil promotes 
conflict, and not solutions, because it establishes the terms by which grilagem is 
consistently legalized" (L. Silva, 243; E.C. Mello 1999b, 161; Mendonfa, 80; Motta 120-
121.)161 
During the 1980s, most writers tended toward the position that the apparent chaos 
was consciously created or aggravated by classes that wanted to maintain the status quo 
of their own power with respect to land and to use land policy to benefit their own 
interests. There is significant truth to this position. It is clear that certain policy makers 
advocated systems that would force small farmers off land and into cities in the interests 
of keeping labor costs down, although others seem to have done so under the idea that it 
161 In 2009 Lula was severely criticized for signing into law Medida Provisoria 458 (which became Law 
11.952), nicknamed the Medida Provisoria de Grilagem, which legalized 67 million hectares of informally 
obtained land in the Amazon region. Critics noted that 72% of this land is large tracts held by less than 7% 
of the landholders benefitte.(J. P. Martins 2009). 
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is easier to provide services to urban populations than to rural ones (many of these 
viewed rural life as essentially backward and saw urbanization as enlightenment). There 
can be little doubt, also, that landowners interested in seizing public or small posseiro's 
land have seen the advantages of confused land titles and unclear laws, interest groups 
opposed to land reform have seen the possibilities for delay through complicating 
procedures and proposals, gunmen (and those who hire them) have benefited from 
inefficient, overloaded, and sometimes corrupt courts. 
More recently scholars have tended to stress the multi-faceted nature of land, the 
many types of small and large landholders and rural workers, the variety of relationships 
among them. Some of these scholars see the dualism (small producer v. latifundio, 
dominant class v. oppressed class) of earlier writers as naive. They make valid points, 
although the essential difference may be that, whereas the military regime, with its clear 
demand that one choose sides, gave legitimate rise to dualistic interpretations (power v. 
people, government v. Church, etc.), the more complex interworkings of Brazil's current 
democracy make multi-faceted approaches more viable. Some of the newer writers, 
moreover, especially those who deal with the intricacies of the agro-industrial complex, 
risk a naivate of their own, seemingly underestimating the impact of domination in a 
system in which disparities of wealth are as great as they are in Brazil. 
E.C. Mello suggests that (especially with respect to Northeastern landowners) we 
are not dealing with a hegemony as such, but with a "corporativist class," i.e., "a class 
that seeks to preserve its objectives not through control of the social milieu but through 
insertion into a milieu whose control has escaped them" (E.C. Mello, Norte Agraria, 
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26). This seems to me, on a national level, to be valid. Certainly landowners, by 
merging their interests with those of urban based capitalist classes, have been able to 
expand their influence. There are, in addition, other factors which have tended to give 
the interest group power over the ordinary Brazilian mind: 
• Faulty agricultural models: as noted above, Brazilians have been generally convinced 
that large scale, chemically and mechanically oriented agriculture is the only modern 
approach. The environmental movement is beginning to challenge this view, but it 
has a long way to go before effectively changing public opinion. 
• A model of planning divorced from reality: this is a phenomenon which has been 
repeatedly noted in Brazil. There is a deep cultural tendency for experts (in Brasilia, 
in universities, etc.) to develop elaborate and theoretically pleasing plans that have 
little relation to, much less input from, the people effected. Furthermore, there is a 
tendency to mistake a paper accomplishment — a law passed, a plan written and 
published ~ for a concrete one.163 
• Paternalistic modes of behavior, favor-based politics, and corruption ~ the "power of 
backwardness" discussed above ~ which make real change so difficult.164 
• Inefficiency and inertia. Mello (1999b, 9) quotes Henry Adams: "My conclusion is 
152 Mello was writing of the late imperial period, but the observation is even more valid today. Belik (181-
188) further discusses the role of "corporativist" or "corporatist" groups in modern Brazil. 
163 This tendency is shared by some well-meaning Brazilian civil groups. There is a tendency to produce 
beautifully designed posters (against AIDS or child prostitution, for instance) or, as recently happened 
outside my office building, elaborate displays (this one ran up the hillside and said - children should not be 
in the garbage - referring to children who work in garbage dumps) and feel one has accomplished 
something, without taking any action that essentially changes the situation. 
164 Thus Veiga, 7, writing in 1989, noted, along with the potential economic advantages of agrarian reform, 
the growing political inviability of carrying it out. J.B. Silva, however, discussing political evolution in 
Ceara since 1985, correctly views more optimistic possibilities. 
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that history is simply social development along the lines of least resistance, and that 
frequently the line of least resistance is as much unconsciously discovered by society 
as it is by water." 
With respect to the last two points above, the MST (Movimento Sem Terra) took 
one of the few viable approaches. They became expert at keeping the agrarian issue in 
the public eye — through court actions, demonstrations, public declarations sometimes 
bordering on the outrageous (see, e.g., Secco).165 
One of MST's key strategies has been occupying unproductive land — or, 
depending on one's point of view, invading it. Marcia Motta notes that the term 
"invader" is used by the landed classes to describe small posseiros today in very much 
the same way that it was used in the 1850s. 
The truth is that the sem-terra of our time are, in one way or another, heirs to the 
struggles of the sem-terra of the past, but today they have at least the possibility 
to record, in the media, their version of the facts. For their representatives, the 
invasions are in reality occupations of land undertaken by the movement, whose 
objective is to question Brazilian agrarian policy through occupation of 
uncultivated lands, many of them legally public (devoluta), but griladas by large 
landowners. 
.... As much in the past as today, the invaders claim that the occupied lands 
are, in reality, public lands, and not part of the landowner's domain.... 
165 The current head of MST, Joao Pedro Stedile, lacks the charm of his predecessor, Jose Rainha, and the 
MST seriously alienated public opinion through seemingly gratuitous acts of vandalism, most notably the 
invasion and looting of President Cardoso's private farm in 2002 and the invasion, forced detention of 
guards, and destruction of plants and specimens at an Aracruz research farm in 2005. 
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More than a century has passed... Nonetheless, as much yesterday as today, 
small landless posseiros seek to legitimate the occupation through the principal of 
the act of possession, denying in judicial actions or in direct confrontations, 
through their occupation, the territorial limits set by the large fazendeiros (Motta, 
225). 
In this respect, MST's efforts had real impact; by 1999 an estimated 90% of rural land 
expropriations in Brazil resulted from occupations, most of them with MST support 
(Fernandes, 225). 
In order to be effective, the MST's political approach needed to be backed by 
serious, long-term pressure, such as the Church and a few civic organizations continue to 
provide (see, e.g., "O Clamor Que Vem Do Campo" and Biernaski). Equally important is 
the continued realistic presentation of a new model of "modern" agriculture, one that 
presents a caring relationship between humans and land not only as the only option which 
is sustainable over the long-term, but as one which is at least equal (in the long-run 
superior) to the productivity of current commercial practices.166 
By the late 1990s and early 2000s, there were indications that Brazil was 
approaching another moment in its history when agrarian reform might be viable: 
Never have conditions been so favorable for the decision, which must be of a 
political nature, to eliminate the latifundio. It does not have the strength it once 
had. There are great numbers of the population who desire to work the land; new 
agricultural technology is available, opening up wide regions for development and 
166 For work in this area, see, inter alia, Pessoa, Coelho & Miranda, Tubaldini 
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profoundly altering the conditions in which production in the countryside can be 
carried out; rural isolation was broken by roads and communication networks, the 
population has urbanized, diminishing the political weight of rural bosses. It is 
anti-historical that Brazil continues to submit itself to groups who base their 
power and authority on the monopolistic control of territory.... 
Modern Brazil is now witnessing... a notable phenomenon: the desire to 
return to the land of populations mistreated in the cities, which have exhausted 
their capacity to absorb [the population]. At a moment in which unemployment 
places on the agenda the need to alter the paradigm of employing labor, and in a 
society in which the demand for food remains high, the existence of empty land, 
of people disposed to cultivate it, and of available technology makes for a rare 
potential that our country cannot refuse to use (Benjamin, et al., 85-86.)167 
A number of additional factors added to the favorable circumstances outlined in 
the above quote. With a relatively stable currency implanted in 1994, land prices fell 
considerably and other options for investment (the stock market, lending, commercial and 
industrial activities) became more attractive. Investment in land was also been affected 
by other factors: concern with the rising number of land invasions by MST, a serious 
effort on the part of government to collect land taxes from large landholders, a 1993 law 
providing a more streamlined process for expropriation, and actions by the government to 
167 New mechanisms for promoting agrarian reform, recently introduced by the government, may be a step 
in this direction. See, e.g., Sekles; Jungman "A Nova Reforma Agraria" 
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revise the indicators for land use and production efficiency. It appeared that holding a 
latifundio would become increasingly less viable (Fernandes, 224-227).168 
By early 2006, when the case studies reported in this dissertation were 
undertaken, it seemed there was a window of opportunity to promote the vocation of 
Brazilian farmers (as well as of Brazil) for agriculture. It was against this background 
that this study was carried out. 
168 Fernandes traces land price declines of 30-50% in Sao Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul; in the North this 
may not be so much a factor. However, he notes that INCRA has now become probably the major 
purchaser of land (it has been accused of paying inflated prices [see, e.g., Galluci]), to the point that at least 
one fazandeiro has been accused of paying to have his land invaded. (Galhardo). Delgado, 235, notes that 
the fall in land prices is due in part to the lowering of prices for agricultural goods through opening of 
borders to imports, but also affected by the high price of Brazilian currency, which changed with this years 
devaluation. The summary process law mentioned is Complimentary Law 76 of July 6, 1993. 
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CHAPTER IV 
MARKET-BASED LAND REFORM IN BRAZIL 
(1996-2005) 
Background 
Brazil is a unique political/cultural/economic system and, as with all such 
systems, change is easier to discuss or plan than it is to effect. In Chapter III, I traced 
how certain patterns in Brazilian land occupation have been endemic since the colonial 
period. As with any complex system, what appear to be the obvious leverage points for 
change may not in fact be the best leverage points, and policies made to correct problems 
may have spin-offs that are damaging, or unexpected reactions which produce results 
different from, even contrary to, those originally intended.169 
In a country with the vast income disparity of Brazil, public policies and 
development programs tend to suffer significant distortions. One reason is that those who 
make laws and policies often represent or identify with the ruling classes, and the policies 
and/or their application therefore, consciously or unconsciously, benefit those classes. 
Even when a policy or its administration does not actively benefit the ruling 
classes, however, distortions result. Access to information, skills, education, and capital 
are so unequally distributed that almost any change tends to favor the small portion of the 
population that possesses these resources. Thus the poor tend to be displaced by 
development projects (irrigation, road building, tourist development) and pushed into 
more marginal areas while (in a process similar to "gentrification" in U.S. cities) the 
better-off occupy those lands benefited by the projects. 
169 Examples date back to the 1690s, when the Portuguese instituted land taxes to raise income and control 
speculation, but which resulted in a loss of control of land registration; the 1790s reforms by Pombal, 
which proved counterproductive; attempts to diminish rural exodus in the 1950s-1970s by passing land 
reform legislation, which (due to landowner fears) resulted in expulsion of tenant farmers from the land; 
FISET incentives for reforestation in the 1970's, which resulted in increased land speculation, rural exodus, 
environmental degradation, and food shortages. 
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Particularly applicable to the present case, this inequality extends to bargaining 
power. The wealthiest classes in Brazil can afford to sit on assets (rural land, urban 
offices and apartments) even where the assets produce no income or involve ongoing 
expenses. This phenomenon appears in the holding of vast tracks of rural land, for 
purposes of speculation, access to rural credit, hedging against inflation, and/or the 
prestige and political power that land ownership entails. On the other hand, the poorest 
classes - including most rural workers and many small farmers - are often desperate to 
secure immediate necessities and have very little possibility of bargaining. 
The Players 
With respect to the implementation of agrarian reform in Brazil during the period 
leading up to our case studies (1996-2005), a number of players must be considered. 
Foremost should be mentioned those who need land - landless workers and those 
whose parcels of land are too small to sustain their families. The FAO estimates that 2.5 
million Brazilian families are in need of land (World Bank 2002, 2), while the MST 
(Movimento dos Sem-Terra) estimates that number at 4.5 million (Stedile c. 1999, 2) and 
a government/university study as high as 5.3 million (NEAD 2000b). In addition, there 
are many small and medium-sized family farmers who, while they may not need land 
personally, are interested in the availability of land for their children. Other small 
farmers may believe that their political-social-economic position may be improved 
through the growth in numbers and influence of the small landowner class. Small towns 
- especially their commercial classes - benefit substantially when agrarian reform 
populates the surrounding countryside with small farmers in place of thinly populated 
latifundios with absentee owners. Urban workers and unemployed may benefit from land 
reform through a reduction in the numbers of workers in the labor market. In some areas 
of the country, an increase in small properties may also lead to a more secure and 
accessible food source, benefiting the urban poor and residents of smaller towns. 
At the policy bargaining table, the interests of the landless, of rural workers, and 
other popular groups tend to be represented by the following: 
1) CONTAG (Confedera^ao Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura 
[National Confederation of Agricultural Workers]) - the federation of rural 
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workers' unions. Formed in 1963, it is based on union structures developed in 
the 1940s as part of the corporativist state plan of dictator Getulio Vargas. 
Operating out of a political philosophy similar to that of Mussolini in Italy, 
Vargas promulgated labor laws which protected workers' rights but viewed 
unions (sindicatos) of both employers and workers as auxiliaries of the state; 
the purpose of these unions was to help keep the economic system working in 
an orderly fashion. Local rural workers unions were more involved in 
administering workers' health benefits than in fighting for their rights. 
CONTAG supported agrarian reform, especially after the end of the 1964-85 
military dictatorship, but did so from an administrative approach - proposing 
laws and trying to work within the government system, (e.g., Magalhaes 
1996, 2) It met with little success. CONTAG is opposed in some places by 
unions linked with the more leftist CUT (Centro Unico dos Trabalhadores), 
although since 1995 CONTAG has itself been officially a member of CUT. 
CONTAG is in some senses both an ally of MST and its rival in representing 
rural workers. (Navarro 1998, 5) 
2) Catholic Church/CPT (Comissao do Pastoral da Terra [Land Pastoral 
Commission]). During the late 1960s and early 70s, partially in response to 
the modernization of agriculture promoted by the military government, the 
Church, especially through its Base Community groups, began to support the 
cause of displaced and threatened farmers and rural workers. The CPT was 
founded in 1975 to organize this work, and was soon active throughout the 
country. The unique role of the Church during the military regime - as the 
only body large and popular enough to attempt to counterbalance the power of 
the military - brought under its protection a large number of social justice 
activities that would normally have been carried out by lay or secular 
organizations. The interest of the Church and the CPT was and is (as the 
name of the latter implies) a pastoral one, primarily concerned with the 
injustices experienced by small farmers and rural workers at the hands of 
grileiros (land-grabbers) and the negative effect that being thrown off the land 
has on families. While capable of confrontation, the Church is more 
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comfortable with negotiation.170 These positions at times put it at odds with 
leftists and radical groups, but has also at times placed it in the role of 
mediator (e.g., Fernandes 2000b, 50-51). The CPT is allied to, but sometimes 
critical of, the MST. 
3) MST (Movimento dos Sem-Terra [Movement of the Landless]) - The MST 
was organized, with strong Church/CPT assistance in 1984 in southern Brazil 
- a region of numerous small farms. It has developed a confrontational policy 
with the government, actively occupying land and engaging in civil 
disobedience. It is fair to state that the increase in land reform expropriations 
following 1994, facilitated by economic factors that reduced the value of land 
as a speculative hedge against inflation and a source of easy credit,171 was also 
due to active pressure from MST in occupying land and keeping the land 
reform issue alive in the public consciousness. (e.g, Kay 1998, 28; 
SDdimensions 2000, 3) 
4) NGOs - Prior to the 1992 Earth Summit, there was division between 
environmentally oriented NGOs (mostly international), some of which seemed 
to view people as primarily a problem, and socially oriented NGOs, some of 
which viewed environmental issues as frivolous.172 The Agenda 21 process 
helped to do away with this false dichotomy, so that almost all serious NGOs 
working in Brazil recognize the mutuality of social justice and environmental 
issues. NGOs have been wary of collaborating with the government for three 
173 reasons: fear of political manipulation, lack of government continuity, and 
170 Jose de Souza Martins (2000b, 27) believes that, with the greater laicization of the CPT after the military 
dictatorship, the CPT (as opposed to the Church itself) lost some of this pastoral approach and became 
more confrontational and ideological. It is true that most mediating has been carried out by the CNBB 
(Council of Bishops) rather than the CPT, but CNBB depends on CPT orientation on land reform issues. 
171 During the 1980s, e.g., GoB spent $2.5 billion subsidizing cattle ranchers in the Amazon. (Myers 1992, 
443) 
172 See, e.g., Hurell 1992, 411-13, 410, on the environmental movement prior to the Earth Summit. There 
are, however, groups like the Institute of Human Ecology in Pernambuco/Paraxba (with roots dating to the 
1960s), that always took seriously the dynamic between human poverty and environment. 
173 It is common at all levels of Brazilian government for one administration to completely cancel and 
change policies and programs developed by its predecessor. 
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government pressure (responding to political demands) to diminish quality 
and increase quantity of program coverage. However, most NGOs consider 
working with government in appropriate circumstances if it is understood that 
their primary obligation is to beneficiaries. 
The other key groups at the market-based agrarian reform policy bargaining table 
(although only the first two of these were ever officially at the bargaining table) are: 
5) The World Bank - The World Bank comes to the table with a history of its 
own, including the following factors that need to be considered: 1) significant 
criticism inside and outside Brazil for engaging in large-scale development 
programs that have often proven socially and environmentally harmful (e.g., 
Piddington 1992)174, 2) significant criticism in Brazil for having ignored civil 
society and NGO input; 3) limited success with land reform programs.175 At 
the time the Cedula da Terra program was started, the Bank had limited 
experience with market-based agrarian reform, and this program was viewed 
as an experiment. It should be noted that the World Bank is viewed in Brazil, 
to a large extent, as the representative of the development policies of the 
industrialized nations, and thus a certain north-south tension exists.176 
6) The Government of Brazil ("GoB") - which, itself, is a complex alliance of 
interests. The President from 1995-2003, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, a 
sociologist of the PSDB party, was viewed at the time of his election as being 
center-left. However, in order to win the election against the Workers Party 
(PT) and to govern the country in a multi-party congress, Cardoso allied 
himself with two other large parties: the PFL - a right-wing party, based in 
Northeastern and Northern Brazil, with a heavy representation of large 
landowners, and the PMBD - the party with the largest national political 
174 "Despite... efforts to improve its environmental image, questions persist about whether the World Bank 
has... enacted sufficient reforms. It is not apparent that the environmental units and policies are having any 
meaningful impact on the culture of the organization...." (Soroos 1999,46) 
175 Interest in land reform among donor agencies had lagged for the fifteen or so years prior to 1997, then 
experienced a sudden resurgence. (SDdimensions 2000, 1) 
176 "Development programs devised by the North have often emphasized large-scale, politically visible 
projects that impose Western technologies and ways of thinking on cultures and societies that are organized 
and structured much differently." (Bryner 1999, 178) 
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machine but which is largely made up, at a congressional level, of political 
opportunists without strong ideology but with a significant interest in 
maintaining the status quo. Cardoso became identified with neo-liberalism -
the policy of opening the country to free markets (which many feel happened 
precipitously) and privatizing government enterprises (often in favor of 
foreign capital). Although he introduced significant programs - including 
market-based land reform and the bolsa escola, Cardoso was unpopular and 
widely viewed as sacrificing Brazil's interests to the demands of the 
industrialized nations. In 2002, Lula - the PT candidate - was elected 
President, assuming office in January 2003. Lula maintained many of the 
prior government's policies (notably with respect to economics), and built 
upon and improved such existing programs as the bolsa escola, Cedula da 
Terra, and PRONAF. His origins in the poverty of Northeastern Brazil gave 
him a strong personal commitment to land reform, but he faced many of the 
same political and institutional issues that Cardoso had faced; he same found 
himself facing a confrontation with the MST that was almost as tense as that 
faced by Cardoso. 
7) Agro-Industry - there is intense competition in Brazil in the areas of seeds, 
fertilizers and pesticides (mostly multinational companies) and food 
processing and marketing (both multinational and national companies). These 
groups have a vested interest in including as many farmers and as much land 
and production as possible in the agro-industrial chain - producing specialized 
crops with high levels of chemical fertilization and regular uses of pesticides, 
usually on a mono-cultural basis (considered more efficient), often with pre-
planting sales contracts to large processors.177 Agro-industry has no objection 
to land reform and/or small farms per se, seeing them as appropriate for, e.g., 
fruit and truck farming. 
177 The representative of a Japanese pesticide firm told me (8/24/01) that his company, in order to compete, 
attempts to put together a complete package for farmers - bringing together a seed/fertilizer manufacturer, 
their own pesticide company, and a food processor who will finance/buy the crop - with orientation 
provided to the farmers. He considered this to be a win/win situation for everyone. 
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8) The Ruralistas - the "ruralists" are the larger landowners. They are 
represented by a powerful inter-party block in congress. Their extreme wing 
- represented to some extent by the somewhat discredited UDR (Uniao 
Democratica Ruralista) - promotes violent reaction to the threat of land 
reform and land occupations. Generally, however, the Ruralistas use their 
considerable political power to secure legislation and policies favorable to 
178 their interests. 
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Summary of Brazilian Land Reform Efforts 
While discussions in Brazil of land reform date from the 18th Century, the issue 
rose to a serious national level following World War II. The 1950s witnessed increasing 
demands for land reform from both developmentalists and leftists, culminating with the 
enactment of the 1964 Land Statute (Estatuto da Terra - Law 4.504) - promulgated by 
the new military regime with support of the United States government, both of whom 
viewed land reform as a method of combating Communism. Although the Land Statute 
is in many respects a good law, the strong influence of landowning elites within the 
military regime prevented serious land reform from occurring over the next twenty years. 
The first civilian government, which came to power in 1985, headed by a conservative 
president closely identified with large landholdings, produced little significant land 
reform, and progress under subsequent administrations has proved disappointing. 
Poor progress during the post-military period is attributable in part to the political 
resistance of landholders, whose position was reinforced during the military regime by 
government programs that encouraged industry and the urban upper/middle class to 
invest in large landholdings. In addition, the modernization of Brazilian agriculture, 
during the 1964-85 period, caused opinion leaders to increasingly view the small family 
farm as a relic with little economic significance, removing much of the force of the 
developmentalist argument in favor of land reform. Land reform thus began to be viewed 
by many as a social project to provide subsistence to rural families so that they would not 
178 "One of the main difficulties the executive faces... is the passage of pro-land reform legislation in the 
national legislature. The bancada ruralista... has repeatedly voted down legislation...." (Magalhaes 1996, 
3) 
179 This section is a brief summary. See Chapter III for more detail. 
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move into urban slums - i.e., the lesser of two undesirables - a dirt farmer's life (viewed 
by urban Brazilians as quaint but not something they would want) v. a life in violent 
urban favelas. Serious interest in land reform seemed to be limited to a small group of 
academics, the opposition Workers' Party, the Church, and the growing MST. 
Legal Background 
Articles 184-191 of the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 deal with agricultural and 
land policy and agrarian reform. Article 184 allows the Federal Government: 
to expropriate on account of social interest, for purposes of agrarian reform, rural 
property which is not performing its social function, against prior and fair 
compensation in agrarian debt bonds... redeemable within a period of up to twenty 
years 
Expropriation is prohibited of small and medium-sized properties and of 
productive properties. A property is deemed to be fulfilling its social function if it is 
being rationally and adequately used, is in compliance with environmental and labor 
laws, and the exploitation "favors the well-being of the owners and laborers." Agrarian 
reform title deeds cannot be sold for ten years after they are conceded. (Arts. 185-6, 189) 
The Constitution was further defined by the Agrarian Law (8.629). Enacted in 
1993, it was seen as a significant victory for the ruralista anti-land reform block. The 
law provided liberal definitions of what constitutes "productive property" exempt from 
expropriation, extended that exemption to unproductive property that has a technical 
project being implanted, and generally used language which is intentionally unclear and 
makes the legal process of expropriation easier to defeat. (Alves 1995, 251-253) 
The Beginnings of "Market-Based Land Reform" 
The Birth of a Policy 
"Market-Based Land Reform" (MBLR) is a term that has come to be used for 
programs in which a government, rather than expropriating land for redistribution, 
finances the purchase of land by groups of landless farmers. Though arguably a 
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misnomer, the term is used in this paper for convenience. The two forms of MBLR that 
had been fully implemented at the time of our case studies were the Cedula da Terra 
(under which the settlements we studied were formed) and the Banco da Terra (Land 
Bank). A third form, Credito Fundiario, was beginning to be implemented at the time of 
our case studies. 
1) The World Bank Pilot Project - Cedula da Terra 
A 1996 World Bank financed project, Ceara Rural Poverty Alleviation Project, 
included a small market-based land reform element which allowed 700 families to obtain 
land at a cost of approximately US$ 6000 per family, less than half the then current per 
family cost of land reforms using expropriation. The initial results of this project led the 
GoB to make "its first-ever request to the Bank for a free-standing Land Reform Project." 
(World Bank 2000, 4) 
In 1997, the World Bank granted this request, approving Land Reform and 
Poverty Alleviation Pilot Project 4147-BR - known in Brazil as the Cedula da Terra 
[Land Note] Project, which further instituted a market based approach to land reform. 
The project seeks to reduce rural poverty in Northeast Brazil by: (i) increasing 
the incomes of about 15,000 poor rural families through improved access to 
land and participation in complementary, demand-driven community 
subprojects; (ii) raising the agricultural output of lands included in the project; 
and (iii) pilot testing a market-based approach to land reform in which 
beneficiaries obtain financing for the purchase of suitable properties negotiated 
directly between rural communities and willing sellers and which, if successful, 
will enable the Government to greatly accelerate the pace and lower the cost of 
its programs to improve land access by the rural poor throughout the Northeast 
and elsewhere in Brazil. (World Bank 1997, 2) 
Community associations of rural workers would select the land and negotiate the 
purchase, allocate land to members, present supplementary proposals, receive financing, 
and engage in mutual self-help projects. The program was to be operated in a 
decentralized manner through state and municipal governments, and an active role was 
foreseen for "intermediary" NGOs. (Ibid, 2, 9) 
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The pilot would be implemented over four years. The budgeted cost was US$ 
150 million (i.e., $10,000 per family), allocated 30% for land purchases, 56.2% for 
infrastructure, goods and materials, 2.6% for community development and technical 
support, 6.7% for state government level administration, and 4.5% for Federal 
Government evaluation and dissemination. (Ibid.,2-3) 
The World Bank justification for the market-based approach as an alternative to 
expropriation noted that resistance to expropriation leads to higher fiscal costs, legal 
disputes, long administrative delays, and political contention, and that the expropriation 
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and redistribution process results in "Frequent selection of unsuitable beneficiaries." 
(Ibid., 5). It was noted that government policies (subsidized agricultural credit, blanket tot 
debt relief, and tax breaks) and economic structural problems (inflation), that had led 
to land being over-valued as an object for speculation, had to some extent been curtailed 
by the current GoB, improving the viability of a market-based approach. (Ibid., 4,6). 
With respect to environmental matters, the World Bank noted: 
In contrast to conventional land reform projects, which because of lower costs are 
often located at or near the agricultural frontier, land purchases under the 
proposed project will likely occur well within traditional agricultural areas where 
services are available and markets are near. Therefore, the project is consistent 
with an overall approach to reduce the pressure on protected areas and primary 
forests by intensifying land use within the agricultural frontier. (Ibid., 9). 
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2) Implementation of the Land Bank {"Banco da Terra ") 
Complementary Law No. 93 of February 4, 1998, instituted "the Fund for Land 
and Agrarian Reform - Land Bank." Following the World Bank proposal (developed in 
180 The World Bank Proposal did not specifically mention corruption, which in the past led to gross 
overpayments for land and purchases of phantom land (e.g., Ministerio de Desenvolviment Agrario 1999; 
Gondim 2001b). The World Bank model clearly envisions a negotiated model in which the interest of the 
buyers will make such overpayments less feasible. 
181 "...without price stability at the macro-economic level, the problem of getting prices and incentives right 
at the regional and local levels (which forms the central thrust of... World Bank policy) is unlikely to be 
effectively addressed." (Hurrell 1996,424) 
182 This paper focuses on the Cedula da Terra, and is not directly concerned with the Land Bank. 
Differences between the two programs are briefly discussed in Chapter VI. 
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conjunction with the Ministry of Agrarian Reform), the Law created the Land Bank "for 
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the purpose of financing programs of landholding reordering and rural settlement." 
Beneficiaries are to be landless rural workers with at least five years experience or tillers 
with land parcels whose properties do not reach the size necessary to sustain a family, as 
defined in Article 40(11) of the Land Statute. It allowed for both collective and individual 
loans, payable over twenty years, a grace period of up to thirty-six months, interest no 
greater than 12% per year (a subsidized rate in Brazil), with a discount of 50% of 
principal and interest allowed pursuant to regulations.184 IOC 
The Decree regulating the Law entered into more detail, clarifying that 
collective loans could be made through cooperatives or associations of beneficiaries, that 
loans were to be secured by mortgages on the farm properties and, in the case of 
collective loans, by the fiduciary pledge of all cooperative or association members. 
Loans could be made for land purchase and basic infrastructure. A Caretaking Council i o/: 
(Conselho Curador) for the Land Bank was created at the federal level to oversee the 
state and municipal governments, which had direct administrative responsibility for the 
program. 
The process of land purchase started with a Carta Consulta (Consulting Letter) 
from the proposed beneficiaries - usually a group organized in a cooperative or 
association. The Carta included basic information on the group, number of members of 
the group who intend to participate in the program, identification of all association 
members and their spouses, preliminary data on the land they wished to acquire (more 
than one property can be listed, in order of preference), and the estimated value of the 
183 Assentamento - here translated as "settlement" — is the term for communities of small farmers who have 
won their land through land reform. 
184 The actual rate in use is even more highly subsidized. Central Bank Resolution 2.728/2000 establishes 
interest at 6% p/a for loans up to R$ 15.000 per beneficiary, 8% on loans of R$ 15.000-30.000, and 10% 
above that. A rebate on financial charges is allowed of up to 50% in regions denominated "poorest" and 
30% on all others. 
185 Previously Decrees 3.027 of April 13, 1999 and 3.115 of July 9, 1999, both revoked by the current 
Decree 3.475 of May 19, 2000. 
186 The Council consists of seven Ministers (Agrarian Development - who presides, Agriculture, Planning, 
Development-Industry-External Commerce, Finance, Environment, and Sports & Tourism), the president 
of the National Development Bank (BNDES), the president of INCRA, and two representatives of potential 
beneficiaries, selected by the Minister of Agrarian Development. 
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property and of additional basic infrastructure needed. A declaration by the landowners 
declaring willingness to sell to the beneficiaries, and proof of their ownership, had to 
accompany the Carta. The Carta was submitted to the local Municipal Council for Rural 
Development, which must forward it, within thirty days, to Technical Units, established 
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by state governments or associations of municipalities. The Technical Unit then 
examined the eligibility of the proposed beneficiaries (cross-checking with lists of 
beneficiaries of other agrarian reform programs), the legal status and eligibility of the 
property, the adequacy of the property for the proposed purpose, its fair value, the 
priority of the project pursuant to national norms, and the availability of resources. If the 
project presented no difficulties, approval was to be communicated to the beneficiaries 
and the Municipal Council; if resources for the year in question were lacking, the project 
would placed on a waiting list for the next year. (Regulamento, Arts. 3, 27-30) 
The legal operation was carried out in a single document which included the 
public registry of sale, financing contract, and mortgage. (Ibid., Art. 38) Provisions were 
made for accompanying and auditing the process. (Regulamento, Arts. 40-45) In the 
event of non-payment of principal or interest by beneficiaries, extra-judicial collection is 
to be attempted, failing which the beneficiary is listed as non-compliant in CADIN (the 
informative registry of unpaid credits of the federal public sector) and S ERAS A (the 
central credit service for banks). (Ibid., Art.25) No mention is made of judicially 
enforcing mortgages. 
The Philosophical Issues 
At first glance, the question of MBLR would seem to be simple in concept, if 
somewhat more difficult at the level of proof. Is the MBLR an effective instrument to 
redistribute land to working farmers in a socially, environmentally, and economically 
sustainable manner? 
No instrument, however, is value free. The manner in which goals are achieved 
affects both the nature of those achievements and the lives of participants and 
beneficiaries. 
187 Municipalities may group together in associations to participate in the program. 
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Underlying the conflicts that surrounded MBLR are deep philosophical 
differences as to the way things ought to be. This is true even among those who, in good 
faith, firmly believe that a meaningful land reform should take place: the World Bank, 
sectors of the government, the Church, the unions, MST, the NGOs. I concern myself 
here with looking at the philosophical issues that divide these "good faith" players, 
setting aside for the moment, those players who - while they may verbally support 
agrarian reform - have little interest in its outcome or, in some cases, consider it as a 
superfluous or negative undertaking. 
For convenience, I divide this discussion into a look at (1) methods and (2) results 




"Land is not received as a gift, it is conquered" is an MST slogan. It is a reaction 
to centuries during which access to land in general, and agrarian reform in particular, 
were viewed as primarily something which occurs from the top down. In Chapter III, I 
traced how, from the 14th Century in Portuguese history, land was a grant from royal 
authority, and how this pattern remained throughout Brazilian history, both formally 
(through legal structures) and informally (through large landholders, who would allow 
less important tillers use of land). While there were always exceptions of small tillers 
who staked their own claims, this happened most frequently in frontier and other 
marginal areas189 (continued expansion into the Amazonian frontier and other marginal 
188 "A terra nao e ganhada, e conquistada " An MST document translates this as "Land is not gained, it is 
conquered," but this translation loses some of the meaning of the word "ganhada" in Portuguese. 
189 This is a recurring pattern in Brazilian history. "Certain societies, such as Brazilian, permit an 
expansion at the margins of the formal and institutional system. This reveals at the same time a negative 
aspect, that is, concentration of power, and others, positive, the possibility for many people who live in 
marginality to find conditions more or less comfortable in which to live and work. But this does not occur 
without a strong dependency in relation to the "center." It appears that one deals with, here, a form of self-
organization of the "periphery" that seeks to constitute a more autonomous way within the economic 
system, giving itself levels of liberty and independence in relation to the dominant scheme and the modern 
classical pattern of organization of work. Those who propose this type of autonomy pertain to social 
groups that have generally few rights to participate, are poorly organized, and live in a precarious situation 
on the economic and material plane." (J. Almeida 1999, 149) 
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areas being one of the causes of environmental problems190). If land in those areas 
became more valuable, the top-down structure would reassert itself. 
For the MST and its allies, therefore, the struggle for land is not only an end in 
itself, but a process of conscientization (concientizagao). Through the struggle, the 
worker learns not only to value the land itself but the need for solidarity, critical thought, 
and continuous assertion of rights. 
It could be responded to this position that the MBLR mechanism, in establishing a 
system through which small farmers pay for their land, is providing them with a sense of 
importance of that land, a true sense of owning it and having "conquered" it. It is not (at 
least, entirely) a give-away. Furthermore, insofar as the program promotes associations 
of owners, cooperatives, training, etc., it could be argued that the system is promoting 
other values which the MST advocates - such as solidarity. 
The answer to this is partly practical as well as philosophical. Or, better, it has 
practical results which arise out of the philosophical positions. The position of the MST 
and its allies might be summarized as follows (this list was originally developed during 
the Cardoso administration, but the MST relationship with the Lula administration is not 
as different as one might have expected)191: 
• The essential purpose of the GoB is to defuse the social conflict created by, and 
undermine the political base of, movements such as the MST. The government is 
using access to land in much the way that Henry Ford used higher salaries to defuse 
the union movement. The government (as opposed to individuals in the government) 
has no real interest in land reform and, once the social movements are undercut, will 
return to the minimally active stance it followed prior to the rise of those movements. 
• Through stressing land purchases, the government is giving the large owners the 
essential choice as to which land they will make available. They will tend to keep the 
best lands for themselves and sell more marginal lands to the workers. Thus the old 
patterns will be maintained. 
190 e.g., The highway to Rondonia, which in the 1970s opened the southern Brazilian Amazon to migration 
and significant degradation, was financed with a $440 million loan from the World Bank. (Soroos, 45) 
191 This summary is my own, but based on extensive reading, discussion, and personal experience. (See, 
e.g., Aslam c. 1999, Global Exchange/Economic Justice Now c. 1999, Latin American Report 1999, Plevin 
1999, Schwartzman 2000, Stedile c. 1999) 
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• The community associations established for MBLR program are often not authentic 
community organizations but have only been put together for the purposes of the 
program, and in many cases are controlled by political figures identified with 
1 M 
landowners or other elite. This situation arises in part because neither the World 
Bank nor the government is interested in undergoing the long (minimum three year), 
arduous process of building genuine grass-root organizations. 
• Decentralization of the project to state and municipal levels puts power in the hands 
of those levels of government where large landholders and anti-land reform lobbies 
have the strongest influence; this is especially the case in the poorest regions of the 
country, the North and Northeast. 
• Access to land should be viewed as a right. The landless should not be unduly 
burdened with debt on their farms. The process serves to subjugate the small farmers 
to the agro-industrial-financial complex. 
It has also been noted that the original project was presented by the government and 
the World Bank as a fait accompli with no input from representatives of the landless or 
other elements of civil society, and that the representation of civil society on the 
Caretaking Council is "almost non-existent... already indicating serious limitations as to 
its role and the positions to be defended" (Schwartzman 2000, 1; Bittencourt 1999, 6). 
A 1999 analysis by an NGO technician expressed concern that, with the birth of 
MBLR, the number of expropriations was falling (he noted that, except for the World 
Bank participation, the funds for MBLR come out of the funds for land reform). He 
phrased the issue as follows: 
[We] understand that the carrying out of an agrarian reform that promotes 
structural changes in land concentration (with expropriation of latifundios that do 
192 Brazil has a history of such non-authentic community organizations 
193 Tania Bacelar de Araujo (1998) draws an important distinction between what she calls 
"deconcentration" - the passing of tasks from a more central authority (e.g., the Federal Government) to 
less central authorities (e.g., state governments or state offices of federal agencies) as opposed to what she 
believes to be true decentralization, the passing of real decision making power to beneficiaries and local 
communities. "For non-liberals, decentralization is not confused with privatization or the hegemony of 
atomized decisions of individuals or businesses, but means 'transfer of competency, means, resources and 
power from the central spheres to the local spheres'." (p. 5) By her definition, it might be fair to say that 
the Cedula da Terra program includes some elements of both deconcentration and decentralization. 
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not fulfill their social function) should not be viewed only through the economic 
and social aspects of job and income generation, but also from the political point 
of view (of the power structures at the three levels of government) and that of 
sustainable development. Therefore, the objectives of agrarian reform are not 
summed up in the distribution of land for settling families, they should also 
contribute to the decrease or breaking of the power of the latifundio, which is 
responsible for the political, economic, and social backwardness of many 
Brazilian regions. Only with the breaking of the latifundio culture... which 
signifies a change in conception and policies that to this day dominate the 
Brazilian government, will it be possible to realize the potential of family 
agriculture and... advance in the construction of sustainable development for rural 
regions. (Bittencourt, 1) 
2) Results 
There are at least three views of the results which land reform may bring about: 
• Providing the landless with land will allow them to minimally sustain themselves and 
their families, relieve the country of a significant social problem, and perhaps reduce 
the pressure on overburdened urban slums caused by rural migration. 
• Small farmers will be integrated into modern agriculture as part of the agro-industrial-
financial system. The disadvantage of smallness can be offset, to a certain extent, 
through cooperative structures.194 
• Small farmers represent the possibility of a truly alternative agriculture and way of 
life, geared to solidarity rather than competition, use of appropriate technologies, 
environmentally sound (often organic) farming methods, and more just social 
structures. 
Note that these three positions are not mutually exclusive. Agribusiness people 
recognize a niche for organic products, even the most solidarity-based groups recognize 
194 Among some groups supporting market-based reform, prejudice against small farms is diminishing and 
there is recognition that family owned farms are "the most efficient and sustainable" (SDdimensions, p. 9). 
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that farmers need to market their crops,195 and everyone recognizes that agrarian reform 
will help resolve a significant social problem. The difference lies in one's primary vision 
of what agrarian reform is meant to achieve. The average person on the street (if s/he 
thinks about it at all), many politicians, and a significant sector of government officials 
on all three levels, think in terms of the first of these models - resolving a social problem. 
Those in the government more seriously involved with agrarian reform and agriculture, 
the agribusiness and financial sectors, the World Bank, and some academics think more 
in terms of the second model. Many NGOs and popular movements, and some 
academics, think in terms of the third one. 
Perhaps one of the key points that focuses these philosophical differences is the 
view of land as a commodity. J. Molina (2001), a supporter of market-based land reform 
writing in an FAO publication, notes that "...the new model of development emphasizes 
the market as the principal force or factor to distribute resources in the rural sector, both 
land and labor capital." Recognizing that classical economic theory requires a 
competitive market to have fungible goods, freedom of participation for buyers and 
sellers, and a great number of buyers and sellers, and that all participants should have 
complete information, he states: 
In the case of the land market, these requirements are not fulfilled because said 
markets are highly imperfect.... First, the degree of heterogenity of land (which 
has to do with soil type, availability of water and other natural resources, 
existence of infrastructure and access to markets, among other factors). Second, 
the availability of capital to purchase land.... Third... the land market tends to 
be fragmented and/or segmented. Finally.... the high cost of obtaining 
information respecting the size and characteristics of property.... [emphasis 
added] (Molina, 2-3) 
195 "...it is important to note that this ideological opposition has little correspondence, in the case of MST... 
with the concrete situations which they influence, in various regions of Brazil, where the economic projects 
which they sustain normally have a strong sense of economic integration and inclusion in the commercial 
and financial relations of the municipalities...." (Navarro 1998, 9) 
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Molina's use of the term "imperfect" is standard economic language. Yet it is ironic 
that in classical economic terms the uniqueness of land is viewed as an "imperfection," 
whereas an environmentalist or one who loves land would see this as a valuable quality. 
Once again, the ability of classical economics to ignore the reality of natural resources, 
the "conceptual chasms that divide modern economics from ecology" (Hempel 1996, 11), 
is brought into play. 
Within the classical model, virtually all the prerequisites of a classical free market 
are missing in Brazil with respect to land. In addition to land not being a fungible item, 
there is no equality of bargaining power between the parties, few clearly defined property 
rights, no "effective and creditable mechanisms for resolutions of property rights 
conflicts" or "information systems so that the diverse agents in the market can participate 
and operate in the same efficient and effective manner." (Molina 2001, 2) 
Some of these failings can be alleviated. The MBLR legislation and regulations 
take steps to facilitate the legal transfer system, reduce conflicts as to property rights, and 
equalize (through the creation of technical units and the contracting of NGOs) the access 
to information. While an efficient and credible court system and overall equality of 
bargaining power are very long-range problems, the land bank regulations create 
mechanisms that help to deal with these issues. 
None of the "good faith" players in our situation would deny the ultimate value of 
greater equality, clear property rights, effective conflict resolution, or greater access to 
information. But the reason for advocating those things can be disputed. A World Bank 
publication states one position clearly: 
Land markets... are subject to regulatory constraints that significantly affect the 
operation of the market and equilibrium prices and sales, contribute to reduced 
efficiency, and have negative equity implications. The role of government in land 
market reform is to remove such regulations, establish a system of predictable 
market rules, and focus on the provision of information, adjudication of border 
disputes, enforcement of property rights, and valuation and assessment of land for 
tax purposes (Brandao and Feder 1995, 1). 
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Here is a clear concept of land as a commodity.196 
It is this factor, I believe, which underlies much of the initial resistance to and 
continuing discomfort with MBLR concept. Brazilians - especially poor Brazilians -
have no particular reason to be enamored of the capitalist system and the market 
economy, which have not notably worked to their advantage. Other models of 
relationship to the land may lead to greater social, cultural, and environmental 
sustainability. A Brazilian sociologist has spoken of the attractive aspects of peasant 
autonomy, noting that it involves specialized knowledge of work and of a place, the 
ability to vary work and organize one's work time, and the possibility of living and 
working "close to the place of origin, conserving social and neighborly relations...." 
... these are clearly a pre-industrial relationship with work.... [T]his leads us to 
admit that industrial work represents, at least apparently, a loss of autonomy 
that suffers a disaggregation when compared with work as it was previously 
conceived.... [T]his is not to say, necessarily, that these propositions-aspirations 
and these experiences of peasant autonomy are retrograde. In fact, one cannot 
deny that such a system has an internal logic that is dynamic and at times 
effective from the microeconomic and technical viewpoint when compared with 
the modern matrix; at the same time, it appears to have preserved certain 
characteristics of tradition that industrial society, as it is known today, has 
erased. (J. Almeida, 149)197 
196 At the time of resurgent donor interest in land reform, "...there was an emerging new consensus on neo-
liberal theory of economic growth... and a related group focusing more on fiscal and trade reforms broadly 
known as the Washington Consensus. This new paradigm was inherently opposed to policy interventions 
aimed at achieving social equity. There was a growing body of literature that pointed to development 
policy overcoming market distortions that prevented resources going to the best use.... Land and natural 
resources markets did not work because economic policies had favoured subsidies, protectionism and a 
whole gamut of interventions.... Almost all the major donors are now supporting land reform programmes 
in conceptual terms that are compatible with the Washington Consensus " (SDdimensions, 4-5) 
197 Note also Bryner, 178: "An alternative view of development begins with the interests and desires of 
local residents, who identify their problems, propose solutions, and work alongside those who can provide 
external technological and financial support. Crops are produced primarily for domestic consumption 
rather than export.... These efforts are sensitive to how change effects traditional cultures and to the need to 
reinvent community and individual identity in response to change.... [Alternative technologies are 
appropriate, small-scale, compatible with local knowledge and culture...." 
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From both a social and environmental standpoint, treating land as a commodity 
can have negative results. The breakdown in rural community life is notable when land is 
sold and, particularly, accumulated into larger parcels for commercial farming. The 
process tends to dispossess small farmers: impressed by the money offered (coming from 
near-subsistence, a relatively small amount of money seems like a fortune), they often 
sell land and subsequently discover they have insufficient funds and skills to support their 
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families. (e.g., Powers 1987a and 1987b) From an environmental standpoint, 
viewing land as a commodity pushes one away from the personal relationship to land, 
necessary to good husbandry, and towards short-term economic returns dependent on the 
use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, (see, e.g., Netting 1993) The World Bank and 
neo-liberal vision of converting land into a commodity would, thus, seem to be an 
example of what has been termed "misplaced concreteness" — applying the classical 
economic model to policy making as though it represented reality, with a inevitably 
distorted impact on real human culture, communities, relationships, and undertakings. 
(Daly and Cobb 1004; see also Middleton 1993, 110) 
Evolution of the Program 
As noted above, for approximately fifteen years prior to 1996, the World Bank 
and other large donor agencies had virtually dismissed land reform as a viable 
development mechanism. As the Sustainable Development Department (SDD) of FAO 
(which never stopped advocating land reform) noted, this situation changed: 
What is surprising... is the rapidity with which land and agrarian reform has been 
returned to the development agenda by the major donors.... First and foremost 
land reform is back on the agenda because rural populations have put it there. 
(SDdimensions 2000, 1) [emphasis in the original] 
The MST in Brazil is cited by SDD as one of the forces that has brought about this 
change. Also noted as factors in this change of agenda are growing awareness of rural 
issues on the part of urban populations, increased demands for rural rights, and greater 
international networking by NGOs and farmers groups, leading to pressures from civil 
198 From 1985-1996, an estimated 4 million family farms ceased to exist. Dias & Amaral 2000, 242 
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society such as the document from the 1998 Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, 
"Towards A Better Distribution of Land." (Ibid., 2) 
In light of these pressures, the World Bank and other major donors were obliged 
to reconsider land reform. Historically, imposed redistributive land reforms have had 
mixed results, representing "both the most successful and the most unsuccessful 
examples of land and agrarian reform." Given the risks of such programs, World Bank 
rules prohibit it from financing such land reforms. Furthermore, such programs were not 
in tune with prevailing neo-liberal economic theories. Thus "...negotiated and market-
led land reform programmes [became] the 'flavour of the month' in the donor 
community...." (Ibid., 3, 5, 8) "Paradoxically, such [market-oriented] land policies have 
been much driven from above by the State and international agencies." (Kay, 28) 
The World Bank therefore had a strong vested interest in the success of the 
market-based approach. In the two years following implantation of the Cedula da Terra 
program, the Bank's Inspection Panel turned down two requests for an investigation of 
the program from the Brazilian National Forum on land reform, a group consisting of 
most of the major civil society groups dealing with the issue (CPT, MST, ABRA-
Associagao Brasileira de Reforma Agraria, etc.). The Panel contended that the Forum's 
critiques of the program arose from an ideological bias against market-based mechanisms 
and unawareness of program successes. (Schwartzman 2000, 1) 
By 1999, the World Bank was declaring on its web page that "New Approach to 
Land Reform Proves Successful," a claim echoed (at a more moderate level) in the neo-
liberal press. (Schwartzman, 5; The Economist 1999) The Bank's web page went on to 
state that: 
...the three year project achieved its objectives one year ahead of schedule. A 
follow-up $ 1 billion adaptable program loan is being prepared for this fiscal year 
to capitalize on the current project's success and maintain the momentum that this 
kind of land reform has generate (quoted in Schwartzman, 5). 
The rush to expand the program caused tremendous concern, especially as it was 
recognized that such a large program would draw considerable funds away from land 
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reform expropriation.199 The Bank's own Preliminary Evaluation stated that "...the 
Cedula da Terra program is still too recent to permit an evaluation of its socio-economic 
impacts, either on the beneficiaries of on the communities" and noted that it was an open 
question whether beneficiaries would be able to manage their properties and generate 
sufficient income to meet loan commitments. (Ibid.) Schwartzman points out: 
Even were information available on the productivity of the land... and the 
management capacity of the beneficiaries, it would still be extremely 
precipitous to call the program a "success," since there is a three-year grace 
period for project loans, and the first beneficiaries will only have to begin 
repaying their loans in 2001. (Ibid.) 
During the 2000 Grito da Terra ("Cry for the Land" - an annual event in Brasilia 
organized by the Church to advocate for land reform), representatives of CONTAG met 
personally with President Cardoso. CONTAG's primary demand with respect to MBLR 
was not philosophical but highly practical - easier credit terms. On this basis, the GoB 
entered into dialogue with groups representing "organized civil society" that resulted in 
an agreement to move forward with an adapted Project of Land Credit and Combating 
Rural Poverty. The Project, announced by the government in July and approved by the 
World Bank in December, 2000, sought to provide access to land, community 
infrastructure, and technical assistance to 50,000 families over a three-year period, at a 
cost of US$ 400 million ($8,000 per family), half to be financed by the World Bank. 
Analysis of the Issues 
1) The issues related to methodology 
The methodology arguments against MBLR were not without merit at the time 
that they were made. Certainly one of them - that the GoB was seeking to undercut the 
influence of the MST - rang true. Prior to the election of Lula, the MST was allied to the 
opposition Workers' Party (PT) and consistently criticized the Cardoso government. 
During the Cardoso administration, the MST's civil disobedience frequently irritated the 
government, and that irritation seemed to turn to personal dislike on the part of the 
199 Plevin notes that in 1999 GoB "cut funding for INCRA 47% while spending $220 million on Banco da 
Terra." He also notes that the World Bank loan increases Brazil's foreign debt. (4-5) 
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President in 2002 when the MST invaded and vandalized his family farm in Minas 
Gerais. (This act also embarrassed the PT, which began to distance itself from the MST.) 
The Cardoso government overstepped itself occasionally in reacting to the MST, and a 
World Bank preliminary evaluation of the Cedula da Terra Program "...found that the 
Cedula [community] associations typically define themselves in opposition to the MST" 
(Schwartzman, 4). Undoubtedly the Cardoso government would have liked to have seen 
the MST's influence wane, and this in part explains the government's repeated praising 
and willingness to work with CONTAG, in some sense a less radical, "well-behaved" 
rival of MST in the representation of rural workers.200 (Jungman 1999a; NEAD 2000a) 
The criticism of the community organization component of the program - i.e., 
that the community organizations undertaking land negotiations were created for that 
purpose and are not truly authentic - may also have had validity in some cases. A 
preliminary evaluation of the program found that 
the majority of the associations originated from the populist tradition, in which 
representation is based on co-optation, subordination, and social and political 
control over poor populations. Even many of the associations that are being 
created exclusively to participate in the Program appear not to escape this 
context. It is however necessary to call attention to the fact that programs such 
as Cedula da Terra presuppose autonomous associations, with the capacity to 
take and implement strategic decisions on the use of assets under their control.... 
(quoted in Schwartzman, 7) 
One observer noted the inability of the community organizations to negotiate 
directly with landowners, the actual negotiations being carried out by state technical 
advisors (Xavier 1999, 22). It is probably this type of situation which led to allegations 
of state officials in Pernambuco receiving bribes and acting as though they were real 
estate agents (Carvalho 1999). 
How 'authentic' these community organizations are warranted study, both in the 
sense of whether they are be able to represent the interests of their members and manage 
200 Evaluators contracted by the World Bank noted the political/ideological dispute with the MST, Church, 
and other sectors of civil society and suggested that participatory inclusion of these groups would reduce 
opposition to the market-based programs. (Schwartzman, 4; Navarro 1998) I suspect it is GoB hostility to 
MST which led the World Bank to officially include only CONTAG in the new program. 
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ongoing program issues, and in the larger political sense of whether they support 
significant change or simply become part of the electoral "corral" of local elites. Weak, 
ineffective, or co-opted community organizations would cut to the very heart of the 
validity of the program. For this reason, evaluation of the community associations was 
a central theme of our case studies. 
Closely tied to this argument is the issue of whether decentralization places 
agrarian reform in the hands of those local elites that have traditionally been most 
opposed to it. There were allegations that "Some associations, urged by landowners, 
pressured [state technical authorities] that the purchase be made for the price asked by the 
landowner, at times the landowners promising extra benefits so that some of the 
ocvy 
community leaders would pressure the government" (Xavier, 22). In this respect, it 
should be noted that the pilot project "involved extensive evaluation and intensive Bank 
supervision" (World Bank 2000, 9), factors likely to diminish manipulation and 
corruption on the part of local power groups. Would a broader, nationwide program with 
less active Bank supervision would be more open to the types of manipulation that such 
groups have engaged in in the past? The primary mechanism for avoiding such 
distortions in the program, per se, would seem to be that the community organizations are 
negotiating for their own benefit and therefore have an interest in obtaining the best land 
at the lowest price. But if these community organizations are not authentic, they can 
themselves be manipulated by local elites. 
With respect to the issue of owners keeping the best land for themselves and only 
selling marginal lands to the program, possibly at inflated prices, initial studies seemed to 
show that this did not widely occur (note, however, that in three of our seven case 
201 "...it is only by reestablishing the primacy of community in political life that the social and 
environmental sensibilities needed to manage the global reach of technology and capital are likely to 
emerge.... The relationship between strong communities and effective governance has been documented in 
numerous studies.... The point of the community restoration argument is... that it permits rooted 
engagement and face-to-face deliberation... The central premise of this book is that only by linking 
community ecological values with democratic design of policies and markets can the goals of 
environmental governance be realized in a sustainable fashion." (Hempel 1996, 8-10) 
202 My experience in rural community organization indicates that these charges may or may not be true; 
because corruption is frequently present in Brazilian society, rural workers (like most other Brazilians) -
especially those who do not have significant solidarity-based training - are quick to suspect (and spread 
rumors about) corruption whenever anything even potentially suspicious arises. 
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studies, owners did sell less desirable land to the program). The early studies showed 
that the beneficiaries negotiated purchase of good land at per family and per hectare costs 
substantially lower than those of land reform expropriations during the same period.204 
However, it should be noted that expropriation itself is not free from the marginal land 
argument: the system gives landowners so much leverage in fighting expropriation that 
the GoB frequently opts to expropriate lands which the landowners are willing to have 
expropriated, and these are often less valuable lands. (There is support here for the MST 
position: there are indications that land expropriated as a result of MST land 
occupations/invasions is better land, especially in terms of location, than that otherwise 
expropriated by the GoB, and thus leads to more sustainable small farms (Sussuarana 
2001)). Furthermore, the market-based approach permits acquisition of medium-sized 
parcels and "productive" land, which are exempt from expropriation under Brazilian land 
reform law; indeed, the new program aims to focus primarily on lands that are not subject 
to expropriation. (World Bank 2000, 11) 
One final point on methodology is worth noting. Jose de Souza Martins, a highly 
respected sociologist, believes that "Those who fight for the rural workers want an 
agrarian reform that is confiscatory and punitive for the latifundio," a position he thinks 
is pointless and ahistorical. He notes the danger of thinking of the land struggle as "a 
holy war," and the "manicheism" of seeing it as a struggle between good and bad.205 
(Martins 2000a, 25) He criticizes the MST and CPT for failing to dialogue with the 
government, recognize the plurality of post-dictatorship Brazil, and the inevitability of 
203 Opponents of the program alleged in 1999 the most expensive land purchased under the Cedula da 
Terra Program "did not have agricultural potential because of its topography" and that the study of land 
values undertaken by the University of Campinas for the World Bank was flawed because the technicians 
responsible for the purchase were the same ones who filled out the study questionnaires. (Forum Nacional 
de Reforma Agraria 1999, 3) 
204 Reydon & Plata (1999, 18-19) found that, in comparison with 1998 Cedula da Terra costs, average 
expropriation costs per hectare during the 1996-98 period were 66% higher in Ceara, 62% in Maranhao, 
49% in Minas Gerais, 43% in Bahia, but only 14% in Pernambuco. World Bank 2000, 10, states that the 
Cedula da Terra lands cost "...about 28% less per family than the present value of initial expropriation 
prices in the Northeast. Since expropriated owners often obtain additional compensation through 
subsequent judicial actions, the final cost of expropriated lands can be as much as three times the initial 
compensation amount." 
205 Martins believes that middle class leaders and pastoral agents in the MST, CPT, and other movements 
tend to ideologize the struggle in a manner that is alien to the way the workers themselves think. There is 
some truth to this, though I think his cited article overstates the issue. 
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government management of agrarian reform206 (Martins 2000b 13-15, 22). I believe that, 
though uncharacteristically one-sided in his criticism, he is right to the extent that the 
literature of the MST often fails to distinguish among opposing parties, classing the GoB 
and the World Bank in essentially the same mode as it would the "landowners" - whom 
907 
themselves vary greatly in attitudes and methods. On the other hand, it is possible to 
make the opposite mistake, of thinking that there are no "bad guys" here; greed, 
corruption, and violence on the part of some landowners and government officials are 
208 very much a part of the agrarian problem. 
2) The speed of the process 
With respect to the issue of whether the GoB and World Bank acted precipitously 
in expanding market-based agrarian reform from a pilot project to a US$ 200 million 
program, the vocal criticism that occurred in 1999 (e.g., Aslam, MST 1999a and 1999b, 
Plevin, PT) became somewhat muted, and probably rightly so. Certainly the critics were 
right that the World Bank announced victory at an early stage. It has been correctly 
pointed out that full evaluation of the impact of an agrarian reform program probably 
requires a thirty-year period, and even then may not be conclusive (Kay). But public 
policy is not an exact science - decisions have to be made on the best evidence available. 
The landless families in Brazil need access to land as quickly as is reasonably possible. 
In this sense, a great deal of study, analysis, and thought went into examining the 
pilot project (e.g., W. Brandao 1998, Buainain et al. c. 1999, Navarro 1998, Reydon & 
206 "j[je (Jisjuncture is, most of all, in the fact that MST and the Church managed to put the agrarian 
question on the agenda of the Brazilian state and, at the same time, did not legitimize this inclusion... when 
they refused to accept it as a political fact, that has as its necessary and inevitable implication negotiation 
and agreement as to the viability, extension, form and quality of the reform. Because this is a pluralistic 
and complex society, different from societies with a more simple social structure, that are the reference 
point of these organizations, such as Cuba, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala...." (Martins 2000b, 25-6) 
207 Martins argues that the GoB has actually gone beyond the vision of MST/CPT by seeking to reassert, for 
the first time since 1822, government authority over public lands held by landowners in posse. Indeed, the 
GoB has been able to reclaim an impressive 20 million ha. of land in this way. Min. de Des. Agrario 2000a 
208 Having approached land reform both as a field worker and academically, I am aware how easy it is to be 
overcome by hate when you are working in the field (especially when your life is threatened and people 
you work with are murdered). This can be a blinding and negative factor, (see, Powers 1987a, 1987b, 
1987c). On the other hand, in the comfort of one's academic study, it is easier to be cool-headed. 
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Plata 1999, Vegro & Garcia c. 1999, Xavier 1999). By the standards that the GoB and 
World Bank set forth, the pilot project was very successful: 
With a stated objective of reaching 15,000 families in three years, the Projeto 
Cedula da Terra... will benefit some 23,000 families with about 617,000 hectares, 
at a per hectare cost of about R$193 and per family cost of about R$4,759. With 
complementary investments of R$4,114 per family, the results are significantly 
below the costs of traditional interventions. (World Bank 2000, 2) 
Furthermore, the Bank noted lessons learned from the pilot and adapted the 
subsequent program accordingly (World Bank 2000, 9-11). This included, especially, 
greater input from civil society, particularly the active participation of CONTAG and the 
rural unions in represents.209 
The GoB and World Bank would thus seem to have been justified, within their 
own context, in having moved forward with the larger program. Within its own 
framework, the analytical and technical work of the Bank, particularly, was impressive 
(see, e.g., Stiglitz 1998a and 1998b, von Amsberg c. 1999, World Bank 2000) and an 
attempt had been made to open dialogue with at least some of the other players (although 
I found no evidence that the GoB or World Bank had followed the advice of their 
evaluator that including "the participation (decisive and not merely consultative) of the 
MST... in the process could greatly reduce its opposition...." (Navarro 1998, 9)) 
3) The issues related to results 
The question remains, however, as to the type of results a market-based land 
reform will produce. As stated above, I think it is this question that underlies much of the 
resistance to and discomfort with the World Bank model. Will the market-based 
approach, with the debt burden it places on the new farmers and the technical assistance 
provided by groups oriented by the GoB and the World Bank, inevitably lead toward land 
being viewed as a commodity, to the valuation of "modern" techniques and the high use 
of commercial/chemical inputs, and to farmers being absorbed into the agro-commercial-
financial complex, losing their autonomy and solidarity? 
209 Plevin states (3) that World Bank management had questioned the legitimacy of the National Forum for 
Agricultural Reform and Justice in Rural Areas, consisting of CONTAG, CPT, MST and other groups, to 
request investigation of the program, but that a World Bank inspection panel confirmed their right to do so. 
177 
This is not a question to be taken lightly. As noted above, the instruments used to 
achieve a purpose do have an effect. Prior to undertaking our case studies, I was 
personally more comfortable with - and confident of the results of ~ methods used by the 
MST and, especially, the CPT - which actively build into the process a strong community 
and solidarity component, critical of the excesses of capitalism. I felt that one was not as 
likely to see these attitudes reflected in World Bank orientations. 
Yet it needs to be remembered that the primary executor of the program is not the 
World Bank but the GoB. In Brazil, by the early 2000s, neo-liberalism had reached an 
apex and its influence was declining. A constructive nationalism was reasserting itself. 
The inevitability of neo-liberal models was being questioned and there was a growing 
articulation among those who doubt the wisdom of allowing market thinking to dominate 
the culture. This had a concrete impact politically - both inside and outside of the 
government. 
At the same time, both in Brazil and elsewhere, the model of "modern" 
commercial agriculture has been under attack. There is growing recognition that the 
family farm is not a relic, but a vibrant unit essential to rural production and social well 
being. As an FAO document noted: 
For some time there has been a growing body of scientific investigation that has 
noted the inverse relationship between farm size and production of food crops.... 
The data indicates clearly that all other things being equal the family farm is the 
most efficient and sustainable. This does not emerge through romantic wishful 
thinking but rather through the fact that, on average, a farm family achieves a 
much higher density of management than do any other types of farm enterprise 
arrangement. This greater density of management exists because there is 
motivated family labour available on a continuous basis. (SDdimension 2000, 9) 
A World Bank economist stated that "...studies undertaken in Northeastern Brazil and 
confirmed by the 1995-6 Agricultural Census have shown that, on average, family farms 
are more efficient... than large farms...." (von Amsberg c. 1999, 6-7) 
From an environmental standpoint, also, there has been a growing realization 
within certain sectors of society and of the government that modern commercial 
agriculture, as it has widely been practiced, may be harmful. Among matters being 
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questioned are genetic manipulation of seeds, use of chemical pesticides,210 excessive 
dependence on commercial fertilizers, and emphasis on monocultures. Given the 
tremendous commercial interests involved with these matters, it would be naive to 
believe that they will be resolved quickly or to expect that large producers of agro-inputs 
will stop courting and orienting agronomists, agricultural extension workers, and farmers 
(small, medium, and large).211 Small farmers who have been active in MST, CPT, and 
similar programs may have more tools for critiquing this commercial orientation, but 
there is no reason, per se, why such critical information cannot be shared with farmers 
who have obtained their land through market-based mechanisms, especially where the 
participation of NGOs is part of the planned process. 
210 Paalberg 1995, however, noted, 312, 330-1, the difficulty encountered by FAO in getting World Bank 
support for even a moderate pesticide limitation program. 
211 "Everyone is aware of the dangers of contemporary industrial farming, the problem is that it is locked 





Overview of Case Studies 
Introduction 
In March and April, 2006, our research team212 visited seven Cedula da Terra land 
reform settlements in the Nordeste (semi-arid Northeast) and Litoral Norte (North 
Coastal) regions of Bahia (see Maps V-O-A, B, and C). In all cases we interviewed a 
substantial sampling of settlement area residents, and we also separately interviewed 
(usually in their offices) technical advisors to those settlements. 
In selecting the settlements, we expressed an interest in seeing areas that had 
experienced some measure of success. We did this for the following reasons: 
• In light of substantial criticism of the Cedula da Terra!Banco da Terra programs, 
we wanted to see whether any successful results had occurred. 
• In our experience, failure in development projects (especially community 
organization projects) is easier to achieve than is success; we believed that 
relatively successful programs would prove to be more interesting. 
212 The team consisted of Brenda King-Powers, a sociologist and trained community organizer with 25 
years experience in Brazil (including nine years rural/small town community organization - two of them in 
Bahia - and three years experience working with farmers' cooperatives in the Brazilian Northeast -
including Bahia); Daniel Carvalho, the former director of Caritas (Catholic Charities) in Bahia, with over 
20 years experience working with rural community and production groups - he is also the son of a small 
farmer and grew up in the region we studied; and the author. 
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• Although one can learn from failures, in many cases of land settlement failure, the 
original settlers have dispersed. 
• We believed that examining what went right - and the problems and 
vulnerabilities of those settlement areas that have been relatively successful -
would allow us to develop information that might be useful to planners and policy 
makers with respect to future programs of a similar nature. 
Settlement areas were initially selected on the basis of interviews with technical 
people who had supported the program on a statewide basis. Our team intentionally 
selected the northern, primarily semi-arid region of the state rather than the more fertile 
southern region, for the following reasons: 
• The semi-arid region, which extends north from Bahia, better represents the 
reality of the rural Brazilian Northeast, the area of greatest poverty in Brazil, 
where there is a high proportion of rural population and an ongoing notable need 
for successful development strategies. 
• The agricultural and ecological challenges of implanting settlements are greater 
in the semi-arid region; we believed that successful experiences there were 
particularly worthy of observation. 
• We, the team members, all have substantial experience with, and an affinity for, 
the semi-arid region. 
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21 Summary Description of Settlement Areas 
The seven settlement areas are briefly described below. All of the communities 
are in the officially designated Semi-Arid Region of Bahia with the exception of Nova 
Lusitania and Boa Vista III, which are in the North Coastal region, although this area is 
still substantially dry.214 
All of the communities follow the agro-vila model of organization (developed in 
Bahia by CELANOR in conjunction with the first settlements in 1997). In this model, 
each settler family received a house/garden lot in the residential portion of the settlement 
and a larger agricultural lot in the surrounding fields. This is in contrast to a model in 
which families have their residences on their agricultural land, preferred in certain parts 
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of Brazil. The agro-vila model makes it easier to deliver electricity, running water, 
and other services to the residents' homes. 
The land in each settlement is divided as follows: 50% individual lands (both 
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housing lots and fields), 30% collective lands, and 20% ecological reserve. The 
original purpose of the collective land was to be worked jointly by the settlers, under the 
213 Throughout this discussion and in the case studies themselves, the present tense is used to indicate 
conditions at the time of the studies - i.e., March/April 2006. 
214 The Cedula da Terra program financed twelve settlements (a total of 468 families) in the Semi-Arid 
(Northeast) region of Bahia, and twelve (463 families) in the North Coastal region. In the entire State, 
there were 111 Cedula da Terra settlements with 4,263 families. During 2002-2005, the succeeding 
program, Credito Fundiario, established eleven more settlements (343 families) in the Semi-Arid region, 
three more (74 families) in the North Coastal region, and 88 more (2,999 families) statewide. (Oliveira, 
Olalde, and Germani 2006, 7-8) 
215 A few settlers did not like the agro-vila system. Some do not like living that close to neighbors, finding 
the agro-vilas noisy and intrusive (these people may be classified as "truly rural" - the level of noise in the 
agro-vilas was very low in comparison with most Brazilian towns. Several families had built small shelters 
or houses on their agricultural plots, where they stayed during key seasons such as planting and harvesting. 
At least one family had moved permanently out to a house on their agricultural lot, where they lived 
without electricity or water, but expressed great contentment as to the peace and quiet of their home. 
216 Communal areas are often close to the residential area; ecological reserves are usually distant. 
1 8 2 
direction of the association, with the income used, first of all, to make land payments, any 
surplus to be administered or distributed by the association. The evolution of the 
collective area in each settlement - how settlers think and feel about it, how it is 
administered - constitutes one of the most interesting (and often polemic) aspects of our 
study. 
Vila Canaa is in the municipio of Euclides da Cunha in the heart of the semi-arid 
region. Founded in 1998, the settlement has 73 titular families (plus 4 additional 
households) in an area of 1649 hectares. The economy is based on agriculture with beans 
as the primary cash crop, supplemented by manioc, corn, cattle and sheep. Leadership in 
the community is provided by a group of Seventh Day Adventists, most of whom (with 
some of the other settlers) came from a community that was a land reform settlement in 
the 1970s. 
Veneza is also in Euclides da Cunha, although in an area even drier than Vila 
Canaa. Founded in 2002, the settlement area has 30 titular families in an area of 1004 
hectares. The economy is based on goat raising and cultivation of sisal. Almost all of the 
settlers came from an area that was declared an Indian reservation and which they were 
required (as non-Indians) to leave. 
Passos da Esperanca is in the municipio of Olindina. Founded in 2001, the 
settlement area has 30 titular families in an area of 450 hectares. The economy is based 
on agriculture (manioc, beans, corn) and fruit raising (passion fruit, oranges). As in the 
case of Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista III below, the majority of settlers have cultural 
roots in the neighboring State of Sergipe, a people who highly value fruit raising 
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(especially oranges) and who view themselves to be, in contrast to their view of the 
Bahians, hardworking, steady, and reliable. 
Moita Redonda is in the neighboring municipio of Inhambupe. Although 
purchased in 1998, actual settlement did not take place until September of 2001. The 
settlement area has 50 titular families in an area of 677 hectares. The economy is based 
on fruit raising. This settlement has been more directly affected by local political 
interference than any of the others. 
Nova Lusitania is in the municipio of Esplanada. Founded in 1997, it was one of 
the first four settlements (all purchased simultaneously) under the Cedula da Terra 
program, and suffered the effects of early organizational problems in the program. The 
settlement has 26 titular families (plus 12 other households) in an area of 806 hectares. 
The agricultural economy was intended to be based on fruit trees - principally oranges, 
but also coconut palms and others. However, with the failure of many of the trees, due to 
soil problems, the settlers have moved to subsistence farming with a few attempts at cash 
crops, and most of the settlers also depend on oil revenues (42 Petrobras oil wells occupy 
240 ha., and the settlement receives a monthly payment from Petrobras; part of the initial 
payments from Petrobras went to purchase an additional -240 ha. in a nearby, non-
adjacent area, on which 10 of the families have their agricultural plots). Almost all 
settlers have roots in a 1960s sergipano orange growing land reform colonization in the 
municipality of Rio Real, on the border of Sergipe (this characteristic shared with Boa 
Vista III). 
Boa Vista (Biritinga) is in the municipio of Biritinga (the community is referred 
to as "Biritinga" by the technical assistants in order to distinguish it from other land 
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settlements named "Boa Vista"). Founded in 2001, the settlement has 37 titular families 
(plus two other families) in an area of 807.4 hectares, plus two non-titular families 
(grown children of settlers). The economy is based on cashew, manioc (with three casas 
de farinha owned by individual settlers), and apiculture. 
Boa Vista III is in the municipio of Esplanada, a few miles from Nova Lusitania. 
Founded in 1998, the settlement has 55 titular families (plus several additional 
households) in an area of 1375 hectares. The economy is based on fruit trees -
principally oranges, but there is concern that oranges may not prosper due to soil issues; 
attempts have also been made to set up a bolacha (cookie/cracker) factory and other 
cottage industries. As in the case of Nova Lusitania, most settlers come from the 
sergipano orange growing culture with roots in earlier land reform colonizations in the 
municipality of Rio Real. Many settlers came from relatively well off circumstances 
(with personal property such as motor scooters) before settling on the land. 
The Cedula da Terra Program In Bahia 
As noted in Chapter IV, following a small World Bank experimental project in 
Ceara, in 1997 the World Bank, at the request of the Brazilian government, approved 
Land Reform and Poverty Alleviation Pilot Project 4147-BR - the Cedula da Terra 
Project. Bahia was one of four states included in this program. The initial budget was 
US$ 150 million (i.e., $10,000 per family), allocated 30% for land purchases, 56.2% for 
infrastructure, goods and materials, 2.6% for community development and technical 
support, 6.7% for state government level administration, and 4.5% for Federal 
Government evaluation and dissemination. The program in Bahia is administered by 
1 8 5 
CDA - Coordenagao de Desenvolvimento Agrario - Agrarian Development 
Coordination - a State Government agency. 
In Bahia, the program had a number of key features. Based on work done by the 
NGO CELANOR, discussed in more detail in Case Studies 1 and 2, the standard agro-
vila approach was developed for the Cedula da Terra land settlements. In addition to the 
house and farm lots, each community has a collective area (usually 30% of the land) and 
an ecological reserve, the latter following the Federal legal requirement of 20%. 
Two major funds constitute key elements of the Bahia Cedula da Terra program: 
SAT - subprojeto para aquisigao da terra — the land acquisition subproject. 
These are the funds for actual purchase of the land, including the purchase price and 
directly related costs such as title registration. Funds are administered through the Banco 
do Nordeste do Brasil (BNB) and are disbursed at the time of purchase to pay the selling 
landowner and related costs. The land is owned by the group in the name of the 
Association - it is not individually held. The settlement has a three year grace period and 
then seventeen years (a total of twenty years) to repay.217 Interest is between four and six 
percent annually (a highly subsidized rate in Brazil). If for any reason payment is not 
made, all other financial resources (SIC, PRONAF, etc.) are suspended until payment is 
received. 
SIC - subprojetos de investimentos comunitarios - community investment 
subprojects. These are funds are a grant allotted to Cedula da Terra land settlement 
communities for post-purchase investments in community infra-structure, and are 
administered through the Banco do Brasil (BB). The first disbursement is usually for 
217 In the newer Credito Fundiario program, the grace period was reduced to two years, with a total of 
fourteen years to repay if the loan is up to $ 15.000 and seventeen years if it is over that amount. 
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construction of housing and basic infrastructure. Beyond that, SIC funds can be used for 
projects developed by the community under the guidance of their technical advisor. 
Projects may include planting fruit trees, seed and fertilizer, livestock, equipment, water 
and electric resources (although frequently the State provides those through special 
programs), productive facilities such as casa de farinha (facility for making manioc 
flour), and other efforts approved by CDA. 
Beyond the funds available through SAT and SIC, the government of Bahia made 
available other development funds. Most notable among these are funds from CAR -
Companhia de Desenvolvimento e Agao Rural - Development and Regional Action 
Company - a state-owned development company in Bahia, which provided funding -
usually in grant form through the CAR PRODUZIR program - for a number of projects 
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in the settlement areas. Another state agency, SECOMP, financed the cookie factory 
in Boa Vista III, for instance. 
In addition, the state government aided settlement areas in obtaining water and 
electric infrastructure. Basic water infrastructure - including, in the case of Vila Canaa 
and Veneza, piping of water from distant sources - is underwritten by a combination of 
state (EMBASA), municipal, and association funds. Starting in 2003, meters were 
installed in settler homes to measure and charge for actual usage. If settlers wish to have 
water in their fields, the settler and/or association has to provide installation. Electrical 
218 The World Bank model envisions a fixed amount per beneficiary. That portion used for land purchase 
(SAT) is subtracted from the total and treated as a loan; the remainder (SIC) is provided as a grant. The 
purpose in this structure is to provide an added incentive for the purchasing farmers to negotiate lower land 
prices, while the SIC portion is seen as providing resources to allow the new settlements to move quickly 
into production and economic viability, (e.g., Deininger 1999; Borras Jr. 2003, 372-373). 
219 CAR PRODUZIR projects require a 10% contribution from the community, but this can be in the form 
of labor, use of the community tractor, etc. PRODUZIR II, in effect from 2001 to 2005, was a $75 million 
progam - $54.4 million from the World Bank and $20.6 million from the State of Bahia. PRODUZIR III, 
which was going into effect at the time of our visit, was expected to be approximately the same size. 
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infrastructure is carried out with help from the State Secretariat for Infrastructure's rural 
electrification program "Light For All" ( "Luz Para Todos"). 
Settlers also qualify for Federal subsidized agricultural loans. The first and most 
basic of these is PRONAF-A,220 a fund set aside for settlers in land reform areas. 
PRONAF-A loans had a value of up to R$13,500221 with very low interest, usually had a 
three year grace period (although up to five may be permitted), and are then repayable in 
seven annual installments with a rebate of 40% of principal if paid on time. 
Once a farmer has used PRONAF-A, s/he can take out additional loans locally 
referred to as custeios. These are officially PRONAF-A/C loans, valued up to R$3,000 at 
2% per annum interest, payable in up to two years, with a rebate on interest of R$200 if 
paid on time. In order to qualify for these loans, farmers must have a gross annual family 
income of between R$2,000 and R$ 14,000, not counting agricultural retirement pensions. 
Most families in settlement areas qualify, and many of the farmers took out these 
custeios, almost always to support specific agricultural projects. 
For farmers with a lower family income, PRONAF-B loans are a possibility -
these are loans of R$ 1,000 with interest of 1% per annum, up to one year grace period, 
and up to two years to repay, with a 25% reduction on the entire debt (principal and 
interest) if repaid on time. Farmers with family income in excess of R$ 14.000 can 
qualify for larger PRONAF D loans at 4% interest, up to five years grace period, with a 
total of eight years to repay and a 25% reduction of interest if repaid on time. 
220 PRONAF - Programa Nacional de Fortelecimento da Agricultura Familiar - National Program to 
Fortify Family Agriculture. The program was created in 1995. 
221 Maria Djalma informed us, interview of March 21, 2006, that she is able to put in an additive that 
increases the maximum amount to R$ 16,000. In 2005-2006, the average exchange rate was approximately 
R$1.00 = US$0,425. 
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Other funding sources include PRONAF MULHER - a small loan fund for 
women who are wives of titleholders; this program, initiated in 2004 and expanded in 
2005, permitted an initial loan of R$3,000 repayable in one year with discount if repaid in 
time. PRONAF JOVEM is a similar program for teenagers and young adults. 
In 1998, the Brazilian Government created the Land Bank {Banco da Terra) a 
parallel program which also sponsored MBLR projects. The experts we spoke to 
preferred the Cedula da Terra program primarily because the Land Bank did not provide 
222 
for a fund such as SIC and this seriously weakened the viability of the communities. 
Both programs were superseded by the Credito Funiario program, and it was generally 
felt that this new program was superior to both of the others, a number of lessons having 
224 been learned and the procedures having been streamlined. 
222 Interview with Berta Veloso and Antonio Fernando da Silva, January 31, 2006. 
223 The Credito Fundiario program began in 2001, overlapping with the Cedula da Terra program, which 
ran through 2002. 
224 See, e.g., interview with technical advisors Sergio Ricardo Matos Almeida and Edna Moreira de Brito 
Batista, March 27, 2006. 
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Map V -0-A. The Brazilian Northeast 
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Map V-O-B. Micro-Regions in Bahia at the time the case studies were carried out. Five 




























1 9 1 
Map V-O-C 
The northeast of Bahia (Northeast and North Coastal micro-regions, showing the 
municipios. The settlements studied were in the following municipios: Nova Lusitania 
and Boa Vista III in Esplanada (54), Vila Canaa and Fazenda Veneza in Euclides da 
Cunha (14), Moita Redonda in Inhambupe (49), Passos da Esperan^a in Olindina (45), 
and Boa Vista in Biritinga (42). 
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Case Studies 1 & 2 
Introduction - Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista III 
These two settlements, located approximately 10 miles apart in the municipio of 
Esplanada, are introduced together because they share three important factors: 
historical/cultural roots, climate, and a major agricultural and land quality problem. The 
unique aspects of each of these two settlements are discussed in the individual case 
studies that follow. As these two settlements were part of a pioneering program that 
helped set standards (such as the agro-vila pattern) for the entire Cedula da Terra 
program, the history here related is relevant to the other case studies as well. 
Common Factors - Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista III 
History:225 In 1960, a large number of families from the neighboring state of 
Sergipe moved into an area of Atlantic rainforest in what is now the Bahian municipio of 
Rio Real, located on the border with Sergipe. In accordance with the agricultural 
traditions of their region, the Sergipanos were orange growers. Each family settled 20 ha. 
of land and, with financing from the IDBA, cleared the land and planted orange groves 
and passion fruit. The families had difficulty repaying the IDBA loans and their credit 
was suspended. 
225 Except where otherwise indicated, this history is based on our April 27, 2006, interview with Rafael and 
Eduardo Carlos, respectively coordinator and agricultural technician of CELANOR. 
1 9 3 
In the mid-1980s, the IDBA wanted to start refinancing the orange groves (which 
were now 25 years old), but required the formation of community associations to do so. 
Four such associations were developed in four villages (all in the municipio of Rio Real): 
226 
Lagoa Seca, Lima, Tanque, and Lagoa de Baixo. 
In 1995, Miguel Arcanjo, a local leader who emerged out of the Catholic CEBs 
movement, developed a plan through which the four associations could work together. 
They founded CELANOR - an agency made up of member associations. They hired an 
agronomist (Manzinho) and jointly bought inputs and sold produce. 
As the families in these communities grew, and children came of age and married, 
the 20 ha. lots were often split up among siblings. However, a minimum of 5 ha. is 
required in that region to provide basic support for a family. A strong interest arose in 
finding more land. 
In 1996, the joint associations, in conjunction with CELANOR, arranged a large 
PRONAF financing and bought land in the neighboring municipio of Esplanada, on 
which they formed the Colonia de Coco - a rural settlement area. This land was settled 
by approximately 26 families from the various associations, who divided the area in 
accordance with each settler's ability to pay: "Those who had more money got more 
land" (Rafael - CELANOR). This was prior to the Cedula da Terra program, and was a 
private undertaking on the part of the associations. 
By this time, CELANOR had 12 member associations. CDA (then CORA -
Comissao Organizadora de Reforma Agraria) approached CELANOR regarding the 
226 Our team visited this area on March 3, 2006 when we went to meet with Miguel Arcanjo, who still lives 
there. A good dirt road passes through several very small villages, each with a Catholic church and a few 
commercial enterprises. The road is lined on both sides with small but well-kept and reasonably 
prosperous looking farmsteads, the houses not far from the road and the fruit groves stretching out behind 
them. 
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Cedula da Terra program. CDA offered to help settle 600 families, and offered 
CELANOR a R$1 million budget if it would assume primary organization of this 
undertaking. CELANOR began developing plans - including the agro-vila concept that 
would subsequently become a mainstay of the Cedula da Terra program in Bahia. 
CELANOR helped to set up the first four Cedula da Terra settlements in the state: Nova 
Lusitania, Novo Orizonte, and Antonio Conselheiro in the municipio of Esplanada and 
Cachoeira in the neighboring municipio of Conde. The official founding (contract 
signing) date for all four was November 9, 1997. Subsequently CELANOR helped in the 
founding of other Cedula da Terra settlements, including Boa Vista III, founded on June 
8, 1998.227 
Although these projects became something of a showcase for the government 
("We spent a lot of time with visits..." from the World Bank, United States, etc. [Rafael 
- CELANOR]), the money promised from the state did not arrive fully as planned. In 
1998, however, CELANOR entered the Fairtrade Labelling "Just Juice" program and 
began to receive international support, so that it was able to continue work without 
government funds. The Just Juice program provided a better price to growers for 
passion-fruit and orange juice, and CELANOR received US$100 for each ton of juice so 
sold. These funds permitted CELANOR to purchase a small house in Rio Real as its 
headquarters and to continue paying its agronomist and field workers. 
In 2000, however, CELANOR had to suspend giving technical assistance to the 
settlements. Technical assistance is based on 8% of the SIC, and the SIC had not been 
227 Berta Veloso (interview January 31, 2006) noted that, during the 1990s eucalyptus prices fell and many 
of the reforestation companies were willing to sell land. In the decade of 2000, eucalyptus prices were 
improving and the companies in some cases tried to convince settlers to grow eucalyptus, and even 
expressed interest in repurchasing land, offering to remove population to other land. However, this does 
not directly impact the communities studied. 
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disbursed (see below). At the same time, a sharp decrease in the world market-price for 
passion-fruit juice diminished income from the Just Juice program. CELANOR was 
998 
unable to pay its people, or even buy fuel for its vehicles. This situation improved as 
PRONAF financing became available for the settlements (PRONAF provides a technical 
assistance fee) - as of 2006, CELANOR was still active in advising on PRONAF 
projects. Eventual release of the SIC and improvement in the fruit juice market prices 
also helped, so that CELANOR was able to return to full functioning ability.229 
Culture: Almost all of the settlers in both Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista III come 
from community associations in Rio Real. Although most were born in Bahia, they are 
culturally Sergipanos, and view themselves that way. These Sergipanos see themselves 
as hard-working and goal oriented, and their cultural model of agriculture is one strongly 
based on orange growing. 
Climate: Although Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista III are officially in the 
Northern Coastal Region rather than the semi-arid region, which they closely border, the 
228 Mazinho, the original CELANOR agronomist, who had worked with only partial payment during the 
early years, left at this time, formed a private agronomist firm and took on much of the advising work on a 
volunteer basis. He is now a PT alderman in Rio Real. 
229 Rafael also discussed land settlements that had not proven as successful (Rafael CELANOR 27/04/06). 
Foremost among these was Cachoeira, which he termed a "mystery." Located in the municipio of Conde, it 
started with 32 families, now has 10; 3 people died there. CDA intervened and indemnified 20+ families 
who left. The remaining 10, he told us, are living well; they have tractor purchased with SIC funds. 
Another settlement with problems is Malombe, which was not a CELANOR project. Located in 
Esplanada - its borders touch those of Boa Vista III - Malombe was the only settlement with primarily 
urban settlers from Esplanada. According to Rafael, it got the worst land and no agro-vila. The settlers 
have very large house lots, and the collective area is small and has poor land. In general Malombe is very 
poor, but there is disparity of wealth there - the prefeito's brother has two lots with a swimming pool. 
When we were in Boa Vista III, we were informed that there is violent crime in Malombe. However, the 
middle school children from Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista III attend school there. 
According to Rafael, the settlements of Timbo and Novo Paraiso are very similar to Malombe. 
Indeed, when we were first looking into land settlements to study, we were warned to stay out of several in 
the area north of Salvador, as they had become similar to urban slums and were considered dangerous. 
Rafael also mentioned Nova Canaa (not to be confused with the Vila Canaa of our studies). Nova 
Canaa was described by Rafael as a pauperized minifudio ("minifundiaria pauparizada") where each 
family has only 1.5 ha. This is not a Cedula da Terra settlement. 
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climate is dry - similar to that of the southern portion of the semi-arid region where 
Moita Redonda, Passos de Esperan^a, and Biritinga are located. Like those communities, 
Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista III had, at the time of our visit, experienced a dry period, 
though a less severe one. 
Officially, the climate is classed as sub-humid and the natural growth of the 
region semi-decidual seasonal forest {floresta estacional semidecidual), although to us it 
looked very similar to the cerrado found in the southern portion of the neighboring semi-
arid region. 
Agricultural Issue: In both Boa Vista III and Nova Lusitania, the settlers 
discovered, after buying the land, that much of their land suffers from highly 
compacted sub-soil. The compacted soil forms an almost rock-like strata, impenetrable 
by most forms of plant roots, starting anywhere from 20cm. to 2 meters beneath the 
surface. Thus plants, which seem to thrive in the fertile top soil, bud and grow 
vigorously but, in the case of fruit trees, will begin, sometimes as early as the second 
year, to shrivel and die. 
This is particularly disheartening to farmers whose goal is to grow orange groves. 
Most of the settlers we talked to in these two settlements consider the growing of annual 
crops, such as beans and corn, to be something one does for family consumption only, but 
not the kind of agriculture they want to engage in professionally. And the subsoil 
problem is not limited to fruit trees: in many places the compacted subsoil negatively 
230 "When the land was purchased, we looked at it from the surface, and it looked good." (Rafael, interview 
27/04/06). Most people we interviewed who had an opinion believed that the reforestation companies 
selling the land were aware of the problem. "We had access to the worst reforestation lands. The best went 
to a company based in Singapore. Here the best lands went into eucalyptus, the worst into agriculture." 
(Frei Chico) It is not clear whether the government was aware of the problem. 
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affects drainage, so that - especially after heavy rains - root crops such as manioc rot, 
and crops like passion fruit, corn, and beans can be harmed by overly wet soil. 
CAR, CDA, EMBRAPA, and EBDA have all come to the area to examine the 
sub-soil problem. According to most of the settlers we interviewed, the consensus of 
these agencies is that this problem makes the land unsuitable for citrus trees. EMBRAPA 
has dug experimental trenches in both Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista III, and has a soil 
specialist studying the problem. 
One solution is to break up the subsoil. However this requires large-scale 
machinery and is expensive. A neighboring reforestation company, COOPENOR, 
reportedly paid R$350 per ha. for such a process. 
The land seems to be slightly better in Boa Vista III than in Nova Lusitania.232 In 
addition, because the cycle of settling, financing, and growing started earlier in Nova 
Lusitania, that community has had to face the problem, while many in Boa Vista III have 
not yet had to. We found that settlers in Nova Lusitania had given the problem a good 
deal of thought. 
In an interview with community leaders in Nova Lusitania (4/5/06), they 
discussed this matter in depth. The men expressed frustration with the land - "We 
weren't able to bring much [with us when we came]. We relied on the land - but were 
mistaken" (Manuel). They discussed various crops that they had considered or 
experimented with. 
231 Meeting with Nova Lusitania representatives, April 5, 2006; meeting at Boa Vista III church, April 28, 
2006. 
232 Interview with Frei Chico, April 5, 2006 
233 Six settlers tried raising pineapples; only one was successful and, because he was the only grower, he 
had trouble getting buyers to pick up his crop. Several had their manioc die. Another turned part of his 
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Edivaldo, one of the most articulate of the farmers in Nova Lusitania, admitted 
that, because of the subsoil issue, he has considered giving up his land and leaving the 
settlement. But he added that, besides the problem with the land, "We have another 
problem - ourselves. We won't change our thought, but have to." He believes that the 
settlers are fixated on oranges, manioc, and cattle, and have to consider alternatives.234 It 
is clear that these men have considered the matter in depth, and they discussed a number 
of alternatives - including carrots, cucumbers, anise (which they told us the Brazilian 
natural cosmetics company, Natura, will buy), tobacco.235 
Edivaldo, Petro, Wilson, and twelve others in Nova Lusitania began 
experimenting with organic farming. Of the original fifteen who did so, seven (including 
those three) have stayed organic. They believe this to be a valid option on the land, but 
note that organic agriculture also presents issues, including the cost of natural fertilizer 
and the cost of certification with IBD (representatives of IBD have visited Nova 
Lustana). I had an opportunity to spend time in the fields with Sr. Petro and Edicarlos, 
the CELANOR agro-technician, and was impressed by the creativity and dedication Sr. 
Petro brought to experimenting with possible crops. 
In our meeting with Dr. Penedo of CDA (April 26, 2006), an agronomist and state 
administrator of whom the settlers spoke of with considerable liking and respect, he 
stated that the State Secretary of Agriculture is concerned about the sub-soil situation in 
Nova Lusitania, Boa Vista III, and neighboring settlements. The state does not have 
land into pasture and has three cows - "But you can have 12 cows maximum - then you live on what? If 
everyone produces milk, it will drive the price of milk down." (Manuel). 
234 Several settlers who do not utilize organic methods mentioned spontaneously to us that they believe that 
the organic method is the best long-term solution. One stated that, although he does not use organic 
methods for his cash crops, he does use it for the food his family will consume. 
235 One settler experimented with tobacco. See case study below. 
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adequate equipment for dealing with the subsoil problem. When we noted that the 
settlers had told us that the local municipal government had purchased a tractor for 
breaking the subsoil, he stated that, while he believes the local government's intentions to 
be good, and the tractor purchased is better than the state's equipment, it is still not really 
strong enough to deal with the compacted subsoil. 
However, he feels that the concern about the subsoil has been overstated by some 
and agrees with the settler's assessment that they need to consider alternatives. Viability, 
he believes, cannot be based only on suitability for citrus growing. He noted that yams 
have done well in the area, although this is not a plant which makes up part of the 
Sergipano culture, and feels that passion fruit can be successfully raised if drainage issues 
can be resolved. He also emphatically stated that the settlers should work with organic 
methods, and that, over the long run, such methods can be helpful in dealing with the 
compacted subsoil issue. He emphasized that organic methods are a holistic way of 
managing land, not simply the use of organic inputs. 
This being said, he noted that the settlers are in need of additional funding to work 
this issue. The government is working to provide an additional two year grace period for 
land payments; Petrobras has been approached about assisting the settlement associations 
in developing projects. Noting that Federal funds for agrarian reform are spread very 
thinly, he hoped that the local government would be willing to help with technical 
assistance. 
2 0 0 
Case Study 1 
Name of Settlement: Nova Lusitania 
Families in Settlement: 26 title holding families +12 additional family homes 
Location: Municipio - Esplanada 
Area: 806 ha. 
Contract Date: November 9, 1997 
Dates Visited: April 5-6, 2006 
Number Interviewed - Households: 15 Individuals: 22 
Family size (persons): 1-3/ 4-6/ 7-9/ 10+ 
Persons Interviewed: 10 men, 9 women, 3 youth (one male 18 married, one male 17 
single, one female 16 married) 
Ages: -20/3, 20-29/2, 30-39/6, 40-49/3, 50-59/6, 60+/2 
Schooling: 0-2/ 7, 3-5/12, 6-8/2, unknown/1 
In 8 families, wives have slightly more education than their husbands - usually 
two years or less. In one family the husband had more education (2 years). 
Technical Assistance: CELANOR 
236 In two cases, families interviewed were not official settlers. Anselmo Rodrigues' father is the title 
holder of their farm, but his father is 75 and Anselmo effectively runs the farm. Vagner de Jesus, on the 
other hand, is the son-in-law of a settler (Vagner is 21 and his wife is 15); he works on his father-in-laws 
land but was not knowledgeable about production or sales. Both men are worker members of the 
Association. 
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Figure V-l-A. Nova Lusitania - plaza with football field and Catholic chapel, with the 
settlement primary school in the background. 
Association headquarters. 
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Figure V-l-C. Settlement youth in school uniforms outside of a small store operated by a 
settler family. 
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Geography: The settlement consists of 26 landholding families and is located in the 
municipio of Esplanada, 23 kms from the municipal seat: 20 km on paved roads, and 3 
km on poor quality dirt roads that wind in and around a Petrobras oil drilling district. 
Each of the families has a dwelling lot (20 x 110m) in the agro-vila and a farm lot 
varying between 19 and 20 has. The communal farm land constitutes approximately 120 
has. and the natural reserve 160 has. In addition to the land-holding families, twelve 
other families (grown married children of settlers) have been provided with small 
residential lots at the edge of the agro-vila and have constructed homes there. 
The agro-vila is strung out along two sides of a winding dirt road that passes 
through the settlement to Novo Horizonte and other locations. At the entry of the 
settlement (the west end), there is the cluster of twelve houses built for non-landholding 
adult children of settlers, each with a small yard. The new Association headquarters are 
located approximately half way down the road on the south side. A small parallel street 
runs north of the road. Because the presence of oil wells led to purchasing additional lots 
(discussed below), some of the farm lots are reached by continuing down the road beyond 
the neighboring Novo Horizonte settlement, a distance of approximately three miles. 
Climate: See Introduction to Case Studies 1 and 2, above. 
History: As mentioned above, Nova Lusitania was one of the first four Cedula da Terra 
projects in the State of Bahia, the contract for all four being signed on November 9, 1997. 
Twenty of the original settlement families came from the Community Association of 
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Loreto,237 and the remaining six came from the Community Association of Lima, both in 
the municipio of Rio Real, member associations of CELANOR. On July 31, 1997, these 
twenty-six families formed the Association for Community Development of the 
"Loteamento" of Nova Lusitana.238 
The land was purchased from Duraflora S.A., a reforestation company, which 
promised to remove the pine (pinus eliotus) trees from the land. The company was 
supposed to harvest the trees in three phases during the first three years after purchase, 
but was not able to meet that schedule. It therefore negotiated with the settlers and 
provided certain benefits (use of tractors, digging of water storage trenches [tanques], 
etc.) in compensation for the delay. Some of the settlers did not negotiate this, and 
retained rights to the trees on their plots. 
Actual entry on the land did not take place until 1998. However, the promised 
financing for the settlers was not released for several years. In 2002, the settlers 
protested at INCRA in Salvador during a visit of Raul Jugman, Minister of Agrarian 
Reform, with the result that their PRONAF financing was released.240 
237 The Loreto Association was formed in 1987. Vitor Rodrigues, 75 at the time of our visit, was President 
of that Association when the new project began; he is now a settler in Nova Lusitania, and his son, 
Sebastiao Rodrigues, also a settler, was President of Nova Lusitania in 2006. Petro was for four years 
Treasurer of the Association in Lima 
238 Of the original 26 families, 12 or 13 (our informants were not sure) have left due to various reasons, 
most notably family issues and agricultural problems. These families were replaced with new families. 
Some of the "new" families arrived quite early; for instance, Judite and her husband arrived after the 
housing lots had been selected but before the farm lots were. There had been no further attrition in the 
three years prior to our visit (2003-2006). 
239 Edivaldo Rodrigues said that they began work on the land in late 1997, then moved there in tents in 
early 1998. His was the last house to be built because, as a leader, he did not have time to work on it. 
240 In this protest, they occupied the INCRA building. Their target was not INCRA, per se, but getting the 
attention of the Minister. Five settlement areas (including Boa Vista III) participated in the protest. The 
municipal Secretary of Agriculture provided them with two buses to transport them to Salvador. 
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PETROBRAS, the Brazilian oil company, has 42 oil wells that occupy 240 ha. of 
settlement land. PETROBRAS paid a royalty to the former owners, but did not pay the 
settlers after formation of Nova Lusitania. The settlers hired a lawyer and, in 2003, 
reached a settlement with PETROBRAS in which they were paid a lump sum for past 
royalties and ongoing royalties based on production. The lump sum was used in part to 
purchase approximately 240 ha. of nearby, but non-adjacent land, on which 10 of the 
families now have their agricultural plots (this land is approximately 3 km. from the agro-
vila; one passes through the neighboring agro-vila of Novo Orizonte to reach it). 
Three years prior to our visit, the settlers were informed that Nova Lusitania had 
reached the stage of emancipation from government tutelage. However, this was 
communicated to the settlers verbally, no document to this effect had been provided to 
them. The settlers received training to assume their own autonomy, but they felt that the 
training was not sufficient.241 At the time of our visit, Government personnel were still 
• 242 visiting the settlement sporadically, and would come if called. 
Demography: All interviewees were of rural origin except for Zelia, who claimed urban 
origin. Of the men, five had owned minifundios; three of these supplemented their 
income as daily farm workers and/or sharecroppers. One other owned 10 has. of land in 
241 At the group meeting, Edivaldo said that CDA tried to prepare them, but it was not sufficient. The 
workshops should have been earlier. When Edivaldo was Treasurer, for instance, he was oriented one year 
after he started. After money had been spent, he was told that it should not have been spent in that way. 
For instance, they opted to buy a simpler tractor than the one CDA indicated, and used the money in other 
way - for instance, for fencing to keep out animals. They had been told they should decide how to spend 
money, but then were told they should have gotten permission first. He got receipts, but they were invalid 
and he did not know that. CDA sent a person to work with him for seven days. He said that at one point 
some of the CDA were rude and looked at him askance, but that subsequently they understood. We were 
told that CDA now recognizes the shortcomings of the training the settlers received. 
242 Edivaldo, at meeting with settlers, April 5, 2006. The settlers will never receive individual title to their 
land. 
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Colonia Coqueira, but the land was so poor he had to supplement his income as a daily 
laborer. Three worked family land, one of these supplementing his income as a tractor 
driver and another as a daily laborer. Three were rural employees: one administrator of a 
small pineapple farm, one a driver/orange worker for a landowner, and one a general 
farm laborer paid weekly. Two of the women worked in restaurants. Judite's husband 
was a small shop owner in a village in Rio Real. 
Race/Ethnicity: white, afro-Brazilian 
Gender: Four of the 26 title holders are women. Of the 15 households 
interviewed, 13 are titular families; of these, in three cases the titles are held by 
the wife (in two cases, because the husbands were too old to qualify). 
Religion: There are nineteen Catholic families and seven Evangelical Protestants 
(Congreca9&o Crista do Brasil) in the settlement. Of the families interviewed, 11 
identified themselves as Catholic (in one of these the wife is Catholic, the 
husband does not claim Church membership) and 4 as Congreca9§o Crista. Both 
have active chapels in the settlement. 
Age: The title holders of the land interviewed ranged from in age from 25 to 65. 
Average age of title holders here was slightly older than in other settlements 
studied. 
Attrition: In the period prior to 2003, thirteen or fourteen (our informants were not 
certain) of the original families left the settlement. Reasons cited for their leaving 
included hunger, family issues (separation), urban background,243 and the soil 
problem. No settlers were expelled. New settlers took their places and, from 
243 "If a person comes from the city, unless they were raised in the country, they don't stay." Manoel Paixao 
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2003 on, there has been no further attrition. Some members of the community, 
however, feel that this is due more to the ongoing oil royalty payments than to 
increased satisfaction with community life. 
Education: Most interviewees were satisfied with the education system. Twelve 
interviewees classed the schools as good or excellent, one as so-so, and one as weak. 
"In the city (Esplanada), people say that the children from the settlements have 
more privileges than those in the city. Children here are more organized and 
developed than the children in the city." (Elenice) 
th 
Children attend pre-school to 4 grade in the settlement. The school, built with CDA 
funds, is owned by the Association. 
5th through 8th graders are bused to school in the Malombe settlement. The bus 
picks up students from the settlements of Cequeira, Novo Orizonte, and Nova Lusitania; 
there are 60 to 70 kids on the bus, some have to stand for the half hour trip. There are 
150 students in the Malombe school. Parents were satisfied with the education; Antonia 
stated that the teachers are excellent but that the students are "wild" ("bravos "). Beyond 
eighth grade, students have to go into Esplanada to study. 
Health: Four interviewees stated that the health system is bad, one stated that it is good. 
Edivaldo pointed out that the health system is difficult in the whole country, but stated it 
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is adequate for the settlement. A health agent comes to the settlement periodically; there 
was divided opinion as to her effectiveness. 
There is a doctor every Monday at the health post in the Antonio Conselheiro 
settlement. Residents have to take the bus, which requires that they be gone most of the 
day. At times they go and find that the doctor is not present. 
Water: The Association administers an artesian well with the capacity of 2400 liters per 
hour. A water tower with 10,000 liter capacity was constructed with CAR funding; the 
project was administered by the Association. The water is of good quality. One issue 
under discussion in the Association is whether or not to install water meters in the homes. 
The Itairi River borders the settlement, and Barro Branco Creek runs through it. 
The community tried to dam the latter to make a small reservoir, but the project was 
unsuccessful - the dam failed to hold water. 
Association and Collective Area: The Association has its headquarters in a house 
constructed for that purpose on the main street. It also owns and administers the school 
(built with CDA funds), a tractor, a galpao, and the water well, and administers the 
payments received from Petrobras. These payments cover most Association expenses. 
However, there are also monthly dues of R$10 for full members and R$3 for worker 
members. There are 26 full members and 8 worker members. 
The collective area is located close to the agro-vila. It was planted with oranges 
and coconuts. In 2005, these began to die, and we were told at the general settlers 
meeting that they consider most of these trees to be lost. 
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Eleven interviewees stated that the Association is representative of its 
membership, and none said that it was not. However, Jocemaria mentioned that 
representation is not always equal, that some members have more influence than others 
(she mentioned Milton, Raimundo, Branco, and Sebastiao). 
Wilson was one of those who said the Association is representative, but he stated 
that "problems in the Association" is what he likes least in the settlement. He was one of 
two who stated that they would not belong to the Association if they did not need 
membership to obtain credit. 
Several interviewees stressed that, while there are differences of opinion, these 
are discussed in meetings, voted upon where necessary, and the majority opinion 
prevails. 
"It's rare that people [all] think alike. Some[one] will always disagree. What the 
majority chooses is what counts." (Ivonete) 
"People think differently. [They] take it to the Assembly." (Judite) 
Edivaldo, a former President of the Association and now a member of the Fiscal 
Council, said that in the beginning they had serious disputes and always had two slates of 
candidates for elections. More recently, they have put together a single slate, and he said 
that everyone's reaction was "Thank God!" However, he stated that there continue to be 
important differences, one of them being the discussion between organic and non-organic 
farmers. But the major difference in his eyes is "associativsmo, " i.e., one's view on the 
value and role of associations. 
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"All that we have is via the [Association], Each directory had a different manner 
[of carrying this out].... I learned a lot. I'm a defender of associativismo" 
(Edivaldo) 
He noted, however, that many members do not share this value. "[They] only work 
together because [they are] required to do so." Others confirmed that the participation in 
the collective work was low.244 
This may be in part due to discouragement. We were told at the general settlers' 
meeting that participation in work projects had been higher until 2005, when the trees in 
the collective area started to die. After that, participation decreased. 
For this reason, a decision was reached to divide up the collective area, with each 
family taking responsibility for a portion of it, the goal being that income from that 
portion would go to each family's land payment. However, we were informed that many 
of the parcels so distributed have been essentially abandoned. Petro stated that the 
division of the collective land had not worked out, and he felt that the situation was now 
worse than previously. 
Edivaldo stated that, when he was President, about two years prior to our visit, the 
Association tried to change the by-laws to allow non-titleholding spouses (mostly wives) 
the right to vote, but "the law wouldn't let them." However, in the last election, with 
244 At one point, the Association considered expelling members who continuously refused to meet their 
obligations. However, the neighboring settlement of Novo Orizonte expelled a member who then took 
them to court, and the matter has been pending for years, with the expelled member receiving a portion of 
the sale of eucalyptus and retaining control of his farmstead, although he put another person there and 
never lived on the land. This experience discouraged Nova Lusitania from taking sanctions against 
members. 
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CDA and CAR present, the women were allowed to vote. Elenice pointed out that, while 
non-titleholding spouses could now vote, only titleholders could hold office. 
Only one woman interviewed listed herself as being "very active" in the 
Association, and a few others said they attended meetings when they were able to. We 
also interviewed two worker members of the Association, one of whom (Anselmo) listed 
himself as being very active. 
Ecological Area: The ecological reserve is divided up into small areas. All of the 
lowlands are reserved areas, as is a 30 meter wide strip along the river. Interviewees 
understand that the ecological reserve cannot be removed; those who spoke of it see it as 
positive for preserving nature and for wild animals. Also mentioned were that reserves 
help promote rainfall and/or that removing the ecological areas would be harmful to the 
river. "The reserve is like our lung." (Jose Martins da Cruz) One woman mentioned 
that, while it was prohibited to remove wood from the ecological area for sale, it is 
permitted to remove it for fence posts. 
Economy: 
Distinguishing Factor: Oil Revenue - The oil royalties in 2006 generated an 
income of between R$7,000 and R$ 10,000 per month. The Association uses these funds 
to pay certain Association expenses, and the remainder is distributed evenly among the 
settler families, deposited in their bank accounts. This amount averages around R$300-
600 per family monthly,245 and several families interviewed stated that they depend on it. 
245 Petrobras funds distributed to landholding families were R$ 520 in January 06, R$ 490 in February 06, 
and R$ 330 in March 06. 
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Land: The land purchase took place on November 9, 1997. The purchase price 
was R$130 per ha, for a total of R$104,780. SAT funds were R$110,119, and SIC 
R$ 131,967. Payments are R$310 per year.246 Most families seemed to be less worried 
about their ability to meet this payment than they were about PRONAF-A and custeio 
loans. 
The subsoil problem (discussed in detail above) is the overriding factor with 
respect to land. At the general meeting with the settlers, we were told that they had 
invested in the area and that they felt that it would now be impossible to recover that 
investment. The felt the land would serve to survive, but not to progress. When there is 
a lot of rain, the soil becomes overly wet, even affecting corn and beans. When there is 
less rain, it is better, but still weak. With fertilizer, they are able to grow something, but 
rain seems to wash fertilizer away. The soil does not seem to improve. 
A soil expert has opened trenches to study the land problem, gathering 
information for CDA, CAR, and the bank. With the help of the Church, a letter has been 
sent to the Minister of Agriculture from several settlements in the municipios of 
Esplanada and Conde, all with a similar problem. 
Ten of the families stated that the soil is not fertile. Jose Viana said that "...the 
land doesn't produce - [you] work the entire year and at the end of the year have 
nothing." He noted the uncertainty as to what to plant. 
One farmer stated that he believed further study necessary before determining the 
fertility of the soil. Jose Martins da Cruz, the only farmer with a significant commercial 
246 At the beginning of the program, land payments were to be spread out over 10 years, but a change to 20 
years was negotiated. 
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plantation of grain and vegetables (see below) noted that his two ha. near the 
fertile, and that the remaining 20, while clay, are workable ("dar para plantar 
Guimaraes, an organic farmer who opted to plant Tahiti lemons on a commer 
rather than oranges, stated that the land is of medium fertility. Only one 
Jocimaria Paixao, stated that the soil was "good" - she and her husband • 
oranges, manioc, passion fruit, and coconuts (see below). 
Financing: Twenty-two of the twenty-six families took out PRONAF A 
These loans are repayable in four installments of R$ 1300 each, with a rebait 
timely payment is made. When the first repayment fell due in 2005, only six-
families were able to repay, and these did so by selling motor scooters, hor.v. 
The remaining families negotiated repayment.247 The second parcel was 
shortly after our visit, and settlers generally expressed concern as to whether 
paid. 
Almost all of the households we interviewed had PRONAF-A financing 
cases, PRONAF-A funds were used to plant orange and coconut trees, thougV1 
mentioned he also used them to plant manioc. In three cases, the families had u-
the homesteads from earlier settlers and had assumed their PRONAF-A debts. 
Six of the households had taken out custeio loans. In three cases ih 
finance manioc planting, in one passion fruit, and in one fertilizer for orange 
Two of the households had repaid their loans, and one of these had taken out f. 
loan for R$1800. In most cases the landholders seemed confident that they co s , 
247 "If we pay PRONAF, our families will go hungry; better to negotiate with the bank." (Man 
Each family that renegotiated repaid the portion of the loan taken for oranges, but was allowe 
payment for the remainder until May 2006. If the remainder is paid on time, they will get the 
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the loan, with the exception of the purchaser of fertilizer, who said that the loan had not 
produced any appreciable income. 
The Association submitted a project to the EBDA for PRONAF-Mulher funds to 
raise livestock. When asked why they chose that over, e.g., additional passion fruit, we 
were told that they had been informed that PRONAF-Mulher had to be for something 
they did not already have. They were told that the first R$1000 per family PRONAF-
Mulher funds would be released only after currently due PRONAF payments were made. 
If the first R$1000 is repaid, then additional funds would be available. 
Production and Income: Fourteen families were interviewed with respect to their 
agricultural production. Four of those families use purely organic methods; and three 
others are transitioning to organic.248 We were told that fifteen families total had moved 
or were moving to organic fertilizer.249 Jose Viana said that he would like to transition to 
organic, but did not have sufficient funds to do so. 
In accordance with Sergipano custom, 11 of the families interviewed planted 
oranges as a cash crop.250 For 7 of the families, oranges were significantly their single 
largest investment. The approximate size of the orange plantings ranged from 450 to 
1800 trees.251 In many cases, the trees had not reached full maturity, but where 
248 Anselmo Rodrigues is one of the farmers transitioning to organic. In his opinion, their land will only be 
viable with organic methods - "The soil is hot, and doesn't work with chemical (fertilizers)." 
249 Meeting with the community, April 5, 2006 
250 In addition to commercial planting, all of the families planted fruit trees in their yards. These included a 
wide range - banana, acerola, guava, avocado, mango, seringuela, jack fruit, cashew, tangerine, gravida, as 
well as oranges, lemons, etc. The yard trees were generally reported to be doing well. 
251 These numbers are approximate; farmers variously stated their orchard sizes in number of trees, in 
tarefas, or in hectares. 
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production was occurring, it was reported as weak. Edivaldo Rodrigues, with 3 ha. of 
trees, reported that he harvested only 10% of what he expected; Petro Oliveira, with 2 ha. 
of oranges, harvested and sold 3 tons252 at prices varying from R$60 to R$200 per ton; 
Antonio Nascimento dos Santos, with 750 trees, harvested and sold (for R$120) one ton; 
David and Jocimaria Paixao harvested and sold (for R$80-90) one ton. However, Jose 
and Maria Lucia Paixao, with six tarefas of oranges (700-800 trees) were able to harvest 
5 tons in 2005, which they sold at prices varying from R$80 to R$150. 
Two of the farmers invested heavily in lemons. Sebastiao Rodrigues and his wife, 
Ivonete, found them to be "better than oranges" - with 700 3-4 year old lemon trees, they 
were able to sell 5 tons @ R$300 each. Wilson Guimaraes planted no oranges but 7 
tarefas of Tahiti lemons; he sells to a middleman (25 kg. for R$ 6). 
Eleven of the families had commercial plantings of passion fruit. Jocimaria 
Paixao stated that, when passion fruit is producing, it fetches R$ 0.60 per kg., adding 
$100 to $200 weekly to family income. Isabel and Eliezer Martins receive R$ 0.60 per 
kg. Edivaldo Rodrigues reported selling 4-5 tons a year @ R$ 0.50 per kg. 
However, the soil drainage issue may affect passion fruit. In a visit with Petro 
Oliveira in his fields, he stated that the soil problem causes passion fruit to wither and die 
after approximately a year of production (normal life span is 2 Vi years). 
Ten of the families have commercial plantings of coconut, but the trees are not 
fully mature. Coconut is sold at a price ranging from R$20 to R$30 per 100. Only two 
families mentioned coconut as a significant source of income. Other commercial fruit 
252 1 ton (tonelada) = 1000 kg. 
253 Passion fruit grows on vines suspended from arbors. If carefully tended, the vines produce fairly 
regularly throughout the year. Tending includes the delicate task of removing buds 
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production included Jose Martins da Cruz' 2 ha. of papaya (mamao) and Cosme Silva's 1 
ha. of pineapple. 
With respect to non-fruit crops, almost all of the families plant manioc, usually in 
relatively small areas (< 2 tarefas). This is milled into manioc flour (farinha) - a staple 
of the Brazilian diet - at a casa de farinha - the miller keeps 18% of the total. Excess, 
beyond that needed for home use, is sold at the farmer's market254 in Esplanada. 
Families recorded sales prices ranging from R$20 to R$30 a 60 kg. sack, with yearly 
sales ranging up to 30 sacks. 
Drainage problems also affect manioc - which is usually allowed to stay in the 
soil and harvested as needed. Antonio Nascimento noted that, where he lived before, 
manioc could stay in the soil up to two years, but that here it cannot - "it is very weak." 
One farmer, Jose Martins da Cruz, has a significant planting (7 ha.) of beans, 
corn, peanuts, squash (abobora), watermelon, and okra which he sells in the farmers 
market in Espanada; for the prior year he reported earning R$800 from watermelons, 
R$200 from beans, and R$150 from peanuts. Other landholders have only relatively 
small areas dedicated to this type of non-fruit crop. 
At the general settlers meeting, we were told that the soil issue may also affect 
beans. Settlers stated that they should be able to harvest 12 sacks of beans per tarefa, but 
were harvesting half that amount. 
The Brazilian tobacco company, Souza Cruz, recruited farmers to raise tobacco. 
Only one farmer, Sebastiao Rodrigues, attempted this. Souza Cruz provided inputs and 
254 At the group meeting, we were told that, with the presence of the settlements in the area, the farmers' 
market in Esplanada has grown 50-60%, and now operates on both Friday and Saturday instead of just the 
latter. Food has become less expensive for those living in town; they are "undercutting the middleman" 
(Petro). In addition, it has expanded the products available, with more varieties of fruit and vegetables. 
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he planted 60,000 tobacco plants, but the resulting crop was very small and did not 
recompense the labor. 
Eight of the families raise chickens - on the average about 20 chickens per 
family. Six of the families have a mule or horse. The most diverse in terms of stock 
raising are Jocimaria and David Paixao who, in addition to 10 chickens, have two pigs, 
two sheep, and three goats. 
Eight of the families receive the Bolsa Familia, which - depending on the 
number of children - is up to R$95 per month. Only one family has a member receiving 
an old-age pension.256 
Nine of the landholders interviewed work as daily laborers, ranging from about a 
week a month to "almost every day." Daily laborers earn R$12/day working for the 
settlement (on settlement programs) and R$15/day working for others. The most 
common labor mentioned were agricultural work, loading trucks, and cutting pine trees 
for the reforestation company. 
Other sources of income: Jose Domingos owns a tractor and rents it out with his 
time in other settlement areas (but not in Nova Lusitania, which has its own tractor), 
usually paid by the prefeitura. Elenice (his wife) started a small store in 2005 - she says 
business is slow; when she can she buys goods wholesale in Feira da Santana (about four 
hours away) - her brother has a truck and goes there with her. Antonia Ferreira crochets, 
and sells Avon and Hermes products (earning about R$30 month). Maria Lucia Paixao 
255 The Bolsa Familia provides a stipend to low-income families with school age children on the condition 
that the children are vaccinated and attending school. 
256 This is a bit unusual, as in most rural communities in Brazil, old-age pensions are a major source of 
local income. In our small town in the State of Tocantins, for example, the day old-age pensions were 
distributed was the single most active day for local commerce. 
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also sells Avon products - she earns about R$10 per month, 20% of what she sells. Other 
families reported selling tanks of gas (used for cooking stoves) with earnings of R$ 40/m; 
and selling ice cream & popsicles, with earnings of R$ 45/m. 
Sufficiency of Income: When asked if family income was sufficient, only two 
householders (both men) responded "yes." Most others stated that there is enough to eat 
but not for other perceived needs: 
"There is a lot lacking. But we get by (da para viver). Food is no problem -
Thank God. Clothes and shoes are more difficult." ( Elenice Rodrigues dos 
Santos) 
"You work the whole year and it isn't even enough to buy a shirt." (Ivonete 
Maria de Jesus) 
Jose Ferreira stated that there is enough to eat but not enough to pay for necessary 
investments: hiring a tractor, buying fertilizer. Several mentioned the importance of the 
Petrobras income and other income not generated from the land. But, when discussing 
other matters such as the future of their children, many were eloquent about the 
advantages of having enough to eat and a place to live (see below). 
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Settler Attitudes: 
Satisfaction: Nova Lusitania suffered the highest attrition rate (-50%) we 
encountered. That was prior to 2003, but has since stabilized. However, there are 
indications that stabilization (i.e., settlers not leaving) may be due in part to the oil 
revenues received by each family. The expressed level of satisfaction was not high: 17 of 
22 people interviewed said that they would be willing to trade or sell their land given 
certain conditions. Sixteen of the respondents believe that their life is better in the 
settlement than before they moved there,257 and only one felt her life is worse (she came 
from a small landholding in Rio Real with producing fruit trees which they owned 
258 
outright). Many had favorable comments about the community, but there was an 
overall sense of disappointment as to the quality of the land (especially with respect to 
raising fruit trees), concern about the cost of fertilizer, worry about the ability to meet 
259 
payments, and a sense of apathy with respect to the future. 
Future: Most interviewee responses with respect to the future of the settlement 
were general and superficial - things would be better in two years, much better in 10 
years, or the interviewee hoped things will be better. A few expressed more specific 
insights. Edivaldo Rodrigues believes there are two possibilities: if the land problem is 
resolved, he believes it will be a new start for the community; if the problem is not 
resolved, he believes he will make it through, but is concerned that many of the others 
257 Some responses were nuanced. Edivaldo Rodrigues, who had previously been an administrator for a 
small pineapple farm, noted that he is now better off in terms of infrastructure (his term) - owning a house 
and land - but less well off financially - he is currently earning less money. 
258 Edivaldo Rodrigues - "It's the best place in the world" - but he would sell or trade for another 
community because of the soil problem - he emphasized that was his only issue. Antonio Nascimento dos 
Santos - "If the whole community could get better land and decided to move, we would too." 
259 One interviewee, Eliezer, said that he did not like anything about the settlement. 
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may fail. Petro also feels the future depends on the soil, and Eliezer Martins believes 
things will get worse - the soil is weak and oranges won't grow. Ivonete de Jesus wants 
the prefeito to do more - especially in establishing a health post. 
Deeper feelings emerged in some instances when discussing the future of their 
families. Antonio Nascimento wants his children: 
".. .to study well so as to progress in life. Not like me. But to stay around here. 
Out (in the world) only (works) if you have a very good job. This is rare. The 
good of man is the land. There are so many people unemployed, without 
anything to eat. If you have a house and food, everything is okay. Out there {la 
ford) everything is purchased - here in the countryside we have everything." 
Edivaldo Rodrigues also wants his children to stay in the country, close by, but hopes 
the financial situation will ease up. Elenice hopes her children can go to college - which 
she sees as requiring them to study in Salvador - but hopes they will return to live in the 
interior. Maria Lucia thinks that in the future working in the country will become easier 
- she hopes for jobs for children so their life will be easier.260 
Socio-Political Awareness: Generally the level of social-political awareness among 
interviewees was similar to the level one would expect among Northeastern rural 
Brazilians who are not active members of political parties, landless movements, active 
unions, or Church social justice groups (such as CPT or the CEBs movement). When 
260 One settler's teenage son was present at this point in the interview. Alair (17) wants to go to Sao Paulo 
to spend a year. His uncle and godfather live there; his uncle will get Alair a job if he finishes high school. 
But he ended by saying he would stay in the settlement if he could earn enough to "buy a shirt" (i.e., to 
have some ready spending money). 
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asked who helps/is in favor of the rural worker, answers included Lula/the President (3), 
the prefeito/municipal government (3)261, the Church/churches/Frei Chico (2), and people 
or agencies within the government (2). Edivaldo stated, "The [Federal] Government says 
it is concerned, but doesn't help much." Cosme noted that "the person [worker] himself 
has to be in favor." Alair stated that the producers of fertilizer and inputs, and the 
commercial intermediaries, work against the rural worker. 
Attitudes toward the MST were similar to those current on Globo Television.262 
Of the 13 interviewees who expressed opinions, six felt strongly negative toward the 
263 
MST and its methods, three had more nuanced negative opinions, and three expressed 
approval; one of these last was the lay leader of the Catholic Church who is actively 
involved in diocesan social justice matters.264 One interviewee commented that she 
resented the MST in part because the negative image it creates rubs off on land reform 
settlement dwellers, and that people in town refer to the people in the settlements as "sem 
265 terras" (landless in a pejorative sense). 
261 The municipal government has, in fact, provided help to the settlers to a greater extent than any other 
municipio in our study. 
262 During the several months prior to the interviews, the image of the MST as portrayed in mainstream 
media was largely negative, emphasizing invasions of productive land, isolated acts of violence, and the 
presence of MST militants who were allegedly not legitimately landless farmers. 
263 One interviewee stated that he found MST methods disagreeable, but it was good that people were 
winning the land; similarly, another said she disagreed with invading land, but people do need land and 
have to go after it ("correr atras"). Similarly, Edivaldo, one of the more articulate interviewees, stated that 
he did not approve of MST methods - he clarified that he is not against the people who are trying to get 
land, but against their leaders, whom he felt are using them. 
264 Alair, 17 years old, provided an interesting response. He stated that MST land invasions call attention to 
problem - that MST is helping people who are seeking (correndo atras) a means of working (meios de 
trabalhar) - taking land from those who do nothing with it and giving it to people who want to work it. 
265 Researcher Brenda King-Powers noted that, in informal conversations, many of the women felt strongly 
about they and their children being ridiculed as "sem-terras. " See also Case Study 2. 
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With respect to politics, the interviews showed 19 votes in the last election for 
Lula, 3 for Serra, and 3 non-voters. With respect to the forthcoming election, of those 
who responded, 13 were undecided, 7 for Lula, and 3 for Serra. Only two interviewees 
expressed strong party affiliations, one with the PT, and one with Antonio Carlos 
Magalhaes - the long standing political boss of the State of Bahia. 
Strengths/Vulnerabilities/Recommendations: Nova Lusitania is the oldest of the 
settlement areas studied, and one of the four oldest Cedula da Terra settlements in Bahia. 
Partly because it was among the first, the settlement experienced considerable difficulties 
in the organizational stages. Financing was delayed, attrition was high and settler 
satisfaction is the lowest that we encountered. 
The subsoil issue speaks directly to one of the points that critics of market based 
land reform often make: that landowners will sell off the worst portions, while keeping 
the better portions of land themselves.266 It seems fairly clear that the company that sold 
the land was aware of the compacted subsoil. 
Discovery of Petrobras oil on the land has been a mixed blessing. On one hand, it 
halted attrition and provided settler families with some income while potential solutions 
to the subsoil issue are examined. On the other hand, it seems to have created some 
dependency, and perhaps removed impetus for some of the settlers to be as active and 
creative as they might otherwise be in seeking alternatives to orange growing. 
266 As mentioned earlier in this essay, however, this critique is somewhat offset by the fact that, in Brazil, it 
is very difficult for the government to expropriate land that the owner does not want it to expropriate. We 
have seen the same issue arise in traditional land reform projects: landowners allowing the government to 
expropriate poor land while successfully resisting expropriation of good land. 
2 2 3 
Short of a massive investment in turning the subsoil, which no agency seems both 
capable and willing to make, it is difficult to imagine that the land will readily be 
converted to growing fruit trees. This is justifiably disappointing to most of the settlers -
to ask a fruit grower to become a farmer of seasonable crops is asking a person to 
completely change his profession. Some of the farmers, especially those currently 
experimenting with organic methods, may be able to transition and find new crops. A 
way may yet be found to successfully extend the productive life of passion fruit and to 
grow other non-tree fruits. But as one farmer said to us, he has risked considerably and 
lost - he would want a thorough soil analysis and good technical guidance before he 
would be willing to risk again. 
Government funds for land reform are stretched very thin, and the priority has to 
be landless families. The amount available to be invested in areas that have already 
received both land and considerable additional funds is limited. Nonetheless, and partly 
because the subsoil problem affects more than one community, a sincere effort seems to 
be being made to study the problem and develop alternatives. We doubt that these 
alternatives will be satisfactory to all of the settlers, and some may decide to leave or to 
simply remain relatively passively on their land depending primarily on Petrobras 
payments. But creative alternatives could help to revitalize that portion of the community 
that is able to adapt, and - perhaps via a certain percentage of replacement - the 
community itself. 
Despite all of the difficulties, it is important to note that sixteen out of nineteen 
adults interviewed felt that their life was better in the settlement than it had been before. 
Interviewees were also on the whole positive about their neighbors and (aside from the 
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subsoil issue) about living in the settlement. Despite the very real disappointment of not 
being able to realize their dream of citrus raising, and the real costs of lost investment in 
time, effort, and money, this says significantly that Nova Lusitania is not a failure - that 
it has had a positive impact on settlers' lives. 
When we first visited Nova Lusitania, we became very concerned that, as the 
oldest of the settlements, it represented a pattern. In other words, we saw a danger that, 
once SIC, SAT, and PRONAF A moneys have been spent, the tendency would be for 
settler enthusiasm to wane and for disillusion to set in, sapping communities of their 
vitality and making sustainability less likely. We do realize that this is a potential danger, 
but in most of the other settlements studied, while the period following expenditures of 
funds and of obtaining emancipation from government tutelage is a vulnerable one, the 
realistic expectation of improved future production and income is a real impetus. In 
Nova Lusitania, where this expectation/hope seems to have vanished - or at least become 
much more difficult to envision - we admire the tenacity and resilience of those settlers 
who continue working to produce what they can, to try new approaches, to create a solid 
community life. 
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Case Study 2 
Name of Settlement: Boa Vista III 
Families in Settlement: 55 landholding families plus several additional families 
Location: Municipio - Esplanada 
Area: 1,375 ha. 
Contract Date: June 8, 1998 
Dates Visited: April 28-30, 2006 
Number Interviewed - Households: 19 Individuals: 32 
Family size (persons): 1-3/2 4-6/11 7-9/3 10+/1 
Persons Interviewed: 17 men, 15 women (including 2 20-year-old single daughters) 
Ages 20-29/3, 30-39/7, 40-49/17,50-59/5 
Schooling: 0-2/14, 3-5/13, 6-8/3, (one of the young women completed high school) 
In 9 of the families interviewed, the wife had more education than the husband - in three 
cases, 4 or more years more. In four families the husband had more education than the 
wife, but in only one case was the difference substantial. 
Technical Assistance: CELANOR 
267 We were not given an exact number, but we saw the street with several of the new houses, at least one of 
which was under construction. 
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Map V-2-A. Boa Vista III Settlement. Cross-hatching indicates collective areas, dotting 
indicates ecological reserves. Settlers have two agricultural lots - a smaller one along the 
river and a larger one removed from the river. Unlike most settlements, ecological 
reserves are largely within the agricultural lots. Note that there are neighboring 
settlements both to the north (Baixa Grande) and south (Malhombe). 
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Geography: The settlement consists of 55 landholding families and is located along both 
sides of the small Ovo River in the municipio of Esplanada, 12 kms from the municipal 
seat on a good quality dirt road. The total area is 1375 ha. Each of the families has a 
268 
dwelling lot (15 x 30m) in the agro-vila, an additional 1 ha. lot (discussed below), a 
riverside lot (average size 3.4 ha.), and a farm lot (average size 15 ha.) The communal 
farm land is located in three areas totaling approximately 260 ha, and the natural reserve 
269 
is 101 ha. (primarily an allocated portion of each riverside and farm lot). 
The agro-vila is constructed in the shape of a U, with a large central plaza in the 
center and a Catholic church in the plaza. Using the additional lots mentioned above, the 
community has also set up three streets of new house lots (15 x 50m) for grown married 
270 
children of settlers, and several have constructed homes there. 
Climate: See Introduction to Case Studies 1 and 2, above. 
History: Boa Vista III was one of the second wave of Cedula da Terra projects in this 
part of Bahia, the contract being signed on June, 1998. Many of the original settlement 
971 families came from the Community Association of Lagoa de Baixo, and most of the 
268 The original plan for the community provided for 1 ha. house lots, but a technician from Salvador told 
the settlers they had to use smaller (15 x 30m) lots (presumably to facilitate basic services); the delta 
between the lot sizes was retained by each family in a separate lot close to the agro-vila. Meeting at 
Church 28/03/09. 
269 Meeting with settlers at church 
270 Ibid. 
271 Rafael (interview April 27, 2006) referred to Boa Vista III as "a child (filha) of Lagoa de Baixo) 
228 
272 others came from other community associations in the municipio of Rio Real, member 
associations of CELANOR. 
The land was purchased from FERBASA (Cia. De Ferro Ligas da Bahia S/A), a 
reforestation company. The company cut the pine trees before the settlers moved in. The 
273 
settlers we talked to believed that the pines had a negative impact on the soil. 
Initially, many settlers continued to maintain their families in Rio Real; the men 
came to Boa Vista III to work during the week, often returning to Rio Real on the 
weekends. Some began moving onto the land at the end of 1999 and seriously working it 
in 2000.274 According to interviewees, in late 1999 or early 2000, Dr. Penedo, the 
agronomist responsible for the settlement, informed the families that they had to move to 
the land or they would lose their rights. Twenty-five of the fifty-five families on the 
original list (including the first President of the Association) decided not to make the 
move, and were replaced by twenty-five other families. 
The initial SIC allocation for construction of houses was R$1300 per family, an 
amount that Rafael of Celanor feels was too little. But many of the settlers brought 
resources from Rio Real and used them to establish themselves in Boa Vista III. Some 
275 
had tractors and other equipment. 
Mico Preto's story was fairly typical of the early settlement period. When he first 
arrived in late 1999/early 2000, there were only seven houses in the settlement area. 
272 Waldemar Correio de Jesus, for example, still maintains his membership in the Association of Lima, as 
well as in Boa Vista III. Interview, April 29, 2006. 
273 Meeting with settlers at church, April 28, 2006 
274 Meeting with settlers at church, April 28, 2006. 
275 Rafael, interview, April 27, 2006 
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Initially he lived in a temporary hut (barraca); his family stayed in Rio Real and he went 
back there every week end. When the house was built, he moved two of his daughters to 
the settlement with him. Blanca, the elder, remembers that there were twelve families 
when she arrived. When he had put in the floor and built an addition, he moved the rest 
of his family from Rio Real, sold the house there, and used the money to plant 280 
276 orange trees. 
Water and electricity were installed in 2002. In that year Boa Vista III was 
considered a highly successful settlement, receiving the highest rating given by CDA. 
The settlement was featured in a 2003 article in Revista Cedula da Terra. 
Demography: Only four of the adult interviewees claimed urban origins, and all of those 
grew up on farms. One of these, Ivone, had been working as a hairdresser in Salvador 
before moving to the settlement, but all interviewees had come to the settlement from 
rural settings. Ten of the men had minifundios (the largest 20 tarefas, the smallest 1 
tarefa) and six (including the minfundista with 1 tarefa) worked land belong to their 
families. Eight of these men supplemented their income as sharecroppers, daily farm 
laborers, or - in one situation each - as a fruit seller, and as owner of a small bar. Only 
three of the men were entirely landless - all three worked as daily farm laborers, one also 
worked as a sharecropper and one as a bricklayer. 
Race/Ethnicity: primarily white, some Afro-Brazilian 
Gender: two of the 55 titleholders are women 
276 Interview, 29 April 2006 
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Religion: The great majority of residents are Catholics. Sixteen of the families 
interviewed were Catholic, two did not declare a religious preference, and one 
said that they "had been" Jehovah Witnesses. The Catholic Church is in the 
central plaza; there is an active parish, with catechism and youth ministry. 
Age: 17 of the 35 residents interviewed were in their 40s, eight in their 30s, five 
in their 50s. 
Attrition: Approximately 35 of the original 55 settler families remain at Boa 
Vista III.277 
Education: The settlement has a public school that goes up to the 4th grade. The director 
and two of the teachers come in from the city (Esplanada), and four other teachers are 
from the settlement. Most of the interviewees stated that the school was good, although 
two rated it as only fair. Students travel 15 kilometers to another settlement, Antonio 
Conselheiro, to attend middle school. 
Health: Residents did not feel that health care was good. The nearest health post is in 
Antonio Conselheiro. The school bus takes patients there, but it ends up being an all-day 
trip. The doctor is there only on Tuesdays, and sometimes does not show up. There is a 
health agent at the health post, and people thought highly of her. There is also a local 
health agent resident in Boa Vista III, the daughter of one of the settlers; she does home 
visits, but there was some feeling that she was not sufficiently trained. 
277 Meeting at church, 28/04/2006. In the early days of settlement, of the 55 families originally scheduled 
to be settled on the land, twenty-five did not take over their land and were replaced. This replacement has 
not included in the calculation of attrition. 
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Water: The Association well, opened in 2002, can produce 6800 liters per hour. The 
water tower has a capacity of 20,000 liters and is eight meters high, providing good water 
pressure to the houses, which can have water tanks located up to five meters above 
ground. Several interviewees cited the water - both having running water in their home 
and the quality of the water - as one of the things they like about the settlement. The 
riverside lots can be irrigated from the river, the farm lots have no running water on them. 
Association and Collective Area: The collective land is planted with 25 ha in oranges 
and 15 ha in coconuts (approximately 7000 trees of each). Initially collective work went 
well, but participation waned. Approximately a year prior to our visit, the Association 
assigned a portion of the collective area to each family to maintain. However, this 
system did not work out, and - shortly prior to our visit - the community returned to the 
original system of collective work. 
Not surprisingly, the collective work was cited as one of the major areas of 
discussion for the Association. Although settlers are only asked to work one day a month 
(or contribute R$15 to pay a substitute), there continue to be difficulties in getting 
everyone to participate. The Association Treasurer, Ze Sana, told us it gives the directory 
"a lot of work." 
Mico Preto, who was elected Vice President in the February election, focused on 
the importance of this issue: 
"We have to sit and organize [the collective area]. We have to determine how 
much work is needed. We could divide in sub groups. If 30 go and 25 don't, 
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[we] have to explain, call a meeting. [They] can pay rather than go. Those who 
don't want [to work] can give up their right the collective [income] in writing 
through an Act of the Assembly." 
Jose Irmao, the Vice Treasurer, pointed out that all associations have the problem of 
people who do not work. "It's always that way, every place." Nilton agreed: "These 
things always happen." 
However, Ze Sana said that, despite the problem, they manage to get the work done. 
Mico Preto agreed, saying that already, having returned to the collective system, they are 
back to cleaning (limpando) the orange groves. Isodoro estimated that 90% of the settlers 
are participating; if true, this is a higher percentage than in most settlements. 
In addition to the collective land, the Association owns the school, the well, the 
bolacha factory (see below), the soccer field, and a large tractor. Tractor charges are 
R$35/day for members, R$40/day for non-members.278 
Shortly prior to our visit, the Association constructed, with SIC funds, an electrified 
casa de farinha with a capacity of producing 20 sacks of manioc flour a day, and also 
capable of making tapioca. The Association Treasurer told us that there is not sufficient 
manioc for the casa, and that there is relatively little manioc being planted. The 
Association had approximately R$5000 in SIC funds remaining when we visited. 
The Association plans to set up a day care center where mothers can leave their 
children when they go out either to work in the fields or to jobs outside of the settlement 
area. They intended to use the second parcel of the SECOMP funds (the first parcel was 
278 There are also five smaller, privately owned tractors in the settlement that charge R$35/day to members 
and non-members alike. 
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for the factory) for the center, but due to delays in accounting for the first parcel, the 
second parcel was cancelled. They therefore were planning a new project for SECOMP 
which they believed would be submitted to more rigorous examination due to the 
previous delays.279 
The Association had five Presidents since its inception; the sixth, Luis Carlos, was 
elected in February 2006, shortly before our visit, in a 23 to 19 vote victory over former 
President Fausto. According to several interviewees, the two slates had no substantial 
difference in platforms, and the election did not cause significant hard feelings or 
divisions in the community. Most prior elections have had at least two slates of 
candidates; the election of 2000 had three, but the election of 2002 was undisputed.280 
Luis Carlos, 30, was said to be a calm person but a hard worker who dedicates 
most of his time to the Association. Natalia said that he travels a good deal, striving 
(lutando) to benefit the settlement. Waldemar noted that the Association should 
represent all of the settlers, and that Luis Carlos is doing that. 
In an interview, Luis Carlos spoke of his experience (he was Treasurer before he 
became President) and that being part of the Association has increased his knowledge. 
He said that he thought that differences among the settlers at the Association meeting 
were not that great. Among the things he would like to see for the settlement are a juice 
factory, a scale for weighing oranges, the day-care center, a medical post, and paving the 
streets. He noted that, in addition to the Association, the Church and sports (the 
279 Meeting with group representing the settlement, April 28, 2006 
280 Bosco was elected President in 2000 with 15 votes, over 14 for Fausto and 10 for Agostinho. Bosco was 
reelected without opposition in 2002, but only served one year of his second term. 
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settlement has a soccer team) are strong uniting factors in the community (several other 
settlers also cited these two as unifying factors). 
Overall support for the Association seemed to remain strong. Fausto mentioned 
that the Association is important for coming up with productive ideas. Blanca, 20, 
emphasized that working together they accomplish more than each one working alone. 
Antonio Gago used the example of toothpicks - one alone can be broken, but it is almost 
impossible to break a bunch of them held together. 
"We have to live today in Association. [We] all need the Association. It makes 
it easier to get things, gives [us] more force." (Antonio Gago) 
"Who governs [the settlement] is us.... If [for instance] the fertilizer [we 
received] is not good for the oranges, and everyone votes on it, we handle the 
situation. The Association is for everyone." (Ivone) 
Several interviewees noted that differences of opinion are natural, and that 
differences are worked out through the meeting process. Natalia noted that they discuss 
the factory, the collective, and the fact that many members do not have money to pay for 
the land and PRONAF - these matters are discussed in meetings. Bosco noted that there 
are small differences of opinion: "People are different." Renato, the current Secretary, 
said that there is diversity of opinion; the Directory tries to understand why a person is 
opposed to a proposition, and seeks to provide answers and convince members. 
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Although article 6 of the Association by-laws allows non-titleholding spouses to 
vote and be elected, this provision was not being observed in practice at the time of our 
visit. This seems to have arisen from a lack of understanding of the contents of the by-
laws. When the content of the article was explained to them, the Directors of the 
Association said that they would take steps to implement it. 
Another barrier to full participation is lack of education. Waldemar, for instance, 
was invited to hold a leadership position but said that he did not feel comfortable doing 
so as he did not know how to read. The case of Isodoro, however, had an interesting 
twist: although he had only a first grade education, he was elected Secretary of the 
Association in the past administration because the members wanted his daughter, Carla, 
then in her late teens and a high school graduate, to actually perform the job (she carried 
it out successfully). 
Ecological Area: Unlike the other settlements studied, the ecological area(s) in Boa 
Vista III is a designated portion of each settler's riverside and farm lots, as well as of the 
collective land, sufficient in total to make up the 20% legal requirement. We were told in 
the general meeting that the ecological reserves are not used at all (e.g., for bee keeping, 
firewood), but are for "only wild animals." However, one woman said that it provides 
firewood (lenha) for cooking. 
Adilson noted that it is difficult to control the environmental areas because they 
are distant, and that there have been incidents of outsiders lighting fires and taking out 
wood. Natalia confirmed that the Association cannot control the areas, and that, where 
problems occur, they are not reported to IBAMA. Fausto, who was the second President 
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of the Association, believes that it is the Association's job to protect the areas, but - in 
addition to being distant - the areas are not fenced; he says that they are being destroyed. 
Economy: 
Distinguishing Factor: This community has gone further than most others studied 
in trying to industrialize. In addition to an electric-powered casa de farinha (manioc 
flour mill) financed with SIC funds,281 the community has a factory (fabrica) to 
manufacture bolachas, inexpensive cookies and crackers (the difference being whether 
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they are made with sugar or salt) made with very fine manioc-flour (polvilho). 
The project, based on the knowledge and experience of women in the settlement, 
was developed by the Association President, the technical advisor, and Rose from 
Celanor. Rose purchased the material and supervised building the factory. SIC money 
was supplemented with additional funds. The factory consists of a kitchen and 
additional tiled room for preparing dough, packaging, etc. Firewood for the oven comes 
from the ecological reserve and from the orange groves. 
281 The casa de farinha has a median daily production of 20 sixty-kilo sacks. Meeting at church, 28/04/06. 
282 Alice Prima Aguiar, wife of one of the titulars, provided interesting background. She had made 
bolachas at her home in Rio Real, and taught the other women at BVIII how to do so. "We began to work 
with a small clay oven." They then moved to Neide's house, and eventually formed a group of 25 women. 
She considered herself a leader of the group, but subsequently desisted due to disagreements on how to 
carry forward the activities. Interview 29/04/06 
283 Frei Chico developed a project through SECOMP ("Projeto Mulheres Rurais Empreendodoras do 
Litoral Norte") that included projects for four settlement communities - BVIII, Palmeira (manufacture of 
clothing), Mata Verde (home-made sweets) and Sabauma (artisan goods). SECOMP provided 
R$68,267.09, the prefeitura R$5,780 and BVIII R$3,750; the contract was signed on 10/11/02. As the 
other settlements did not have their accounts in order, money for their projects also flowed through BVIII. 
Each settlement had a tecnico to accompany it - Rose for BVIII. After the factory was built, Maria Lucia 
dos Santos was chosen as treasurer for the project. There was a problem with accounting for the project 
funds; that was resolved in September, 2005, but the delay led to losing a second parcel of SECOMP funds 
that was intended to establish a day care center. However, when we visited, they were discussing with 
SECOMP putting in a new proposal for the day-care center, in order to free up the women in the settlement 
to work. Visit to the factory 28/03/06 
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In addition to bolachas, the factory can make bread, but was not currently doing 
so. The market for bolachas is small. The settlers we spoke to believe they have the 
necessary equipment but need to find the market, and that they really have not yet made a 
sufficient effort to identify markets. 
Bolachas are sold in 60 gram packages and have a 60 day shelf life (but are most 
flavorful during the first week or two). One intermediary buys 100 packages every 15 
days or so for R$0.50, and the factory sells directly in the town market for R$0.70. At 
the time of our visit, three women were working; a problem was noted with other women 
working part time and wanting a full monthly salary. Marlene, one of the women 
working in the factory, noted that, in the beginning the settlement kids and young people 
bought a lot, but they got tired of them. 
Land:286 The land purchase took place on June 8, 1998. The purchase price was 
R$130 per ha, for a total of R$ 178,750. SAT funds were R$ 194,425 and SIC R$301,925. 
Opinions varied as to whether the land should be described as good, adequate, 
weak, or - perhaps most realistically - some parts better and some weaker. But all 
settlers agreed that the land needs fertilizer 
284 Visit to the factory 28/03/06. Alice Aguiar, op cit., wanted to try selling bolachas in the Municipio of 
Conde, on the coast, but others did not agree. 
285 Alice Aguiar, op cit., feels that the factory is not being well run. "There, everything is wrong (Ali tudo e 
errado)" She thinks the factory should make cake, and should be open to new ideas wherever they can get 
them - for instance the ideas appearing in Globo Rural. She says the factory needs (1) unity among the 
women working there, (2) firm management, and (3) clear rules to be followed (regimento). When she was 
in charge of the factory, she was able to go to Esplanada with 200 packages and sell them all. But she 
found being both administrator and sales person was too much. She also sought to impose rules, setting 
working hours, and doling out measured portions of dough to each woman; but she was criticized for 
wanting to be the "dona" of the factory. 
286 Rafael of CELANOR mentioned that "family life in Boa Vista III is [sometimes] guaranteed by land in 
Rio Real. We encountered four incidents of this. Waldemar still owns two tarefas of land in Rio Real and 
maintains his membership in the Lima Association. Del also owns land in Rio Real. Galego has 400 
orange trees that he maintains on his father's land in Rio Real. Ivone's father bought the lot in Boa Vista 
III from another settler and put it in Ivone's name; he continues to own land in Rio Real. 
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"This land isn't bad, nor is it the best. But if you fertilize, take care of the land 
and don't let the weeds take over..." Mico Preto 
"It's good. There is the problem of the subsoil, but it's good. That only 
hampers oranges. [The land] is good for coconut, manioc, beans." Ze Reis 
"Those who take care [of the plants] harvest." Antonio Gago287 
As in Nova Lusitania, soil experts have dug trenches in Boa Vista III and are 
mapping the soil. An attempt was made to turn the subsoil using an EDBA tractor; 
however, the tractor only had the capacity to cut 40 cm into the soil as opposed to the 
tractor used to by the neighboring reforestation company, which can cut up to 1.2 meters. 
Financing: In 1998, each family received R$2210 to plant passion fruit - an 
amount not sufficient to plant one hectare. The passion fruit was excellent in quality. 
288 But about two years later world prices began to fall dramatically. 
98Q 
Of the nineteen households interviewed, sixteen had taken out PRONAF A loans, 
in most cases for oranges, although the loans could also be used for land clearing, 
fencing, and/or coconut planting (only one of the interviewees used part of the funds for 
coconuts). 
287 "Quem zela, colha." 
288 Interview with Rafael at CELANOR, April 27, 2006 
289 One interviewee was barred from taking the loan due to an old outstanding bank debt. The other two 
did not state their reasons for not taking out the loan. 
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Twelve of the households had taken out custeio loans, in all cases but one to plant 
manioc.290 One farmer mentioned that he had repaid two of the three payments on the 
loan, and was contemplating taking out an additional custeio. Two of the farmers took 
out the loans but felt the weather was too dry and did not plant. "The Bank Manager is 
from the country and understands," Natalia stated. Her family was negotiating a new 
custeio for R$3000 - R$ 1200 to repay the bank and the remainder to plant manioc.291 Ze 
do Roque and his wife De stated that she had submitted a proposal, prepared by Renato 
of CELANOR, for a PRONAF Women's project that provides R$1000 capital for 
projects started by non-titular female spouses - which they planned to put into pig 
raising. 
Antonio Gago is negotiating via COPEF, using his passion fruit on the vine as 
collateral for purchasing fertilizer. He states that this method will work with oranges 
also. He sees it as the only near term option for financing. "The Banco do Nordeste 
would finance a larger loan (custeio) for one year, but our production is [currently] too 
small to warrant this." 
Production and Income: With respect to agricultural practices, only two families 
used fully organic methods. "Chemical fertilizer is throwing money away," Mico Preto 
said. He uses chicken manure, which costs him R$70-90 a ton; he stated that passion 
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fruit needs 2 kg per plant, oranges 5 kg per tree. lane mentioned that she and her 
husband would like to put 2-3 tons of chicken manure on the land, but at the cost of R$70 
290 The exception, Waldemar, took out the custeio to plant oranges. He repaid the full value (R$2000) and 
was contemplating a new loan of R$3000). Interview 29 April 2006 
291 Interview, 28/04/06. The bank manager had been expected to visit the settlement, with a bank inspector, 
the week before to study the situation and make recommendations, but he did not arrive. Ze do Roque, 
interview, 28/04/06. 
292 Interview, 28/04/06 
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per ton, could not afford to do so.293 Antonio Gago said that he uses chemical fertilizer 
rather than organic because he can pay for the former over time, and that makes it 
affordable.294 Several families said that they use a combination of organic and chemical 
methods. 
As mentioned above, the settlers in Boa Vista III are of Sergipano background, in 
which orange raising is an important aspect of the culture. All nineteen families 
interviewed had planted commercial orange groves, ranging from 400 to 2500 trees, the 
average being 1450. However, due to the relative immaturity of the trees, only four of 
the families reported selling oranges during the preceding year. One of these, Ze Sande 
- the owner of the largest grove - earned R$1600 from oranges, and Mico Peto earned 
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R$440, but the two remaining earned around R$100 or less. Del and Ana also have a 
commercial grove of 400 lemon trees, and reported selling approximately R$ 15-20 of 
lemons each week at the market in Esplanada. 
Due to the immaturity of the orange groves, at the time of the interviews, passion 
fruit was the most important cash crop (it begins producing 6-9 months after planting). 
Seventeen of the nineteen families had commercial plantings of passion fruit, ranging 
from 500 to 2300 plants. Fifteen families reported income from sale of passion fruit. For 
2005, two families recorded selling 10 tons (1 ton = 1000kg), one family sold 8 tons, 
three sold 4-5 tons. Prices were generally R$ 0.40 per kg, with a low of R$0.20 and a 
high of R$0.60. For some families, this added R$2000-4000 to annual income - a 
293 Interview, 28/04/06 
294 Interview, 29/04/06 
295 Prices received for oranges ranged from R$110 to R$200 per ton. 
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significant amount.296 As the fruit is harvested during a ten month period each year, it 
provides a useful flow of income. Del mentioned that he sold 1500 passion fruit mudas 
(seedlings, saplings) at R$0.12 - 0.15. 
Twelve families had coconut groves, the largest being 400 trees. However, the 
trees are not yet producing in quantity, and only one family recorded moderately 
significant sales (R$300) during 2005. 
Thirteen families had manioc planted, in all cases one hectare or less. Six families 
recorded sales of manioc flour (farinha) the standard price during 2005 being around 
R$30 per 60 kg sack. One family earned R$1200 in such sales during the year, but for 
most it was considerably less. 
Other significant cash crops planted included one farmer with 1700 inhame plants, 
three with significant plantings of papaya (mamao), one with three tarefas of watermelon, 
and one with 50 banana trees. Only one of these farmers recorded sales during 2005 -
R$280 for papaya. 
Waldemar noted that he had experimented with cotton, sunflowers, and castor oil 
plants (mamona); all three did well and he plans to plant more when he takes out a new 
loan (he repaid his first loan). He also experimented with rice and sugar cane, and said 
both did well.297 Adilson experiemented with 250 acerola plants, but the experiement 
was not successful. 
296 Antonio Gago noted that passion fruit sales were the basis of his family's survival. Interview 29/04/06. 
297 Interview, April 29, 2006. 
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Most of the farmers interviewed planted black beans,298 corn, squash, and 
vegetables for family use and for sale in small quantities at the farmers' market in 
Esplanada and other towns. Isodoro maintained a stall at the market in Acajutiba, a small 
municipio (population 14,000) north of Esplanada, which he stated earned his family 
approximately a minimum salary per month. Most families have a variety of fruit trees 
on their house lots; one mentioned that he planted coffee on his house lot and it is 
growing well. 
Stock raising was not a significant source of income. Although many families had a 
few chickens, only three of the interviewed families had significant flocks of poultry 
(ranging up to 25), mostly chickens, although one had 15 ducks. Only three farmers had 
a horse or mule, and one of these owned - in partnership with a neighbor - a two-
wheeled horse drawn wagon (carroga) used for carting. 
In eight of the households, the men work part time off their land. In five cases, the 
men work as day laborers earning R$ 15 a day, although one of these mentioned that he 
also takes on fixed price tasks (empreito) such as cleaning orange groves. One of the day 
laborers reports that he works outside only "as needed," and one spends 20% of his time 
working off his farm, but three spend about half their working time on such jobs. 
Three others who work outside have a higher skill level. Antonio Gago is the local 
representative of COPEF,299 receiving and weighing passion fruit each Saturday, 
receiving a commission on the amount so received; he also works 2-3 days a week in the 
casa de farinha, earning R$20 a day (R$25 a day if they work overtime). Fausto works 
298 "Some people think that planting beans isn't worth the effort," Antonio Gago told us. He laughed. "But 
I plant them." 
299 COFEP had more than 30 members altogether, four of them in Boa Vista III - Antonio Gago, Bosco, 
Zinho, and Nato. However, it also purchases from non-members. 
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as a mason, carpenter, and electrician, earning R$25-40 per day. Bosco hires out as a 
tractor driver/maintenance person at R$30 per day; he also owns his own tractor and nets 
R$600 a month in hiring it out (the standard fee for renting a small tractor is R$35 per 
day). 
Ideas for additional investment were mentioned. As noted above, Luis Carlos 
envisions a juice factory as a possibility. Alice, who is a seamstress, says that there is not 
enough work for her in the settlement; she would like to set up a sewing atelier and could 
teach the other women, but needs a plan, a place to work, machines, and a place to sell 
goods manufactured. Several men mentioned the need for additional capital to better 
work the land. 
Ten of the nineteen households receive bolsa escola/familia ranging from R$30 to 
R$95 a month, and one other family is in the process of registering for the bolsa. In one 
family, the husband receives a government retirement pension (a minimum salary per 
month). In two families, young adult children living at home have municipal teaching 
positions, earning a minimum salary per month. Renato's wife earns approximately 
R$40 a month selling cosmetics. 
At the time of our visit, Petrobras was preparing to dig three oil wells on settlement 
land. If the wells were successful, the Association would receive some payment. The 
Association had contracted a lawyer (who worked on a 30% commission) to represent 
them in dealings with Petrobras.300 
300 lane, interview 29 May 2006, expressed the hope that by next year Petrobras would be paying an 
amount equivalent to R$300 for each settler, and with this the settlers would make their land payments. 
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Sufficiency of Income: Only two of the nineteen households interviewed answered 
"yes" when asked whether household income is sufficient (again, both these respondents 
were men). Five families simply stated income is not sufficient - in one of these the 
father and three eldest sons work as day laborers to supplement income. Several other 
families indicated that they are able to make do with the income: 
"Sometimes it's sufficient, sometimes it's weak ifraco), but it serves to make a 
living (da para viver)" (Waldemar) 
"We dance in accordance with the music. I don't have, but I will have. This 
year, if God gives me half of what I ask, I'll accept it and carry forward." (Mico 
Preto) 
Mico Preto's hope for the future - seeing the current hard times as an investment toward 
future harvests - was mentioned by three other men, and two others mentioned that, 
during passion fruit harvests, income is sufficent. 
Day-to-day maintenance and health concerns were most cited by settlers among 
their worries. Delmina jokingly mentioned her devotion to Our Lady of the Grocery Bag 
(Nossa Senhora da Sacola) as she faced the weekly concern of whether there would be 
money for the Saturday farmers' market and basic bills - water and electricity. Money 
for transport in the event of sickness, and for the purchase of medicine, was mentioned as 
a major worry by several interviewees. 
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Settler Attitudes: 
Satisfaction: The early years at Boa Vista III were difficult. Rafael of CELANOR 
used very strong language: "Este povo foram massacrado "301 Attrition was relatively 
high, with approximately 20 of the first 55 families (27.5%) leaving. At the time of our 
visit, based on the agricultural events occurring in Nova Lusitania and other nearby 
settlements, settlers were beginning to express concern about the subsoil, but most had 
not experienced problems yet. However, attitudes among those interviewed were 
relatively positive. Of 37 people interviewed, only six (two married couples and two 
others) expressed mild interest in selling or trading their land. Four of the couples 
interviewed were emphatic about not leaving, and several mentioned that they had had to 
work hard to achieve what they now possessed in the settlement area. 25 of those 
interviewed stated that their life on the settlement was better than it had been before 
moving there,304 and only 4 stated that things were worse. 
Future: Responses to questions about the future were generally optimistic. Several 
interviewees mentioned expectations for improved harvests. While orange harvests were 
cited by several people, there did not seem to be as much focus on oranges as in Nova 
Lusitania. Other crops were discussed, including truck farming, manioc, passion fruit, 
301 Literally, "These people were massacred." Interview, March 27, 2006 
302 Nilton mentioned the need to study other plants that can substitute for oranges. 
303 lane, one of the two female titleholders, was thinking of selling and was offered R$25,000 for her land; 
she went to Salvador and saw "many things there I didn't like," so decided to stay in the settlement. 
304 Waldemar & Alice, a couple who stated how much they love their land, noted that economically they 
were just as well off prior to moving to BVIII, but that they love the land and community, so feel better off. 
2 4 6 
and papaya. Several respondents mentioned hoped-for improvements such as pavement, 
a plaza, a sports area, a public telephone post, a health post, a child-care center, and even 
a middle school. Three respondents mentioned the need for additional commercialization 
of local produce, two suggested scales for weighing large quantities of oranges, and one a 
juice factory. 
With respect to long-range views, of the seven communities studied, the interviewees 
at Boa Vista III were one of the two most focused on having their children remain in the 
area. Mico Preto wants to help his children build houses in the area. Ze de Roque 
mentioned that his son moved to Salvador but was assaulted there and wants to return to 
the land - each of his sons has their own area to plant, and Ze de Roque intends to retire 
and leave his land to his sons. Antonio Gago wants his children to graduate, but wants 
them to learn to value the land and crops, to have pride in being "children of the 
countryside." Natalia mentioned that one of the reasons to promote local 
305 
commercialization is to provide jobs for children so that they can stay in the area. 
Isodoro mentioned the need for the family to obtain additional land so that the children, 
when grown up, can stay in the area. 
Socio-Political Awareness: The level of socio-political awareness in Boa Vista III 
was similar to the settlements visited. When asked who helps/is in favor of the rural 
worker, answers included Lula/Federal Government (11), the Church/Frei Chico (5), the 
Program/CDA, etc. (5), the Rural Workers' Union (2), and the prefeito (2). Ivone stated 
that it is "groups of workers" who support the rural worker. 
305 Blanca, 20 year old daughter of community leader Mico Preto, with a high school education, also 
mentioned that a factory is needed to generate income; she is dating a young man from the settlement and 
wishes to get married and live there. 
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Opinions of the MST were largely negative. Thirteen interviewees did not approve of 
it, citing invasion of land, violence, and death. Ivone added that she thought the MST is 
badly organized. Del said: "How we entered here is right, invading is wrong." 
Four interviewees had mixed opinions. Gamelao said the MST is "one part right, one 
part wrong." Isodoro thought they are "good when they make demands (cobram) on the 
authorities, bad when they invade." Ze Reis said he is neither for nor against them, but 
that the MST lost a lot of credibility when they invaded land and then were forced to 
leave it. Renato stated: "It is just to demand [land], [I am] in favor as long as it is 
peaceful." 
However, Blanca, 20, supports the MST. "They invade because they need land to 
work and to provide food for their children." Ze do Roque observed that the large 
demonstrations carried out (by the MST) in the South of Brazil help the rural workers. 
A factor that emerged more at Boa Vista III than at any other settlement, and which 
may impact the settlers' reluctance to identify with the MST, is the prejudice that they 
feel in town against the "landless." Gamelao stated that there are people in the city 
(Esplanada) who do not like the people from the settlements, to the extent of saying they 
are "nauseated" by them. 
"The Prefeito isn't bad, but some of the people in his group treat us as though 
we were landless." (Antonio Gago) 
Waldemar is able to joke about it: 
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"People call me Waldemar sem-terra (landless) and I respond, call me sem-
dinheiro (money-less) but not sem-terra." 
With respect to the last election, 19 interviewees voted for Lula and 10 for Serra. 
With respect to the next election, 25 interviewees intended to vote for Lula, three were 
undecided, and one said she would vote against him (interestingly, this was Blanca, 20, 
who listed the PT and Lula as factors that help the rural worker, but said that she simply 
did not like Lula). Only two interviewees had strong party affiliation, both with the 
Workers' Party, but one of these clarified that he identified with the party at the national 
level only, not at the local level. 
Strengths/Vulnerabilities/Recommendations: Boa Vista III has not yet been hit by the 
subsoil compacting as hard as has been Nova Lusitania. Although there is an awareness 
of the problem, it seems to lie on the horizon - we heard no significant reports of trees or 
crops failing because of it. Indeed the problem may be less severe in Boa Vista III than 
in Nova Lusitania; there are indications that the top soil may be deeper, and that portions 
of the settlement - such as the riverside lots - may not be affected by it. We heard no 
reports of the problem affecting passion fruit, a major cash crop with significant 
potential. 
It also seemed to us that the settlers' hopes were not quite as much fixated on 
oranges here as in Nova Lusitania. There is a willingness to diversify, to experiment with 
inhame (which Dr. Penedo told us does well in this soil), castor oil plants, and papaya -
none of which require deep soil. But there is no doubt that, if the land turns out not to 
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support oranges, coconuts, lemons, and other fruit trees, it will be a severe blow to the 
community. 
In speaking of the people of Boa Vista III, Rafael of CELANOR used the term 
"resilient." He stated it is interesting to see how some communities bounce back from 
adversity. He attributed this in part to the fact that the settlers arrived with above average 
material and cultural resources, and that many retained a safety net in the form of small 
fields and/or orange groves in Rio Real. But he acknowledged that resilience is not a 
phenomenon that can easily be explained 
This spirit has shown itself also in the push to move beyond agricultural 
production into processing. The bolacha factory, initially a success, has encountered 
significant difficulties, leading to some disappointment. But the feeling we received was 
not that of the community giving up on the idea, but of regrouping to decide how to move 
forward. 
The Association is encountering the tensions - especially with respect to the 
collective areas - that most of the associations studied are encountering. Leadership 
seems to be good, and there is a reasonably strong consensus on the value of the 
Association - not only to administer local needs, but to search out resources and 
solutions. The group had the ability to experiment with a new way of administering 
collective lands and, when that did not work out, to change back to the former method. It 
is clear that they are examining alternatives. 
There is also evidence that, although participation in collective work continues to 
be problematic, participation may be at or above the level of most other associations. 
Efforts to include women, and perhaps to extend educational activities so that less 
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educated members can participate more fully, may well increase participation, as well as 
adding to the potential leadership pool. 
Largely due to the unknown extent of the compacted subsoil, it is not possible to 
paint as bright a future for Boa Vista III as it is for some other settlements, in which it 
seems simply a matter of time until abundant crops bring a certain level of prosperity. 
Nonetheless, Boa Vista III seems to us to be a well-rooted community with strong 
unifying factors, which has shown itself able to envision and pursue opportunities. It is 
our impression that the settlement will be able to navigate the future and to confront 
whatever issues may arise. 
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Case Study 3 
Name of Settlement: Vila Canaa (Associa9ao dos Pequenos Produtores Rurais Vila de 
Canaa) 
Families in Settlement: 73 officially settled + 4 additional families 
Location: Municipio - Euclides da Cunha 
Area: 1,649 ha. 
Contract Date: May 25, 1998 
Dates Visited: March 16 & 19, 2006 
Number Interviewed - Households: 27 Individuals: 41 
Family size (persons): 1-3/7; 4-6/16; 7-9/2; 10+/2 
Persons Interviewed: 22 men, 14 women, 5 youth (2 female - 16, one female - 15, and 2 
male - 16, all unmarried) 
Ages: -20/5, 20-29/1, 30-39/12, 40-49/14, 50-59/7, 60+/2 
Education: 0-2/18, 3-5/17, 6-8/3, 8+/3 (all youth) 
Husbands and wives tended to be in relative parity in terms of education, 
with the exception of five households; in four of these the women had 
more education than their husbands, in one the husband had an 8th grade 
education (the highest level of education among adults interviewed) and 
his wife a 4th grade education 
Technical Assistance: Maria Djalma Andrade de Abreu of NATE Nucleo de Assistencia 
Tecnica Agropecuaria Ltda. 
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Map V-3-A Nova Canaa: The agro-vila, showing seventy-three residential lots, four 
institutional lots, plaza, and football field. 
Figure V-3-C. Seventh-Day Adventist church in Vila Canaa 
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Figures V-3-D and V-3-E. Association buildings in Vila Canaa. Above: the community 
galpao. Below: the casa de farinha. Both buildings are clearly marked with the names 
of the sponsoring entities - the World Bank (BIRD), the Government of the State of 
Bahia, CAR, CDA, and MDA. 
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Figures V-3-F and V-3-G. Settlers in Vila Canaa. Above: Ari Souza and his wife, Bela, 
in front of their home. Below: Decio dos Santos, leader of the opposition, and his 
daughter in front of the school bus that he partly owns and operates as a concession from 
the municipal government. 
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Figure V-3-H. Researchers Brenda King-Powers and Daniel Carvalho (left) with settler 
Gerson de Jesus next to water tank on his agricultural lot. 
Figure V-3-I. Settlers in the living room of Veraluce and Adilson Souza (on the right), 
primary leader in organizing to purchase the land and first president of the Association. 
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Geography: The settlement is located in the semi-arid Northeast Region of the state of 
Bahia. Approximately 18 km. east of the town of Euclides da Cunha over 10 km. of good 
dirt roads, 8 km. of good sand roads (although we were told the sand roads are difficult to 
travel in the rainy season). The area of the settlement is less arid than other portions of 
the region, and has developed, in the last ten years, into an area of brown bean (feijao) 
growing (Euclides da Cunha has become the second greatest producer, after Irece, of 
feijao in the State of Bahia). Because of this development, the value of the land since its 
acquisiton has risen almost ninefold, from R$150/ha. to R$1350/ha. 
Each of the landholding families has a dwelling lot in the agro-vila and a farm lot 
of approximately 11 ha. (according to local calculations, approximately 50 tarefas306). 
30% of the land is collectively held by the Association. As required by law, 20% is an 
ecological reserve. 
The agro-vila consists of one wide main street running roughly west from the 
entry road, with two small parallel streets, and four small cross streets (see map). Houses 
range from very simple rough brick,307 to more standard smooth white plaster (reboco), 
to one or two that are more elaborate and resemble middle class homes in town. 
There is no through road, but small roads run in three directions from the agro-
vila to the farm lots. At the end of the agro-vila, at the edge of the settlement property, 
the community has a good soccer field. Just beyond it - outside of the property - are two 
306 1 5 ha. divided by 50 is 3000 m2; a tarefa in this region is 3025 m2, so the actual size in tarefas would 
be 49.57. 
307 External or internal brick that is not covered by smooth plaster is usually a sign that a home is either 
unfinished or the owners cannot afford to plaster it. The funding to construct houses included plastering. 
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bars (these are a matter of minor controversy in the community, some residents 
contending that the bars are a source of rowdiness among some of the youth and visiting 
youth from other communities). 
Climate: Vila Canaa is located in the semi-arid region. The natural vegetation would be 
cerrado. 
1AO 
History: In 1997, Adilson de Silva Souza, a small farmer in Lagoa dos Matos (located 
about 35 km away in the neighboring municipio of Quijinge), learned of the Cedula da 
Terra program.309 Adilson traveled to Salvador, met with persons in CDA, brought back 
information, and began forming a group, primarily of neighbors and relatives, to seek 
land under the program. The group considered land close to Lagoa dos Matos, but was 
not favorably impressed. 
One member of the group, Decio dos Santos, was familiar with the region where 
the settlement is now located and believed that the land owner, Carlos Sampaio, might be 
willing to sell. Several members of the group, including Adilson and his wife, Veraluce, 
Adilson's brother Ari, and Decio, visited the site and liked it. They began negotiations 
directly with the landowner and, according to the tecnica, Maria Djalma, handled the 
308 Lagoa dos Matos was itself a land occupation area. In 1972, families from the area of Rio do Pombal 
entered what was apparently abandoned land and started to farm there, gradually claiming their rights. 
Some of the settlers in Vila Canaa, including Adilson and his elder brother Ari, were children of these 
families. According to what they told us, Lagoa dos Matos is highly accidented land with relatively small 
lots and, after thirty years of farming, the land is wearing out. This last point is possibly significant in 
considering the future sustainability of Vila Canaa. 
309 Prior to learning about the Cedula da Terra program, Adilson, Ari, and other persons (mostly Adventists 
from Lagoa dos Matos) entered onto land next to their parents' land in Lagoa dos Matos. Their apparent 
goal was not so much to gain the land (which was of poor quality) but to call attention to their need for 
land. Although the land was not being used, the landowner reacted strongly and "forced them to run" 
("botou eles para correr.") 
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negotiations very well. She felt that this was "an important factor" in the formation of 
the group.310 
Carlos Sampaio had purchased the land some years before from the son-in-law of 
a man who had reportedly obtained it through grilagem. Sampaio, a former prefect of the 
municipio of Ruy Barbosa, was aging and had lost interest in the land. He was willing to 
sell.311 However, the negotiation process was lengthy, stretching from May, 1997, until 
the actual contract date in May, 1998. 
The settlers' original objective was to purchase the entire fazenda. However, it 
was discovered that part of the land held deposits of lime. Under Brazilian law, mining 
rights are separate from surface land rights; holders of mining rights can take over the 
area by paying indemnification to the surface holder. For this reason, the Cedula da 
Terra program would not finance the purchase of land covering mineral deposits. This 
factor seemed likely to kill the deal, but the members of the association approached the 
landowner regarding the possibility of purchasing that portion of the fazenda that did not 
have lime deposits, and the owner agreed. This deal was carried out. 
Negotiations also almost foundered over the purchase price. After considerable 
negotiation, the government was willing to pay R$ 150 per hectare, but the landowner 
wanted R$180, a difference of R$30,000. The landowner agreed to take a personal 
promissory note from Adilson for the difference. Each family contributed R$300 and the 
amount was paid. The land so purchased was sufficient to settle 100 families in two 
310 Interview with Maria Djalma, March 15, 2006 
311 Adilson told us that initially Sampaio was hard to contact, and seemed to be wary of the group. But 
when he realized they were proposing a peaceful transition, he opened up and "in the end became a good 
friend." 
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distinct areas, which subsequently became the settlements of Vila Canaa (73 families) 
and Alto Paraiso (27 families). 
The 100 families had been made up of families from Lagoa dos Matos and a 
neighboring community. According to interviewees from Vila Canaa (we did not 
interview in Alto Paraiso), the division into two groups occurred with facility. Within the 
Vila Canaa group itself, rather than distributing fields purely by drawing lots (as is the 
usual case), the association decided to divide into five sub-groups (based on kinship 
and/or affinity); each of these sub-groups was assigned a number of fields (in accordance 
with its membership) and these were distributed by lots among the sub-group members. 
Once the land was purchased, many settlers came and lived in temporary huts 
covered with plastic sheeting while they began work on the land. Carlinhos and Aliene, a 
married couple, came together and lived in such a hut. They liked it from the beginning, 
and had good memories of working during the day and conversing with other settlers in 
the evening. But they said the beginning period was hard, especially during the first two 
years. 
This was in part because funding for the program was blocked for a year and a 
half. According to Maria Djalma, the blockage was caused by charges, levied by the 
MST, that landowners were being unduly favored. However, this matter was cleared up 
and funding was continued in 1999. In July of that year, Maria Djalma facilitated the 
group in a "participatory diagnostic," in which settlers met, discussed the strengths and 
312 weaknesses of their community, and drew up immediate and long term goals. 
312 "Due to the necessity of creating a referential model for training for the pilot project 'Cedula da Terra' 
Settlement, a training was carried out between July 13 and 17, 1999.... As this project is a pilot, up to this 
time some activities were stumbling (atropeladas), various projects being in the phase of execution without 
there having been clearly defined their priorities and potential. This training event seeks to salvage this 
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By the early 2000s, Vila Canaa came to be viewed as one of the communities that 
was functioning well. Visitors were frequent. In 2004, an international conference was 
held and the community received visitors from various parts of the world. 
Demography: All of the interviewees were of rural origin except for Ana Francisca 
Souza, who was born in the city of Santos, Sao Paulo, and Maria Josefa de Jesus, who 
was from the town of Euclides da Cunha; both were working on the land when it was 
bought and were included in the project. Of the men interviewed, prior to moving to the 
settlement, five were sharecroppers (one of these also had an employment relationship 
with a landowner), four worked land belonging to parents or parents-in-law, four had 
minifundios (one of these also sharecropped on the side), and four simply said they 
worked in agriculture without defining the type of arrangement (one of these also sold 
cattle as a sideline). Three had larger areas of relatively poor land - one 30 tarefas, one 
40 tarefas, and Manoel Santana 86 tarefas that he had received in an INTERBA land 
reform project - he said the land was so bad that only 3 tarefas were arable. One man 
had grown up on a farm, but was running a small store in the town of Ribeiro do Pombal 
before moving to the settlement. 
Three of the men had grown up on small farms that had to be divided among 
numerous children. Ernesto had so many brothers that there was no room for him on his 
father's land, and he was selling roasted corn on the streets in Euclides da Cunha (hence 
fault of execution of the program, bringing forth first a diagnostic of the project so that, in a second event 
of training, a participatory planning may be developed.... A principal goal of this diagnostic is to waken 
the community so that it may identify its principle potentials and consequently permit their ordered and 
sustained development. The difficulty of perceiving good opportunities for production and business are 
elements that impede the growth of this project." "DPA - Oficina Diagnostico Participativo - Comunidade 
Vila de Canaa" (NATE, Euclides da Cunha, 1999) 
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his nickname - "Milho Assado " - Roasted Corn). Antonio Santana, as the youngest 
brother, was in a similar situation - he went to Sao Paulo and worked there as a cook for 
eight years.313 Gerson was one of 20 siblings (17 brothers), and was selling books, sugar 
cane juice, and pasteis (light pastry filled with meat or cheese) in Sergipe before moving 
to the settlement. 
Race/Ethnicity: Principally white, some Afro-Brazilian 
Gender: In one of the twenty-seven households interviewed, a woman was 
titleholder. Women were not very active in the Association, although some attend 
the meetings. However, a number of women held active leadership positions in 
the Adventist Church. 
Religion: About half the community (Decio estimated 40 families) were in some 
manner connected to the Seventh Day Adventist Church. Sixteen of the families 
interviewed identified themselves as Adventist, and in two others one of the spouses was 
Adventist. Those identifying themselves as "Catholic" tended to be largely unchurched -
there is no Catholic chapel nearby and the priest has never been to the settlement. The 
Adventists tend to dominate leadership, but this is probably in part because their church 
teaches them leadership and participatory skills. In fact, those skills are probably one of 
the factors leading to the success of the community. One Catholic interviewed felt that 
Catholics are marginalized in the community; it is interesting, however, that the main 
"opposition" figure in the community is an Adventist. 
Age: Leadership in the community is provided by settlers now in their 40s; most 
of these would have been in their late thirties at the time of settlement. As in the 
313 "They telephoned me [about founding the settlement] and I didn't think twice - 1 came. Here is good - 1 
don't even think about returning." (Antonio Santana) 
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case of Fazenda Veneza, this may be a factor in community success. 25 of the 37 
people interviewed were in their thirties or forties. 
Attrition: Interviewees estimated that attrition since the beginning has been 
between 20 and 30%. Replacement of families leaving is governed by the 
Association. It was noted, however, that no families have left recently.314 Of the 
families interviewed, 23 were original settlers and four newer settlers. One 
interviewee stated that some attrition had been due to lack of adequate health care 
in the area - one child could not be treated in Euclides da Cunha, was sent to 
Salvador and died. 
Education: The school in the settlement teaches approximately 80 children in pre-school 
through 4th grade. Opinion about the schools was divided. Whereas 15 respondents 
classed them as "good," fifteen others rated them anywhere between "so-so" to terrible. 
One noted that books and school supplies were lacking. It was stated that, although there 
are teachers who live in the settlement, for political reasons they are not appointed to the 
public school. Jo said that she wished there were evening classes for adults. 
After 4th grade, students go into Euclides da Cunha to study. A bus, owned in part 
and driven by Decio, transports the students under a contract paid by the municipal 
government. Jose Domingos felt that transport to schools in Euclides da Cunha for older 
students does not work well. Joice, 15, confirmed that they missed some school because 
of transport issues. Currently, however, she is attending regularly and likes it; she says 
that it is "good and organized," and that there is little distinction between town and 
country students. 
314 "Those who didn't like it have left." (Jose Hilton) 
264 
Health: Interviewees were almost unanimously dissatisfied with health services. 
Fourteen stated that there essentially are no health services, and twelve that they are 
terrible, while nine classified them as mediocre or "not good." 
We were told that there is a health agent who comes at times to weigh the 
children. However, the agent did not seem to be very active. Jose Rodrigues said that he 
would like the prefeitura to open a position for health agent and fill it with someone from 
the community. Several interviewees said there should be a health post in the settlement. 
For medical help, it is necessary to travel to Euclides da Cunha. According to 
Adalia, "one has to leave very early, wait in line - at times [even then] one does not get 
an appointment." However, when one does get an appointment, she says the doctor is 
good. If one has to hire a car to go to town, it costs R$30. 
Water: The Association has an artesian well that was opened in approximately 2000, 
with a water tower and water piped to the houses and to the fields. However, the water 
from the well is not good for drinking and several interviewees mentioned the water as 
one thing they do not like about the settlement. 
At the time of our visit, CAR had a project underway to pipe water from Monte 
Alegre to the two settlements of Vila Canaa and Alto Paraiso, a distance of 93 kms. It 
will be good quality water, but the settlers will have to pay based on consumption.315 The 
project calls for piping parallel to the existing piping, so that settlers can continue to use 
315 Since 2003, CAR has insisted that all such projects use water meters; consumers pay approximately R$1 
per 1000 liters of water. This includes the cost of water and an operating fee for the entity that administers 
the water system, which can be IMBASSA, a municipal government, or another organization. Meeting 
with Marcos Gonpalves Adriano, CAR engineer, March 17, 2006. 
2 6 5 
the existing well (which has less good quality water) for irrigating their gardens, house 
plots, and fields. The project is undertaken via the PRODUZIR program, which is a grant 
requiring 10% participation by the community - the 10% can be in the form of labor.316 
Association and Collective Area: At the time of our visit, the community was reaching 
the stage of emancipation, i.e., freedom from government tutelage. Maria Djalma, the 
technical advisor, stated that the programs and infrastructure planned for the community 
had been accomplished. SIC and PRONAF A funds have been invested, and the 
317 
community now has individual financing. 
As is generally the case, 30% of settlement land is allocated to the collective area 
administered by the Association. The goal of the collective area is to produce income 
sufficient to pay for the land. Pursuant to rules set forth by the Association assembly, 
each titleholder is required to provide one day labor per month in the collective area. 
As long as there were SIC funds, the Association was able to pay settlers for work 
done beyond their one-day commitment, and this was a source of income important 
especially to some of the poorer settlers. "When the Association was paying, people 
were working a lot." (Ari) From approximately 2003 on, however, the Association no 
longer had the funds to do this. 
The tension between collective and individual interests is, as in most of the 
I I O settlements, the primary issue confronting the Association. The current president, Jose 
316 Interview with Marcos Gongalves Adriano, CAR engineer, March 17, 2006 
317 Interview with Maria Djalma Andrade de Andreu, March 15, 2006 
318 Among other issues that were reported to have been serious ones was whether the collective area should 
be dedicated to manioc or to grazing land. 
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Rodrigues, told us that the collective is his biggest worry. Interviewees repeatedly said 
that Association meetings frequently resulted in debates about the difficulty of getting 
settlers to perform their collective labor days and/or the advisability of keeping the 
collective area or of dividing it up among the settlers. Maria Djalma informed us that the 
Association proposed that the land be divided up among the settlers, but that CDA had 
vetoed the idea. Apparently it seems to have been carried out in practice anyway: we 
were told that five tarefas of collective land were allocated to each settler and that these 
areas were distributed by drawing lots. Even with emancipation from government 
tutelage, however, such an arrangement will have to remain extra-official until the land is 
completely paid for. 
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In addition to the artesian well, the Association has a tractor, a casa de farinha, 
a galpao, and a corral. The Association also administers a seed bank and has silos for 
storing beans. Symptomatic of its current difficulties, the Association also has bee 
hives in storage: the project has stalled due to a dispute as to whether apiculture should be 
a collective undertaking or the hives distributed to individual settlers.321 
There are differences in view as to the purpose and goaf of the Association. 
Adilson, the founding president and the single most respected leader in the settlement,322 
319 As in some other settlements, maintenance of the tractor is a challenge. Decio told us that, for awhile, 
he was in charge of the tractor. When he assumed responsibility, the tractor was in a state of disrepair; he 
got it fixed and running, and maintained it with its income, but - within a year after he passed control to 
someone else - it was again in disrepair. Adilson also said that administering the tractor is a problem. 
320 Maria Djalma (interview, March 15. 2006) helped the settlers negotiate a bank loan so that they would 
not have to sell beans during harvest season, when prices are low, but would be able to store them until 
prices rose. 
321 We were informed that there are 15 families very interested in apiculture and that the Association was 
considering turning the hives over to them as a sub-group within the Association. Another group within the 
Association wanted to put together a project to plant cashew trees, but that had not been approved. 
322 In questions about leadership, his name was almost unanimously cited. 
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sees it as essential for moving forward with community-based projects and efforts to 
secure funding: 
"We have to find a path for continuing. The Association can't stop. We have to 
develop plans." 
Adilson feels that most Association members still do not understand the collective well. 
Antonio Santos Reis sees the collective as good for the settlers: 
"I think it would be good to return to the collective. The members would get 
something; [and] they could maintain the tractor that is falling into disrepair." 
But Jose Moraes, a member of the fiscal council in the first directorate of the Association, 
believes that it has served its role. He believes that the function of the Association was to 
get the land and the early financing, and that it is no longer viable. In talking about the 
future, Antonio Andre said that he thought that in ten years the Association would 
probably be nearly dissolved. 
Within the Association, some interviewees felt that there was a division between 
the Adventists and the Catholics, the Adventists being generally more in favor of 
394 collective work, the Catholics more in favor of individual effort. There certainly 
323 "The collective doesn't function anymore. In the beginning it was different." (Isacale) 
324 "The Adventists want to do things their way." (Antonio Andrade) He was the most outspoken on this 
point. He stated that the Adventists have their political group, but that he belonged "to the other group." 
He said that, although there are more Catholics in the settlement, the Adventists are more united (among 
themselves). 
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seemed to be a difference in participation: of the fourteen settlers who classified 
themselves as mere members of the association, attending meetings and, in some cases, 
doing their monthly stint, eleven were Catholics and only three Adventists. On the other 
hand, of the seven who indicated that they were current or former officers, all but two 
were Adventists.325 
Jose Rodrigues confirmed that the Association is divided to a certain extent in two 
groups. There have always been two slates of candidates for Association elections, and 
he said that these parallel to a certain extent the division in municipal politics between the 
' I ' j f . 
PFL and PMDB parties. The local Adventists are fairly united in supporting the PFL, 
although many Catholics do so also.327 In the last municipal election, the PFL won 150 
votes in the settlement and the PMDB 94. However, these divisions are by no means 
hard and fast: Carlinho and Aliene, for instance, are Catholics who voted PMDB, but 
they cite the Adventist and PFL supporter Adilson as the leader they most respect in the 
community, and are very pleased with the (largely Adventist) leadership of the 
328 Association. 
325 Of those settlers not recorded here, four interviews were with non-titular wives. 
326 Nationally, the PFL is viewed as a conservative party; the PMDB is the largest party in Brazil, and is 
generally centrist, although it is largely opportunistic and has a wide range of membership. In Bahia, the 
PFL was at this time identified with Antonio Carlos Magalhaes, the most powerful political boss in Bahia 
for over thirty years. However, local political party affiliations may have little or nothing to do with the 
national ideology of the parties. Note that most of those who supported the PFL locally voted for Lula of 
the leftist Workers' Party for president. 
327 However, Decio, an Adventist who lists himself as being very active in the church, was the opposition 
candidate for President of the Association in both 2002 and 2004, in both cases losing by "a little more than 
20 votes." He supported the PMDB in the local election and, when that party won, was awarded the 
contract to bus students from the settlement to town (a contract previously held by one of Adilson's 
brothers-in-law). Although he cited the church as a divisive factor, he thought that only about 10% of the 
settlers are against the Adventist Church. 
328 Other Catholics who feel the same way included Antonio Andrade Silva, Ernesto "Milho Verde" 
Ribeiro da Silva, and Cecilio Lopes Dantas, 
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In any event, settlers seem to remain active in the Association, if not in the 
collective work. Both Adilson and Jose Rodrigues individually stated that there is 80-
85% participation in monthly meetings. Meetings are, by all accounts, lively, with active 
discussions; many settlers mentioned that issues were raised in meetings, discussed, 
voted on, and resolved.329 Some were less sanguine about the degree to which they were 
resolved: Jose Moraes thinks that only a minority agrees with the Association norms -
"but they let it go;" Isacale finds the discussions tiresome and says they don't resolve 
anything. 
"I support what's right; what's wrong, I keep my mouth shut. [But] not 
everyone is the same - each one has different ideas." Gerson 
Of the ten settlers asked the question, eight felt that the Association represented 
well both the interests of their own family and those of other families, while only two did 
not feel it was representative. Sonia felt the representation was good, but could be better. 
Aliene stated, "Up until now, it's good - the Association has made good decisions, and 
we agree [with them]." Twenty-four of the twenty-seven households said that they 
would continue to be members of the Association even if they did not need it to obtain 
330 credit; only three said they would desist from membership. 
329 "Each one gives his opinion. Collective v. individual. [They] converse in the meeting, arrive at an 
agreement. Sometimes it is more difficult." (Marineide) 
330 Ari mentioned that they used, at least in one situation, a leadership technique which we have seen work 
well in other organizations. When a member complained about how a certain project was being carried out, 
the Directorate invited him to take over leadership of the project. The member did so, and came to realize 
the complexities of the matter he was dealing with. 
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Sonia noted that the Association handled a delicate matter of stealing and drinking 
on the part of adolescent children of settlers. The young people were called in, talked to, 
and required to work on collective land to repay the damage they had caused. 
Women tend not to be active in the Association. Jo, for instance, stated that women 
support and watch "but the voice is the men's - [this is our] tradition." Like many other 
women, she is active in the Adventist Church, where she is chief deaconess. She also 
stated that, as a woman, she has a concern about her husband becoming too active in the 
Association. Marlene attends the meetings and feels that she learns from them, and 
sometimes gives her opinion. Adalia, who was knowledgeable about the Association, 
said that the women support the Association from outside; she also noted that the young 
people were not represented in the Association. Catya, who is not an active Adventist, 
stated that there are no activities for the women; Tereza, also not an active Adventist, said 
that the women tend to stay in their homes, and that there are no activities for them. 
Economics: 
Land: The land purchase took place on May 25, 1998. The purchase price was 
R$150 per ha, for a total of R$247,350. SAT funds were R$259,118, and SIC 
R$335,945. (Note also, as discussed above, that each settler contributed an extra-legal 
R$300 to make up the difference between the price the landowner wanted and the price 
the government was willing to pay.) 
Land payments are R$280 per year for seventeen years (twelve years remain to be 
paid). Maria Djalma, the technical assistant, who knows the financial situation of settler 
families, believed that, at that time, 40% of the families would be able to pay up the full 
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remaining value of the land (R$3360) if they needed to. However, a relatively 
prosperous settler, Ari, noted that, although he used not to worry about paying for the 
land (as that was the function of the Association through collective production), since the 
"paralyzation" of the collective area, he is more concerned. 
Observation indicates that the land is good quality. Twenty-one of the twenty-
seven households interviewed stated that their land is fertile; only one stated that his is 
not.332 Five noted that parts of their land are fertile and other parts not. Twenty-two of 
the households said that they use no fertilizer on the land, and twenty-three that they use 
no pesticides. 
An interesting note is that several settlers have begun plowing with animal 
traction. There seemed to be a growing interest in this alternative technology. 
Financing: All twenty-seven families interviewed had taken out PRONAF A 
loans in the amount of RS9205.25. Although there was some flexibility according to 
personal preferences, typically the loan provided funds for: 
• planting 4.1 ha of grazing land, 1 ha each of manioc and palma, and 0.5 ha 
of either leucena or andu beans 
• purchase of 40 female and 1 male sheep or goats 
• construction of 1.5 km of fencing and a small corral 
• purchase of a small cart 
• technical assistance 
331 Interview March 15, 2006 
332 This is Antonio Andrade, who stated that his land is sandy and dry. But he said that he chose that 
weaker land because it was closer to water. 
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Three families were unable to make the first PRONAF A repayment, and the 
Association covered the debt for them. This is considered a loan from the Association 
that the families will have to repay.333 
Twenty settlers interviewed (and over sixty of the settlers) also took out custeio 
loans, almost all of them to plant beans and corn. The loans were from the Banco 
Nordeste, and the bank manager visited the settlement. 
According to Jose Rodrigues, the settlers went to the Bank in April of 2005 and 
applied for a loan to be disbursed in April. Actual disbursement of the first parcel of 60% 
of the loan did not take place until June 10. This meant that some settlers had to get 
advances from private money lenders in order to plant (private money lenders charge 
very high interest). The second parcel (20%) was disbursed in July/August, and the third 
(20%) in September, after the crop had been harvested and sold. Another issue he raised 
was that the custeio loans only came in amounts up to R$3000: Jose Rodrigues said that 
he only needed R$1500, but others needed up to R$6000 - although the manager was 
solicitous, he apparently did not have flexibility on this point. (The actual custeio loans 
granted to settlers were R$2900.) 
Similar concerns about financing were expressed by other respondents. Antonio 
Andrade, one of the less prosperous settlers, also complained that financing often arrives 
too late for planting. He stated that it is necessary to plow two months prior to planting. 
"But how can I get money to plow? If I don't repay in time, [I] enter into a vicious circle. 
[But] how can I pay to plow and pay the debt?" Three other interviewees felt so strongly 
about these delays that they cited bank bureaucracy and bank delays as the factor that 
causes most difficulty for the rural worker. 
333 Interview with Maria Djalma, May 15, 2006. 
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According to Adilson, the prior President and one of the strong leaders in the 
community, of the 60+ families that took out custeio loans (R$2900), only 10-12 have 
been able to repay on a timely basis. The remainder are being negotiated with the bank 
(according to Decio, about half have already renegotiated their loans). Valdino, for 
example, was able to pay 30% in December and extended the remaining 70%. But 
Ernesto Milho Assado told us that he had been unable to renegotiate the custeio'?^ "I'll 
pay it if I can - if not, I can't." 
Cecilio was able to renegotiate his custeio, but still worries about it "a lot" 
("demais"). Thirteen of the interviewees listed repayment of the loans (PRONAF A and 
custeio) as a major worry. For Marineide, it is "agony." Ari and Antonio Costa (neither 
of whom took out custeio loans) said that they thought custeio borrowers underestimated 
the difficulty of the short-term pay back period 
Production and Income: Black beans (feijao) were virtually the only cash crop in 
the settlement. All 27 families have some land in beans, ranging from 6 to 50 tarefas (the 
latter the entire farm lot). In all but one case, farmers co-plant corn with beans, but corn 
is far less important economically. Carlos Joao dos Santos harvested 560 sacks of black 
beans and sold 500 @ R$60 each - an income of R$30,000. He was also one of the top 
sellers of corn, selling 30 sacks @ R$20 = R$600. Other relatively prosperous settlers 
reported income from beans ranging from R$11,500 to 25,000. 
Nineteen of the families also have planted grazing land (capim), ranging from 4 to 
35 tarefas, and ten have plantation of palma (used for animal feed), ranging from 1 to 5 
334 We were informed by other interviewees that Ernesto is very poor; our own observations tended to 
confirm this. 
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tarefas 335 Sheep are the most common livestock - 21 families have sheep; the largest 
herd is Adilson's, with 80 head; another herd has 50 head, and two have 30 each, but 
most families have 20 sheep or less. We were told that goats do not do well in the area, 
and only five families raise them - two with herds of about 25, the others considerably 
smaller. 
Fifteen families have cattle - usually including at least one milk cow. The largest 
herd is 16 head. Fourteen have one or more donkeys, nine have a horse, and three a 
mule. Sixteen families raise chickens, mostly in small quantities, although Sonia has 70, 
two other families have 50, and three have 40. 
Only one interviewed family is attempting to raise non-bean cash crops: Adalia 
and Joao Jose experimented with Vi ha. each of tomatoes/okra and mango/coconut trees, 
and have 1 ha. of watermelon. When we spoke with Adalia, the tomato experiment, 
which they had financed themselves, had not gone well. She expressed as her major 
worry investments that do not produce a return. 
Although the PRONAF A financing encouraged manioc planting, only one family 
— Jose Gois and Nilza - had a commercial planting of manioc, and they only had two 
tarefas. In 2005 they sold 25 sacks of farinha at R$40 each - an income of RS1000. 
Sonia and her husband had previously two tarefas of manioc, but harvested it all and did 
not replant. Other families had small amounts of manioc on their house lots. There was 
a substantial planting of manioc on the collective land. 
335 Gerson Felix de Jesus has the largest palma crop. "We needed land - God gave us land. A rose has 
thorns. [Ours is] the problem of drought. I planted palma. We have to think not only of ourselves, but 
also of the animals - they provide us with meat and milk. If I could, I would plant 10 tarefas of palma. 
Many people criticize, but I don't like to see animals suffer." 
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Antonio Andrade Silva said that he would engage in truck farming if he could 
irrigate his farm lot. He said that he has water available there two days a week, but needs 
irrigation equipment. 
Several families plant squash and other vegetables alongside their beans and corn 
and/or use the bean fields to raise vegetables during the off-season, almost always 
primarily for consumption. Families use their house lots to plant a wide variety of fruit 
trees - we noted coconut, guava, tangerine, orange, lemon, pinha, banana, graviola, 
seringuela, cashew, acerola, jack fruit, mango, jambo - as well as garden vegetables and 
aipim. 
Although the community enjoyed a prosperous year in 2005, there are poor 
families.336 It is interesting to compare the situation of two farmers. Jose Hilton (one of 
the poorest residents) has 2 sheep and 6 chickens. In 2005 he produced 12 sacks of corn, 
and sold 3 @ R$10 each. He produced 14 sacks of beans, sold 10 @ R$ 45. He sold 2 
kids for R$60. His family receives R$90/month from the bolsa escola. His sons - 17 and 
16 - help in fields. He owes R$280/yr in land payments, R$830 in Pronaf A, and R$2900 
for custeio. Not being able to repay his debt is one of his principal worries: "I worry - I 
nearly went crazy." 
Jose Domingo carries exactly the same debt - and also admits to some worry 
about repayment. In 2005, he produced 500 sacks of beans and 80 sacks of corn, selling 
"almost all of it" @ R$50 and R$16 respectively. He has 20 sheep, 7 head of cattle, and 
30 chickens. Marlene, his wife, sells sweets and homemade popsicles. They also receive 
a bolsa escola. The family is relatively prosperous. 
336 Adilson stated that the stronger families try to help the weaker ones. 
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Only three men mentioned working as daily laborers (a common source of income 
in other settlements); daily laborers in the area receive only R$10/day, lower than in most 
areas. One man reported working as a daily laborer only three days a month, the others 
12-15 days. Carlos Joao owns a tractor in partnership with his father and charges R$25 
per tarefa for its use in cultivating and harvesting. 
Non-farm income seems to be less diversified in Vila Canaa than in most the 
other settlements studied. The main source is the bolsa escola - which fourteen of the 27 
families interviewed mentioned receiving. This can be an important element of income; 
for instance, Ernesto Milho Assado's 2005 family income was approximately R$3500, of 
which over R$ 1000 came from the bolsa escola. 
Only one family mentioned receiving government pensions - they receive two. 
One woman reported earning R$30/month selling cosmetics, and one family earns about 
R$50/month reselling natural gas for cooking. Decio owns a bus in partnership with his 
brother-in-law, and rents it to the municipal government for R$2400/month to transport 
students to school in Euclides da Cunha.337 One couple interviewed expressed their 
interest in setting up a small store in the settlement, which they felt would be a good 
source of income. (There is already one small store and a bakery - that produces bread -
in the settlement area.) Marlene and Catya both mentioned independently that they 
would like to have a job in order to provide their children with a better chance to study. 
337 This is a highly political appointment: the contract depends on the prefect's continued patronage. Decio 
is the primary "opposition" leader within the settlement, and there was an undercurrent of comment linking 
him to the prefect, whom the majority of settlers did not support in the last election. 
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Decio, the opposition leader within the Association, mentioned the need for a small 
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factory - perhaps one making fruit sweets. 
Sufficiency of income: When asked if family income was sufficient, seven families 
interviewed answered with a definite "yes." Eight answered "no" with respect to basic 
needs (and in most cases their physical situation seemed to confirm this). Two noted 
that it is sufficient in years when there is rainfall and not sufficient in dry years. 
"One year of drought wreaks havoc ("acaba com tudo"). [You can] store up 
food, but it would be difficult to pay the bank." 
"When there are beans it is [sufficient], when there are not beans, it isn't." 
(Josevanda) 
"It's not enough, but we have learned to live with it. Summers are difficult" 
(Marlene) 
Three families answered "no" because they needed specific additional income. 
Adalia would like additional income so as to be free to experiment with more crops, 
338 "[You] pass the whole year without wages. When winter [the rainy season] comes, you are burdened 
with debt; it's difficult. [This is] why I think about an industrial area and irrigation." (Decio) 
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Decio in order to purchase a health plan,339 Sonia because her daughter has medical 
needs. 
Other responses were nuanced: 
"A little more would be nice." (Jose and Ana) 
"The financial [loans] is the most difficult. We keep hoping." (Jose Rodrigues) 
"[It is] more or less [sufficient]. You have to be careful, but it's sufficient. 100 
sacks [of beans] at R$40 equals R$4000 - for one year, it's little. You have to 
plan." (Gerson) 
Ze and Nilza felt that income was insufficient because they have to sell a sheep each 
month to break even (they have a flock of 50 sheep and 4 goats). Marineide also noted 
that at times "a little is lacking in terms of basics" - then her family sells beans, corn, or 
livestock. Adilson felt that income is sufficient for basic needs, but noted that 
diversification of income is important: he mentioned crops, goats, and that his family 
resells cooking gas. 
Settler Attitudes: 
339 Private health plans are very rare among rural Brazilians, who essentially depend on government 
medical services. 
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Satisfaction: Satisfaction was high. Interviewees were unanimous in saying they 
would not sell their land, and many of them were emphatic about it. 
"For no money in the world. I came here to stay." (Cecilio Dantas) 
"No way ("de jeito nenhuniy. I'd buy more land if I could. (Carlinho) 
"Not even for a lot of money." (Manoel) 
"Deus me livre!" (Zequinho)340 
Thirty-one interviewees stated that life in the settlement is better than it had been 
previously, one said it is a little better, one noted that it got worse at first but then got 
better. Only two respondents felt that it was worse. 
Jo mentioned that, in the beginning she was afraid that it wouldn't work out for her 
family without water, with fields to be cleared. But now she feels that this is the right 
place for them. Ivaneide, however, is lukewarm about living in the settlement, although 
her husband likes it. 
Marlene expresses as her chief worry the "culture" (i.e., education) of her children 
("cultura dos filhos "). With four children ages 16-20, all studying at the 8th grade level 
or higher, she is doing very well for this region. Yet, even in this prosperous family, 
there is an awareness of how dependent they are on the weather. Jose sums it up: "If the 
340 Literally "God deliver me!" - a very strong negation in Portuguese. 
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winter341 is good, it's okay; if the winter is bad, it isn't." Jedeone, their sixteen year old 
son, expresses as his greatest worry the connection between this factor and his own 
education: "You plant and you don't know if you are going to harvest - if you lose the 
crop, you lose a year at school." 
Future: Settlers were generally optimistic about the future, envisioning larger 
harvests, greater prosperity, and more infrastructure (better appointed homes, paved 
streets). However, once again there was a realization of the importance of weather. 
Adilson and Veraluce said that, if it rains sufficiently, things will go well - if it does not 
rain, they hope the government will provide work projects to help families bridge the 
drought. Josevanda said, "If there isn't rain, it will fail." Isacale said the future would 
be better "if the weather is good." 
Antonio Andrade, one of the poorer settlers, said that it is difficult for him to see the 
future; he mentioned that he needs the help of his family, that he needs another chance. 
Antonio Santana said that some families will not make it, but those who do will thrive. 
Ari estimated that 10% of the families would not see their situation improve. Cecilio was 
generally optimistic, but felt there would be greater progress if there were greater unity 
among the settlers. 
Visions of the future for their children vary. Cecilio's son, 22 and married, will take 
over his father's land. Zequinho also said that his sons and daughters (30, 28, 24, and 19) 
will take over his area. Antonio Andre says his children (ranging from 28 to 1 year old) 
will stay in the settlement. Aliene thinks that country life is better for her daughters. 
341 Throughout northern Brazil, "winter" is used to mean the rainy season, and "summer" the dry season. 
These terms more closely coincide with Northern Hemisphere months than with those of the Southern 
hemisphere, "winter" usually beginning in October and ending in May. 
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Josevanda envisioned her children staying and working with them, and Jose Domingo 
said he hoped his children could marry in the settlement and stay there, especially as jobs 
outside the settlement are hard to find. His 20 year old son has obtained a lot, and is 
building a home next to his father's. 
But Jose Rodrigues wants his children to study and not to work in agriculture: 
"I worry about the young people. They want to study and get jobs. I cannot 
predict what will happen." 
Adalia wants her children to go to university and realize their dreams - have a 
house in town. Ari's daughter, Eliane, 15, wants to become a veterinarian and live in 
Salvador. Her cousin, Adilson's son Renato, 16, also wants to be a veterinarian. 
Marineide wants her children to have jobs, as does Ernesto Silva. 
But, as Jose Rodriges implied, the dreams and reality may not mesh. As Sonia 
notes, "The young people would like to find work outside of the settlement, but they 
can't find it." Ze Nelson envisioned the possibility of starting up a small business in 
order to provide jobs for his children. 
Maria Djalma estimated that about 20% of the youth want to continue farming, and 
that the need for land for growing children has become a topic of discussion among the 
families. Adilson mentioned that he is concerned about jobs for his children once they 
graduate, as the land is not sufficient for all of them; if possible, he would buy an 
additional lot in the settlement. 
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Given the number of young people interested in having land - including an additional 
38 young people from the neighboring community of Alto Paraiso - Maria Djalma was in 
the process of putting together a project for a new land reform area, to be carried out in a 
modified form of the Cedula da Terra known as Credito Fundiario. One of the 
difficulties she faced, however, was the tremendous increase in value of land in the local 
area. 
Socio-Political Awareness: As in most of the settlements, the socio-political 
awareness of settlers was at a level that one would expect from rural Northeastern 
Brazilians not actively involved in social movements. Unlike portions of the Catholic 
Church (which were not present among the largely non-practicing Catholics here), the 
Adventist Church, while providing its members with excellent organizational and people 
skills, and a genuine concern for community, does not tend to get involved in larger 
political/social justice issues. This was reflected in the comments of interviewees. 
When asked who was in favor/supported the rural worker, answers included Lula/the 
Federal Government (7), the Cedula da Terra Program/institutions (5), and the Rural 
Workers' Union (4). When asked who is against the rural worker, answers tended to be 
generic. Four interviewees answered citing bank delays and/or lack of financing, two 
mentioned bureaucracy, and three said that only people who do not understand (or are 
crazy) could be against the rural worker. 
With respect to attitudes toward the MST, ten were primarily negative, most citing 
violence and/or invasion as the problem. Four had basically positive reactions. Marlene 
noted that the settlement came into existence due to the momentum caused by the MST; 
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her son, Gedeone, 15, said that the MST is fighting for what people need. Similarly, 
Marineide said that the MST "helps the needy to get land." And Antonio Andre listed the 
MST as the foremost group helping the rural worker. 
Other answers were more nuanced. Jo, Decio, and Ari all stated that they are in favor 
of the MST's objectives, but not of their methods. Antonio Reis answered with a 
question: "It's difficult to tell - are they [the MST] struggling sincerely or simply prone 
to violence?" 
Regarding elections, 28 interviewees voted in the last election for Lula, three for 
Serra. In the next election, 26 said they would vote for Lula, two for Alckmin, and five 
were undecided. Only two interviewees said they had party affiliations, one with the 
Workers' Party (PT) and one with the PSDB, the party running a candidate against Lula; 
but the latter said that he was going to vote for Lula rather than for the PSDB candidate 
because "Lula did much more in four years than FHC [Fernando Henrique Cardoso] did 
in eight." 
Jo mentioned the prejudice that the people in the settlements feel in town because 
they are identified with the "landless." She said that initially, for that reason, stores in 
town did not want to give her credit, but that is no longer the case. 
Strengths/V ulnerabilities/Recommendations: 
Vila Canaa appears to be a highly successful settlement with indications that it 
can continue to be so. The community is blessed with excellent, fertile land - and it has 
successfully integrated itself into the area's growing vocation for bean raising. As Decio 
stated: "We were privileged to find the right location for the program." 
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Harvests have been good, and - as the land has not needed fertilizer - costs of 
production have been relatively low. Yet these very factors may speak to future 
difficulties, of which more below. 
Maria Djalma and other observers noted the presence of the Adventists settlers as 
an asset. Our observations tended to confirm this. In any settlement, especially of this 
size, there will be (and should be) dissent, and not everyone is going to agree with the 
leadership. But, overall, the organizational and administrative skills of the Adventists 
seem to have been helpful to the community. Adilson, particularly, who led the 
settlement for many years and was almost universally sited as a leader even though he is 
currently not the President, seemed to be a person of unusual vision and compassion, 
honest and sincerely concerned with the community. 
The major point of dissension - administration of the collective land - is one that 
haunts almost every one of the settlements (the possible exception being Veneza, where 
the wealth of the collective area, underwritten by sisal production, is sufficient to be able 
to pay settlers for their work). The community has tried some solutions - dividing up 
work groups according to vocation, semi-privitization of responsibility. None of these 
has worked astoundingly well, but the Association seems to continue to function 
adequately. 
The community has two major sources of potential income and maintenance: black 
beans and livestock - principally sheep. Of these, beans are by far the economically more 
important, although the livestock could provide an important supplementary source of 
income and a safety net for difficult years. Dependence on beans has some of the 
disadvantages of monoculture discussed elsewhere - dangers of disease, overdependence 
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on the prices of a single market - but it is far less dangerous than fruit tree monocultures 
as fields dedicated to beans one year may easily be switched to other crops in another 
year. 
Of more concern is the land itself. It is our impression that the settlers are taking 
the fertility of the land for granted, and are in danger of over-farming it. When asked if 
they practiced crop rotation, twenty-one farmers said "no" and only one, Antonio Andre, 
answered positively: he keeps 3-4 ha fallow each year. Unless some conscious practice 
of maintaining and renovating the soil is engaged in soon, the fertility is likely to 
decrease, creating the need for fertilization and the likelihood of lower yields. 
The success of the bean crop may also have dimmed the need for creativity in the 
leadership and in the community at large. Unlike most settlements, we heard little talk of 
creative ideas for processing or industrialization. Granted, beans lend themselves less 
than fruit or sisal to such activities, but early on in the life of the community thought was 
given to processing goat milk and setting up systems for better marketing meat, and these 
were not mentioned during our interviews. 
But we emphasize that, if our impression in this sense is correct, it is a matter of 
circumstances and not of personal capacity; the people of Vila Canaa seem to us to be 
intelligent and capable of creativity when the need arises. The willingness to consider 
alternative technologies (e.g., animal traction plows) may be a good sign in this respect. 
With respect to participation of women in the Association, we have - in other 
communities - cited this as a significant area of possible improvement. It may be 
somewhat less so in Vila Canaa. The Adventist women seem to find satisfaction and 
leadership roles within the church, and their tradition - which should be respected - may 
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(as one of them said) make them more comfortable with exercising their skills in that 
arena. The non-Adventist women, however, do not have this outlet for their skills, and 
active inclusion in the Association could provide them with a means for developing 
activities that would both interest them and be advantageous to the community. 
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Case Study 4 
Name of Settlement: Moita Redonda (Associa^ao dos Pequenos Agricultores da 
Fazenda Moita Redonda) 
Families in Settlement: 50 title holding families + 
Location: Municipio - Inhambupe, Bahia 
Area: 677 ha. 
Land Purchase Date: September 18, 1998 
Dates Visited: March 29-31, 2006 
Number Interviewed - Households: 24 Individuals: 36 
Family size (persons): 1-3/6; 4-6/10; 7-9/4; 10-12/0; 13-16/3 
Persons Interviewed: 16 men, 16 women, 1 youth (male 16) 
Ages: -20/1; 20-29/8; 30-39/9; 40-49/7; 50-59/8; 60+/3 
Schooling: 0-2/20; 3-5/11; 6-8/3; 9+/2 
In 10 of the families interviewed, the wife had 2+ years more education 
than the husband; in only two cases do the husbands have substantially 
more education than their wives. 
Technician: Jose Eduardo Rocha Reis 
Geography: The settlement is located 13 kms north of the town of Inhambupe, three 
kms from the village of Entrocamento. It is a short distance to the east of BR 110, the 
paved two-lane Federal highway between Inhambupe and Olandina. 
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Figures V-4-A and V-4-B. Above: Associate President Walmir Reis, his wife, Irelice, 
and their children. Below: Students in the settlement primary school. 
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Figures V-4-C and V-4-D. Above: Moita Redonda agro-vila. Below: settlers working 
with passion fruit vines. 
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The agro-vila has the appearance of a sizeable village - with a large open area at 
the entrance and dirt streets: three running north-south, and three crossing them east-west 
in a grid pattern. Houses are small but made of brick, varying between ill-kept messy 
exteriors to neatly smooth stuccoed white-painted exteriors. 
The land is flat. Farm lots extend principally to the east of the agro-vila along 
342 
three wide straight dirt paths (adequate for a jeep, truck, or horse cart to travel), 
gridded by shorter perpendicular paths that occur after every other farm lot. 
House lots are 20 x 40m. The farm lots are approximately 8.5 ha each, with slight 
variations due to topography. Collective lots make up 30% of the area. As required by 
law, 20% of the land is set aside as an ecological preserve. 
Climate: This is a semi-arid climate. At the time of our visit, the area was suffering 
from a drought that seriously affected production. For instance, we were told that passion 
fruit production was not even 20% of what it had been during the pre-drought period. 
The community's future is dependent on orange trees that are in the process of 
maturation, and the drought undoubtedly has had a negative impact on their growth. 
History: Moita Redonda's history and existence has been more closely tied to local 
politics than any of the other of the settlements we studied. According to interviewees, 
342 The central of these paths ends at a fence, on the other side of which is a road. Some of the settlers 
would like to open a gate here for ease of access, but others are opposed as there would be no easy way to 
control outsiders coming through settlement lands. 
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the purchase of the land was arranged, at least in part, by the prefeita, Simone;343 she 
called the absentee landowner, Jose Marques, a personal friend, and asked him to sell.344 
She was also active in encouraging the Association and in negotiations.345 According to 
Jose Eduardo, who is not her supporter, and several interviewees, Simone has continued 
to be involved with (or, depending on the viewpoint, interfere with) settlement matters.346 
A local movement, headed by Carlos Alberto (Carlito),347 began seeking land as 
early as 1996. Carlito, who worked for EBDA as a security guard, is a controversial 
figure. Nearly all the interviewees spoke of him as the leader of the movement, and he 
was said to be intelligent, but some thought he was dishonest (a "bandit" in the eyes of 
343 Simone Simoes Neri served as prefeita from 1997-2001 and from 2005-09. Leonidas Simoes de 
Azevedo, from an opposing party (PFL) served asprefei to from 1993-97 and 2001-05; one interviewee told 
us that, in 1998, Leonidas was interested in buying the land for himself and questioned its suitability for 
land reform, generating a visit from CDA to examine the quality of the land. As prefeito, however, 
Leonidas left the settlement alone, neither supporting nor interfering; Jose Eduardo felt that this was better 
for the settlement. 
344 One interviewee said that Jose Marques told settlers that he only sold them land because the prefeita had 
asked him to. 
345 Israel Santos, who had been president of the Association Boa Sorte, was in 1998 secretary of the 
Association Moita Redonda and is one of the original signatories. He confirmed that the idea to buy the 
land came from Carlito and Simone, and that Simone was active, with the EBDA and others, in negotiating 
the purchase of the land. In an open-ended question, ten other founders and early settlers mentioned 
Simone's participation as a leader/negotiator in obtaining the land. In addition to Simone's involvement, 
two founding members told us that they were called into the Association by a municipal alderman. 
346 Of the 20 interviewees who voted in the municipio and told us for whom they voted, 18 said they voted 
for Simone in 2004. Irandi stated that Simone had always helped the settlement, and stated that she had 
won 36 out of 55 votes cast in the settlement. (Although there are many more than 55 adults in the 
settlement, some - especially the newer settlers - are not registered to vote in the municipio.) Cecilia, wife 
of former Association president Zito, stated less approvingly that Simone was deeply involved in the wrong 
direction the Association was taking ("A prefeita esta no meio desta coisa.") Lindoval, who voted for her, 
said Simone was a worker but "false" ("falsa ") - that she uses people. Simone's active involvement in the 
settlement was also confirmed by Benone Reys, a former priest and ex-prefeito in Inhambupe (interview 
29/03/06); he indicated that Simone was essentially responsible for organizing the Moita Redonda 
Association. 
347 Jose Ribeiro, who said that he participated in every meeting relating to the land purchase, stated that 
Carlito formed (fez) the Association. This type of leadership - an organization dependent on a single leader 
- is common in Brazil. 
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Lindoval).348 The technical assistant, Jose Eduardo, spoke of him being a good person 
and a hard worker. It seems clear that Carlito was closely tied to political figures, and 
that he used his connections to help find and purchase the land.349 
Purchase of the land occurred September 18, 1998. The land had essentially been 
abandoned, although Lindoval (who later became a founding settler) had been resident on 
it since 1982 as an employee caretaker. A few settlers moved onto the land in tents 
and/or began planting in the fields in late 1998/early 1999. But most families did not 
move onto the land until the end of September, 2001, when funding for housing became 
available. PRONAF funding to plant orange trees was not available until December 23, 
2002 - so that most orange groves were planted in 2003 (three years prior to our visit). 
The settlers came from two associations - Moita Redonda and Boa Sorte - each 
of which had about 40 members. The Moita Redonda Association was based in the 
nearby village of Entrocamento (3 km) and Boa Sorte in the village of Gameleira in the 
neighboring municipio of Olandina. The two associations were merged into one - the 
current Association. CDA made the selection of which members would be settled onto 
the land. Almost all of the original settlers were from nearby surrounding areas - some 
had minifundios quite close to the settlement. According to Jose Eduardo, the prefeita 
was instrumental in merging the two groups, and she also added some urban people from 
the town of Inhambupe; apparently CDA approved these people, but they turned out not 
to adapt to farm life and most had left the settlement well prior to the time of our visit. 
348 In our experience of rural communities, it is not uncommon for leaders to be suspected by some of 
taking funds. Such rumors are not always true. However, the circumstances here are certainly unusual and 
would warrant further investigation. 
349 Carlito never became a settler because he worked as a security guard for EBDA and would therefore not 
be eligible to receive land; he chose to retain his employment rather than enter the settlement. 
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Demography: 32 of the 36 interviewees stated they were of rural origin. Those claiming 
urban350 origin were Marcos Silva, Coho, and Jose Vincente and his wife, Hilda, but all 
four of them had farming experience prior to arriving in the settlement (Jose Vincente 
and Hilda are among the most successful farmers in the settlement). Two other men 
interviewed said that their wives (not interviewed) were of urban origin. 
Except for Walter, who worked as a bricklayer for the prefeitura of Olandina, 
almost all the men were engaged in agricultural work immediately prior to coming to the 
settlement. Eleven had minifundios of from two to eight tarefas. Of these, seven also 
hired out as day laborers, and two worked as sharecroppers (one of these also as a 
bricklayer). Three others were sharecroppers without land of their own, three were 
landless daily workers (one of these also worked as a barber), and two were employed 
farm workers. Two lived and farmed on their parents' land. 
Race/Ethnicity: Principally white. 
Gender: Two of the families interviewed are female titleholders. One of these, 
Daci, served as vice secretary - one of the six directors - of the Association from 
2002 to 2004. 
Religion: Most families are at least nominally Catholic. There are six Adventist 
families in the settlement and one family from the Igreja Crista (literally, 
Christian Church), an evangelical Protestant denomination. Of the households 
interviewed, fifteen stated that they were Catholic, and three Adventist. 
350 "Urban" in Brazil may mean that a person was born in a city or in the seat of a municipio, which 
includes many very small, primarily rural towns. 
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Age: Most of the founders we interviewed were in their forties or older; but 
Walmir (the president of the Association) was 36, and his wife 29, and founders 
Marcos Silva and his wife Maria were both 28. The families that entered since 
2004 were all in their twenties and thirties. 
Attrition: Only 27 of the original families remained on the land when we visited. 
23 families were new. We were told that 10 families (not necessarily original 
ones) had left "in recent times" (i.e., the last couple of years).351 Jose Eduardo 
attributes the high attrition to a combination of selection of unsuitable settlers and 
local public mismanagement. Of the families we interviewed, 14 were founding 
families, one each the wife and daughter of founders who had left the settlement, 
and three not founders but early settlers (2001). Of the newer settlers, one had 
arrived in 2004, two in 2005, and one in 2006 less than a month prior to our visit. 
Education: The settlement school has two classrooms and offers education through the 
fourth grade during the day and at night. The morning session has pre-school and 1st 
grade, the afternoon 2nd and 3rd grades; 4th graders (and other adult students) study at 
night. 
Settlers were overwhelmingly positive about the settlement school. Seventeen of 
those interviewed said that it was good or excellent, two said it was fair. Only one said 
that it was weak: her children had previously studied at an Adventist school, which are 
very strong academically in comparison with Brazilian public schools. Two interviewees 
mentioned the higher grades in Inhambupe - one thought they were good, the other only 
351 Raimundo, who arrived in 2005, claimed that there were 15 new families in the last six months, but this 
may be an overstatement. 
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fair. Cecilia's daughter studies at the Escola Agricola (a cooperative agricultural school); 
she is excited about her studies there and has developed ideas for investing in their land. 
We interviewed the night school teacher (last year she taught the children), 
Edivania da Silva, 26, the daughter of settlers. She has a normal school education. We 
were impressed by her attitude. "I learn together with them [the students]; they have 
much to teach me." 
Health: A health agent comes to the settlement once a month, and doctors are at the 
health post in Entrocamento (3 kms distance) on Tuesdays (pediatrician), Thursdays 
(gynecologist), and Fridays (general practitioner). Settlers here were more positive about 
the health system than at most of the settlements we visited. Six said the health 
attendance is good, two thought it was so-so, and only one felt it was bad. Most simply 
described the system without stating whether they thought it was good or bad, but their 
overall attitude was moderately positive. Raimundo Rodrigues noted that the Brazilian 
public health system is pretty much the same everywhere - not an accolade, but a sign 
that he doesn't feel that health care in the settlement is any worse than elsewhere. Two 
interviewees expressed concern about distance: Maria Angelina felt that Entrocamento 
was far, Jose Batista noted that one has to hire a car if anyone is really sick. Josefa stated 
that she felt the health care at the settlement was not a problem, but that the level of care 
in town (Inhambupe) was. 
Water: Very early in the settlement history (c. 1999), a significant issue arose which 
has created a continuing problem. As president of the Association, Carlito, authorized 
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the digging of a well on his father's farm (Fazenda Caraiba), where it serves five homes 
(not in the settlement) including, apparently, a home that Carlito built for himself. The 
well was not completed, and the prefeita, Simone, has pressured the Associaiton to 
commit itself to signing a new project for amplification of the work. Shortly before our 
visit, a meeting was held in the Association in which the Municipal Secretary of 
Agriculture was present, pressuring the community to remove Israel as Treasurer because 
he refused to authorize additional expenditures on this well. Although the attempt did not 
succeed, the meeting increased tensions within the community, and Israel told us that he 
is thinking of leaving because of what is occurring there. 
In CERB's records, therefore, the settlement has two wells, when in fact there is 
only one in the settlement area. The second well provides water for house lots; settlers 
are charged a monthly fee of R$14 for water and electricity. 
Raimundo stated that only twenty people - the newcomers - pay this fee. The 
president of the Association, Walmir, confirmed that there are families that have not paid 
their water bill for ten months, and that the new people have a better record for paying 
than the old settlers do. 
At this time, water is not piped to the farm lots. Irrigation is being discussed in 
the Association as a possible project using remaining SIC funds. 
Association and Collective Area:352 As mentioned above, the present Association is the 
fusion of two earlier associations - Moita Redonda and Boa Sorte. Each had 
352 Unless otherwise noted, the information in this section was provided at the initial meeting with the 
settlers in the galpao (storage area), March 30, 2006. The meeting was attended by fourteen men and one 
woman from the settlement, Jose Eduardo, and our team. 
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approximately 40 members and the selection of the settlers was made by CDA. (Jose 
Eduardo) 
Originally each family donated one ha. of its land to augment the collective area. 
The collective area is planted with coconuts, oranges, and pasture. Jose Eduardo 
informed us that the pasture was in place when the land was purchased; the Association 
fenced it and rented it out for grazing cattle, income going to the Association, but that 
contract was ending and will not be renewed. The grazing land will be available for a 
collective sheep flock and for settlers to graze livestock.354 
The Association also developed what appears to be a viable program of planting 
passion fruit on the collective land. The association plowed the land and provided wire. 
Two thousand passion fruit plants were planted. 30% of the revenue goes to the 
Association; the remainder is divided among the settlers in accordance with the work 
they provide on the passion fruit - those who do not participate have no right to the 
income. Passion fruit and harvests from the maturing orange trees (which produce three 
harvests a year) account for most of the Association's agricultural income. 
Association dues are R$2 per month. The Association has a galpao (a metal 
roofed structure used for storage) that was used as the school until a new school was built 
353 Israel Santos, the current treasurer of the Association, was president of the Boa Sorte Association. 
When it was merged into the Moita Redonda Association, in 1998, he became secretary of the latter. 
354 Jose Ribeiro stated that the decision to set aside 1 ha as pasture land was never approved by the 
Association. He also stated that the members are not informed as to the Association accounts - what has 
been earned and spent - and that there is need to present an accounting. He stated that the Association sold 
oranges, and when asked about it, the treasurer responded "are you calling me a thief?" He claimed that 
the Association had a horse and wagon, that it was sold, and that nobody knows what happened to the 
money. Nonetheless, he pays his dues and generally supports the Association. Coho also felt that the 
treasurer does not provide sufficient reporting. But other members, e.g., Pedro Xavier, state that the Fiscal 
Counsel provides good reports. 
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in 2005. It also owns a tractor, which was obtained from CAR-PRODUZIR; it hires out 
to settlers at the subsidized rate of RS25/30 per day - the market rate is R$40-45.355 
When a family decides to leave, three replacement candidates are presented to the 
Association. The Association votes to pick one of these. The family picked then 
negotiates directly with the family that is leaving, without the participation of the 
Association.356 However, all the new families were currently waiting for CDA in 
Salvador to officially recognize their presence. Until that confirmation occurs, the new 
settlers are not completely certain that they can stay.358 
According to Jose Eduardo, the system for new entries worked fairly well until 
2005, when some families entered without prior approval from the Association. Five 
families represented at our initial meeting stated that they had entered without the 
Association approval process. Jose Eduardo, who was present, stated that they must be 
treated as though they are in a trial period, and must go through approval.359 
355 Some settlers have failed to pay for tractor services; Walmir, the President Association, told us that the 
tractor is what gives him the most problems. 
356 Raimundo paid RS7.000 to take over the rights; he found the orange groves badly neglected. Jose 
Batista paid R$2.000 for house and fields, both of which he said were essentially "abandoned." Both 
agreed to take over PRONAF debt. 
357 Jose Eduardo told us that CDA has delayed so much in registration of new families that people who 
entered onto the land three years previously through the official approval process were still not registered. 
358 Raimundo Rodrigues, one of the new settlers, told us that this situation made him nervous to the point of 
feeling ill. He is very uncomfortable because he has not been fully approved. He pays his monthly dues to 
the Association (R$2). He has seven tarefas of oranges planted by the previous homesteader, which were 
so neglected that he had to "save" them. He has only been able to plant 100 passion fruit vines and 2.5 
tarefas of cowpeas. He paid R$7.000 to the prior settler to take over the land. 
359 Walmir and Israel traveled to Salvador to discuss with CDA the process for these new families. They 
were told that the old titleholders must sign a document saying they are desisting and that the new 
titleholders must sign a commitment and go through a 90 day trial period. Only two families have not yet 
signed the required commitment. 
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In the beginning, there was a good deal of orientation as to the value of the 
Association and how it should function. The Association by-laws were read aloud at 
least three times for the benefit of those who have difficulty reading. 
However, in our initial meeting with a group of settlers, we were told that 
currently the by-laws of the Association were not being fully respected. The group stated 
that there are people who say they will not obey because, in that settlement, nobody is 
expelled for not obeying. They traced this in part to a fight in the fields with machetes 
that ended up in court. The Association decided to expel the guilty party and sent that 
decision to CDA in Salvador, but no action was taken. However, the guilty party left the 
settlement of his own accord. 
By 2003, the Association directorate had stopped functioning to the point that, 
when a new family (Raimundo and Gedilsa) entered, Jose Eduardo had to call a special 
meeting to get them approved. They signed a commitment. Raimundo said that he feels 
marginalized in the Association meetings. The directorate takes the position that only 
those new members approved by the Association can participate. Raimundo fulfilled his 
duties, but it took seven months for him to get approved. He did courses in 
associativismo and cooperativismo, and his wife did courses in associativismo and 
apiculture. 
The technical assistant, Jose Eduardo, said that the new members want the 
Association rules enforced.361 Most of the new members are Sergipanos (a few are 
second generation Sergipanos from Colonia Roberto Santos, the established land reform 
360 However, there are some sanctions. Pedro Xavier told us that members who have not paid their monthly 
dues (R$2) cannot graze animals on Association pasture. He is six months behind in his dues. 
361 "Everyone has to follow the by-laws." (Walter de Souza, a Bahian new settler who entered in 2004) 
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area in Olandina), who are seen by themselves and others as being more industrious and 
organized.362 Benival, a former president of the Association and a Bahian, summed it up 
this way: 
"It's going to get better [here] because the new settlers are Sergipanos and like 
to work. They are truer friends than the settlers who left." 
Israel dos Santos, a founding settler and a Bahian, is currently treasurer of the 
Association. He has been severely criticized for trying to maintain the rules, but feels 
that they are important: 
"I came to work, follow the norms and rules, obey the by-laws (estatutos). Who 
enters on the land and is qualified [to do so] should know the by-laws and obey 
them" 
He feels that the Association is deeply divided, in part because its work has gotten mixed 
up with local politics. He states that the Association directorate is not listened to, that the 
members do not accept the actions of the directorate and wish to be consulted on all 
362 The new Sergipano settlers we interviewed were attractive couples in their twenties and thirties, 
dynamic, enthusiastic, and apparently excellent farmers. They also showed a strong community spirit, 
spoke favorably of coopertivism and associativism. Jose Batista and Anuncieta, for example, organized a 
group of 10 families to begin giving parties in the school; she is organizing group of women to make and 
sell embroidery. 
363 The group meeting confirmed that many of the new settlers are working better than the original ones -
much better ("100%") than the people they replaced, and that the new settlers are paying their monthly 
fees. But some new settlers have not worked out and have left. Jose Eduardo feels that the selection 
process is inadequate. 
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matters. Even as one of the leaders, he stated that the Association does not adequately 
represent all the families in the settlement.364 
In the last election, as in previous elections, there were two slates of candidates. 
In the view of some, these slates reflected a division between local political parties. 
Walmir, a supporter of prefeita Simone, won the election for president over Saval. 
However, Israel, who was on the ticket with Walmir, was a supporter of another 
candidate for prefeito. 
Walmir confirmed that "individualism" divides the group, and that there is an 
issue in getting people to work the collective land. He has begged CDA to intervene. He 
notes that, up until now, income from the collective lands has been sufficient for the land 
payments. "[If we] lose the collective, we're losing our heart." The depth of his concern 
is perhaps reflected in his response to the question "In your view, who is against the rural 
worker?" His answer: "The rural worker himself. The government is providing the 
365 
conditions [for succeeding on the land], but the people don't take advantage of them." 
Work in the collective area is carried out by groups of 10 settlers - there are five 
groups, each with a coordinator. The groups were formed taking into account each 
settler's interests and the days when it was best for him to work. The president of the 
Association determines the work to be done by each group. The collective work is one 
matter that generates discussions and divisions during meetings. 
We were told that only one of the five groups is fully functioning - in the other 
four up to 50% of the members fail to turn up. Jose Eduardo stated that, overall, the 
364 Israel, however, is positive about the settlement. "Life here is good. Our concern is with development. 
[Otherwise] it is calm." 
365 Walmir also noted that being president of the Association caused him to "lose a lot of time." 
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collective work had 70-80% participation. To overcome the need for work in the 
collective area, a contract was entered into to pay for work on the collective land. This 
created further issues, as settlers prefer to be paid for their work rather than donating their 
free days. We were told that there were members who owed the Association as many as 
30 work days.366 
The day prior to our visit, it had rained, indicating the end of the drought. The 
president of the Association declared all settlers free from collective work for that week 
in order that they could start planting their private fields, in order to take advantage of the 
wet soil. This was a sensible decision, as much collective land work is maintenance not 
notably affected by rain. 
Jose Eduardo informed us that the Association still has approximately R$200.000 
in SIC funds. Jose Eduardo's contract as technical assistance ended in 2005, but - after 
six months - the community called him back because CDA told them they needed 
technical assistance with the remaining SIC. He stated that the community is considering 
a casa de farinha and possibly irrigated castor-oil plants (mamona). 
In the meetings the women who are not titleholders listen but cannot talk, only 
whispering their opinions to their husbands.367 They have no vote. However, when CDA 
comes, the women participate - especially if the CDA representative is a woman. New 
by-laws proposed by CDA would allow both members of a couple to be members, and 
would also allow for worker members (socios trabalhadores), a membership used in 
366 Presence and absence for workdays is recorded in a notebook. Jose da Conceigao, a member of the 
Conselho Fiscal, told us: "[They] say they are going to pay their days [missed], but they don't pay." 
367 Pipio, a Sergipano who entered in 2005, said that, in their orientation, they were told that women who 
are not titleholders could not participate in Association meetings. Neide confirmed this, and most of the 
non-titleholding women said that they do not participate. 
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some settlements for, e.g, grown children of settlers who live in the area and help work 
the land. However the new by-laws have not yet been officially adopted. 
The presence of a substantial number of new settlers who have not been officially 
recognized by CDA also makes the Association less effective. Though these new 
members seem to be diligent about paying their dues and performing their collective 
work, their lack of full standing limits their practical participation, especially with respect 
to voting and holding office. 
Ecological Area: Most interviewees did not seem to have a clear idea of the purpose of 
the ecological area. Some mentioned that you cannot hunt on it, or disturb it in any way. 
They understand that it is protected by IBAMA. One interviewee suggested that the area 
should be deforested in order to make room for fields and homes for landless people. 
Walmir mentioned that, when the settlers had use all the land available, he would petition 
the government to let them use the ecological area. 
Jose Eduardo told us that the fence protecting the ecological area from outsiders is 
not well maintained, and that - especially during the drought period - there has been an 
issue with outsiders putting cattle to graze there. He himself encountered a neighbor of 
the settlement there with twenty head of cattle. 
Economy: 
Distinguishing Factors: This settlement has been more affected by local politics 
than any of the others, in a way that has been detrimental to its development. Jose 
Eduardo believes that political involvement has caused a series of problems: (1) Because 
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of the relative ease of securing the land, the settlers perhaps did not value the land as 
much as settlers in areas that experienced a greater struggle. (2) The prefeita's 
intervention resulted in certain families being given land who were not suited to it, did 
not properly care for the land and eventually left it, but in the process slowed the 
agricultural development. (3) The continued mixture of Association issues with local 
politics is disruptive to the Association and therefore prejudicial to socio-economic 
development. Regarding the first point, Lindoval compared the settlements history with 
those of MST settlements: "If we had to fight [for the land], I would be the only one left -
no! even I would run." 
Land: The land purchase took place on September 18, 1998. The purchase price 
was RS254.48 per ha, for a total of R$ 172,355.04 total. SAT funds were R$ 186,500, and 
SIC R$313,209.60. 
Land payments are made by the Association from sale of products from the 
collective area. At the time of our visit, four payments had been made. Only two 
interviewees mentioned land payments as one of their chief worries. 
Sixteen of the households interviewed said that their land was good/fertile. Two 
said it was fair, one of these pointing out that it needs a lot of fertilizer. Four 
interviewees said that their land is weak or very weak. These statistics coincide with Jose 
Eduardo's observation that 4-6 of the farm lots have poor soil. 
Only two families are using exclusively organic fertilizer: Jose Vincente and 
Hilda, and Raimundo and Gedilsa. Raimundo noted that natural fertilizer is expensive. 
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According to Jose Eduardo, the land is good for raising fruit (oranges, passion 
fruit, coconut, papaya, watermelon, cashew, jackfruit, mango) as well as pepper, okra, 
corn, beans, and manioc. 
Jose Batista, one of the new settlers from Sergipe, found that the land he took 
over had been abandoned. It was weak land - half of his acreage was especially weak. 
He applied fertilizer three times, and he also kept the trees on the land. "It is getting 
better;" he says that his land went from being the worst in the settlement to being "one of 
the ten best areas." Anucieta, his wife, stated succinctly: "The land was dead - now it is 
alive."368 
Israel, one of the founders, stated that his land is weak. His parents own land 
nearby and he farms 8 tarefas on their land, which he says does not require fertilizer. He 
is using chemical fertilizer on his settlement land to try to improve the soil. 
Financing: Forty-five of the fifty settlement families took out PRONAF A loans. 
All the families interviewed except one (see below) received this financing. The amount 
was approximately R$9000, intended for the planting of orange groves (approximately 3 
ha per family). The loan was signed in late 2002, and the first parcel disbursed in March 
2003 for preparing the land. An Association commission was sent to Sergipe, where they 
purchased 65,000 saplings; they also purchased 20 sacks of fertilizer for each sapling. 
Subsequent disbursements were made in the second and third years to maintain the 
orange groves, but the bank made an error in the third year and disbursed only R$1000 
per settler rather than R$ 1800. 
368 We visited a farm lot that had clearly been almost abandoned, and were informed that the new owner 
was in the process of recuperating it. 
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The first installment of PRONAF A loans was to come due in December, 2006. 
There are seven installments of R$1300 each, or R$780 with a 40% rebate if the 
installments are paid in a timely manner. Walmir, the president of the Association, 
estimates that 70% of those owing will not be able to make timely payment. 
Five interviewees listed payment of the debt as their chief worry. Jose Ribeiro 
stated that the directors were trying to get the first payment, due in December 2006, 
postponed until 2007; if the paper work is not processed, the settlers will lose the rebate 
(for timely repayment) and then he believes "nobody will have conditions to pay." 
However, he believed that, if the payment is postponed until 2007, many will be able to 
pay. Walter also believed that, once orange groves reach full production, it will be 
sufficient to pay the debt. 
Although others did not indicate PRONAF payments as a chief worry, it may still 
be a matter of some concern. In a joint interview, Irindi stated that she was more worried 
about PRONAF payments than here husband, to which he responded: "Who isn't worried 
about this?" 
With respect to additional financing, Lucia - a former treasurer of the 
Association, no longer resident in the settlement - attempted to get together a group of 
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women to apply for PRONAF-Mulher, but was unable to do so. Two teenage children 
of settlers, both of whom studied at the Escola Agricola, obtained PRONAF-Jovem 
loans. 
369 Interveiw with Benone, March 29, 2006. 
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Jose Eduardo has also encouraged settlers to become members of the Credit 
Cooperative in Inhambupe, which will facilitate taking out smaller loans for agricultural 
projects. However, only about six settlers had become members at the time of our visit. 
Production and Income: Although the contract was signed in 1998, Moita 
Redonda was not actually settled until 2001, which places it in practice among the newer 
settlements studied. It has also suffered a high rate of turnover. PRONAF funds were 
disbursed in early 2003, and production has been slowed by drought and other factors. 
The PRONAF financing was for planting of orange trees. All of the households 
we interviewed except one370 received PRONAF financing and had orange groves, in 
most cases around three ha, although two homesteaders noted that they had planted 
additional orange trees at their own expense.371 
Because of the high turnover, many of the new families inherited orange groves 
(and PRONAF debt) from earlier settlers. In some cases, the inherited orange trees had 
not been well taken care of - either due to neglect by previous owners or to lag time 
between owners. Raimundo Rodrigues, who moved onto the land in 2005, stated that he 
had "saved" the orange trees abandoned by the prior owner. Three other new settlers, 
Jose Batista, Walter, and Reninho also mentioned that the orange groves they inherited 
from earlier settlers were in poor condition. 
The orange groves that did receive adequate care are mature enough to have 
begun production. Fifteen of the twenty-four families interviewed reported some income 
from the sale of oranges. Jose Vincente and Hilda had significant production, selling 3 
370 The exception was Neia and her husband; they do not have orange trees; they had been on the land three 
years, had planted 3000 passion fruit vines, one tarefa of papaya, and one tarefa of lemons. 
371 According to Olga, some orange trees were planted as early as June, 2001. The majority, however, were 
planted only after PRONAF financing became available. 
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tons in 2005 at R$100 each; already in 2006 they had sold 4 tons at R$150, one ton at 
R$180, and (the day before we arrived) 1700 kgs (1.7 tons) for R$350, 2006 to-date 
orange income for them totaling R$1140. Neide and her husband sold 5 tons of oranges 
in 2005, Olga 2 tons, Pipio 1 ton. The others settlers sold smaller amounts, often 
relatively insignificant as sources of income. Many of these sold by the 30 kg crate 
rather than by the ton. 
A more significant source of income for at least three families was passion fruit. 
Altogether, thirteen of the interviewed families had significant plantings of passion fruit, 
ranging from 100 to 3000 vines, but only six families mentioned income from sales. 
Again, Jose Vincente and Hilda were one of the biggest producers, selling in 2005 10,000 
kgs at between R$0.60 and 0.80 - income of between R$6000 and 8000 - notably more 
than their income from oranges.372 Another settler, Jose Batista, who had been on the 
land a little less than a year, planted 1000 vines of passion fruit and stated that he lived 
off the passion fruit, averaging R$150/week in sales. Walmir, who also has 1000 vines, 
stated that, during 2005, he sold an average of 200 kg a week at R$ 0.30-0.50. However, 
he noted that, because of the drought, production this year is not even 20% of what it was 
in the prior year. 
Jose Ribeiro noted that he had previously had passion fruit, but gave it up. He 
found it to be "a lot of work" and needed significant inputs - stakes, wire, and fertilizer. 
He now plants pepper, which he sells at R$3 per kg. He is also retired with a government 
pension, and his wife earns a salary as a school teacher. 
372 Neia, who with her husband, has the largest planting of passion fruit (3000 vines) simply stated that they 
had sold passion fruit but did not tell us the quantity sold or the price. 
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The only other commercial plantings of fruit were relatively small areas: lemon (1 
tarefa), coconut (maximum 1 ha),373 cashew (50 trees), papaya (1000 plants), and 
watermelon (maximum 1 ha). Except for watermelon (see below), no income from these 
was reported. On house lots, most settlers had a number of fruit trees, including mango, 
guava, pinha, banana, jack-fruit, acerola, avocado, seringuela, and sugar cane. 
The third significant source of agricultural income was manioc. Sixteen families 
plant manioc, some small amounts, most around 1 ha, the largest being Cecilia and her 
husband with 3 ha. Eleven families reported earnings from manioc, Cecilia's being the 
most significant - 8 tons sold in 2005 at R$80 per ton - for a total of R$640. Daci sold 5 
tons at R$ 100 each to an intermediary truck. Benival sold 2-3 tons, Pipio sold 1 ton, and 
Pedro Xavier sold lA ton. 
Jose Vincente, who was 62 and retired at the time of our visit, but also one of the 
most productive farmers, did something that we have not seen anywhere else in our 
study. He had a sharecropper work his 1 ha of manioc land. The crop resulted in 60 
sacks of manioc flour, of which Jose Vincente's share was 30; he sold 10 at R$20 each 
and kept 20. 
The only other significant income from manioc was earned by Lindoval, who 
owns a non-mechanized casa de farinha. where he charges 10 litres of manioc flour for 
every 60 kg sack processed. Lindoval was a farmhand resident on the fazenda before it 
was purchased, and has lived on the land since 1982. He received R$8000 in severance 
pay, and says it is this that has sustained his family. A jovial man of 46, he heads an 
373 Marcos Silva also tried planting coconuts, but they failed. He was not sure whether it was the seedlings 
he purchased or the land in which they were planted that caused the problem. 
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enormous family (at least 16 persons374), officially divided into two households, although 
essentially living as one.375 He and his children farm the land and also have staked out a 
20 tarefa area on a neighboring abandoned farm that has been invaded by landless 
workers. In this latter area they run a brick-making facility which earns them R$500-600 
per month "when everyone [in the family] works," and have 40 banana trees from which 
they sell 50 caixas a month at R$30. He has a triturator (agricultural shredder) that he 
uses to make fertilizer and animal ration from manioc stalks and castor oil plants. 
Settlers recorded small earnings from other crops. The most significant in terms 
of income is beans; nine interviewed families sold some beans, the largest seller earning 
R$440 in 2005 from sale of beans. Ten families sold corn, the largest selling 30 sacks at 
R$23 (a total of R$690), but most selling only a few sacks at low prices. Coho sold one 
ton of watermelon at CEASA for R$230; Dudu sold 1000 watermelon in 2005 (he did not 
recall the price). Other settles sold small quantities of peanuts, peppers, cowpeas, and 
squash. Most of the families raise vegetables for consumption. Hilda and Jose Vicente 
are planning to plant 1 ha of okra. 
None of the families interviewed reported significant income from sale of 
livestock. Five families have chickens, the largest flock being Lindoval's (50). Four 
have pigs: Jose Ribeiro has six, Lindoval five. Two have cows; a third, Antonio Alves 
Santos, has a herd of five cows and a bull, which he keeps on his son's land outside of the 
settlement area. Jose Batista said that he intends to raise sheep if he can obtain 
permission to graze them on collective land. 
374 He named 16 in the interview, but later mentioned they had 23 in the household. 
375 This allows them to draw two bolsa familias. 
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Seven families have at least one horse, mule, or donkey. Four of these have carts. 
Pipio mentioned that carting freight was a significant part of his income; Jose da 
Concei^ao charges R$5 for freighting within the settlement area. 
Four families reported that their men work as daily farm laborers up to eight days 
a month at a wage of R$12/day. Of these Pedro Xavier, who is single, hires out 
exclusively to neighbors in the settlement. A certain prejudice against this form of 
earning was reflected by Anuncieta, who was happy that her husband "does not have to 
be humiliated by working in the fields of others."376 Joseneide's husband drives the 
Association tractor, earning R$15/day. Lucineia's husband occasionally works as a 
driver for his father-in-law's tractor in Entrocamento. 
Fourteen of the families interviewed received bolsas escola/familia.. Five families 
have members who receive retirement pensions. Dominga Silva earns a salary as a 
teacher. Raimundo Rodrigues works (part time) as a barber in Entrocamento. Anuncieta 
who, prior to moving to the settlement, sold embroidery as artisan work in Aracaju (the 
capital of Sergipe), has identified three other women in the settlement who do embroidery 
and intends to carry forward with that activity. One settler, not interviewed, borrowed 
money from the Credit Cooperative to open a small store in the settlement, but was 
reportedly having difficulty repaying the loan. 
Other non-farm income is trivial. Jose Batista and Anuncieta resell bread. 
Walter's wife earns R$20/month selling clothing and costume jewelry. Israel's daughter 
earns R$10 doing odd jobs (biscates). 
376 We encountered this feeling among small farmers when we worked in Tocantins; a farmer who needed 
to work for pay (as opposed to trading work days) on the land of others, was often pitied as either going 
through hard times or not able to succeed on his own land. 
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Sufficiency of Income: In considering settler attitudes toward sufficiency of income and 
overall satisfaction, it is important to realize that some of the settlers interviewed are very 
new to the community, have not yet been officially recognized as settlers, and have not 
yet been able to fully develop their agricultural plots. Even for more established settlers, 
this is a transitional period between intense government involvement, with SIC and 
PRONAF A programs, and full agricultural production, as orange groves are not yet fully 
mature. It has also been a period of drought. 
Raimundo and Gedilsa, are newcomers from Sergipe, Adventists, and have been 
on the land about a year. They seem to be a highly motivated young couple - both are 
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intelligent and articulate (she has a complete 8 grade education, which makes her one of 
the more educated settlers). He is a trained barber, and supplements their income by 
barbering in Entrocamento. Their home is neat and clean, with a TV, a CD stand, 
comfortable sofas, a framed photograph of their daughter, a nice hutch in the kitchen. 
They have noted the lack of means of sustenance in the community. "The last seven 
months, people who didn't have an income suffered." 
When asked whether income is sufficient, ten of the twenty-four families 
interviewed answered in the negative. 
"It doesn't make it. The oranges don't produce income. They only serve to 
maybe pay the [PRONAF] debt." (Dudu) 
Three households answered positively. In one household, the husband answered 
positively, the wife negatively. 
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"Yes - up until now [it has been sufficient]" (Jose Vicente) 
"No - because there are many mouths to feed and other things [to buy]" (Hilda) 
Other responses were more nuanced: 
"It depends on the year - [you] save from one year to the next." (Bernival) 
"Sometimes yes, sometimes no." (Neia) 
"It serves for the household, but not for the field [i.e. agricultural expenses]" 
(Raimundo) 
"At times it doesn't do - we have to economize, sell bread, use the bolsa 
familia." (Jose Batista) 
Three families mentioned the importance of the bolsa familia/escola in meeting their 
economic needs. "It's slow - if it weren't for the bolsa escola we wouldn't make it" 
(Lindoval) But Cecilia noted that the bolsa only serves to buy one week of food ( "fazer 
uma feira "), and that they depend on help from relatives. One other family also noted 
that they received help from relatives. 
Lindoval sounded a note that reflects a general concern with the program. He stated 
that family income was good as long as the government program was in place (SIC, 
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PRONAF A). Now it is "sufficient to eat, but not to buy meat." He noted that in this 
year (2006) there would be no additional government investment. "It will be difficult. 
The oranges are not [yet] producing - it is going to be tight." About his own situation (he 
has at least sixteen in his household) he joked: "R$200 for our family is only one fava 
bean." 
Settler Attitudes: 
Satisfaction: 27 of the interviewees stated definitely that they would not sell or 
trade their land.377 Maria Angelina said she would think of trading only if the other land 
were much better: "We don't want to throw away what is ours." Irandi stated that she 
and her husband had thought of selling but had decided against it. 
"Don't even think about it! My dream has been to have a place [land] to work" 
(Walmir) 
"No way!" (Liazinho) 
"No - we struggled to make it better here." (Joseneide) 
"We didn't buy to sell." (Olga) 
377 Pedro Xavier, who is single, also said he was not thinking of selling, although he is widely rumored to 
be thinking of leaving. 
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Raimundo and Gedilsa Rodrigues, the couple who expressed deep worry because 
they have not yet been legally recognized as owners, said that they would sell if they 
knew that they could buy land in another area. Lindoval expressed the same sentiment 
(he previously had 80 tarefas of land in another area that he bought in 2001 for R$3400 
and sold for R$9000). Jose Ribeiro said that he had not previously thought of leaving, 
but might do so because of the technical advisor. Israel, the treasurer of the 
Association, who was criticized by some (and supported by others) for trying to enforce 
Association rules, said that he was thinking of leaving; he and his wife stated they saw 
many wrong things happening. 
Twenty-nine interviewees said that life was better (or much better) on the 
settlement than it had been previously. 
"What we harvest is ours - before we worked harder and harvested less" 
(Marcos Silva) 
"Every year we have beans, [sweet] potatoes, manioc." (Maria Reis) 
Jose and Josefa Correia qualified their satisfaction by saying that, although life was 
better, they now have more worries. Irandi said that they passed through many 
difficulties, but that it was beginning to get better. Raimundo and Gedilsa, Jose Ribeiro 
378 Jose Ribeiro was very angry with Jose Eduardo. This may have been in part because Jose Ribeiro's 
son's application to take over one of the vacancies in the settlement was denied and/or for political reasons. 
Jose Ribeiro is closely tied to the prefeita Simone; while his daughter is reportedly a very good teacher, her 
appointment as a municipal teacher was made by Simone. Jose Eduardo has attempted to help settlement 
leaders resist pressure from Simone, e.g., with respect to making further payments to finish the well that is 
not on settlement land. 
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and Dominga, and Walter all felt that it was neither better nor worse than where they had 
been previously. Lindoval, who has been on the land (as an employee of the former 
owner) since 1982, stated: "It was better [now] for me because I know how to live here -
but for the others it had to be difficult." 
Anuncieta, who with her husband Jose Batista, arrived relatively recently in the area, 
said that on the first day she didn't like it here. They had moved from a village in 
Sergipe where they had a new, bigger house, and which had "everything" - such as paved 
streets. But she thinks it is better here because they have their own land, because her 
husband does not have to work on land that belongs to others (he previously had only 2 
tarefas of land, so also had to hire out as a day laborer). 
Future: Most interviewees were optimistic about the future. Seven settlers 
specifically mentioned expectations of increased orange production within the next two 
years: 
"We'll be selling more than 10 tons of oranges. [There will be] more comfort in 
the home." (Walmir) 
Two settlers mentioned expectations of increased passion fruit production, and eight 
increases in crops generally. 
"It will be the double of today." (Jose Concei<?ao) 
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"I believe that, if it rains, it will be better - [but] lack of fertilizer will be a 
problem." (Lindoval) 
One settler was notably pessimistic about the future: 
"The way it's going, it's going to be worse. If new [Association] directors 
enter, it could get better. In two years, none of the old settlers will be left." 
(Jose Ribeiro)379 
Other interviewees expressed concern about the Association and divisions within 
the community, but in no other cases did such concern override essential optimism about 
the future of the settlement. 
With respect to the longer term future of the families, few of the families voiced a 
desire for their children to remain on the land. Benival expressly stated that he does not 
expect his children to remain in the country. Other interviewees expressed desires that 
their children could study for a profession, would get jobs, perhaps be a teacher. Jose 
Batista and Anuncieta want their children to study for a career - which could be in 
agriculture or something else - but which will get them a job. Only Jose Concei9ao said 
that he wants his children to understand that, if they help, the land he has will be worth 
double what it is today. And Lindoval - who has a large family - stated that his lot is 
only sufficient for two families - he needs more land for his children as they grow up. 
379 As noted above, Jose Ribeiro's son was not selected as an applicant for one of the openings that 
occurred in the settlement, and Jose Ribeiro was angry about this. 
Gedilsa - who is in her twenties - stated that "In the city everything is difficult.... We 
will stay in the countryside." 
Socio-Political Awareness: The level of political socio-political awareness was, as in 
many of the other settlements, what one would respect from Northeastern rural Brazilians 
who are not active in political parties or social movements. To the question of who is for 
or against the rural worker, most interviewees had either no answer or very general ones. 
Sixteen interviewees stated that Lula and/or the government were on the side of the rural 
workers. Three interviewees mentioned that the rural workers unions are for workers, 
and one mentioned cooperatives. Jose Ribeiro made the observation that the workers 
help themselves; Coho similarly said that "we ourselves" help the rural worker. 
Most interviewees either knew nothing of the MST or had only seen about it on 
television. At this time, TV Globo, the dominant station and the only one available in 
most rural areas, had focused on negative stories about the MST, and this was reflected in 
answers. Thirteen interviewees had negative opinions of the MST, three had mildly 
favorable opinions, and Neide stated: "If it weren't for the violence, they would be great 
(otimo)." Some other comments: 
"A lot of fear, death - if it were I, I wouldn't go with them. I doubt that they are 
really after land." (Walter) 
"Invasion doesn't work. It's better to buy [the land]." (Jose da Concei^o) 
"Negotiation is better." (Edivaldo) 
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Most settlers rejected the MST strategy of "invading" land. Benival and Israel both 
compared this strategy to grilagem. 
More telling were the comments of those who did have experience with the MST. 
Raimundo Rodrigues participated for four years in the MST in Sergipe and identifies 
with the Workers Party (PT); he stated that the MST "is only talk - it was a failure." Jose 
Batista was in an MST camp for two years - he came to believe that their strategy of 
invasion was wrong and left. 
Respecting politics, 27 respondents voted for Lula in the last election, and four for 
Serra. Interestingly, in three households, the husband voted one way, the wife another. 
In the next election, twenty said they were voting for Lula, and six were undecided. Only 
two interviewees expressed strong national party identification, both with the PT. Jose 
Batista and Anucieta expressly stated that they support Lula himself, not the PT. 
Strengths/Vulnerabilities/Recommendations: 
We visited Moita Redonda at a time of considerable tension - the Association had 
just held a meeting in which an attempt was made to unseat the treasurer. This 
highlighted several underlying issues - the off-site artesian well and the role of local 
politics (the Municipal Secretary of Agriculture was pressuring for the treasurer's 
resignation), but also the issue of obeying the by-laws (the treasurer was an advocate of 
strict enforcement) and the question of old v. new settlers. Some of the new settlers felt 
that the treasurer was against them, although his resistance seems to be aimed more at 
strictly enforcing the rules of Association acceptance rather than any antipathy to the new 
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settlers themselves, whom he respected for being rule-abiding and paying their monthly 
fees. 
Certainly this settlement experienced more internal conflict than any other 
settlement we studied. Political interference may be partially responsible for this, 
especially insofar as political influence caused the presence of early settlers who did not 
have an appropriate background or motivation for rural settlement life. Attrition always 
takes a toll, and in this case it seems to have been more rancorous than usual; many of the 
families who left failed to care for their land, did not perform their share of collective 
work, and left owing the Association monthly payments. 
There are indications that the prefeita was essentially responsible for organizing 
the Moita Redonda Association. To the extent this was the case, it touches on concerns 
of critics of the Cedula da Terra (and other market based land reform) programs that local 
politicians will form paper associations for primarily electoral purposes. However, 
whatever its origins, the resulting Association in Moita Redonda has not turned out to be 
a paper association. Although flawed in many respects, the Association is an active body 
capable of reaching conclusions contrary to the wishes of the prefeita. Immediate 
emotions aside, the problems of the Association - administration of the collective lands, 
difficulty collecting dues and utility payments, problems with the tractor - are pretty 
much the standard problems that most associations face. 
Indeed, in actual practice, the 70-80% estimated participation in collective work is 
higher than some other associations. And the Association has shown ingenuity in 
developing solutions to problems - leasing out grazing land for income, and then 
bringing the lease to a successful close when other income starts to become available; 
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coming up with an innovative concept for raising passion fruit on collective land with 
voluntary participation accompanied by corresponding rewards. 
But divisions within the community could paralyze Association leadership and 
hamper the Association from moving forward with the organizational process necessary 
to carry the settlement further along the road to sustainability. A settlement of this size 
should be actively engaged in thinking of ways of leveraging its produce through 
commercializing and processing crops. A great deal will depend on how the Association 
invests the remaining SIC funds, and whether it is able to go beyond those funds into 
other development projects. 
Certainly one key element to getting the community working together is the 
registration and official recognition of the new settlers and their integration into the 
community; we note that Walmir and Israel were taking steps to effect this. Community 
organization and/or facilitation by a neutral outside party might help the community to 
come to terms with some of the factors that currently divide it. Another factor of key 
importance is the adoption of the new regulations which will allow non-titleholding 
spouses to become full members of the Association, allowing the Association to draw on 
the talents and ability of the women who are now essentially excluded. 
Economically, with the end of the drought period and the maturing of the orange 
groves, there is good reason to believe that settler income will substantially increase. It is 
unlikely that most settlers would be able to make the December 2006 PRONAF payment, 
but the chances of getting that repayment extended, especially in light of the drought, are 
reasonably high. Once orange production increases, loan repayment should be more 
feasible. Orange and passion fruit harvests from the collective area should be adequate to 
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cover land payments, and these may be supplemented by a collective flock of sheep and 
other income. 
One serious area of concern, however, is the monoculture of orange groves; 
monoculture both makes plant diseases more likely and more devastating when they 
occur. It also exposes settlers to fluctuations in the orange market. In order to help 
hedge against these risks, we would recommend continued production of passion fruit 
and the consideration of additional possible cash crops. 
An additional concern is the attitude of settlers toward the ecological area. Not 
only is this troublesome in that it shows a lack of concern with that area, but it throws a 
light onto the question of whether settlers are really aware of the complexity and 
interlinking of natural systems. An understanding of ecology is vital for any farmer to 
achieve sustainability, and especially so in a vulnerable, semi-arid climate. 
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Case Study 5 
Name of Settlement: Passos de Esperan^a - Associa^ao Desenvolimento Rural 
Passos de Esperanija (Footsteps of Hope Rural Development 
Association) 
Families in Settlement: 30 
Location: Municipio - Olindina 
Area: 450 ha. 
Contract Date: December 28, 2001 
Dates Visited: March 27-28, 2006 
Number Interviewed - Households: 19 Individuals: 33 
Family size (persons): 1-3/2; 4-6/10; 7-9/5; 10+/2 
Persons Interviewed: 16 men, 16 women, 1 youth (female 13 years old) 
Ages: -20/1; 20-29/6; 30-39/8; 40-49/10; 50-59/7; 60+/1 
Schooling: 0-2/19; 3-5/10; 6-8/3; in HS/1 (21 yr old daughter) 
Note: In six households interviewed, the wife had significantly (3+ 
years) more education than the husband; in the remainder of the 
homes, the educational level of husband/wife were roughly equal. 
Technical Assistants: Sergio Ricardo Matos Almeida and Edna Moreira de Brito 
Batista of TECPLATA, both interviewed March 27, 2006 
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Map V-5-A - Passos de Esperan^a settlement area sketched onto a pre-existing map 
of the property. Environmental reserves are located at the southern tip and along the 
eastern border, and the collective area in the southwest. 
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I * 
Figures V-5-A and V-5-B. Above: meeting with Passos da Esperan«?a settlers in the 
village school. Below: settlers in front of school following the meeting. 
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Geography: The settlement is located in the semi-arid Northeast region of the State 
of Bahia, 25 km. from the town of Olindina: 20 km south along paved federal 
highway BR110 (two kilometers south of a highway-based village called Dona 
Maria), and 5 km west of the highway by dirt road. 
Each of the landholding families has a dwelling lot in the agro-vila (20 x 37m) 
and a farm lot of 9 ha. (according to local calculations, approximately 20.66 
tarefasm) About 20% of the land is in two collective areas - one area of 60 ha. 
located on the southeast of the settlement, and one of 30 ha. located in the southwest 
near the larger of the two ecological reserves. 
One enters the community through a wide gate. The main street lies straight 
ahead, and a secondary street - on which the school and association headquarters are 
located - parallels it to the east. Both are dirt streets - and the secondary street 
develops a huge puddle of water after rain. 
The agro-vila was designed by an outside expert from Feira de Santana. We 
were told by community leaders that, if they were to do it over, they would have 
wider streets and would put the school in another location. 
Some fields are fairly distant from the agro-vila. For instance, Jose 
Nascimento's field is about 1 km. from his home; he owns a motorbike to get there. 
Climate: The region is classed by IBGE as semi-arid, with the natural growth 
ranging from cerrado to caatinga. Our visit here coincided with the end of an eight 
380 The settlers here use the Bahian tarefa 
hectare. 
- 4,356 M2 - and roughly calculate it at 2.3 tarefas per 
327 
month drought period. We were told that this was the first serious drought in sixteen 
years - although there had been a shorter one in 1993. (Joselito) 
History: Within three kms of the settlement is the village of Gameleira, and beyond 
that the older land reform areas of Colonia Roberto Santos. The Colonia (as it is 
called locally) was formed through invasion of vacant land381 in the mid 1980s, 
principally by settlers from Sergipe, and was eventually administered by INCRA. 
When the Cedula da Terra program was announced, meetings were held in 
Gameleira with the support of a state legislator, Aderbal Fontes Caldas, sparking the 
interest primarily of adult children of the settlers in the Colonia. Many joined the 
Rural Workers Union (STR). One of the original settlers in Passos de Esperan9a, 
Americo dos Santos, was president of the STR from 1997 to 2005 and is currently its 
treasurer; he still lives in the settlement and was interviewed. 
In 1998 the Association was formed to try to locate land. The primary leader 
of the group and first president of the Association was Anselmo, who later became 
one of the original settlers of Passos de Esperan^a (although he no longer lives there). 
Railda Dantas Oliveira learned of the program and entered into it, as she said, "body 
and soul." She became voluntary secretary of STR in 1998.382 She told us that 10-12 
of the original sixty Association members now live in the settlement - some others 
381 According to Americo, the land had been fenced in and claimed by a company that had no legal 
right to it. They planted pine trees, but then abandoned the land. The Sergipanos invaded this land and 
occupied it. As most of the settlers in Passos come from this area, this is interesting background. 
382 Edna, the tecnica, stated that Railda is "a natural leader." Interview March 27, 2006. Our 
observations tended to confirm this. 
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went to other settlement areas. Dona Edna, the tecnica, accompanied them the whole 
way - she is their "godmother." 
In 2000 the Association located the land, and purchased it on December 28, 
2001. The landowner,383 who had approached the tecnicos (Sergio Ricardo and Edna) 
about the possibility of selling his land, wanted to sell 500 ha., but INCRA only 
agreed to buying 450, so they had to diminish the area of each settler. The land cost 
R$ 130,000. 
The initial settlement included some families from the city of Olindina whom 
Dona Edna recommended. All of these families left the settlement and were largely 
replaced by families from the Colonia, many of them relatives of Colonia families 
already in the settlement. 
Demography: The settlers were almost entirely of Sergipano stock and background. 
Almost all of them had roots in the nearby older settlement area, Colonia Roberto 
Santos,385 located around the nearby village of Gameleira. 
All but four of the interviewees classed themselves as being of rural origin. 
The four who classed themselves as "urban" were women; one of these had moved to 
a rural area when she was sixteen years old. Before moving to the settlement, six of 
the men were rural day laborers (although one of these also said he was an 
383 The landowner, Glaudson Jose de Almeida Chagas, was from Sergipe. According to Josefa, many 
of the people from Gameleira worked for him on his land; he was a "good person" and paid his 
workers "certinho" (i.e., the right amount at the time it was due). 
384 Edna stated that she was impressed by the attrition rates: "What are these people thinking [when 
they enter onto the land]?" Sergio Ricardo noted that "99% of urban people don't work out - the 
problem is learning to survive on the land." Ultimately, he pointed out, there is a process of self-
selection. 
385 People from this Colonia also were among the founding and new settlers at Moita Redonda. 
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electrician), three were sharecroppers, two were employed farm hands, one a 
cowhand, one a rural security guard, and one worked his parents' land. Two had 
previously had small landholdings of their own, but had lost them. 
Race/Ethnicity: White, Afro-Brazilian 
Gender: Four women are titleholders. One of them, Railda, was Secretary of 
the Association from 2001-2005 (and is currently Secretary of the Rural 
Workers' Union); she holds a leadership role that goes beyond formal offices. 
Religion: All of the interviewees were Catholic except for two women - one 
Adventist and one Evangelical Protestant. A number of Catholics attend mass 
in Gameleira (2-3 km distance). There is no chapel in the settlement. 
Age: Eighteen of the thirty-three interviewees were in their thirties or forties, 
and this seemed representative of the settlement. Key leader Railda was 40, 
and directory members ranged in age from 38 to 55. 
Attrition: In the initial stages, there was considerable attrition, and only about 
a third of the present settlers are from the original group. Vacancies were 
filled primarily through family connections, so that there are many related 
families presently in the settlement. Six of the fifteen families we interviewed 
were original settlers. Most of the others arrived fairly early, the most recent 
in January 2005 (a little over a year prior to our visit). 
Education: There is a school in the settlement that teaches pre-school through 4th 
grades. It has 46 students in the morning session, and 21 adult students at night. The 
school building is owned by the Association, the teachers are provided by the 
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municipio. The school has two classrooms, bathrooms, and office and a cantina 
(small kitchen). The school building is in good condition, with ceramic flooring, 
good quality desk-chairs, blackboards, large open windows. The rooms are light and 
airy. There were a few pictures drawn by students on the walls. 
Twelve respondents stated that the school is good to very good (one said 
excellent). Two thought that it is so-so ( "mais ou menos "). One simply stated that it 
is simple ("simples ") - a term roughly translatable as "nothing fancy." 
Approximately six 5th through 8th graders from the settlement study in the 
nearby village of Dona Maria. For 8th grade and beyond, students go into the town of 
Olindina. Dessiene, 13, is one of these; she said that she enjoys going to school in 
Olindina - fifteen students go there together on the bus. 
Health: There is a health agent who lives in the neighboring area of Gameleira (3 
kms. distance) and who comes once a month to the settlement. She performs some 
basic services, such as weighing the children and checking for dengue fever, and 
marks appointments for settlers to visit the doctor. There is a health post in Dona 
Maria. The nearest pharmacy is in Olindina. 
Three respondents stated that the health agent herself is good, although one 
felt that she was limited ("muito devagar"); Americo noted that she is overworked. 
However, most of the respondents felt that the health system itself is mediocre to 
terrible. 
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Water: There was an artesian well on the land when it was purchased; it is currently 
owned and operated by the Association. The municipality donated 600 meters of 
pipe. Americo told us the pipe is too thin (affecting the flow of water). However, the 
settlers themselves installed the piping through a mutirao and now receive water in 
houses. Previously they had to fetch it from a central tank (tanque). 
The water tower holds 10,000 liters. Water is pumped into it from a diesel 
driven pump (the electric company did not yet installed the 3 phase electrical 
necessary for an electric pump). 
Although there is running water for the settler's vegetable gardens on their 
house lots, there is no water piped to the fields for irrigation. Irrigating the fields has 
been discussed; it would entail extending water pipes or hosing to faucets on the 
agricultural lots. Josenito, a member of the Fiscal Council, stated that he thought 
such irrigation was not feasible, but other settlers cited irrigation as one of the goals 
of the community. 
Association and Collective Area: The Association meets weekly on Mondays, and 
attendance was reported to be good. Members pay monthly dues of R$5. Several 
interviewees stated that they thought attendance at meetings to be important. 
Interviewees generally stated that there was not significant dissension within the 
community, and that matters were discussed in meetings and - when no consensus 
was reached - voted on. In each Association election, there has been only one set of 
candidates. 
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Women generally attend the meetings, and nine of the women interviewed 
listed themselves as being "very active" in the Association. Marivalda, wife of 
former President Edilson, stated that it is good that the wives participate, and that 
386 
many women think this way. Holding office is limited to women titleholders: 
Railda was secretary of the Association, 2001-2005, and Josefina was currently 2nd 
Secretary. Railda stated that she finds the men to be more united than the women, 
and that the women participate less than the men do. 
Of the men interviewed, nine were members who had held no officer 
positions, although all said that they attended meetings, and several mentioned 
working in collective projects, paying dues, and generally participating. Of the 
others, Edilson had been president (2002-2004), Jose Pereira is currently vice 
president, Americo is treasurer, one had been vice secretary, and three members or 
substitute members of the Fiscal Council. 
The collective land is planted with 20 ha each of passion fruit, oranges, and 
cashew. There is also manioc on the collective land. Americo noted that the orange 
trees on the collective land are not being fertilized due to lack of funds. 
An issue in the past was whether a portion of the collective land should be 
devoted to oranges or sheep (oranges prevailed). Another recent issue, peacefully 
resolved, was the gate that was erected at the entrance to the community.387 
386 Her husband agrees: "The two need to participate." (Edilson) 
387 Due to the proximity of the highway, some of the settlers wanted the gate locked at night. Others 
thought that would be inconvenient. The solution found was to lock the gate and provide each family 
with a key. 
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The primary current discussion topic at meetings is the care of the collective 
crops - especially oranges, which require more care than do cashews. Railda stated 
that administration of the collective lands does cause some division. 388 Josenito 
mentioned that the failure of some to participate in the collective work causes 
differences. 
There is a rule that, if a settler misses three work days, he is suspended from 
the Association. However, one settler who was suspended took the matter to court, 
and the judge initially showed signs of supporting his claim. CDA's lawyers are 
fighting the issue and say that legally the settler should not have a case. However, 
there is a sense that the local judge does not understand the nature of the Cedula da 
Terra settlements. 
There are varying opinions as to how funds - including future funds - should 
be spent; currently there are three opinions as to what should be the next investment: 
a tractor, a casa de farinha, or irrigation (water piped to the fields). The disagreement 
is only one as to which of these should come first; most settlers agree that all three are 
desirable. "Tractor, casa de farinha, irrigation - these are our dreams but we don't 
have resources." (Americo) 
Jose Nascimento stated that, "For the time being, it's okay. But [the 
Association] could do more projects." He felt the prior President, Edilson, was more 
active, traveling to Salvador in search of resources. 
388 She also stated that the settlers who arrived later were generally more individualistic than the 
original group that had worked together to form the Association and obtain the land. This is an 
interesting point and is in line with those who believe that the struggle to obtain land may be an 
important factor in community cohesiveness. 
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The Association owns the school. When the school was constructed, R$1600 
was left over in the building fund. The community constructed a covered bus stop on 
the road and the entrance gate. 
The last of the SIC funds - R$48,000 - were paid to COELBA (the state 
electric company) to install electric energy. It is expected that the government will 
reimburse the settlers this cost, in which case they would use the funds either to 
construct a casa de farinha and a casa de mel, or to pipe water to the farm lots.389 
Ecological Area: As required by law, 20% of the land is ecological reserve. This is 
in two parcels - 25 ha. at the eastern edge of the settlement, and 65 ha. along the 
settlement's southern border. Settlers spoke relatively little about the ecological area; 
when they did it was merely to state that it was an area that could not be cleared and 
was important for wild animals. 
Economy: 
Distinguishing Factors: The economy of this settlement is directed at diverse 
fruit raising - principally oranges, cashews, and passion fruit. Manioc is an important 
secondary crop. Livestock is not permitted. 
Land: The land purchase took place on November 13, 2001. The purchase 
price was R$288.88 per ha, for a total of R$130,000. SAT funds were R$143,906.40 
and SIC R$201,645. 
389 Sergio Ricardo, interview of March 27, 2006. Railda believes that the decision will be for the casa 
de farinha. 
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The land cost R$ 130,000 (R$4334 per family). Payments are R$305 annually 
for seventeen years. Most interviewees expressed no concern about land payments. 
390 Income from the collective area is expected to be able to cover those payments, 
although last year the settlers had to contribute a portion from their own pockets. 
Thirteen of the nineteen farmers stated that their land is good. One said that 
part of his is good, part weak. Two said that it is not good. Josenito and Mauricio 
stated that it was not initially good, but is improving with care. 
All of the farmers use fertilizer. "If you don't use fertilizer, you don't harvest 
anything." (Americo) Several use commercial pesticides. Edilson, one of the most 
productive farmers, uses only organic inputs, as do Xiquinho, and Gabriel. Americo 
stated that he would prefer to use organic, but that "it doesn't work fast enough." 
Five of the farmers mentioned that they would like to have more land. "If I 
could arrange for more land, it would be good." (Xiquinho) Edilson, specifically 
mentioned that he could work 15 ha. (he has nine); he hopes that his profits from the 
land will allow him to buy more outside of the settlement area. Gabriel (Bie) stated 
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that the settlers have too little land. The tecnico, Sergio Ricardo, also stated that he 
felt that 9 ha. is insufficient. 
Financing: All of the families interviewed received PRONAF A, which was 
earmarked for planting passion fruit, oranges, and cashews. The amount of the loans 
reported ranged from R$ 13,000 to R$ 15,000, and they were drawn down in three 
390 A possible exception is Gabriel, who stated that he would have to sell something ( "desfazer alguma 
coisa ") in order to make the payments. 
391 "Too little land, too little money - it's not good." (Gabriel) 
392 Interview March 27, 2006 
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installments. The first repayment parcel is due in 2009. Three interviewees included 
repayment among their chief worries. 
According to Sergio Ricardo, the PRONAF A financing was appropriate for 
7-8 has. He stated that the settlement was now ready for a new stage in financing, but 
it had yet to take place. Seven families told us that they intended to take out the 
special PRONAF loans for women (PRONAF MULHER - subsidized loans of 
R$1000 - if paid in a timely manner at the end of the year only R$800 needs to be 
repaid.) Four stated that they would use the loans to plant additional passion fruit, 
one was deciding between passion fruit and beans, and two were undecided. In 
addition, Josefa told us that she and her husband were in the process of obtaining a 
custeio loan to plant manioc, and Edilson stated that he was going to do the same. 
Production and Income: As noted above, the PRONAF A financing was for 
orange, cashew, and passion fruit, and all of the households interviewed had 
commercial plantings of these three fruits. Most families had 2 ha. of orange trees, 
the largest grove being 3 has. Cashew plantations ranged from 1 ha. to 3 has.393 All 
families had 1 -2 has. of passion fruit, except for Edilson, who had 4 has. 
Because passion fruit vines mature more quickly than orange or cashew trees, 
passion fruit was at the time of our visit the major source of income for most of the 
families.394 In 2005, Edilson harvested 16,500 kgs of passion fruit - which he sold at 
R$0.50 - 0.80 per kg. He stated that his 2005 profit from passion fruit was R$3000 -
393 Sergio Ricardo stated that Sergipanos tend to see oranges as the basis of their security, but in fact 
orange markets fluctuate a great deal, and only one in every three to four years is really profitable. The 
big juice factories really set the price. He believes that, in the long run, cashew will be a much more 
important and stable element of settler income. Interview March 27, 2006 
394 Only one farmer mentioned selling small amounts of oranges and cashews. 
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in 2006 he was expecting R$2000 - 3000 per harvest (passion fruit in the area can 
render three to four harvests a year). Mauricio sold 12,000 kg at R$0.50, equaling 
revenue of R$6000. Josenito did not have an annual figure, but said that he sold 
R$200-300 a week when the passion fruit was producing, and that it produced fairly 
continuously during the year. 
Thirteen other families reported 2005 passion fruit sales of between 500 and 
2500 kgs, all sold at R$0.50 - 0.60. The three remaining families sold little or none. 
Sergio Ricardo noted that passion fruit had been providing a constant good price, and 
stated that it guarantees the basic income ("feira ") of most of the families, who are 
able to sell at least small amounts throughout the year. 
Passion fruit is generally sold to middlemen who bring trucks from Salvador, 
Feira de Santana, or Sergipe. Settlers noted that they could get a better price for the 
passion fruit at CEASA - the produce wholesale center in Feira de Santana. 
Increasing production will allow them to institute better selling practices. 
Fifteen of the families have commercial planting of manioc, ranging from 1 -3 
has. In some cases the manioc is planted alongside cashew trees, but most seemed to 
be dedicated fields. Thirteen families reported some income from manioc. 
Manioc is sold in a number of ways. Unharvested manioc may be sold - the 
buyer harvests it and pays for it. Thus, for instance, Xiquinho sold 25 tarefas of 
unharvested manioc for R$120 each, for revenue of R$3000; Denicio and Neide sold 
nine tarefas at R$100; Josefina and her husband earned R$1700 from manioc sold "in 
the land." 
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Harvested manioc may be sold in small quantities or by the truckload. Or it 
may be processed into manioc flour {farinha) and sold by the sack; prices vary 
depending on the market and the quality of the flour, reported price per sack ranging 
R$20 - R$60. Americo was possibly the top earner in this area, selling 60 sacks of 
manioc flour at R$33 each, for revenue of R$l,980.395 Because the settlement does 
not have a casa de farinha, the settlers have to take their manioc either to Gameleira 
or Dona Maria to be processed into flour, and the casas in those localities keep 20% 
of the production in payment for processing. 
Ten families had commercial planting of beans, normally 1-2 has., although 
Railda and Edmundo had 4 has. Josefina and her husband sold 35 sacks of beans at 
R$50, for income of R$ 1,750. The other families sold 20 sacks or less at prices 
ranging from R$45 to R$60. 
Three families had commercial plantings of watermelon. Jose Pereira has had 
3 ha. dedicated to watermelon for the past four years and said the he "harvests a lot." 
He sold 2000 watermelon in 2005, but did not state the price he received (as with 
manioc, the price of watermelon can be affected by whether the farmer or the buyer 
harvests the field.) Josefa and her husband received R$0.20 per melon - they sold 
about 250 melons. 
Railda and Edmundo have 500 papaya (mamao) plants and 500 banana trees. 
She reported that they sell about 30 crates of papaya a week at RS10 a crate. Their 
bananas were almost ready to produce at the time of our visit. 
395 
Settlers also use a manioc by-product (goma) as starch for clothing. Manioc is also used for animal 
ration and its remnants can be used for fertilizer. 
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Most settlers have production of corn, squash, sweet potatoes, and other 
vegetables (green beans, okra, inhame, maxixe, etc.) for consumption. Some sold 
small amounts of these. For instance, Joao Firmo sells squash and watermelon at the 
feira in Olindina. 
All of the settlers interviewed have fruit trees on their house lots, often around 
20-25 of them. In addition to fruits already mentioned, these include avocados, sweet 
limes, lemons, coconut, acerola, mango, graviola, seringuela, pinha, guava, jack fruit, 
persimmons, cacao, and others. 
Livestock raising is not permitted in the settlement. Only two families 
interviewed indicated that they would like to raise livestock.396 We were told that the 
rule extended to raising chickens; however five families have flocks of chickens, 
Railda and Edmundo's flock, with forty chickens, being by far the largest. One 
family has a horse, and Antenio has three sheep that he keeps on his parents' land 
outside of the settlement. 
Only three of the men said that they hire out as daily laborers, earning R$8-12 
a day. A fourth, Edilson (one of the most prosperous farmers), said that he worked as 
a daily laborer until the PRONAF financing enabled him to really invest in his land. 
Unlike some areas, we were told that it was common in this settlement for the women 
to work in the fields.397 
396 Sergio Ricardo pointed out that it is not practical to raise livestock with passion fruit, especially in a 
small area. He believes that it is an illusion for small farmers to think they can depend on livestock for 
a living. Interview March 27, 2006 
397 Although on most subsistence farms in Brazil, everyone in the family helps out in the fields during 
times of peak activity (especially planting and harvest), we found that in Tocantins farm families in 
which the women had to work regularly in the fields were looked upon as being particularly poor - or 
the husbands were looked upon as being shiftless, lazy, incompetent, almost abusive. This attitude 
also seemed to be present in some of the settlements in this study. However, where - as here - the 
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Two men receive retirement pensions. Eight families receive the bolsa 
familia or similar government subsidies, ranging up to R$95/month. Railda, who has 
been the volunteer secretary for the Rural Workers Union in Olindina since 1998, 
began in January, 2006, receiving a salary of R$300/month - she works there 
Tuesdays, Fridays, and Saturday mornings. Josenito's wife is janitor at the school 
and earns R$276/month when school is in session. 
Other non-agricultural income seems to be less here than in some settlements. 
Donice earns an average of R$10/month selling magazines. Antenio resells gas for 
cooking - he sells about six tanks a month. 
Josefa Carvalho mentioned that a primary need of the community is jobs for 
women and youth. Railda mentioned a possible project with passion fruit fiber. 
There are no stores or other commercial enterprises in the settlement. Several 
interviewees mentioned that this made it difficult when they needed to make small 
purchases.398 
Sufficiency of Income: When asked whether income was sufficient, eleven 
households responded positively, six negatively, one said "sometimes," and an older 
settler - who had just started receiving his old age pension three months previously -
said "yes and no" - that it is adequate for him because of the pension. Of the positive 
responses, one noted the dependency of weather, and three indicated that the income 
activity is fruit raising rather than heavy agricultural labor, the attitude may be different. Several 
settlers noted that women are particularly adept at picking the flowers from passion fruit vines - a 
delicate operation necessary to make the vines produce. 
398 When Joao Firmo made this point as a minor complaint, however, his wife, Angelita pointed out 
that, before moving to the settlement, she used to have to buy everything - now she also has something 
to sell. 
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was barely sufficient. Three of the negative respondents said that things are getting 
better as the fruit production increases. 
"Yes - it serves to live very well" (Jose Almeida - but he noted that the 
bolsa escola helps) 
"Yes - Thanks be to God!" (Xiquinho) 
"We get by with what we have" (Gabriel) 
"We make do ( "da um jeitinho ")" (Railda - but her home is a comfortable 
rural middle class home with nice furniture) 
"Something is always lacking - you have to think that way." (Jose Firmo -
but he noted that his passion fruit will produce better this year) 
"It's tight. We do not have good nourishment (alimentagaoy (Americo and 
Martinha - but they felt that this would get better with increased production) 
Railda mentioned that some families have sold all their beans and were now 
finding it hard to get by. Ilsa, who is the janitor at the school, stated that some 
children arrive at school hungry. Her husband, Josenito, noted that this is partly due 
to the drought and especially to its impact on the passion fruit harvest. 
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Settler Attitudes: 
Satisfaction: Settler satisfaction was high. Of the adults interviewed, 29 said 
they would not trade or sell their land - four emphatically.399 One said he would do 
so only if the community became weak. 
"It's our patrimony for securing our daily bread." (Gabriel) 
"Here is to live and to keep for my children" (Jose Almeida) 
Several other settlers also mentioned that their land was for their children. 
Twenty-five of the interviewees stated that life in the settlement was better 
than previously, and for thirteen of these it was much better. None said that it was 
worse. One said that it was about the same. 
Future: Settlers were overwhelmingly optimistic about the future. Many 
envisioned a more abundant future when the fruit trees begin producing in quantity. 
Jose Nascimento pointed out that the greater level of production will not only be good 
in itself, but will enable the community to commercialize its produce more 
effectively. 
Confidence in agriculture as a future for their children was higher in Passos 
than in any other settlement. In response to an open ended question about the future, 
several settlers envision their children continuing to work in agriculture, either in the 
settlement area or on nearby areas. Joao Firmo envisions his children working with 
399 Eurides' statement in response to this question - "Hail Mary - God deliver me" ("Ave Maria - Deus 
me livrel") does not translate well, but shows the depth of her feeling that she would never leave the 
land. 
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him on his land - he notes that they could put up to three more houses on their agro-
vila lot. Edilson also noted that his son (who was then 17) will want his own house -
Edilson has already given each of his children a part of the land for which they are 
responsible, and they each keep the profits from their portions. Railda stated that she 
would not want her children getting jobs in town - that she would want them to stay 
on the land. Joselito says that his sons, now in their twenties, like the land and will 
stay in agriculture. Jose Almeida wants his children to study, but to use their 
education in agriculture. Xiquinho, Jose Almeida, Josefina Carvalho, Americo and 
his wife, Marinha, all mentioned that they wanted their children to have land. Unlike 
most settlements, no one interviewed stated that they wanted their children to get jobs 
and work in the city. 
This situation produces a certain pressure. Edilson mentioned in passing that 
the collective land could be divided up for adult children of settlers, although it is 
difficult to see how this could be accomplished in a fair manner (there would be only 
90 ha of collective land to divide among 30 families). He mentioned that he initially 
thought that 9 has was a lot, but is now realizing that he will need more for his 
children, and hopes that the income from his lots will allow him to buy land for his 
children outside the settlement. Donice and Bolero said they hoped their children 
would form a group to obtain their own land. 
Socio-Political Awareness: When asked who helps the rural worker, 
responses included the Federal Government (7), Lula/the President (6), the Rural 
Workers' Union (4), CDA/CAR/the program (2), other unnamed politicians (2), and 
banks - one specifically mentioning the Banco do Nordeste (2). There was one 
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mention each of the Association, the Coopertive (although nobody in the settlement is 
yet a member), and the prefeito. 
Opinions of the MST were mixed. Of the twelve interviewees who voiced 
opinions, five were favorable. Valdina stated that the MST had a "good idea: they 
pursue [the land] and they get it." Josefina Carvalho said that she thought the 
Movement important because "so many people don't have land to work." Edilson 
stated that the MST benefits thousands of families. 
Six settlers had negative opinions, including two who have above average 
knowledge of rural issues. Americo, president of the Rural Workers' Union, said he 
participated in an MST activity in Salvador, but didn't understand well their program 
objectives. He doesn't approve of invading land, but believes the government should 
require non-productive landowners to either produce or sell. Railda admitted she 
only knows of the MST via television, but questioned whether their real objective is 
to obtain land - if so, she thinks that they are going about it in the wrong way. 
Mauricio stated: "It is right to want land, [but] wrong to invade land." 
In the last election, 25 of the respondents voted for Lula and five for Serra. 
With respect to the next election, 25 intended to vote for Lula and five were 
undecided (interestingly, these five did not include any of the Serra voters, all of 
whom said they planned to vote for Lula). Four families stated strong identity with a 
political party - three with the Workers' Party (PT) and one with the Liberal Front 
Party (PFL) - a conservative party strongly identified in Bahia with the then state 
political boss, Antonio Carlos Magalhaes. 
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Railda noted that, with Lula in office, the rural worker was being helped from 
the top down, as well as from the bottom up. Jose Almeida, who voted for Serra but 
planned in the next election to vote for Lula, stated that Lula is "the only president 
who has helped the small farmer." Edilson agreed: "Now the small [people] are the 
priority" ( "Agora o pequeno e a prioridade. ") 
Strangths/Vulnerabilities/Recommendations: 
Passos de Esperanq;a seems to us to be a highly viable community. Despite 
difficulties of early high attrition, delay in disbursement of PRONAF A funds, and 
drought, and the real need some families were experiencing at the time of our visit, 
settlers showed a high level of satisfaction and optimism with respect to the future. 
This optimism, based on the maturing fruit trees, seemed to us to have a solid basis. 
The resilience of the community is perhaps due in part to the relative 
homogeneity of the current settlers, and their roots in the old land reform area of 
Colonia. Having been raised in a land reform area, the settlers have a realistic set of 
expectations with respect to difficulties and goals. They have also not been very far 
displaced, and are able to maintain friendship and family ties. 
Even taking into account Railda's comment that the new settlers (who 
constitute two-thirds of the community) are more individualistic than the original 
group, it seems to us that the settlers have a relatively high degree of community 
participation. The issue of collective labor, which almost inevitably tends to create 
tensions in most settlements, has arisen but has not yet developed to the point of 
having to seek an alternative solution. Leadership in the settlement seems to be 
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capable, creative, and recognized by the settlers, and divisions in the community 
seem to be minor. Participation of women in the Association is positive, although we 
would recommend that office holding be opened to non-titleholding spouses. 
Technical guidance seems to have been very good. The community has 
avoided monoculture, and has at least four major sources of potential agricultural 
income: oranges, cashews, passion fruit, and manioc. With Sergio Ricardo, we agree 
that the other three crops will be useful in offsetting less profitable years for oranges. 
We also agree that cashews may prove to be the real mainstay for the local economy, 
especially if the community can engage in small-scale processing. 
Cashew processing can be done on a very small scale - even a single family 
can significantly add to its income by processing the nuts. However, both for general 
processing of produce and for commercialization, it would be recommended that 
Passos, as a relatively small community, consider combining efforts with other 
nearby small farmers (in Colonia and elsewhere), to create a larger base for 
operations. (We were informed that the Rural Workers' Union in the municipio has 
over 3500 members, which indicates a strong population of small farmers.) This 
could be carried out through cooperatives, which already exist in the area, or through 
agreements among local associations. 
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Case Study 6 
Name of Settlement: Biritinga ("Assentamento Boa Vista")400 
Families in Settlement: 37 titleholders + 2 houses of non-titleholders 
Location: Municipio - Biritinga 
Area: 807.4 ha. (842.622 ha.) 
Contract Date: June 19, 2001 
Dates Visited: April 18-20, 2006 
Number Interviewed - Households: 21 Individuals: 33 
Family size (persons): 1-3/7; 4-6/12; 7-9/2 
Persons Interviewed: 16 men, 16 women, 1 youth (male 16) 
Ages: -20/2; 20-29/5; 30-39/9; 40-49/9; 50-59/5; 60+/3 
Schooling: 0-2/13; 3-5/14; 6-8/4; one complete HS and one some university 
In most of the families interviewed, husbands and wives were more or 
less equally educated. In two families, the husband had three or more 
years schooling than the wife. One wife (not interviewed) had a 
normal school degree - which allows her to teach school. Jurandi had 
three years of university in mechanical engineering and Josi, his wife, 
has a full high school education. 
Technical Assistant: Sergio Ricardo Matos Almeida of TECPLATA, interviewed 
March 27, 2006 
400 Assentamento Boa Vista (Good View Settlement) is the official name, but "Boa Vista" is such a 
common name among settlement areas that the community is often referred to as "Biritinga." 
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Map V-6-A - Boa Vista (Biritinga) settlement. 
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Figures V-6-D and V-6-E. Settler homes in Boa Vista (Biritinga). 
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Geography: The settlement is located in a semi-arid region approximately 15 kms. 
east of the town of Biritinga via a poorly paved state highway (BA-85),401 and less 
than one km. north of the highway by dirt road. The town of Biritinga, however, is 
very small, and settlers have at least as much contact with the larger town of Serrinha, 
25 km to the west of Biritinga. 
Each settler family has a house lot (15 x 50m) in the agro-vila and a farm lot 
of 11 has. Two months prior to our arrival, the association divided up the collective 
lots (see below) so that each family received an additional 3+ has. of grazing land and 
135 additional cashew trees. The manioc, however, continues to be held collectively. 
The current President of the Association, Antonio Sales de Silva, told us that 
the settlers were not consulted as to the design of the agro-vila. They would have 
preferred larger housing lots. The community has also opened a new street to 
construct houses for grown children of settlers. Two families interviewed complained 
about the distance of their farm lots from their houses (one other family decided to 
live on their farm lot). 
Climate: This area is classed by the IBGE as cerrado arborio aberto - a semi arid 
vegetation type that occurs in the interface between cerrado and caatinga - consisting 
of grasslands interspersed with small twisted trees. 
Our visit to the community was at the tail end of a period of drought. One of 
the older settlers, Lourival Ferreira Lima, summed up the situation well: 
401 There was formerly a bus from Biritinga directly to Salvador that ran on this highway. This was 
convenient for the community, but the bus was discontinued due to the bad quality of the road. 
"Normally it rains well here. But once in awhile we have had these dry 
spells. Usually there are a few thunder showers in the summer, but last 
summer no." 
He noted that, whereas they can usually plant cowpeas, watermelon, and other food 
crops, it was more difficult this year. 
The drought is an underlying theme in the case study. Several settlers 
mentioned losing cashew trees - some as much as 20%, although others almost none 
(the cashew is well adapted to the semi-arid climate). The weather also partially 
explains the relatively low agricultural production. 
History: In 1995, the Association Boa Vista, a group of sixty families led by 
Antonio Cezar Mota de Carvalho (Lila), occupied a 22.000 ha. area called 
Campolandia which had belonged to the Barreto Araujo company but was abandoned. 
However, that settlement had problems as INCRA judged that the land was unsuitable 
for agriculture, and the land was under mortgage to a bank. 
In approximately 2000, Antonio Pedreira Lobo, who had been two terms 
prefeito of the municipio of Biritinga, sought out Lila, who was his childhood friend. 
Lobo had been an unsuccessful candidate for political office, had campaign debts, and 
wanted to sell part of his land to cover them. The portion of land he offered the 
Association was without water. 
By this time the Association had approximately 80 families. Of these, only 
twenty families qualified for the Cedula da Terra program and additional families 
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had to be found.402 Lila and other families began moving onto the land in 2000, 
although the Cedula da Terra land purchase was not effected until June 19, 2001. 
Life was hard during the first several years. Settlers lived in tents while they 
built their houses. There was neither water nor electric energy. What water they had 
came from a reservoir on a portion of the farm that had not been sold to them. There 
they bathed, washed clothes, and fetched water for construction of the houses; they 
also drank that water. Water was considered a luxury - settlers stated they fried food 
because there was insufficient water for boiling. Subsequently they dug a shallow 
hole, lined it with plastic sheeting, and the municipal water truck would fill it once or 
twice a week. CERB - the state water company - stated that they were going to drill 
but failed to do so. The Association used its own funds to hire a private company 
(CRIAR - Construfao e Engenharia Ltda.) based in Salvador to drill a well. This 
well, drilled in 2004, caved in. The Association petitioned CAR to allow them to use 
money earmarked for a casa de farinha to dig another well; CAR authorized this and 
the new well was successfully drilled in August 2005 at a cost R$56,000.403 
Lila continued to serve as president of the Association after the move. 
According to those we interviewed, he was something of a dictator. Anyone who 
spoke out against him he would threaten to expel from the community. He was also 
said to have administered the funds of the Association unfairly, paying some people 
for working when they did little or no work. 
402 Interview with Lila's brother, Jose Rubens Mota de Carvalho, March 18, 2006. 
403 According to Firmino Dos Santos, who was president at the time, CAR has pledged to reimburse 
these funds. Inteview April 20, 2006 
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Per CDA rules, Lila could not remain indefinitely as president. He selected 
his successor, Firmino. Once in office, however, Firmino refused to obey Lila, 
generating a split in the community.404 In the next election (2004), Firmino's chosen 
successor, Antonio Sales de Silva, defeated Lila by 36 to 35 votes.405 Sergio Ricardo 
helped mediate the dispute. Lila ended up leaving the settlement, and currently only 
eleven of the original families remain (and one son of original settlers406) - the other 
twenty-five families are "new" settlers, not from the Campolandia group. 
Attrition continues to be fairly high. During the year prior to our visit, two 
families left, one because he accepted a job in the town of Serrinha, and one because 
the wife had not wanted to come to the settlement in the first place and did not adapt 
there. 
However, the settlers considered 2005 to be a "blessed" year in several 
respects. In addition to drilling the well and constructing the school (see below), the 
community received electric energy. The settlement had petitioned for electric 
404 Firmino told us that as president "he lost a lot of time." A group of settlers who did not want to stay 
left the land, but wanted to return in 2003 when money to build houses was disbursed. They created a 
false document with the son of the prior landowner (apparently this document indicated that the 
plaintiffs were the true directors of the Association) and demanded R$30.000. The Association won 
the case, but spent R$3.000 on a lawyer, and Firmino had to spend a lot of time dealing with the case 
405 This was the first election to have more than one ticket of candidates. Lourival, the current Vice 
President, stated that part of the problem was that the newer families were feeling marginalized; by the 
time of our visit, however, he believed that "Now everything is better - now we know each other 
better." 
406 Manoel; his mother was the original titleholder. Manoel had been working in the mechanic's shop 
for the local Serrinha bus company, but lost his job. He was married with three children; his mother 
called them to live with her (his father had had a prostrate operation and was away for six months). 
His mother transferred the title to Manoel. Manoel's wife left him in 2005, taking their three teenage 
children to live in Feira de Santana; Manoel met Luciene and she and her seven year old son are now 
living with him. 
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energy in 2003. Installations were finally installed on December 31, 2005.407 The 
energy was turned on in the late afternoon, failed, and returned just before midnight. 
At the time of our visit it had been functioning for three months. 
Demography: All of the men interviewed are of rural origin except for 
Jurandi Nilo, who is a trained metallurgical technician from Sao Paulo.408 Five of the 
women classified themselves as being or urban origin. 
Before settling in the area, six of the men had possessed minifundios, and five 
had worked small parcels of land owned by their families. Many of these had to also 
sharecrop additional land or work as daily laborers. Three were sharecroppers who 
also worked out as daily laborers. One was a bricklayer and agricultural laborer, one 
was a full time bricklayer in Serrinha (where his wife was a domestic servant), one 
had worked in the mechanic shop for the Serrinha bus company but had lost his job, 
another was unemployed in Serrinha doing odd jobs. One was an unemployed 
security guard in Salvador, and one was living in an MST camp for landless workers. 
Race/Ethnicity: Mostly white; one woman is the daughter of Gypsies. 
Gender: Four of the 37 titleholders are women; we interviewed three of 
these 409 Joao Rocha and his wife, Del, are joint titleholders;410 Del was a 
407 Electricity was originally requested under the "Luz no Camp" (Light in the Countryside) program. 
This program required that the municipio enter with 10% of the cost, and there was a great deal of 
lobbying and bureaucracy involved at the local level. The Federal Government then replaced that 
program with "Luz Para Todos" (Light For All), which no longer required 10% from municipalities. 
Jurandi Ferreira Nilo, one of the settlers who had been a Workers Party activist in Sao Paulo, was in 
Sao Paulo on other matters and went to the party's central headquarters there with the request. This 
was sent to the Ministry of Agriculture and funds for the project were authorized. 
408 Jurandir left Sao Paulo and worked on his father-in-law"s land in Cipo (a rural area in Bahia not far 
from the settlement) for two years before seeking his own land. He came to visit the settlement, loved 
it (in his wife's words, he "adored" it [adorou]), and put his name in with the association in the event 
of an opening. When another family left, he and his wife were called in. Because he receives a 
government pension, she is the titleholder. Both are leaders in the community. 
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member of the Fiscal Council. Zefinha is the Secretary of the Association 
even though she is not a title holder. 
Religion: This settlement is more religiously mixed than most. We were told 
that there are four Assembly of God families in the settlement, and two in the 
neighboring settlement of Boa Sorte; they are in the process of building a 
temple in Boa Vista. We were also told that there are two Baptist families. 
Among families interviewed, eleven were Catholic,411 three Assembly of God, 
one Baptist, one Adventist, one mixed Catholic/Assembly, and one mixed 
Adventist/Assembly. Two respondents stated that religion is a divisive factor 
in the community. 
Age: Eighteen of the 33 persons interviewed were in their 30s or 40s, and this 
seemed to be representative of the community. 
Attrition: Only eleven of the original 37 founders, and the son of another 
founder, remain on the land. Of the families we interviewed, eight were 
founders. Many of the newcomers were persons who had some tie to the 
409 Eugenia is separated from her husband and runs her land with the help of her two sons, who are 25 
and 20. Josi is titleholder because Jurandi, her husband, has a government pension and therefore 
cannot qualify as a titleholder. Jane was living with her husband on her father-in-law's land in the 
municipio of Serrinha - there were 2 tarefas of land for 8 houses of relatives; her mother called her to 
live in the settlement; she and her husband arrived in 2002, worked with her mother; her husband left; 
in 2003, an opening came up and Jane got it in her own name; she is now living with Erivaldo. 
410 Although rare under the Cedula da Terra, this was legally permitted where the couple is married 
under civil law. Registration of land in the name of couples has since become standard. 
411 Maria Jose coordinates religious education and Josefina, Nalva, and Gracinha help teach it. Jose 
Marivaldo is one of the leaders of the Church. There is a Thursday prayer group. The priest comes, 
alternately, every three months to the settlement and to the nearby settlement of Boa Sorte, and most 
Catholic families attend mass at these two locations. The Catholics would like to build a chapel, but 
have held their services in the Association building. 
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community and were on a waiting list for openings.412 Most of the 
newcomers we interviewed arrived in 2002 or 2003. We were told that two 
families left and were replaced in 2005. Very early on, one family was asked 
to leave.413 
Education: Until the end of 2005, the school functioned in the Association building, 
but the Association built a two classroom school. The municipio agreed to provide 
the roof to the school - at the time of our visit, only one classroom had a roof, and the 
school was beginning to function in that classroom. Twenty children study in the 
morning pre-school to 4th grade. In addition, 28 adults were signed up for night 
classes. The teacher is Elaine Pereira Lima, who lives in the settlement and is 
daughter of the vice president of the Association. 
Most interviewees felt that the school is improving. Five interviewees said 
that the teacher is good to excellent, and three more classed the school as good. 
Three said that the teaching is so-so ("mais ou menos "), and one said the teacher "is 
not bad." One said the school is not very good. Luciene stated that the school is 
"normal for this region." Lourival stated that the educational system in Brazil is not 
good. 
Beyond the fourth grade, students go to school in the town of Biritinga. Only 
one interviewee mentioned the schools there - she thought they were good. 
412 Juraci, for instance, put his name on the waiting list in 2000; he waited two years for an opening. 
Similarly, Jose Carlos had his name on the waiting list from the beginning; he worked with one of the 
other men on the waiting list, Paulo (their wives are comadres [co-godmothers]), on a contract to clear 
settlement land. In 2002, there were 13 families on the waiting list; the directory met and selected Jose 
Carlos; Paulo was admitted later when a subsequent vacancy opened. Although Jose Carlos did not get 
his own lot until 2002, he considers himself to be "almost one of the founders." 
413 "The family was no good. Even the kids were no good." (Jair) 
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Health: The Association has a small health post for a nurse who is supposed to come 
every fifteen days. Several interviewees stated that she does not come that often -
perhaps once a month, that the attendance is poor, and that there is no privacy in the 
health post. But five women and one man, in separate interviews, told us the nurse is 
attentive, that she "helps a lot," that she is good. All acknowledged that the space she 
works in is not adequate. 
For any other health care, the settlers have to go to Biritinga. This usually 
means walking to the highway (about a kilometer) and waiting for the bus. 
Water: The difficult history of this settlement with respect to water is set forth 
above. A successful well was drilled in August, 2005. The well has a capacity of 
28,000 liters per hour. Although the community obtained electric energy at the end of 
2005, at the time of our visit the well was still operating with a diesel motor as the 
Association did not have funds to purchase an electric pump. We were told that 
Petrobras would be donating a two-phase pump to the community. 
The well has a 20,000 liter water tower. The Association charges a monthly 
fee of R$10, covering dues, water, and electricity. Water is pumped to the houses. 
Each residence has a 310 liter water storage tank. Because the tower was placed 
lower than it should have been, the water pressure is low and there is some difficulty 
in the flow to the houses.414 
414 They received orientation from a geological engineer, Antonio Marcos Santos Raimundo (since 
deceased), who told them that locating the tower 2.5m above ground would be more than sufficient. 
They opted for 3m, but even that is not sufficient. 
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Association and Collective Area: The collective land was planted with 5000 dwarf 
cashew trees, and an area was set aside for grazing land. The community also planted 
manioc; some was harvested and the income used to make the first land payment. 
The pasture was used to graze sheep but "nearly all died - they were a total loss" ( "so 
deu prejuizo "), and the community is discussing planting additional manioc on that 
land. 
Because very few settlers were participating in the collective work projects, 
the Association divided the cashew and pasture collective area among the settlers. 
This occurred two months prior to our arrival. Each family received seven tarefas415 
(slightly more than 3 has.) of pasture land and an average of 135 cashew trees. 
The intention is for each family to care for and harvest from those trees. 
According to the President, Antonio Sales, the produce from the collective cashew 
trees still belongs to the Association, and will be used to make land payments. 
Differences among members in production level will be duly accounted for. The 
Association manioc is still completely collective; a collective work day ("mutirao ") 
is held every couple of months to keep the field clean, and "nearly everybody 
participates." 
Manoel is an enthusiastic supporter of the new system. He stated that the 
collective work never reached 50% participation, and admitted that he himself owed 
many days due to sickness. Today he says that his area of the collective is all cleaned 
up - that he did it in a month. He feels that the Association is now moving forward 
and can concentrate on finding new resources. 
415 This community uses the Bahian tarefa (4.536 M2) 
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Firmino, who was President from 2002-04416 and is now a member of the 
Fiscal Council, told us that formal voting in Association meetings is rare - that many 
decisions are made by consensus following discussion. The meetings foster free 
communications: 
"Matters are well discussed. People speak openly, each one giving his 
opinion." (Gracinha) 
Manoel noted that at times differences can be great, and that people can become 
rude. But both Jair and Jane said that the biggest disagreements arose from 
administration of collective work, a matter that seems to have been resolved. 
Dissension reached its peak in the 2004 Association election where, for the first 
time, there were two slates of candidates. According to Lourival, the dissension arose 
in part because the newer arrivals felt marginalized.417 Antonio Sales won the 
election by one vote - Sergio Ricardo helped to mediate the dispute. Lourival feels 
that the dispute is behind them - "Now we know each other better." Maria Elena 
agrees: 
"The two groups didn't have different proposals [ideas]. It has now returned 
to normal." 
416 Firmino, a jovial, upbeat person with a good sense of humor, noted something that several 
presidents in the associations we studied encountered: that the time spent serving as president takes 
away from their agricultural activities and puts them behind. 
417 As noted in the History, above, it may also have been generated in part by the personality of Lila. 
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Joao Rocha and Del said that there is now only one family that causes difficulties -
that the rest are "everyone is for everyone." Firmino stated that the Association is 
well organized, representative, and "works for the benefit of all." 
Jose Rubens believes that the Association could do better. He thinks it should 
actively lobby for government help. He emphasized that this is not only the job of the 
President. "[It's as though], for the municipal government and the banks, [we] don't 
exist." He believes the Association should be constructing a water tank - and that the 
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settlement needs industry - he mentioned, as possibilities, a bolacho factory and a 
broom factory. Josi, the current Treasurer, stated that she thinks the association is 
weak, needs to be more united, and needs bigger objectives: "[The settlement] still 
lacks a lot of things." 
Josi, who is the current Treasurer, says that, when she took over, the 
Association had no money in its account and owed the bank R$180 in fees, the 
municipio R$490 for water, and various amounts for taxes. She estimates that -
including amounts owed for days not worked and unpaid monthly fees - settlers owed 
(and owe) the Association approximately R$5000. She took measures, including 
selling the remaining sheep (see below) and organizing expenditures, and the 
Association now has R$1600 in its account. She keeps clear books and posts 
information regularly. Nonetheless, she stated that in January, for instance, only ten 
families paid their full dues/utility bills. She said that there are two families who are 
very economically strapped (both single mothers).419 
418 See Case Study 2. 
419 Josi also feels that community festivities are important, and (as a community member, not as 
Treasurer) she helped organize festivities for the June Fetes (Festas Juninhas), Mothers' Day, 
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There is also an issue with one family that does not live in the area, but has a 
home in Serrinha. This is illegal. However, the Association expelled a member in its 
early days and the experience was "horrible." So they now work on the basis of 
trying to dialogue. 
Miguel, who was Treasurer and is now a member of the Fiscal Council, 
stated: "We gain a lot as members - including knowledge." Juraci agreed - he did a 
sustainable agriculture course through the Association and went on an educational 
trip. But he noted that all this had stopped occurring. 
In two areas, the Association is advanced beyond most of those we studied. 
They allow "worker members" (socios trabalhadores) - a category that recognizes 
and gives voice (but not a vote) to non-titleholding residents who work land -
primarily grown sons or other relatives of settlers. 
The Association also encourages the participation of women. Women who 
are not titleholders are free to participate in Association meetings and leadership, and 
many of them do so. Josefa, who is not a titleholder, is Secretary of the Association. 
Joao Rocha and Del are joint titleholders; both have served as officers in the 
association - he as vice treasurer, and she as a member of the fiscal council. 
Ecological Area: The ecological area is distant from the rest of the community. The 
settlers use it for bee-raising. The President, Antonio Sales, told us that the 
ecological reserve was not in the best place, that what is now the pasture area was 
Christmas, New Years, Easter, the Cora Harvest Queen, and others. She taught a number of women 
how to bake cakes. 
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filled with trees which should have been saved. However, we were told that the 
ecological area protects the source of a small spring of water. 
Consciousness of the value of the ecological area was higher here than in any 
other of the settlements. Three settlers also told us that they had set aside part of their 
own land as additional ecological reserve. Juraci said that he has a personal 
ecological reserve that he would not remove for any reason ("de jeito nenhum"), 
consisting of a grove of trees with a large canopy. Manoel told us he keeps 5% of his 
land in its natural state. Jane also noted that she and her husband have a private 
ecological reserve that they believe is important "for the animals and for the rain." 
Eugenia said that she hoped she would not have to clear all her land - if she had 
money she would buy more land to avoid the need to clear it all. 
Economy: 
Distinguishing Factor: Biritinga has the highest percentage of organic farmers 
of any settlement we studied. Of the farmers interviewed, seventeen are fully 
organic, one uses chemical pesticides only to kill ants and is moving toward using 
only organic methods, and only two use a mixture of chemical and organic methods. 
Land: The land purchase took place on June 19, 2001. The purchase price 
was RS91.99 per ha, for a total of R$74,280. SAT funds were R$82,434 and SIC 
R$294,750. The first land payment of R$5600 was made in December, 2005. 
Ten of the farmers said that the land is fertile, three said it was not fertile, 
three said it was so-so, and one said some is fertile and some not. However, their 
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answers seemed as much based on expectations as on objective factors. Every one of 
them stated that the land needs fertilizer to produce well. 
Evandro stated that, for manioc, the land is of the best quality. Jurandi stated 
that it is good for cashew, manioc, and vegetables. Joao Rocha said that the land is 
good and, with fertilizer, very good. Firmino stated that, with fertilizer "everything 
grows," and that by the third year of fertilization the land is good for beans. Paulo 
said, "There is no such thing as bad land" - indicating that it is how you treat the land 
that matters. 
Jose Carlos, one of the least satisfied of the settlers, stated that without 
fertilizer a tarefa of land produces 15 sacks of farinha, with fertilizer it produces 50. 
He noted that you need a cartload of fertilizer per tarifa and the investmentt may not 
be worth it. However, if his calculations are correct, it would seem to be worth the 
effort: at a median sales price of R$25 a sack, the difference between the value 
produced by the unfertilized and fertilized tarefa is R$875, and the cost of a cartload 
of fertilizer is about R$200.420 
Financing: All of the families received PRONAF A financing. Settlers had a 
choice between opting for only cashew trees (in which case they received financing 
sufficient for 1284 trees) or for cashew and apiculture (in which case they received 
1070 trees and a kit including 10 beehives). Twenty-four of the thirty-seven families 
opted for apiculture. A portion of PRONAF A could be used for manioc. 
Nine of the farmers stated that they have applied for and/or are waiting for the 
custeio, which they will use for manioc. The amount of the loan will be R$3000 per 
420 Jose Carlos further detailed his costs as follows - R$55/hour for a tractor to prepare the land - it 
cost him nearly R$ 1.000 to prepare 20 tarefas. 
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homestead, repayable in 20 months at 2% interest, with a R$200 rebate for timely 
payment. 
As Firmino points out, the custeio is not really for manioc, but for the 
fertilizer to make the manioc grow. The cost of fertilizer is a concern expressed by 
many interviewees. Chicken manure was R$800 per truckload in 2005, and one 
interviewee said that he had heard it had risen to R1100; sisal residue was R$250 and 
said to have gone up to R$300. Firmino expressed hope that the custeio would be 
disbursed before the rains came, as he believes that after the rain starts the price of 
fertilizer will rise and it will be more difficult to work with it in the fields. 
Firmino purchased two truckloads of chicken manure last year (paid with 
PRONAF A funds). He stated, however, that often two or three farmers will get 
together to purchase a truckload. In addition to chicken manure and sisal residue, 
Lourival bought cow manure. He also emphasized that they need to buy by the 
truckload - transport costs make smaller purchases more expensive. 
Production and Income: Boa Vista (Biritinga) is a relatively new settlement, 
subject to difficulties in getting started and a high rate of turnover in its early 
population. PRONAF A funds were initially disbursed in 2003, but production has 
been slowed by drought and other factors. As a result, this settlement has the lowest 
agricultural production of any that we visited. 
The primary PRONAF financing was for dwarf cashew trees, which had not at 
the time of our visit begun to produce in significant amounts. All settlers initially 
planted (approximately) either 1284 or 1070 cashew trees (depending on whether 
they opted for apiculture), but nine of the farmers interviewed reporting significant 
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loss of trees (100 or more) during the drought. Sebastiao said that he lost nearly 40%, 
but this was unusually high. Seven farmers reported little or no loss. No farmer 
reported income from cashew. 
PRONAF A also supported bee hives (apiculture), providing 10 kits - each 
with one hive - to farmers who opted for it. Thirteen of the farmers we interviewed 
owned hives - almost all the standard allotment of ten. Not all the hives had bees, but 
many did. Joao Rocha and Del had sixteen active hives and they sell honey at R$10 a 
liter, R$8 a liter if the buyer buys in quantity. One other farmer mentioned that he 
was beginning to harvest honey, but no other reported income from honey.421 
However, at the general meeting we were told that settlers sell it in Serrinha at 
R$5/liter. 
The only crop from which significant income was derived is manioc. All of 
the households interviewed have manioc, the largest planting being 9 tarefas. Manoel 
told us that he had lost 80% of his manioc in the drought; he stated that, because the 
second parcel of PRONAF A was disbursed late, he planted late and this resulted in 
losing most of the crop. But no other farmer reported significant losses. 
There are three private casas de farinha in the settlement, owned by settlers. 
Maria Elena and her husband, Jose Maria, told us that theirs was the first casa de 
farinha in the settlement. They had operated it where they previously lived and 
brought it to the settlement in approximately 2003. Maria Elena told us that, since 
the arrival of the other casas de farinha, she and her husband no longer process 
421 Firmino established a "sharecropping" system (his term); a young man from the settlement who 
understands apiculture agreed to take care of his hives, and they intend to split the produce 50/50. 
422 Although they are original settlers, she did not fully move to the land until that date. 
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farinha for other families; they have two tarefas of manioc, which they process for 
themselves, selling a couple of sacks "from time to time." Other than that, in 2005 
they sold two sacks of corn and some firewood (see below) and receive a small bolsa 
escola. She said they live off their land, growing food for consumption. 
Nininho and his wife, Aliene, own the second casa de farinha.423 His father 
helped them finance its construction. They go to the feira in Serrinha every Saturday 
and sell two to four sacks of farinha there each week (this is income of approximately 
R$50-100 per week, or around R$3750 per year). A truck from another nearby 
settlement transports them, charging R$5 per person and R$2.50 per sack. Nininho is 
also a bricklayer and painter, and earns money on jobs outside the settlement. 
The third casa de farinha is owned by Sebatiao. He rents it to other settlers, 
receiving 10 liters of far inha from every 80 liter sack processed there. He stated that 
the establishing of a new casa de farinha owned by the community would not affect 
him as he has 9 tarefas of manioc of his own and will continue to use his own facility 
to process it. In 2005 he sold more than 100 sacks of farinha at prices ranging up to 
R$36/sack. 
Antonio Sales earned in 2005 approximately R$3000 from the sale of farinha. 
Four other farmers earned R$600-700 each. Jacira stated that her family had five 
harvests of manioc in the last four years, and Joao Rocha and Del indicated they sell 
it whenever they need to. None of the other families reported significant sales. 
There were minor amounts of other produce sold, including corn and mangaba 
(a native fruit that grows wild in the fields), but neither in economically significant 
423 When I visited Nininho's casa de farinha a group of women were cleaning manioc in preparation 
for making flour (see Figures VI-6-F and Vi-6-G). 
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quantities. Lourival indicated that he usually plants watermelon for sale, but did not 
do so in 2005 due to the drought; he said that his brother did plant and lost 60% of his 
crop, and that the rest was dwarfed. Three families reported gathering and selling 
lenha - firewood used in cooking stoves; they sell it at R$6 per meter to trucks that 
pick it up and take it into town. 
Almost all the families grew vegetables for family consumption, including 
beans, corn, cowpeas, squash, onions, watermelon, and various herbs. Three families 
had passion fruit (ranging from 30 to 100 plants). Most families had fruit on their 
house lots - often 20 trees or more; the varieties included mango, acerola, banana, 
coconut, orange, pinha, graviola, jack-fruit, sugar cane, seringuela, guava, papaya, 
coffee, castor oil plants, avocados, lemon, and - in one case - grapes. 
Ten families raise chickens - most in fairly small quantities, but Eugenia has 
160 free range chickens; she told us that they were 2-5 months old, and start laying 
when they are 6 months old. Lourival had plans to buy 200 chicks to start seriously 
raising chickens. One family has 5 ducks. Five families have 1-2 pigs each, five 
families have horses or mules and three have donkeys (three families have horse or 
donkey carts). 
Six families received government pensions: four retirement pensions and two 
pensions for retarded children. Nine families received bolsa familia. 
Sebastiao works as a driver for the municipio of Serrinha, earning 
R$600/month. Marivaldo's wife works as a teacher in Serrinha (she has had that job 
23 years). Lourival works as a bricklayer in Biritinga and Serrinha, earning R$25-
30/day; he often spends the week away from home. His daughter will be teaching 
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night school in the settlement and will earn a minimum wage (approximately 
R$350/month). Paulo also works as a bricklayer. Jacira's husband works as a daily 
laborer a few days a month earning R$15-20/day; Jane told us that her husband also 
works at times as a daily laborer, but earns only $R10/day. Firmino's daughter works 
in Serrinha as manager in a store; she sends money to help care for her son, who lives 
with his grandparents in the settlement. 
Juraci noted the need for economic activity to provide employment for women 
and young people: his specific suggestions include a factory to process cashew pulp -
with a seal of quality, a honey factory, and a cooperative to sell their products at a 
good price. Aleine also mentioned the need for a factory of some type to provide 
employment for the women; she misses working and would participate in such an 
undertaking. She says that this idea has been discussed but not acted upon; as the 
cashew starts producing, possibilities may occur.424 Jose Rubens mentioned various 
possibilities, including a bolacho factory425 and a broom factory. 
The Vice President of the Association, Lourival, mentioned a proposal to form 
a cooperative. However, the community viewed the group proposing it as being 
political. He noted that the people are not united with respect to this issue. 
Sufficiency of Income: As mentioned above, agricultural production in this 
community is still at the beginning stages, and the community had experienced 
424 Family and/or community scale cashew-nut processing is feasible; the equipment is relatively 
inexpensive (and can sometimes be funded through grants); in programs carried out by GARD, a 
development agency, local processing increased family income R$350 or more a month. (B. King-
Powers, former director of GARD). Juice can be extracted from the pseudo-fruit, and the pulp can be 
used preserves, candy, animal ration, or fetilizer. 
425 See Case Study 2 
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drought. It is therefore not surprising that, when asked if income was sufficient, 
thirteen of the households interviewed replied in the negative, while only three 
replied "yes." 
"Income from the land is zero." (Lourival) 
"For the time being, no." (Antonio Sales) 
"No. But we're beginning now. It should get better." (Manoel) 
"It's nothing! It's not [sufficient]! It doesn't even serve to buy medicine." 
(Isidora) 
Settlers almost all took the question to apply to farm income. Three families 
mentioned that they live off of government pensions, and Jose Rubens said they live 
on his salary as a driver in Serrinha. 
The families that said that they have sufficient income include Nininho and 
Aliene (they own one of the casas de farinha and sell 2-4 sacks of farinha a week, 
and he supplements his income working jobs as a bricklayer and painter), Sebastiao 
(he also owns a casa de farinha and has nine tarefas of manioc), and Joao Rocha and 
Del, who have opted to live on the farm lot and have an approach which is closer to 
subsistence farming than other settlers.426 
426 "He who works has enough to eat." (Joao Rocha) 
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Settler Attitudes: 
Satisfaction: The months before our visit saw two major victories for the 
community - the opening of the well in August and the arrival of electric energy on 
December 31. It is therefore not surprising that the overwhelming majority of settlers 
said that they would not sell or trade their lots: 
"It's going well -the difficult phase has already passed" (Leso) 
"No - we'd have to do everything over again [somewhere else]" (Jane) 
"We already suffered here. On the outside, the money would just come to 
an end. We'll never leave." (Jair) 
"I like it here - I came to stay." (Firmino) 
"We worked before but never got any place. Here it is ours." (Aliene) 
"[I ] got out of the slavery of working for others." (Juraci) 
Fifteen of the interviewees were emphatic in their statement that they would not 
trade or sell. Gracinha - a particularly articulate and intelligent woman, simply 
stated, "No [we won't leave] - this is our victory!" and her husband added, "We will 
never leave - never!" Sebastiao stated, "We already struggled so much - we will not 
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sell!" However, one couple was more doubtful and said they would not sell because 
they were afraid. One woman said she would trade for another piece of land if she 
could live in the country - she did not like living in the agro-vila in close proximity to 
neighbors.427 
Twenty-three of those interviewed felt that life was better or much better in the 
498 
settlement than it had been previously. Zefina noted that it in the beginning it was 
worse, but now it is better due to having water. 
Maria Elena, who with her husband previously had 3 tarefas of land in another 
location, was one of two who stated that things were worse in the settlement than 
previously. At her old home, she had water readily available and planted a garden, 
selling the produce. 
Interestingly, the other person who said it was worse was Josi (Josenilda de 
Gois Bento). She is a dynamic 33-year-old woman, with a full high school education, 
a titleholder and an acknowledged leader in the community. She is committed to the 
community and has no intention of leaving. But she admits she came to the 
community reluctantly because her husband really wanted to - he loves it there.429 
Future: Interviewees were almost unanimously optimistic about the future. 
Several mentioned expectations of increased production and income - especially from 
427 We encountered this attitude occasionally in other settlements, and have seen it in other regions 
where we worked. In certain rural areas it is customary for people to live fairly far apart, and some 
people find village life, even in very small villages, not to their liking. 
428 Gracinha, whose husband previously worked 'A tarefa of his father-in-law's land, stated: "How was 
I to raise five children on XA tarefa of land? Where would they work? God helped this to happen. It is 
a dream come true." 
429 See note 528. Brenda King-Powers, who interviewed Josi and talked with her at depth, believes 
that Josi, who is better educated and better off financially than the other women in the settlement, at 
times feels isolated, especially when her husband travels to Sao Paulo to take jobs that supplement 
family income (he is a trained metallurgical technician). 
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cashew and honey. Others foresaw processing activities of various kinds (as 
discussed above) that will provide income and jobs. Juraci sees projects for 
additional land settlements surrounding them, bringing life and economic growth to 
the region. 
There are differences with respect to their visions of the future of their children. 
Maria Elena wants her children to study and move to the city - she mentioned Sao 
Paulo, Salvador, Feira de Santana. Aleine also said she wants her children to 
graduate and get jobs. Julia and Joao Carlos hope their children will be doctors, 
lawyers, or teachers. But Gracinha is pleased that her seventeen year old daughter is 
almost engaged to a young man from the settlement and that they will be working on 
the land. Jailson, the sixteen year old son of Joao Rocha and Del, said that he wants 
to work with his father in agriculture. Nininho says that his eldest son (now 12) 
wants to be a cowhand. 
Socio-Political Awareness: From our brief survey, the level of socio-political 
awareness was somewhat higher in Boa Vista-Biritinga than in some other 
communities. While many answers were typical of what would be expected from an 
average rural person in the Northeast - based largely on current television opinion -
others were quite insightful. 
Most observers identified Lula and/or the Federal Government as helping rural 
workers. Jurandi, a Worker's Party activist, also noted the positive role of former 
Brazilian President, Fernando Henrique Cardoso (from the PSDB), under whose 
administration the Cedula da Terra program began. Others mentioned, among those 
who help the rural worker, the Worker's Party (8 mentions), CDA and/or the Cedula 
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da Terra Program (5), the Rural Workers Union (2), and the World Bank (2). Cited 
as against the interests of the rural worker were politicians and/or parties who oppose 
Lula (7), big business (5), and the local prefeitura (2). Jose Rubens, when asked who 
was against the interests of the rural worker, responded "500 years of the elite." He 
also discussed briefly the need for land distribution, and cited the law of sesmaria. 
Although recent television had shown images of MST violence that alienated a 
substantial portion of Brazilian people, including Worker's Party activists such as 
Josi,430 responses to the MST among those interviewed were varied and nuanced. 
Three interviewees mentioned that the MST essentially generated the demand for 
land reform that led to the Cedula da Terra program. 
"[I'm] in favor of the struggle for land, against invasion and violence. But 
without [the MST], we wouldn't have entered here into the land." (Juraci) 
Jacira, who spent two years in an MST camp before coming to the settlement, and 
who still volunteers with the MST, stated: "They do so many good things - [the 
experience] gave me courage to stay on the land." Other interesting comments: 
"[MST] has good ideas in principal, but leads people at times into violence 
and death." (Jane) 
430 She stated that she was startled/afraid when she saw the MST violence on TV and that they were 
invading land that had owners, which she felt was not acceptable. 
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"Some parts are good, others no. Invading land is okay, but it has to be 
thought through more carefully." (Antonio Sales) 
"People can organize these days [as opposed to in the past] - they can now 
organize and do this legally." (Gracinha) 
"The Movement is good. There are people who enter it who create 
trouble... but the movement itself is great (otimo)" (Firmino) 
With respect to politics, twenty-eight of the interviewees voted for Lula, and 
thirty-one intended to vote for him in the next election. Eleven interviewees were 
affiliated with a party - all of them the Workers' Party (PT), and two others said they 
voted mostly for the PT. 
Strengths/V ulnerabilities/Recommendations: 
Boa Vista - Biritinga had a difficult beginning marked by high attrition, 
struggles for leadership, water shortages, and lack of infrastructure. It has the lowest 
level of agricultural production of the settlements studied. 
However, there are indications that the settlement may have come through 
these difficulties and may be headed toward a high level of sustainability. Most of 
the families who do not really want to farm have left the community, to be replaced 
by those who do. The dynamic leader who helped start the community, but who may 
have been a barrier to its growth, has moved on. 2005 was a banner year for 
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infrastructure - with the community finally receiving both electricity and water, as 
well as a school building. And the cashew trees that are to provide the economic base 
for community agriculture are maturing and should soon be producing significant 
income. 
Although settlers will undoubtedly continue to plant manioc and to have 
sidelines such as bees and bananas, the planned economic basis of the community is 
essentially a cashew monoculture. As mentioned elsewhere, monoculture is almost 
never desirable. It leaves crops more vulnerable to diseases, and proves more 
devastating to the community when those diseases occur. However, the cashew is a 
hardy plant, native to the Brazilian Northeast, more resistant to drought and disease 
than most. 
Another drawback in monoculture is that it exposes growers to the impact of 
international markets - in this case, the market for cashew nuts. This is a real 
problem, but can be dealt with in part if the community goes beyond simply growing 
cashews and gets into processing them. Equipment for community based cashew nut 
processing is relatively inexpensive, and it can add R$350 or more to monthly family 
income. In periods of low prices, it can also facilitate the storage of nuts in 
expectation of future increasing prices. 
In addition to the nut (which is the true cashew fruit), cashew produces a 
pseudo-fruit or pulp which can be processed into juices or sweets, or used in a 
number of other manners, such as animal ration and fertilizer. With proper planning 
and investment, the settlement could develop a series of processing activities that 
would both increase income and provide jobs. 
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The Association has shown an ability to resolve issues creatively. This 
creativity was illustrated in the decision resulting in the private administration - but 
continued collective ownership - of the collective cashew trees. Steering a course 
between collectivization and privatization, the Association removed a major source of 
dissension (participation in collective work days) while assuring that income would 
continue to be available to make land payments. 
It is hoped, as Manoel suggested, that with this issue behind them, the 
Association will be free to focus on larger objectives - such as the cashew processing 
facilities mentioned above. This will require leadership, vision, and a certain unity of 
purpose. Our interviews indicate that the potential is present, if not yet fully tapped. 
Yet another hopeful sign is the high ecological awareness of the community. 
This is illustrated not only by the unusually high value placed on ecological areas, but 
by the large number of organic farmers - a factor which, in itself, increases the 
likelihood of sustainability. 
Finally, the inclusion of women and worker members, as active participants in 
the Association, increases the diversity and number of potential contributors. It also 
increases the sense of ownership of these groups of community residents in the 
activities of the Association and the settlement.431 
431 When working with small landless workers and small farmers in Tocantins, we discovered that 
families in which both spouses were active were far more likely to stay on the land than were families 
in which only one spouse was active. 
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Case Study 7 
Name of Settlement: Fazenda Veneza (Assoc. Produtores Rurais da Fazenda Veneza) 
Families in Settlement: 30 
Location: Municipio - Euclides da Cunha 
Area: 1,004.79 ha. 
Contract Date: October 4, 2002 
Dates Visited: March 18 & 20, 2006 
Number Interviewed - Households: 18 Individuals: 28 
Family size (persons): 1-3/1; 4-6/15; 7-9/2 
Persons Interviewed: 16 men, 11 women, 1 youth (male 18 years old). 
Ages: -20/1; 20-29/6; 30-39/12; 40-49/1; 50-59/3; 60+/5 
Schooling: 0-2/10; 3-5/9; 6-8/5; 9-10/1; HS complete/1 
Note: Generally the women have more education than the men. Among 
wives not present at the interviews, one has a university education and is 
doing post-grad work, one has a normal school diploma and is doing 
th 
university; and one is a former teacher with an 8 grade education. 
Technical Assistance: Maria Djalma Andrade de Abreu of NATE (Nucleo de Assistencia 
Tecnica Agropecuaria Ltda.) 
Geography: The settlement is located 30 km. northeast of the municipal seat (19 km. of 
good paved road, 11 of good dirt road). The area is semi-arid and relatively flat. The 
total area is 1004.79 has. Each of the families has a dwelling lot in the agro-vila (20 x 
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35m) and a farm/grazing lot of 15 has. The collective area is 344.97 ha., and the 
ecological reserve is 200.96 ha. 
Houses in the agro-vila are located on four dirt streets around a very large 
rectangular central open area (100 x 280m). Each house faces the open area. The open 
area contains a soccer field and sites for construction of a school and a health post. The 
Association headquarters - community center is located on a corner lot, kitty corner to 
the northeast from the open area. The farm lots are located to the east of the agro-vila, 
the collective land immediately to the west, and the ecological area at the far western 
extremity of the settlement. 
Climate: Vila-Canaa is located in the semi-arid region, and is the most arid of the 
settlements we studied. The native growth is caatinga. 
History: Massacara, a village {povoado) dating from the 17th Century, was the original 
seat of the present municipio of Euclides da Cunha. In the early 1990s, Massacara and 
the area surrounding it were declared to belong to the Caimbe Indians; the land was to be 
marked (demarcado) as an Indian reservation and the non-Indian population 
432 removed. Local resistance and bureaucracy resulted in delays, but in 1999 this was 
carried out. Non-Indian residents were indemnified by the state for land (if they were 
landowners) and improvements (both landowners and others), and many moved to the 
town of Euclides da Cunha. 
432 According to interviewees, following generations of intermarriage, the distinction between Indians and 
non-Indians was based on lists maintained by the Indian bureau (FUNAI) and was somewhat arbitrary. 
Some respondents contended that the list was based upon those who had signed up for FUNAI benefits 
some time in the 1980s. There seem to have been families in which one brother was a registered Indian and 
another was not. 
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Maps V-7-A and V-7-B. Above: Fazenda Veneza agro-vila. Below: full plant of 
settlement, showing the agro-vila (center south), with agricultural fields to the east, 
communal lands to the west, and the ecological reserve at the far western edge. 
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In 1997, Joao de Deus de Carvalho (Janjao), a non-Indian resident of Massacara, 
formed an association of residents dwelling in Massacara who wanted to find alternative 
land. The original association had approximately 60 households. Joao and most of the 
others were moved to Euclides da Cunha in 1999. They became aware (through 
television and radio) of the Cedula da Terra program and began the process. Not all the 
members of that association qualified for the program, and some of those who did 
decided not to remain in the settlement. Twenty of the present settlers came from the 
original association (which changed its name to Fazenda Veneza after they purchased the 
land); the others were friends and relatives, except for Francisco Dias, who was the 
watchman on the property for the original owner and who received a lot. 
The owner of the land that they are on was a mechanic (garage owner). The land 
had been rented out to a neighboring farmer but was, as one settler (Edeon) put it, "semi 
abandoned." The owner sold them 749.5 ha. at the rate negotiated with the government, 
then included the remainder (255.29 ha) at no charge. 
Several of the settlers came and saw the land before it was purchased. After 
purchase, as in other settlements, the men came first and began work. Most kept their 
families in Euclides da Cunha until their houses were built. 
The settlement was named Veneza (Venice) because the settlers had heard of 
Venice, Italy, and liked the name. 
Demography: Almost all the original settlement dwellers were families who were 
removed from Massacara during the demarcation process. Two of the families 
interviewed include registered Caimbe Indians who could have remained in Massacara 
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but elected not to. Two families interviewed, in both cases not original settlers, were 
formerly small landholders from an area close to but not included in the demarcation 
zone. 
All families interviewed were of rural origin. The great majority had been small 
landholders previously, although one had been a share cropper, one had worked on land 
belonging to family, one was a rural day laborer and bricklayer, and one simply described 
himself as an agricultural worker.433 
Race/Ethnicity: White, Native American, Afro-Brazilian 
Gender: Six of the thirty titleholders are women (we interviewed three of these) 
Religion: Virtually the entire population of the settlement is Catholic. (One 
interviewee told us his wife is Assembly of God.) However there is no chapel in 
the settlement area; few of the participants listed themselves as active in church, 
and those few put their participation at a low level. Two young men (18 & 21 yrs 
old) from the same family mentioned that they would like to build a chapel, and 
one other couple mentioned spontaneously that a chapel would be something they 
would like to see to better the community in the future. One interviewee 
mentioned that the Catholics would like the priest from Euclides da Cunha to visit 
them, but that he has not been responsive. 
Age: Average age of settlers is about 35 years old. The technical advisor, Maria 
Djalma, believed this to be one factor that makes Veneza a successful community. 
433 This interviewee, Adenor da Silva, also claimed to be a retired gunman, a claim confirmed by his 
neighbors. 
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Twelve of the twenty-eight people we interviewed were in their thirties, and six in 
their late twenties. 
Attrition: 14 of the 18 families we interviewed were original settlers. The 
remainder took over vacancies - three of them fairly early (2002) and the fourth 
in 2003. None of the late comers had to pay indemnifications to prior settlers. 
Education: A municipal primary school with 60 students operates in the Association 
headquarters pending construction of a school. There is one teacher (with one aide) who 
teaches 1-2 grade in the morning and 3-4 in the afternoon. She is from the community 
and holds a teaching degree from UNEB (a regional state university). Interviewees 
almost unanimously stated that the teacher is good but that the facilities are not (we 
observed the school in session and agree that the room in the Association headquarters is 
barely adequate). Several interviewees also mentioned a shortage of books. 
Twenty middle and high students study in Euclides da Cunha; the municipal 
government provides transportation. Respondents felt the schools there are good, but that 
the transportation system is difficult. Only one couple (Raimundo and Monalisa) cited 
studies/schools as a major worry. 
Health: Interviewees felt that health care is inadequate. There is no health agent at the 
settlement. Settlers have to travel 30 kms into Euclides da Cunha to get medical care. 
One child died for lack of medical care. One respondent injured his leg and had to walk 
eleven kms to the highway to get transportation into town. Two interviewees cited health 
care issues as their major worries. 
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Figures VI-7-C and VI-7-D. Students in temporary classroom located in the Fazenda 
Veneza Association headquarters (top picture is an outside view of the headquarters). 
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Figures VI-7-E and VI-7-F. Above: Association tractor and transportable water tank. 
Below: Titleholder Duvalina Rodrigues da Sousa in her donkey cart. 
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Water: The Association owns an artesian well with capacity for 1500 liters/hour, and a 
3500 liter transportable water tank. 
At the time of our visit, the community was waiting for better quality water to be 
piped in from Monte Alegre, approximately 100 km. distance. This project was 
underwritten by CAR, part of the same project designed to provide water to Vila Canaa. 
The piped in water would be used for drinking. 
Only one interviewee cited water, per se, as a major worry. However, many 
interviewees noted the profound influence of climate - especially rain - on the settlement 
(see below). The water being brought in by CAR will not resolve the issue of irrigation 
needed for crops. Interviewees noted that, in their agricultural fields, they still depend on 
water brought from their own well - a distance of up to four kilometers. In addition to 
the Association transportable tank, some settlers carry water to their in barrels in their 
two-wheeled horse carts - a laborious process. 
Association and Collective Area: Maria Djalma, the technical advisor, informed us 
that the Veneza association is the strongest she has seen, and that it is one of the few that 
she believes can fulfill the goal of undertaking complete payment for the land. When we 
arrived at the settlement, we were favorably impressed by the good quality of the 
Association building, which is used in part as a temporary school. Four men from the 
settlement were constructing a galpao (covered area) for keeping the Association tractor, 
tools, etc. We learned that the men were being paid for their work - and that, indeed, the 
Association has sufficient income to pay settlement men for their work at $R14/day - a 
significant source of income for some of the families. 
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Claudio Carvalho, the treasurer, told us that the Association has savings. If a 
family is paid up on their Association dues (R$2/month), the Association will cover 
medical costs; when the son of one settler had to be taken to Salvador for health 
treatment, the Association paid. The Association contributed R$700 to the settlement 
Christmas party, and sponsors parties when there are soccer games. 
The Association owns a tractor. The tractor works out for R$100 a day for non-
members (this was said to be market price) and R$80 a day for members. There are three 
tractor drivers - all from the settlement; a driver earns 20% of the day's take. 
The Association has 65 ha. of pasture land, 20 ha. of palmas, a machine that 
processes palmas for animal feed, and a corral with a 50,000 liter water tank. The 
Association flock is 430 goats and 70 sheep. Annual production per year is 150 head. 
Two men from the settlement are designated to care for the flock. They do not receive a 
wage, but are compensated in the traditional manner - for every three kids born, they 
keep one. 
Much of the Association's income is due to the settlement's 90 ha. of sisal,434 35 
of which are allocated to the collective area. The Association owns a machine for 
extracting fiber from sisal (decortication) - the residue is processed as feed for goats. A 
2005 report (NATE) estimates the potential annual output of sisal fiber from the 
community at 3500 kilos per ha, or 315,000 kilos, with a market value of R$0.80 per kilo, 
for an estimated income of R$252,000, of which R$ 100,000 would be direct Association 
income. Several months prior to our visit, a fire broke out in the collective sisal and 30 
434 According to SINDIFIBRAS - the union of vegetable fiber producers in Bahia, Brazil in 2006 supplied 
150 tons of sisal fiber (valued at US$130 million), approximately 42% of world production. 90% of the 
fiber produced in Brazil comes from the State of Bahia. (International Fiber Journal - February 2006) 
3 9 0 
tarefas435 (26% of the collective sisal) burned. The loss in value to the settlement was 
estimated at R$30,000. Despite this loss, the remaining sisal is considerable and provides 
income to the Association. 
Leadership in the Association is primarily male. One member of the Fiscal 
Counsel (Marilu) and the Second Treasurer (Monalisa) are women, both are titleholders. 
Duvalina, a titleholder who runs her lot with her two sons (21 and 18), stated that she 
enjoys participating in meetings. Other women mentioned participating in meetings of 
mothers for the school, and in a group of artisans organized by the Association. We 
briefly discussed with the community the legality of non-titleholder spouses (mostly 
women) voting and/or holding office in the Association. 
When asked about their participation in the Association, unlike other settlements, 
most interviewees discussed participation in the work days rather than at meetings. 
Collective work is performed every Friday morning (8-11 a.m.) and participation is 
strong. We heard almost no complaints about collective work436 - on the contrary, many 
interviewees cited collective work as a unifying factor, and as something they enjoyed. 
Discussions over issues do exist. Several women organized a petition to have the 
school constructed in the plaza area (as originally proposed in the agro-vila plan). They 
presented this to the meeting, but a decision was reached - to which the women agreed -
that it would be better to construct the school in another location. 
435 We were informed in Veneza that a tarefa is approximately 3.025 m2, a measure closer to the Sergipe 
tarefa (3.052 m2) than to that typically associated with Bahia (4.356 m2). The calculation in Veneza is: 1 
palmo = 22 cm., 10 palmos = 1 vara, 25 varas = 1 tarefa (in other areas of Bahia, 30 varas = 1 tarefa). 
436 The only significant criticism came from Jose Tancredo, who felt that the work days were not used as 
effectively as they could be. He stated that, as a result, some palma was lost and the project of using sisal 
residue for ration was delayed. 
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Ecological Area: The ecological reserve is a single area of 200.96 has. (the obligatory 
20%) at the western end of the settlement. Settlers had few comments about the 
ecological area. One interviewee told us that the settlers use the reserve for grazing. 
Economy: 
Distinguishing Factors: Veneza is the most arid community we visited. It is the 
only community we studied in which livestock raising is the most important activity. The 
role played by sisal is also unique. 
Land: Each family's portion of the land cost is R$110 per year, paid in 
September. There is a grace period of 3 years, followed by payment over a 17 year 
period (the first payment was made in September, 2005). The settlers expressed no worry 
about land payments, stating that the income from the Association, especially the sisal, 
should pay the land costs.437 
When asked if the land is fertile, eleven of the eighteen households interviewed 
answered "yes." Two others remarked that the land is good when it rains, but that it is 
weak when dry. Jose Tancredo stated that the land is the best in that part of the 
municipio. Dalvina modified her answer by saying that it is good for sisal and grazing. 
Del^o, however, feels the land is "not the best" - that it is tired and overworked. 
However, Edeon stated that, although the son of the former owner did work the land, the 
land has lain fallow sufficiently to recover. 
Twelve of the households stated they do not use fertilizer. However, the president 
of the Association, Erico, informed us that virtually all of the families use animal manure 
to nurture their palma. Jose Tancredo stated that beans and corn need fertilizer to grow; 
437 In a separate interview, Maria Djalma, the technical assistant, concurred with this opinion. 
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he and two others stated that they use natural fertilizer only. Only one farmer stated that 
he currently uses chemical fertilizer, and one other (Claudio) stated that he had used 
chemical fertilizer in the past but now uses goat manure. Only three of the farmers 
interviewed use chemical pesticides, and two of these said they use them only to control 
ants. Although these factors make most of the settlers in Veneza de facto organic 
farmers, there did not seem to be as yet a strong sense of consciously opting for organic 
farming, as there was among other farmers, most notably many in Nova Lusitania and 
Biritinga. 
Financing: All of the families interviewed participated in Pronaf A financing. 
Each family had the right to a subsidized loan in the amount of R$ 15,000, drawn down in 
three parcels: 
1st parcel (15 March 2005) - R$6285 for clearing land and fencing 
2nd parcel (June 2005) - R$4788 for planting of 1 ha. of palma, 2 ha. of sisal 
(planted jointly with grass for grazing) 
3rd parcel (March 2006) - R$2350 for purchase of 20 nannies or ewes and 1 billy 
or ram [it was noted that, due to delays in issuing the parcel, it was 
received after the rainy season began and the price of goats had gone up, 
and would probably not be sufficient for the number indicated] 
remainder - R$1577 for technical assistance. 
The loan is repayable over seven years at R$1238 per annum, including a 46.5% rebate 
438 for timely repayment of installments The loan is for preparation of 21 tarefas of soil, 
438 In cases where repayment has not been possible due to valid factors - e.g., weather - settlements have 
been able to renegotiate the timeliness of payments. 
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fencing, planting of 1 hectare of palma and 2 has. of sisal, construction of a covered 
corral and drinking facility (for goats). 
Three of the farmers, and the wife of a fourth, stated that repayment of PRONAF 
is one of their chief worries. Edeon noted that he will have to sell sheep in order to make 
the payment. Claudio said that fifteen of the families will have problems repaying 
PRONAF. 
Production and Income: Livestock raising is the chief activity in Veneza, 
although economically sisal production is the most important mainstay of the community. 
Goat and sheep raising are of primary importance. Sixteen of the eighteen 
families interviewed have goats: Janjao has 140 goats, Jose Tancredo has 80, 
Raimundinho has 50, and two other families have 40 each. Seven families have ten or 
less. Fifteen of the families keep sheep (which are raised for their meat - the climate is 
not adequate for wool), the largest herds being around 30. Del90 buys and sells goats 
both at the feira and to his neighbors 
Erico sells one goat a month at R$5/kg. Rogerio sells 30 head a year. Adenor has 
sold 4 goats over a 2 year period at RS70 each. Jose Carlos sells 4-5 goats a year at 
R$4.50-5 per kg. 
Raimundinho is one of two trained goat herders for the Association. As noted 
above, the herders are not paid for their work but receive one kid for each three born. 
Seven families have beef cattle - the largest herd (belonging to Janjao) being 11 
head, but most around five or six. Two other families keep cows. Only two raise pigs. 
Most families have chickens - usually around 11-15, although one family has 60. 
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Eight families have a horse, donkey or mule. Four settlers have animal-drawn 
plows. 
Fifteen families planted grass (capim) for grazing, ranging in area from 4 to 21 
tarefas. Fifteen families raise palma - a cactus usually used for animal feed (it can be 
consumed by humans when necessary); fourteen of the families had 3 tarefas or less, 
although Janjao and Irineide had 4 tarefas. Many of the families have hog plum (umbu) 
- a small, edible fruit that grows wild in the fields, which most also use for animal feed. 
Sisal is the most important crop. As noted above, a 2005 NATE report estimated 
potential sisal sales for the settlement as a whole at R$252,000, of which approximately 
R$ 100,000 was from collective lands. The remainder, processed by the Association, is 
from the family lots. Allowing 20-30% for processing, this should result in family 
income from sisal averaging between R$3500 - 4000 a year. 
However, these are projections for the future. Only one interviewee - Jose 
Tancredo - reported significant personal income (R$1000) from sisal in 2005, although 
several mentioned the importance of the collective sisal crop. 
Sixteen families interviewed grew sisal, most of it planted after the purchase of 
the land, although (in addition to the collective sisal) two interviewees - Francisco Dias 
(who lived on the land prior to the purchase) and Jose Carlos - had some older sisal. 
Most interviewees had approximately six tarefas of sisal, but others had considerably 
more: Francisco Dias (30 tarefas), Jose Carlos (28), Getulio (16), and two (Adenor and 
Renan) had none. 
Eleven families raised corn interspersed with black beans in areas ranging from 
two to seven tarefas. Two families raised corn alone. Janjao stated that he plants bean 
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and corn only for consumption, and this seems to be the case for a number of families. 
However, some sell their excess production. 
Getulio, for instance, harvested fifteen sacks of beans, and sold seven in town at 
$R45 each. He also sold 29 "colhidas" of corn (20 ears) at R$16 each. Rogerio harvests 
20 sacks of beans a year, and sells half of them. Telfo sells 30% of what he produces 
(bean & corn). Jose Tancredo sold 5 sacks of beans @ R40 and 10 sacks of corn @ 16. 
Raimundinho also said that he sells beans, but did not indicate the quantity. 
The only settler who reported more than a few hundred reais from bean sales was 
Edeon. He reported that he sold 40 sacks of black beans in 2004 at R$55-60 each, 
revenue in excess of R$2200. 
Del<?o mentioned that he could rent land outside of the settlement area for 
planting beans at R$100 per tarefa. He was apparently considering doing so. He owns a 
Chevrolet pickup, which provides him with greater mobility than most settlers. He told 
us that his father owns a 500 ha .fazenda 30 km east of Veneza. 
Seven families interviewed had small plantings (<3 tarefas) of vegetables -
squash, manioc, cord beans, sweet potatoes, aipi cassava. One family had 14 tarefas. 
Two families had small crops of castor oil plants (mamona). Delfo tried planting castor 
oil, but was unsuccessful. 
On their house lots, settlers had planted fruit trees (guava, a^erola, orange, passion 
fruit, etc.), cotton, and small quantities of vegetables. 
Non-farm income can also be important. Tel^o's household is an example. 
Although he is sixty-four, he does not yet receive a retirement pension. He hires out as a 
day-worker approximately seven days a month, earning R$14/day. His wife is a 
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luncheon assistant (merendeira) at the school, earning a minimum salary (approximately 
R$300). Their 18 year old son also works half days as a day laborer, and studies the 
other half. The family earns an additional R$25/month selling homemade sweets. The 
family has 20 goats, a donkey, 2 ha. of sisal, 12 tarefas of grazing land, four tarefas of 
corn, and three of palma. 
Similarly, Walter, who is fifty-nine, is trying to get a retirement pension, but there 
is a long waiting list. He earns about R$20/month selling tanks of gas for cooking. His 
wife, Dalva, sews and sends clothes to her daughter in Sao Paulo to sell. Walter works as 
a daily laborer when he can, sells beans, and sells livestock when necessary. The family 
has over 60 goats and sheep, 8 beef cattle, 15 chickens, a donkey and cart, 5 tarefas co-
planted with beans and corn, 2 ha. of sisal, 1 ha. of palma, and 20 tarefas of grazing land 
(he also uses the ecological reserve for grazing). 
In addition to Walter, Tel^o, and Te^o's son, two other men mentioned working 
as day-laborers (at R$14/day) as a significant source of income. Joao Rodrigues, the 21-
year-old son of settlers, earns somewhat less (R$10-12/day) driving the Association 
tractor. 
Demo's wife is a teacher's aide in the school, earning a minimum salary. She is 
studying for her undergraduate degree at the university branch in Euclides da Cunha. 
Two interviewees receive old-age pensions. Eight of the families interviewed, 
and five others in the settlement, receive the bolsa escola/familia, ranging between R$65 
and R$95/month. One family had a $ 15 bolsa that was discontinued and another family 
had registered for the bolsa and was waiting. 
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Sufficiency of income: When asked whether family income was sufficient, only one 
interviewee responded "yes." Five families answered "no." Most indicated that income 
is barely sufficient. 
"It has to be [sufficient]" ("tern que dar")- (Delijo) 
"[It's] on the edge (meu balangado). There are tight weeks. At times [paid] work 
is lacking [since] the sisal work stopped." (Raimundo) 
"It is more tight than tranquil" ("Mais apertada do que sossegada") (Francisco & 
Rosenilde) 
Several interviewees mentioned that they were waiting for the land to produce. 
Jose Tancredo stated that the land currently creates expenses, not income. Two families 
mentioned that they were surviving based on the R$95/month they receive from bolsa 
escola. An underlying sense of hope was voiced by Rogerio, who - when asked if 
income is sufficient - answered, "not yet." 
Settler Attitudes: 
Satisfaction: Partially, perhaps, because it is the newest of the communities 
studied, settler enthusiasm in Veneza was among the highest we encountered. Of 27 
settlers interviewed, twenty-four were definite in saying that they would not trade or sell 
their land. One woman said she would leave if she could find a better place, and one 
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couple said they wouldn't sell, but would trade for a lot in another location if it were a 
good one. Twenty respondents stated that life is better in the settlement than it was 
before, and for eight of these it is "much better." 
"In the beginning it was difficult... there wasn't either electricity or water. In 
December [2005] they opened a new well." (Irineide) 
"Some things are better. There we had more peace - we had water. What is 
better here is that we have a chance to have livestock - there we had less than one 
tarefa [of land]" (Ines) 
"Before we had water but we didn't have land, we had meat but we didn't have 
work." (Edeon) 
Future: The interviewees were overwhelmingly optimistic about the future. Most 
envisioned increased livestock and sisal production. Several mentioned that results will 
depend upon their work. 
"We will produce more. The Association will have good income. We have to 
work to move things forward. It's not easy." (Claudio) 
"We are gaining experience." (Edeon) 
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In this, the most arid of the communities studied, there is an intense awareness of 
climate: 
"[Things will be] 100% better - if God sends rain." (Walter) 
"If there is no drought, it will be better - if there is, it will be worse." (Adenor) 
"If it rains, it will be better - everything depends on rain." (Irineide) 
Attitudes toward the land as the future of their families varied. Edeon stated that 
in five years his family hopes to have a house in town - one son, who likes the land, will 
stay there. Raimundo wants his children to study and grow - but to really know the land; 
he doesn't want them to go to the city, but to grow on the land. Jose Tancredo wants to 
increase his landholdings - buy more land for the children that are with him and to enable 
his older children to return from Sao Paulo. 
But Francisco Dias feels that "The young people won't stay." Eighteen-year-old 
Douglas wants to become more qualified as a mechanic and have his own garage in ten 
years. Irineide wants her children to graduate from school and seek "a better life, other 
fields of work." 
Socio-Politcal Awareness: In answer to the questions as to who is for or against 
the rural worker, most interviewees had general answers or none at all. Cited in favor of 
the rural worker were Lula (6), the Federal Government (3), Maria Djalma (3), and 
CDA/CAR (2). As against the rural worker, the responses included nobody/don't know 
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(7), big landowners (2) - although Edeon clarified that it was only big landowners who 
were politicians. He also felt that people from southern Brazil, who do not respect the 
Northeast, represented a barrier. And Janjao mentioned politicians who pretend to be in 
favor of land reform but who in practice are against it. 
On a highly practical note, Edeon stated that the main force working against the 
rural workers was the bank, which wasn't dispersing loans in a timely manner. Similarly, 
Erico felt that lack of available land and financing were the biggest barrier to the rural 
worker. 
Attitudes toward the MST varied. Walter noted that there is an MST invasion not 
far from them - Fazenda Jua - where twenty to thirty families had been for the last five 
years: "I think it's wrong to invade. I wouldn't... but the guys want to work." Similarly 
Renan stated that he doesn't favor invasion, but that "There are many who want land and 
can't get it through agrarian reform - [so they] invade." 
Perhaps exposure to a nearby MST settlement was one factor that made settler 
opinions toward the MST more nuanced than in some other settlements. However, some 
interviewees seemed to gain their information about the MST primarily from television. 
Edeon stated that this explicitly in his case. He also had sympathy with the workers: 
"[It's] a way of demanding rights." But he felt that a great number of them lost out in the 
face of resistance from landowners and gunmen. 
Raimundo Monies felt that "No one knows who is right." He respected the 
MST's struggle, but said that it is sad when workers are killed. 
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Other comments included: 
"We see ugly things - invasion. It is better to negotiate." (Delpo) 
"There are people who need land. [The MST] helps." (Duvalina) 
"[We are] against. It provokes tragedy. [They should] search for a 
program similar to the Cedula da Terra." (Adenor & Raimunda) 
"It's good and bad at the same time. It's wrong to break things as they 
have been doing." (Telt^o) 
"The struggle is right - to achieve agrarian reform. The manner in which 
they [carry out the] struggle is wrong." (Raimundo & Monalisa) 
"The Movement in itself is good. Certain actions are not good. Invasions, 
for example." (Getulio) 
"Some [participants of MST] want agrarian reform. Others only want... 
[to create] confusion." (Janjao) 
With respect to politics, as in all the settlements, the interviewees were largely 
supporters of Lula. Eighteen interviewees had supported Lula in the first round of 
elections, six Ciro Gomes, and two Serra (the Ciro Gomes votes split 4-2 in favor of Lula 
in the second round). Sixteen said they would support Lula in the upcoming election, 
three Alkmin, and three were undecided; one other woman said she would not support 
Lula but was undecided as to which other candidate to choose. Claudio stated that he 
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thought Alkmin and Lula were both good candidates, but that "Lula understands the rural 
Northeast." 
Only five interviewees identified with a party - four with the PFL and one (Tel<?o) 
with the PT. However, three of those who identified with the PFL intended to vote for 
Lula. 
Strengths/Vulnerabilities/Recommendations: 
"I have never seen a project more sustainable than this one." (Maria Djalma, 
interview, March 21, 2006) 
Maria Djalma has served as technical advisor to several Cedula da Terra and 
Credito Fundiario projects, and has visited many more. Her opinion carries weight. 
During our interviews at Fazenda Nova, we noted a high degree of optimism. As 
noted above, it is necessary to take into account the relative newness of the settlement -
when we visited, Fazenda Nova had been functioning for only four years and still had 
SIC funds available. Although the first land payment had successfully been made, the 
first repayment of PRONAF A funds had not yet fallen due. It is to be expected that 
some of the initial settler enthusiasm would still be in place. 
Bolstering that enthusiasm, and giving it a more solid footing, was the enviable 
position of the Association with its substantial sisal crop. Association income, 
principally from sisal, allowed the Association to pay for medical expenses, contribute 
funds for settlement celebrations, and pay settlers (and their grown children) to work on 
Association projects. This last is particularly important for community morale, both 
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ameliorating the issue of who performs Association work and providing a source of 
income for families that are having difficulty with cash flow. Some of the other 
communities we visited provided such paid labor out of SIC funds but had to stop doing 
so once SIC was used up. It appears that the Veneza Association may be able to continue 
such payments on a permanent basis. 
The accidental burning of a quarter of the Association sisal planting illustrated 
community resilience. This was a significant set back - the estimated annual cost to the 
community being in the range of R$30,000. But, although regretted, it by no means 
seemed to discourage or even seriously worry the community, which was already looking 
into replanting the burned area. 
Also encouraging was that the Association had moved up the supply chain with 
respect to sisal. Having obtained the appropriate decortication equipment, the 
Association extracts the fiber which allowed it to obtain a larger percentage of the total 
final price. 
The community is leveraging well the by-products of its produce. Animal manure 
and manioc residue are both used for fertilizer, and sisal residue for goat feed. 
The settlement does, however, have vulnerabilities. The one most noted by the 
people themselves is climate. Sisal is well adapted to the semi-arid region and is highly 
drought resistant. A prolonged dry period, however, would affect the settlers' ability to 
grow supplemental food crops. We recommend that the community consider using some 
of the rainwater cachement techniques developed for the semi-arid region by such NGOs 
as MOC and CAATINGA. 
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Drought could also impact stock raising. In this respect, the significant planting 
of palma - a drought-resistant cactus - serves as an excellent hedge. Palma has long 
been used in the Brazilian Northeast during dry periods to feed animals - and, in severe 
droughts, human beings. It also serves as a source of nutrients when fed to animals on a 
regular basis. 
The danger of overgrazing needs to be considered. Though the use of animal 
ration developed from palma, sisal residue, and other local ingredients can extend the 
natural grazing capacity of the land, we saw no evidence that the community has 
considered placing limits on the size of herds. We are concerned that some settlers are 
grazing animals in the environmental reserve. 
The de facto organic farming of the settlers is encouraging. Generally, chemical 
fertilizer is not used in growing sisal. However, with respect to other crops, settlers may 
be currently depending to a large degree on natural fertility, as the land was fallow for 
some time. There may be a growing need to use fertilizers in the future. We would 
encourage the settlers to seek orientation in organic methods and to more consciously 
pursue organic practices. Especially given the delicate balance of the semi-arid area in 
which Veneza is located, we would also recommend that the community seek to become 
aware of the value of the environmental reserve and of best ecological practices 
generally. 
As with any commodity cash crop, sisal is subject to market forces beyond the 
control of settlement dwellers. Current international demand for sisal fiber is strong, but 
markets fluctuate. Given the limits of the semi-arid climate, the settlement has taken 
steps to diversify: having two principal activities, sisal and stock-raising. Beyond the 
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raising of food crops for consumption and small scale marketing, which the community 
has already undertaken, it is difficult to envision what further forms of diversification 
might be possible, but we believe that an effort should be made to examine all such 
possibilities thoroughly. 
This being said, it is our opinion that Fazenda Veneza exhibits characteristics that 
make its sustainability over the next generation highly likely. The agricultural-economic 
base is relatively strong, leadership seems to be reasonably capable, the Association well 
organized, and there seems to be a high level of satisfaction and cohesiveness within the 
community. 
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CHAPTER VI 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Case Study Analysis 
Is market-based land reform potentially an effective instrument to redistribute 
land to working farmers in a socially, environmentally, and economically sustainable 
manner? 
This is the primary research question posed by our study. Case study interviews 
and observations were structured to provide information that could lead us to predict 
whether there is a reasonable probability that the seven land settlements we visited will 
be sustainable. "Sustainable" was defined as follows: that the settlements be socially, 
environmentally, and economically viable for at least a generation (±25 years). Questions 
were based on the sustainability indicators discussed in Chapter II. 
Even positive results from the seven settlements studied would not, of course, 
definitively answer the research question. As noted in Chapter II, we purposely selected 
communities that we believed to be relatively successful (see Tendler 1997). The 
success of these communities might be an anomaly; if only seven successful communities 
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resulted from the entire market-based land reform program in Brazil, the program itself 
would hardly be viable. 
Case study research is seldom definitive; we agree with Seidman (1998, 111) that 
"Much of what you learn may be tentative, suggesting further research." The current 
study provides a strong basis for such further research. But our readings and interviews 
also suggest that the cases here presented represent a sampling of a larger number of 
reasonably successful MBLR settlements. Perhaps most important, our study - together 
with those of other researchers - may aid policy makers and program technicians in 
understanding what factors help or hinder land settlement viability. 
Yin (1994, 102-103) notes that there are "few fixed formulas or cookbook 
recipes" for analyzing case study results, and that a good deal depends on the 
"investigator's own style of rigorous thinking, along with the sufficient presentation of 
evidence and careful consideration of alternative interpretations." At the same time, and 
in no way contradicting this rigor, the validity of the investigator's intuition needs to be 
recognized, although it is still incumbent on the investigator to articulate as fully as 
feasible the criteria used by intuition in selecting threads of fact (Seidman, 109). 
In the present case, rigorous thinking included careful design of the interview 
questions to respond to key research questions, and organization of the case study 
presentations. These were done in such a way as to allow relatively easy comparison of 
factors across the seven communities - demographics, water, income/production, etc. 
Features that particularly distinguished one community from others were also flagged. 
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Key Research Questions 
In support of the primary research question, our Research Proposal set out six 
secondary research questions. Those questions are answered in summary form here 
based on the experience of the seven settlements studied. 
What is the facility of the process (of acquiring land and 
establishing/maintaining the settlement) from the point of view of the purchasing 
farmers? 
This question needs to be placed in the context of land reform in Brazil. The 
traditional methods for obtaining land in Brazil have been settler occupation (or invasion) 
of land and/or expropriation of land by the Government. Both of these methods usually 
take years to concretize.439 Occupation at times leads to violent conflict and is often 
frustrated where the owner resists physically and/or legally. Expropriation (except in 
cases where the owner wants the land to be expropriated) can be held up in the courts for 
years. 
Against this background, the processes in the communities studied were 
comparatively less difficult and more certain, although they were in some cases longer 
and more difficult than they should have been. 
In some communities, the difficulty was not so much in obtaining the land - a 
process that went fairly quickly - as in the following stages. Thus in Boa Vista III 
(helped by the considerable experience developed by CELANOR over the prior three 
439 For instance, Fernandes (2006, 7) states that "The land expropriation process can take as long as five 
years..." and that "Some settlements existing for more than ten years still have few public services 
available." 
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years) and in Moita Redonda (see below), the land acquisition process was relatively 
rapid. But release of funds - especially for housing construction - slowed settlement: in 
Boa Vista III, a year and a half lapsed between land purchase (June 8, 1998) and real 
settlement of the area (late 1999/early 2000); in Moita Redonda, the lapse between 
purchase (September 1998) and settlement (September 2001) was two years. In 
addition, the continued failure of state officials to register replacement families in Moita 
Redonda has undoubtedly been a factor in that community's slow stabilization. 
Even where delays in funding did not slow settlement, they often delayed 
investment essential to the long-range stabilization of the communities. This was 
especially the case with respect to the five communities in which fruit-raising is an 
essential element, as fruit groves require three-five years to begin commercial production. 
Thus, for instance, Moita Redonda was purchased in 1998, settled in September 2001, but 
PRONAF-A funding that permitted full-scale planting of fruit trees was only authorized 
in December of 2002 - allowing planting in early 2003. Full maturation of the orange 
groves would occur in 2008 - 10 years after purchase. A key element necessary for 
economic sustainability of the settlement was thus delayed up to four years beyond what 
might have been achieved. 
The birth of Nova Lusitania was very difficult, in part because it was one of the 
first four Cedula da Terra settlements in the state - all organized by CELANOR and all 
purchased on November 9, 1997. State officials and local technical advisors, as well as 
the farmers themselves, were learning by doing.440 These were the first agro-vilas - a 
concept promoted by CELANOR that subsequently became standard. Evaluation of the 
440 "In the beginning [1997-8], nobody knew how to do it." Maria Djalma, interview March 25, 2006. 
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land purchased was not adequate. SIC and PRONAF funds were not available until 2002. 
Because technical assistance depended to a certain extent on such funding, technical 
assistance was suspended for awhile in 2000. 
Moita Redona's acquisition was facilitated through the influence of local 
politicians, although it still took almost two years between the time the group initiated the 
search for land and the purchase date. This political help may have come at a cost, partly 
because of inclusion of some inappropriate urban background settlers (all of whom have 
since left), and partly because continued intervention by local politicians in the 
community is disruptive. In addition, in the opinion of the local technician, the relative 
ease of obtaining the land may have caused some settlers to undervalue it. 
In Vila Canaa, the acquisition negotiation was handled largely by the settlers 
themselves. It proceeded relatively rapidly, being completed in less than a year. Settlers 
did have to extra-legally contribute R$300 per family to meet the gap between the price 
the landholder wanted and what the government was willing to pay; this is not permitted 
in the program, but it worked and saved the deal from falling through. Additional 
funding (SIC) was held up for about eighteen months due to political issues, but was then 
released. 
In Passos de Esperan^a, the acquisition process was more difficult. It took the 
association three years from the time it organized to locate and buy land. When the land 
was located, the government only authorized the association to buy 450 ha of the 500 ha 
available. 
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Boa Vista - Biritinga actually had its birth in Campolandia, a semi-successful land 
occupation; although in 2006 that occupation continued to exist, the settlers after eleven 
years had not won legal right to stay on the land. Settlers from Campolandia, frustrated 
by the lack of progress there, formed the core of the initial settlers in Biritinga (20 of the 
37 families came from Campolandia). By comparison, legal right to Boa Vista - Biritinga 
was obtained in less than a year. Interestingly, in this case, settlers began moving onto 
the land in 2000, prior to the actual purchase in June, 2001. However, it required another 
four years for settlers to obtain an adequate water supply - an essential component of 
their settlement package. Shortage of water, together with a leadership struggle and the 
presence of some settlers unsuited or uncommitted to rural life, led to high attrition in the 
early years. 
In Veneza, the newest of the settlements, both the acquisition process and 
financing went smoothly. Beyond the 749 ha purchased, the landowner donated an 
additional 255 ha. The settlement was benefited by the substantial plantation of sisal 
already on the land. 
The Importance of SIC and PRONAF. Integrally related to the ease of acquisition 
is the SIC component of the Cedula da Terra program. This program, discussed in the 
Overview of Case Studies, provides funding - as a grant, not a loan - for housing, 
fencing, basic infrastructure, and some initial planting (e.g., fruit trees), equipment, and 
small productive projects. 
Berta Veloso and Antonio Fernando da Silva, state agronomists who worked with 
a large number of land reform programs throughout Bahia, briefly compared the Cedula 
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da Terra to the Banco da Terra,441 another market-based land reform program that did 
not include the equivalent of the SIC. They frankly stated that the SIC made the Cedula 
da Terra much more viable. 442 SIC provided the groundwork for the communities to 
move rapidly beyond land acquisition into productivity. 
Closely related to this is the PRONAF-A program, which provides subsidized 
agricultural loans for land reform settlements. In his study of the Cedula da Terra in 
Ceara, Gomes de Alencar (2002) found access to such credit to be one of the positive 
points that settlers mentioned as a result to land reform.443 Although none of our 
interviewees explicitly stated it in that way, the great majority made use of the PRONAF-
A credit, and several had advanced to PRONAF-A/C - the shorter term "custeio " loans. 
Indeed, several interviewees noted the need for greater amounts of working capital. In 
Moita Redonda, the technical advisor encouraged settlers to join the local rural credit 
union, and a few had done so. Access to credit and to financial information and skills is 
an area in which these communities could develop significantly; we sensed a readiness to 
learn if more opportunities to do so were made available. We recommend that further 
training in this area be provided to settlers, beginning as early in the settlement process as 
feasible. 
441 The Banco da Terra, created in 1998, was a parallel program run by the Brazilian government with 
slightly different goals. Unlike the Cedula da Terra and the Credito Fundiario, the Banco da Terra was 
not aimed at poverty alleviation per se, did not limit beneficiaries to the poor, foresaw reimbursement of all 
expenditures (not just land costs), and allowed for financings up to R$40,000 per beneficiary (compared to 
a combined ceiling of R$ 15,000 under the other two programs) (Teofilo and Prado Garcia 2003, 30). 
442 Interview January 31, 2006. 
443 Germani and Carvalho (2001, 93) raise the question as to whether the nature of the title (i.e., that land is 
titled through the association rather than individually) will inhibit future access to credit from other 
sources. We have not heard this concern expressed elsewhere, but it merits further examination. 
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What is the relative quality and value of the land purchased, in comparison 
with other land reform procedures in Brazil? 
A significant concern with land reform programs in Brazil has been the use of 
relatively marginal lands for land reform. This is the case with expropriation, where 
landowners may make available for expropriation and/or not resist the expropriation of 
lands that they view as less valuable/desirable. In addition, under Brazilian law, only 
non-productive land can be expropriated, a rule that tends to limit the availability of land 
to lower quality parcels or to geographical areas distant from markets. The non-
productive land rule does not apply to land purchased through the Cedula da Terra and 
similar market-based programs, but the former factor - that the current landholder has to 
be willing to part with the land - certainly does apply. Critics express concern that 
landowners will retain the best land and sell marginal/less good lands to the settlers.444 
In three of the seven cases we studied, this seems to have occurred. It is probable 
that the reforestation companies that sold land with impacted soil to the Nova Lusitania 
community and, perhaps to a lesser extent, Boa Vista III, were aware of the problem and 
did not share this information with the purchasers. 
In Biritinga, the landowner sold the settlers a portion of the land that was without 
a readily usable source of water - although in this case the transaction was transparent, 
444 "It is also not possible to avoid... that landowners put their worst land on the market." (Buainain, et al. 
1999,26) 
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the purchasers being aware of the situation.445 As noted above, it took the settlers four 
years to obtain an adequate water supply, a considerable hardship. However, the 
essential fertility of the land seems to be adequate. 
At the other end of the spectrum, the land in Vila Canaa, which had been fallow 
(as pasture) for some years prior to settlement, is very fertile. It has proven to be 
excellent land for beans and other crops, and has substantially increased in value. 
In the remaining settlements, the quality land seems to be neither substantially 
better nor worse than the general land in each respective geographical area. Biritinga, 
Moita Redonda, and Passos de Esperansa are all reasonably fertile. 
Veneza, although typical of the very dry area in which it is located, represents 
something of a warning sign. As land values increase, MBLR programs are pushed 
toward areas where cheaper land is available.446 This issue was confirmed by Maria 
Djalma, the technical advisor for Vila Canaa and Veneza. She noted the difference in 
quality of those areas, acquired respectively in 1998 and 2002. She told us that, although 
there is tremendous interest, especially among the young adult children of settlers, in 
opening additional MBLR areas, it was becoming difficult for her to find land at the price 
authorized by the government.447 
445 It should be noted that Biritinga was also by far the least expensive land per hectare - see Table VII-A. 
446 Deininger (1999) notes that, in order for MBLR programs not to raise the cost of land, the ideal ratio of 
land supply to demand should be 3:1. In the region in which Maria Djalma is working, there is no 
indication that the increase in land prices is a result of MBLR programs (this confirms Teofilo and Prado 
Garcia's finding (2003, 31-32) with respect to the program generally). Prices have risen for other reasons, 
most notably recent recognition that the region is excellent for raising beans. 
447 Under both the Cedula da Terra and Credito Fundiario programs, the ceiling allowed for land purchase 
plus grant (SIC) is R$15,000 (Teofilo and Prado Garcia 2003, 31). As to the importance of the program 
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N. Lusitania 806.00 26 11/09/97 104,780 130.00 4,030 
B. Vista III 1,375.00 55 06/08/98 178,750 130.00 3,250 
V. Canaa 1,649.00 73 05/25/98 247,350 150.00 3,388 
V. Canaa448 269,250 163.28 3,688 
Moita R. 677.00 50 09/18/98 172,355 254.58 3,447 
Biritinga 807.40 37 06/19/01 74,280 91.99 2,008 
P. Esperan. 450.00 30 12/26/01 130,000 288.88 4,333 
Veneza 749.50 30 10/04/02 130,00044V 173.45 4,333 
Veneza450 1004.79 129.38 
Table VII-A sets forth the price of the land per hectare and, perhaps more 
important, per family settled - as comparatively higher per hectare prices (Moita 
Redonda and Passos de Esperan^a) may be justified by the quality of the land being able 
to sustain more families. In most cases, these figures for the settlements studied are 
having a price ceiling, see e.g. Buainain et al (1999, 26), who suggest that the structure of the Cedula da 
Terra program - with associations of buyers who know that they are going to have to bear the cost of the 
land - is the best mechanism, in theory, for assuring a good balance between land price and quality. 
448 Vila Canaa Settlers contributed R$300 each extra-legally to augment the land purchase = R$21,900.00. 
This increases the real land price from R$150 to RS163.28 per ha. 
449 Land price is estimated based on SAT. 
450 The landowner contributed 255.29 ha. without additional charge. This decreases the real land price 
from RS173.45 to RS129.38 per ha. 
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roughly comparable to those for the entire Cedula da Terra program, which were an 
average of RS191 per hectare451 and R$4,759 per family (Childress and Munoz 2008, 
l).452 The notable exception is Biritinga, where both the price per hectare and the price 
of land per family are considerably lower than both the program average and the other 
settlements visited. 
Table VII-B sets forth the cost of each settlement in terms of SAT and SIC 
investment. With the exception of Veneza, which is something of an anomaly (the owner 
donated over 25% of the land, and the exchange rates for dollars were highly skewed), 
cost per family ranged from approximately US$7700 to $9400, with four projects in the 
$8500-9000 range. This compares with R$ 11,975 (approximately US$80 00453) per 
family planned for the Cedula da Terra program generally (Lambais 2007, 18). 
These costs also compare favorably with the cost of land reform programs 
generally. According to INCRA (2002), the cost of land only for resettled families 
ranged from R$ 19,412.74 (at R$382.67 per hectare) in 1995454 - when no MBLR 
451 The average for Bahia was higher - R$230/ha (Teofilo and Prado Garcia (2003, 31). 
452 Gomes de Alencar, in his study of the Cedula da Terra in Ceara (2002, 30-31), cautions against 
overemphasis on low per hectare or per beneficiary costs. He studied three settlements where land cost 
ranged from R$349/ha and R$6,825/family to R$89.35/ha and R$4,280/family. He concluded that only the 
most expensive of these three was likely to be able to pay off its debts - the other two were not sufficiently 
productive. 
453 This figure is obtained by averaging the exchange rates for 1997-2000, when the majority of Cedula da 
Terra programs were carried out. Pursuant to theory (see, e.g. Deininger 1998), the total for SAT/SIC per 
beneficiary was to be identical for all program beneficiaries, the cost of land (SAT) being deducted from 
that total as a loan, and the remainder remaining as a grant to the community. One purpose of this was to 
encourage communities to negotiate hard on the land as they would thereby have more SIC funds (and less 
high loans). Although the basic loan-grant structure was maintained, the equal distribution to all 
beneficiaries seems not to have been followed. 
454 In Brazil, with respect to INCRA expropriations prior to the Cardoso administration, "...anecdotal 
evidence of excessive compensation abounds" (Deininger 1999, 23 n. 32; see Ministerio de 
Desenvolvimento Agrario 1999; Gondim 2001a and 2001b). 
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programs had yet been implemented - to R$8,294.83 - 9,701.00 (at approximately R$260 
per hectare) in 1998-2000 (Teofilo and Prado Garcia 2003, 22). Thus the average price 
of land for all land reform programs was, in 1998-2000, almost twice that of the Cedula 
da Terra program. 
Table VII-B - Cost per family in US$455 
Settlement SAT R$ SAT US$ SIC US$ Total US$ US$ Cost 
per family 
N. Lusitania 110,019 99,565 131,967 231,532 8,950.08 
B. Vista III 194,425 168,655 301,925 470,580 8,556.00 
V. Canaa 259,718 225,254 335,945 561,199 7,687.66 
V. Canaa * +21,900 +18,994 +18,994 +260.19 
Moita R. 186,500 157,917 313,210 471,127 9,422,54 
Biritinga 82,434 33,361 294,750 328,111 8,867.86 
P. Esperan. 143,906 62,029 201,645 263,674 8,789.13 
Veneza ** 143,907 39,589 55,473 95,062 3,168.734i6 
If one compares years prior to institution of the Cedula da Terra, the price of land 
alone under INCRA expropriation programs were over four times as much. The total 
455 US$ figures for SIC are (except for Veneza) from CDA "Programa Cedula da Terra, Projetos 1997-
2001 (c. 2002). SAT figures are provided in R$, converted to US$ as of the contract date for each 
settlement. Numbers for Veneza were provided by the technical advisor, Maria Djalma, all in R$ - the US$ 
figure for Veneza's SIC is an estimate based on an average exchange rate for the years it was in effect. 
456 In 2002 the exchange rate changed dramatically - from R$2.32/US$1 in December 2001, to 
R$3.635/US$1 in October 2002. This accounts in part for the dramatically reduced US$ cost per family in 
Veneza. However, even if adjusted to the 2002 exchange rate and allowing a 1.34 multiplier to the SAT to 
account for the value of the land donated by the landowner, the Veneza cost per family would be 
approximately $5670, considerably less than any other project. 
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average cost per beneficiary of those expropriations has been estimated at US$30,000 
(Deininger 1998, 23), again almost four times as much as the Cedula da Terra. 
It should be noted, however, that the total government investment in the Cedula 
da Terra settlement areas goes beyond SAT and SIC, including - in some settlements -
government subsidized water and energy projects and special projects such as the Boa 
Vista III bolacha factory. In addition, in all land reform areas, there is the general cost of 
subsidized loans (PRONAF), not to mention Bolsa Escola/Bolsa Familia subsidies, 
which are available to low-income families throughout Brazil.457 
What is the quality of technical assistance provided? 
Berta Veloso considers quality of technical assistance to be one of the most 
important factors in settlement success. She specifically focused on the person of the 
technical advisor, stating that she has seen programs saved by dedicated extension 
agronomists.458 Similarly, Maria Djalma noted that, in cases where the technical advisor 
was not interested and stopped accompanying a program, the settlements were often not 
successful.459 
457 De Janvry, Finan, and Sadoulet (2006, 23), in a study of the impact of the Bolsa Escola in the Brazilian 
Northeast, found it increased school attendance 7.8%. 
458 Berta Veloso de Passos. Interview, January 31, 2006. 
459 Maria Djalma Andrade de Abreu. Interview, March 15, 2006. 
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On the whole, we were very favorably impressed by the quality and dedication of 
the technical assistance provided during the early stages of settlement. This may be in 
part because the settlements we studied were relatively successful.460 
It should be noted that, while agricultural advice constitutes an important element 
of such assistance, good assistance goes beyond that to include orientation in preparing 
proposals, advice on loan programs, orientation on association rules and practice, 
discussions regarding administration of collective areas, helping communities develop 
strategies for the future, and a general willingness to accompany settlement dwellers -
and especially leaders - through the entire process of community formation and 
maintenance. One of the most effective technical advisors, Maria Djalma Andrade de 
Abreu, who accompanies Vila Canaa and Veneza, is not an agronomist but a dynamic 
sociologist, deeply concerned with the welfare of the communities, knowing the 
settlement dwellers personally and accompanying their activities on a regular, ongoing 
basis.461 
At Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista III, excellent technical assistance was initially . 
provided by CELANOR. a non-governmental organization. However, CELANOR's 
experience raises certain concerns. Technical assistance is provided by non-government 
460 Germani and Carvalho (2001, 49-50, 89), who studied three Cedula da Terra settlements in Bahia, are 
very critical of the technical assistance provided generally. Nonetheless, with respect to the Antonio 
Conselheiro settlement, a close neighbor of Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista III (the only settlement they 
studied in the regions we visited), they acknowledge that the settlers were satisfied with their technical 
assistance and that production had increased. 
461 "Settlers leave family and structure to come to a new place with people they may not know, under rules 
they are not used to." Maria Djalma, interview March 15, 2006. She points out that not all of the women 
can arrive in the settlements right away - often the men go first. Some wives want to leave, some couples 
separate, there can be issues of domestic violence. "The technical advisor must have sensitivity to family 
problems." 
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technicians - either non-profit groups like CELANOR or independent agricultural 
assistance offices, as in the case of the other five settlements. The assistance is initially 
paid for as a portion (8%) of SIC, and subsequently as a portion of PRONAF-A loans.462 
When the government delayed considerably in disbursing these funds, technical 
assistance had to be suspended. 
As SIC is used up and the first phase of PRONAF-A loans finishes, these funds 
become less available. If CELANOR had not been able to become part of the Just Juice 
program, it might not have been able to continue giving assistance. Indeed in 2006, in 
Nova Lusitania, the oldest of the communities, where SIC and PRONAF funds had been 
spent, almost no ongoing support was being provided to the administrators of the 
association (the settlement was considered "emancipated" from government tutelage, 
although certain rules still applied until the land was fully paid for). CELANOR could 
provide only very limited agricultural assistance, and only to those settlers who were 
engaged in or tending toward organic farming.463 
We identified a need in several of the communities for more in depth and 
continuing assistance. For instance, we found that communities needed help in 
interpreting charters and by-laws (as noted, we were able in several communities to 
462 In c. 1991, a CPT agent in Tocantins expressed concern to me that the payment of technical assistance 
from loan funds inclines the technicians toward advising settlement dwellers to take out loans (such as 
PRONAF) even when it may not be in their best interest to do so. Although we saw no evidence of that 
having happened in the settlements we visited, her concern about a potential conflict of interest is valid. 
463 In Moita Redonda, technical assistance lapsed due to political factors - the local politician who had 
helped the community did not like the technical advisor, and vice versa. The community association 
terminated the advisor's contract but called him back after six months because they needed his advice. 
421 
explain that the charters allowed participation of non-titleholding spouses464). There was 
also a need for accompaniment in the planning and carrying out of industrialization 
projects - such as the bolacha factory in Boa Vista III and the possibility of 
family/community cashew nut processing. Several interviewees, including technical 
advisors, noted that the trainings offered through CDA were useful but not sufficient. We 
believe that ongoing technical support to these communities would significantly enhance 
their ability to identify and carry out productive community projects. 
In terms of continuing agricultural accompaniment, there is no provision to pay 
for this other than the technical assistance fee connected with PRONAF loans. Other 
regions of Brazil have well developed agricultural extension services, although our 
experience is that most extension workers are not trained to work with small farmers or 
with organic and alternative farming methods.465 The ongoing presence of either state 
extension workers, adequately prepared to work with small farmers, or of a mechanism 
capable of supporting independent agronomists (NGOs and/or private firms), seems to us 
to be highly desirable in helping the settlements achieve and maintain sustainable 
production.466 
464 This issue arose in all of the communities except Biritinga, where the non-titleholding spouses were 
actively participating. 
465 In the State of Espirito Santo, in the late 1960s, AC ARES - the state agricultural extension agency -
established a well-developed program for small farmers, including not only agricultural advise, but social 
workers trained in community organization. This was made possible in part due to the large number of 
small farmers in the state and their consequent political clout. When we were living in Tocantins in the 
1990s, the local extension worker in the municipio of Itacaja was knowledgeable about organic methods 
and alternative technologies, but he told us that he was one of a very few in the state that had that interest. 
Again, Itacaja was a district in which small farmers predominated. 
466 Deininger (1999, 25-28), a World Bank economist who sets forth the basic argument in favor of MBLR, 
believes that the mechanism that allows communities to select technical advisors (from an approved list) 
and pay them with SIC/PRONAF funds gives the communities greater control over the technical assistance 
that they receive. However, he also recognizes that, after the first two years or so (the period SIC is in 
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Gender Differences. A final point is the role of women. We have repeatedly 
noted our opinion that inclusion of women in the Associations is important. In 2002, a 
government study showed that 87% of titleholders in traditional (INCRA) land reform 
areas, and 93% in Cedula da Terra settlements, were men. As a result, in 2003 - the year 
after the most recent of the settlements we studies was founded - the government issued 
Portaria 981/2003 requiring that in future land reform settlement titles be granted jointly 
to couples (Ciranda do PRONAF para Mulheres 2005). We believe this is a positive step. 
In the communities we studied, the activity of women in agriculture was mixed. 
Attitudes about this varied. It should be noted that subsistence farming is labor intensive, 
involving heavy work. Some women we interviewed showed no interest in engaging in 
field work, and thought it inappropriate that they should do so,467 except in special 
situations (such as during peak planting or harvesting, or where the family had no sons to 
help their father). Many women took family leadership in less heavy activities such as 
maintaining vegetable gardens and tending poultry and small livestock, and many 
engaged in non-agricultural activity to supplement family income (e.g., holding a 
municipal job, sewing, reselling cosmetics or other products). In the fruit-raising 
communities, women often participated - and they were particularly respected for the 
delicate work of removing passion fruit buds. 
effect), local (or state) governments may have to help with technical support. Cassiano Sousa Lemos Jr. 
(2003, 2), Coordinator of CPE/CAR, makes clear that the State of Bahia consciously opted for the 
contracted technical assistance model in both the Cedula da Terra and Credito Fundiario programs, and 
links this type of assistance to organic agriculture particularly appropriate to the semi-arid region. 
467 When we lived in Tocantins, we found that farmers whose wives worked in the fields - except at peak 
planting and harvest season, when everyone worked - were looked down upon as subjecting their wives to 
inappropriate hard labor. 
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Couples varied widely in the degree to which the wives were knowledgeable 
about and participated in agricultural decisions. Many of our interviews were with wives 
only, or with husbands and wives separately or together. In most cases, the women had a 
good sense of the general nature of the farm activity, the relative value of crops, and what 
was required to carry out the work. Some women were actively involved in planning and 
strategizing - for instance, Adalia in Vila Canaa, when talking about her and her 
husband's unsuccessful experiments with tomatoes and okra, made it clear that they had 
both been involved in the decision to make those experiements. 
In 2001 (Portaria 123/2001) the government decreed that 30% of PRONAF 
should be preferentially directed to women. However, "...in practice, the 30% quota did 
not have a greater impact because it was not accompanied by an effective confrontation 
of the problems of access by women to credit." (Ciranda do PRONAF para Mulheres) In 
2004 PRONAF Mulher ("Women's PRONAF") was created to finance small (R$3000) 
agriculturally related projects. This program was expanded for the 2005-6 season, and 
many of the women we interviewed were considering possible projects. We note that in 
three of the settlements (Vila Canaa, Passos da Esperan<?a, and Veneza) the technical 
advisor was a woman - and in the others, the advisors were supportive of women's 
participation. We expect that a number of these projects were implemented. 
What is the level of overall satisfaction of land settlement dwellers? 
All of the settlement areas suffered attrition during the initial years. Table VII-C 
graphs the attrition rates, which ranged from a low of 25% in Vila Canaa to well over to 
over 60% in Passos de Esperan9a and Biritinga. These figures are somewhat higher than 
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those noted in other studies. G.S. Costa (2002, reported in Oliveira, Olalde, and Germani 
2006, 12), analyzing 26 Cedula da Terra settlements in 2001, found attrition averaged 
36%, though it ranged from 10% to 80%. Another 2001 study (cited by Mattei c. 2002, 
15, and by Martins 2004, 6), found that "In some cases, the study showed that almost 
60% of the families left the settlement areas." 
Similarly, Bruno, Medeiros, and Guaniziroli (2001, reported in IPEA 2002, 81) 
found attrition to be 35% on the average in INCRA expropriation land reform 
settlements, but only 21% in those promoted by grass-roots movements (such as the 
MST). Assuming this last number to be accurate, it points to better selection, 
preparation, and/or support of participants - or perhaps simply to a higher level of 
motivation. Attrition - the reasons for it and possible measures to reduce it - is an 
area that warrants further study. 
468 1 am reminded of the statement of Lindoval in Moita Redonda: "If we had to fight [for the land], I would 
be the only one left - no! even I would run." 
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NovaL. Boa VII I V. Canaa M. Redonda P. Esperan. Biritinga Veneza 
In the seven settlements we studied, with rare exceptions, attrition was voluntary. 
Reasons for leaving included family issues, life decisions (such as to remain in their old 
neighborhood), health problems, and reactions to conflicts within a community. In a 
number of cases, settlers told us that many who had left were not suited to rural life. 
And in communities, such as Biritinga, where there was no really viable source of usable 
water for four years, attrition may be a result of undue hardship. 
Notably absent as reasons for leaving were schools or health facilities (as opposed 
to health problems). In our experience, both of these are factors that can lead rural 
families to abandon their land and move into towns. However, we found that - in all of 
the communities - settlers were reasonably satisfied with the educational options offered 
to their children, which usually included on-site primary education and reasonable 
bussing for middle school and high school. While less satisfied with health facilities, 
interviewees often expressed the opinion that the Brazilian health system is difficult 
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everywhere, and did not necessarily see their own situation as substantially worse than it 
would be elsewhere. We note here that the ability of the MBLR program to purchase 
land relatively close to established towns facilitates access to health and education in 
comparison with land reform projects in frontier or other areas far from population 
centers. 
With the exception of Biritinga, by the time of our visit, the initial attrition 
process seemed to have worked itself out in the communities. In Passos de Esperan<?a, 
for instance, which suffered one of the highest attrition rates, most attrition occurred early 
on, and only one family had left during the two years prior to our visit. 
Do these high attrition rates reflect negatively on the viability of the Cedula da 
Terra process, or on the sustainability of the communities? A certain amount of attrition 
is inevitable. But high attrition rates may be costly to the people involved and to the 
community. In Moita Redonda, for instance, we found that fruit tree maturation lagged 
in many lots that were no longer held by their original owners - either because the 
original owners had not planted or, if they planted, cared for their fruit trees, or because 
there was a gap between the original owner leaving and the new owner taking over, 
during which period the trees were neglected. 
Transition of lots from original to new owners was treated differently in the 
various communities. In some cases, the Association was active in picking the new 
owners and setting the rules for transition, in others it allowed the original and new 
owners to negotiate fairly freely. Most transitions seemed to be fairly reasonable - with 
new settlers paying for improvements actually on the land and assuming the previous 
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owner's PRONAF debts. This latter could be problematic where the original owner did 
not invest the PRONAF funds well. In one instance - in Moita Redonda - we 
encountered a new settler who paid what seemed to us a very high amount for his lot, 
thus diverting funds that might otherwise have been invested in the land. 
Moita Redonda generally seemed to have the most difficulties with the effects of 
attrition. There was significant tension between some older and newer owners, 
augmented by cultural differences between the original Bahiano settlers and the newer 
Sergipano settlers. New owners as a group were kept in limbo over a multi-year period 
due to lack of official approval of their status. But the tensions and uncertainties here 
may be as much a symptom of underlying problems in Moita Redonda as a cause of those 
problems. 
Despite the undoubted psychological, organizational, and - at least in the fruit-
based communities - economic costs of attrition, we did not see evidence that attrition, 
per se, seriously impacts the long-term sustainability of these communities. To a certain 
extent, those settlers who saw it as a winnowing process were not without reason. The 
attrition may be seen as part of the "self-selection" process through which those who are 
less interested, less determined, or less qualified remove themselves from participation in 
the settlement (see Borras Jr. 2003, 371). Aside from Moita Redonda, we found that 
newcomers were absorbed into the community and often viewed as an improvement over 
those who had left. 
To a certain extent, attrition may reflect weaknesses in the community 
organizations that originally gave rise to the associations. In other cases, factors beyond 
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the control of those associations resulted in a certain number of settlers being added to 
the community at the last moment - in Biritinga, for instance, not enough members of the 
original group qualified and seventeen of the original 37 families were added by CDA; in 
Moita Redonda, the local politician who helped birth the movement seems to have 
inserted some of her urban constituents into the group. We recommend that 
organizational and selection processes be examined to determine whether steps can be 
taken to reduce attrition. 
Overall settler satisfaction was high in all communities except Nova Lusitania. A 
very high percentage of those interviewed said that they were not considering leaving the 
community, i.e., by selling or trading their land (Table VII.D) (see Germani and Carvalho 
2001, 67). 
TABLE VII-D - Settlers Willing To Trade Or Sell (# Interviewees) 
Nova Lus Boa V III V Canaa Moita R P Esper Biratinga Veneza 
Nova Lusitania is the oldest of the settlements studied. The large number of 
settlers willing to sell/trade their property raises a concern for settlements as they leave 
the initial funded period and move into a post funding stage. Once SIC and PRONAF-A 
moneys have been spent and state assistance is less available, it is likely that the 
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difficulties of day-to-day life and the concerns about ongoing financial and agricultural 
issues are going to take a certain toll on settler feelings. There is a vulnerable period 
here. 
This point is perhaps reinforced by noting that one of the highest levels of morale 
and satisfaction we encountered was at Veneza, the newest of the settlements we studied, 
where the honeymoon period was not yet over. 
Nevertheless, out conclusion from the interviews is that the willingness in Nova 
Lusitania to sell/trade stems primarily from deep disappointment due to the land being 
unfit for citrus trees. This is a unique circumstance (shared, perhaps to a more limited 
extent, with Boa Vista III). The other fruit-raising communities visited - Moita Redonda, 
Passos de Esperan^a, and Biritinga - are buoyed by reasonable expectation that the fruit 
groves will be productive. While in these latter communities there may be a period, 
between the end of funding and the full maturation of orchards, during which difficulties 
arise, we do not see Nova Lusitania's situation as being predictive of that in the other 
communities. 
Another indicator of satisfaction is how the settlers view their lives in comparison 
with their situation prior to moving into the settlement. Table VII-E sets out comparative 
figures for interviewees. Here also the numbers are highly positive. Even in Nova 
Lusitania, a significant majority of interviewees felt that their life was better or much 
better in the settlement than it had been previously.469 
469 Germani and Carvalho (2001, 66), who are critical of the Cedula da Terra program, record a similar 
finding in the Antonio Conselheiro settlement: "According to... the majority of settlers, the condition of 
their life was better. This is because the opportunity to become small landholders gave them more 
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TABLE VII-E - Life Compared With Prior To Settlement (# Interviewees) 
NovaLus V Canaa Boa V III Moita R Biritinga PEsper Veneza 
These figures, especially given the strength of their verbal and non-verbal 
expression as observed in the interviews, together with settlers' comments about their 
future, demonstrate a strong desire on the part of most settlers to stay in the land reform 
settlements. We have here a significant indicator of commitment to the settlement areas, 
a positive element in building a sustainable community. 
Although we have defined sustainability as approximately covering one 
generation, it is interesting to note settler attitudes toward their children's future. In 
almost all of the communities there were parents who definitely did not want their 
children to continue in agriculture. However, there were also parents who did want and 
expect their children to remain on the land, and in some cases, they had taken practical 
steps toward this happening - most notably by providing their children fields of their own 
to plant and/or in providing adult children their own houses within the settlement area. 
We interviewed too few young people to draw definite conclusions, but among those we 
interviewed, a number expressed interest in staying in the countryside. Maria Djalma 
autonomy, guaranteeing the sustenance of their families and creating hopes of becoming future 
entrepreneurs." Although the use of this last term is unusual, and may stem from Germani and Carvalho's 
underlying premise that MBLR is an instrument of neo-liberalism, it captures the sense of hope we also 
witnessed in most of the settlements. 
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estimates that in the settlements she accompanies (Vila Canaa, Veneza, and several 
more), approximately 20% of the young people want to stay on the land - and it seems 
that this would be a reasonable estimate generally. 
In this light, we find it unfortunate that we only encountered two instances - both 
in Passos de Esperan9a - of young people who were studying at the Escolas Agricolas 
Familiares, the integrated cooperative agricultural schools discussed in Chapter III. 
Formal education generally in Brazil tends to promote urban values and denigrate rural 
ones - all too often youth are presented with a choice between education or agriculture, 
not an opportunity to have education for agriculture. To the extent that schools such as 
the Escolas Agricolas Familiares can be promoted, the long term viability of small scale 
farming will improve.470 
To what degree are land settlement associations authentic and effective? 
In Brazil, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it became fashionable for government 
to offer programs and other benefits through community associations. It sometimes 
occurred that a local politician or other leader would throw together a largely artificial 
"community association" - made up of real people but not a participatory, community 
group in any real sense of that term - in order to meet the technical qualifications of the 
law and receive whatever benefits it provided. All three members of our research team 
had witnessed such happenings, and we were expecting to find that at least some of the 
community associations were inventions of this type. 
470 In the south of Brazil, the MST has established a network of schools. Although these have been 
criticized for being ideological, they undoubtedly offer a rural-oriented education. 
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We were therefore pleasantly surprised to discover that, although varying in their 
effectiveness and quality of leadership, all of the associations were valid organizations 
with genuine participation and, in most cases, histories rooted in genuine community 
movements. Even in Moita Redonda, where there was evidence that the association had 
been formed under the auspices of local politicians and where local political interference 
was most apparent, the association - although plagued by dissension - had developed to 
the point that it was able to take decisions independently of its political mentors.471 
The bases of associations in pre-settlement community movements also affected 
group cohesiveness. Where a significant number of settlers came from the same 
community, or a number of closely knit communities, they tended to have a cohesiveness 
that helped them resolve leadership and community issues. This was certainly a factor in 
Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista III, where all of the settlers came from CELANOR 
member communities in the municipio of Rio Real. Similarly, in Passos de Esperan^a, 
all of the settlers came from a neighboring 1970s sergipano land settlement area, in Vila 
479 Canaa, almost all came from a neighborhood about forty miles away, and in Veneza, 
471 This is not to deny Navarro's (1998, 21) observation that the associations, in some cases, may initially 
have a "merely instrumental orientation" - i.e., that they may have been formed solely or primarily for the 
objective of obtaining land. However, all of the associations we studied had some roots - Nova Lusitania 
and Boa Vista III in longstanding colonization community associations (and CELANOR members) in the 
municipio of Rio Real, Vila Canaa in an earlier land reform area (and its neighborhood) in a neighboring 
municipality, Passos de Esperanga in the old land reform colonization area around Gameleira, Biritinga in 
the Campolandia land invasion area, and Veneza in the group displaced by creation of a Native American 
reservation. Even Moita Redonda - which, more than any other group, owed its origin to the influence of a 
local politician - arose out of a movement that had organized to seek land two years prior to the purchase; 
the group leader and politician saw a mutual benefit to working together to secure land. But this was 
undoubtedly the association with the most "merely instrumental orientation." 
472 In Vila Canaa, although only about half the community identified with the Seventh Day Adventist 
Church, this shared religion also seemed to be a factor in creating considerable cohesiveness. Veneza was 
almost entirely Catholic, and most other communities were majority Catholic with a small number of 
Evangelical Protestants. Nova Lusitania was the community in which the Catholic-Evangelical split was 
most divisive. 
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almost all came from an area that had been declared to be an Native American 
473 reservation. 
An issue which we were able to help the associations address was the question of 
participation of non-titleholder spouses, mostly women. In Biritinga, the ability of non-
titleholder spouses to be active members and hold leadership position provides a rich 
source of talent that has been unavailable to the settlements that prohibit membership 
and/or leadership roles to non-titleholder spouses. The assistance we were able to 
provide to the associations during our visits, analyzing with them the regulations in this 
respect, will enable them to change this situation. 
Beyond the communities we studied, although we were not able to research the 
matter in depth, we were told that "false" community associations have been relatively 
rare in Cedula da Terra programs in Bahia - a state generally noted for political 
machines and maneuvering. Berta Veloso told us that, in the more humid southern 
portion of the state, there had been a number of "adventurers and opportunists" in the 
land settlement areas, but that this type of person is not attracted to difficult areas such as 
, . . . . 474 the semi-and region. 
The Collective Areas. One of the most important functions of the Associations is 
administration of the collective areas. This is also one of the most fascinating aspects of 
our study. 
473 Other factors affecting cohesiveness included the presence of extended family - a factor we identified 
in almost every community - and the shared sergipano cultural identity found in Passos de Esperanpa, 
Nova Lusitania, and Boa Vista III. On the other hand, in Moita Redonda, where most of the older settlers 
were bahianos and the newer ones of sergipano heritage, this was divisive. 
474 Interview January 31, 2006. 
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In theory, if well managed, produce from the collective area in each settlement 
can pay off the value of the land, as well as other community expenses. In only one of 
the settlement areas, Veneza, did we find that the system worked as planned (and even 
there, with modifications). This may be partly due to Veneza being the newest of the 
settlements - enthusiasm for communal activity may diminish with time - but it is also 
due to the mature sisal crop on community land that brings in income, allowing the 
community to pay settler work hours. Other settlements find it very hard to work 
communal areas on a voluntary basis - some dwellers work, others do not, and this builds 
resentment.475 The collective areas therefore varied between fairly successful to virtually 
abandoned. 
A number of communities have, in practice (it is not permitted formally), resorted 
to dividing the collective areas among families, each family caring for its own area as 
though it were an additional family lot. However, even here there are a number of 
permutations. In Biritinga, for instance, shortly before we arrived, the communal dwarf 
cashew trees were turned over to individual families, each family receiving 
approximately 135 trees to care for and harvest. Income from the area goes to the 
association for payment of the land and other expenses, each family being credited with 
amounts brought in from its section. Communal pasture was also divided up, each family 
receiving seven tarefas, but communal manioc was kept under the Association, with a 
collective work day held every couple of months to clean the field, and we were told that 
"nearly everybody participates." 
475 In Biritinga, for instance, we were told that collective work never reached 50% participation. Other 
communities did not provide numbers, but the issue was present in all of them. Enforcing rules may be 
problematic: in Passos de Esperanga, a settler suspended from the Association for failure to perform his 
required work days took the matter to civil court. CDA lawyers were defending the Association, but the 
judge seemed inclined to favor the suspended settler. 
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In Nova Lusitania, a similar division of responsibility for communal fruit trees 
had been put in place earlier, but did not prove successful; we were told that many of the 
allotted communal plots had been essentially abandoned, although this may have been in 
part due to discouragement caused by the compacted subsoil problem, which was causing 
the trees to die. Boa Vista III also discovered that dividing up responsibility for the 
communal lands was not successful; following a year of experimenting with a system of 
individual family administration, the community returned to collectivized work shortly 
before our visit. 
In Moita Redonda, where each family originally donated one hectare of its own 
plot to increase the size of the collective land, the Association plowed the land and 
provided wire for the planting of two thousand passion fruit plants. Thirty per cent of the 
revenue goes to the Association, the rest is divided among settlers according to the work 
they provide on the passion fruit - those who do not participate have no right to income. 
The administration of these areas continues to be a challenge. Part of the problem 
may be that the concept of collective work is not in tune with local culture. Maria 
Djalma, the technical advisor for Vila Canaa and Veneza, noted that collective work is 
not part of the culture of farmers in the Brazilian Northeast; she mentioned that the MST 
has been more successful in introducing this idea. Generally in the North and Northeast 
of Brazil, experiences with cooperative commercialization of produce have been far more 
successful than cooperative production. It may be that, although collective planting is not 
in all cases viable, the associations can find their vocation in organizing settlers to 
industrialize (as is currently the case with sisal in Veneza) and commercialize their crops, 
and in the cooperative purchase of fertilizer and other inputs. 
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What is the micro-economic viability of holdings (i.e., the extent to which 
potential income exceeds costs, including payments for the land)? 
Earlier in this paper we discussed at some length the situation of agriculture in 
Brazil, especially the situation regarding small family farms. While recognizing that 
there is much debate over this issue, we lean toward the position that small scale farming 
can be economically viable - that it can produce a good standard of living for a family -
at least with respect to certain types of crops. Among these are labor intensive farming -
especially organic and other specialized methodologies - as well as other activities such 
as apiculture and certain forms of fruit farming. We noted, however, that small scale 
farming increasingly requires excellent technical assistance and education to thrive, 
techniques that make best use of land on a sustainable basis.476 
One of the greatest areas of concern is the viability of the settlements in terms of 
agriculture. Setting aside for the moment the cases of Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista III, 
where the subsoil problem affects the agricultural capacity of the land, what is the 
evidence that the agricultural production of these communities is sufficient to provide a 
sustainable income for the settlers?477 
476 To the extent that land reform settlements (through either traditional or market-based approaches) are 
pushed toward marginal land, such assistance becomes even more important. Only highly competent 
organic and alternative techniques can renew marginal lands and avoid problems such as desertification. In 
this light it is encouraging to read the following from the Coordinator of CPE/Car: "...some projects in the 
semi-arid region initiated work oriented toward organic agriculture and living in harmony with the dry 
land, with use of native fruits on a sustainable basis...." (Lemos Junior 2003, 2). 
477 This analysis is undertaken with the caveat that it is questionable whether, in the context of modern 
society, any agriculture can be successful without some type of government subsidy (Powers 2006). 
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Two of the settlements - Vila Canaa and Veneza - seem to us to be highly viable 
communities. Although each has its vulnerabilities, both show signs of long-term 
sustainability. One of these signs is that both communities have two major potential 
sources of income - black beans and sheep in Vila Canaa, sisal and goats in Veneza. 
Although Vila Canaa may be currently relying too heavily on the natural richness of its 
long-fallow soil - not yet having implemented crop rotation and organic fertilization -
community cohesiveness is strong, and leadership is capable and adaptable - able to 
guide the community as it confronts issues that will arise. In Veneza, the strong base that 
the existing sisal crop provides to the association should continue to underpin the 
community's ability to pay for land and move forward with substantial collective 
projects. 
Moita Redonda and Passos de Esperan9a also give indications of being self-
sustaining once their fruit trees mature. Passos de Esperan9a has done a better job of 
diversifying, with almost equal distribution of land among orange, cashew, and passion 
fruit; in addition, many families have commercial plantings of manioc. As we have 
noted elsewhere, ecological - as well as economic - diversification is crucial for 
resilience of both the ecosystem and the economy. Moita Redonda is more dependent on 
oranges; this increases the danger of any monoculture by being one with a particularly 
volatile market. It is to be hoped that the settlers will continue to back this up with 
plantings of passion fruit as well as other, smaller cash crops. 
Biritinga had the lowest level of agricultural production of the settlements visited. 
This resulted, in part, from early difficulties mentioned above, most notably a shortage of 
water. However, the impending maturity of the cashew trees - the essential economic 
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component of the community - indicated that the settlement had a good chance of 
obtaining sustainability. As noted, monoculture is not, in our opinion, advisable for 
farms, but cashew offers more potential stability, and more possibility of local 
processing, than other fruit monocultures. The large number of organic farmers here (the 
highest percentage of any community studied) bodes well for the land being sustained -
and even improved - over the next generation. If the community can develop less 
expensive sources of natural fertilizer, can implement cashew processing facilities, 
continues to maintain sufficient food crops to meet essential needs, and continues to 
pursue honey production and other minor income producing activities, Boa Vista-
Biritinga should be able to prosper for at least a generation. 
Boa Vista III is something of a question. It is not yet clear to what extent the 
subsoil problem will keep the settlers from their objective of being orange farmers. 
However, the settlers in Boa Vista III seem open to other possibilities. If orange raising 
does not turn out to be possible, they may turn to other crops that are appropriate to the 
land, such as yams, pineapple, passion fruit (if proper drainage can be established), 
grains, or truck gardening. As the state recognizes a certain degree of responsibility with 
respect to the subsoil problem - and especially as this problem impacts several 
communities - there are indications that the state will help to provide training and seed 
money to facilitate such a transition. 
Nova Lusitania is the least likely of the settlements to be able to support itself 
through agricultural production. Oil revenues are currently playing a large role in 
maintaining the settlement; we have no basis for knowing how long those revenues will 
last, nor how continuous the flow of income may be. A few of the farmers are actively 
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seeking to improve their land through organic methods and to find crops that can grow 
well despite the serious subsoil problem. However, were oil revenues to cease without a 
serious solution to the agricultural question, while it is not likely that the settlement will 
disappear, it could easily become - as are some others in the Coastal North region - an 
area of endemic poverty. It is therefore vital that the soil analyses being carried out by 
the state be taken seriously as the starting point for a program to transition the community 
to appropriate agricultural activities. Properly fertilized, passion fruit and/or other vine or 
bush fruits might constitute a possibility. If not, an option might be considered to offer 
resettlement to those current settlers who do not wish to transition from fruit growing 
activities, and bring in settlers interested in engaging in agriculture appropriate to the 
land. 
One of the issues faced in all of the communities is inevitable inequalities. We 
interviewed families in almost all communities who were very poor and seemingly 
unable to do little more than sustain themselves, much less make land or financing 
payments. Jose Firmino dos Santos, former President of the Association at Biritinga, 
phrased the issue: "Among the poor, there are always some who are more poor." Ari in 
Vila Canaa estimated that ten percent of the settlers there would never improve their 
situation. Erico, President of the Association in Veneza, said that the poor among the 
478 community were one of his major concerns. 
478 Our analysis did not permit an in depth study of the root causes of the poverty of some settlers. Among 
the factors mentioned in interviews and/or observed, alcohol addiction would be a major cause. In most 
cases, single women raising families were hard pressed; in at least one of these cases, the single mother was 
living in the settlement due to family influence and clearly did not have a vocation for agriculture - it 
seemed she was in the settlement merely as a means to obtain housing. Lack of education did not seem to 
be an issue, per se - many illiterate farmers were successful - but lack of know-how (agricultural, financial, 
or both) seemed to play a factor to some extent. There were also incidents of illness. One of the most 
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The settlers' have a joint obligation to make land payments, and failure to make 
land payment suspends all other financing. The plan is for association income to cover 
those payments, but in communities where it has not done so, the group has covered 
payments for those families who cannot (the understanding being that these families will 
repay when and if able). However, it is unlikely that the community can or will cover 
lapsed Pronaf-A or custeio loans - although, at least where a good number of settlers are 
unable to pay, the associations generally work to obtain extensions. Adilson, the former 
President of Vila Canaa and a natural leader, stated that the better-off settlers take care of 
the poorest among them; to a certain extent this view is reflected in other communities -
Maria Djalma noted that "social inclusion" is an essential part of the program.479 But 
there is the view expressed by Antonio Costa, also of Vila Canaa, that "in ten years those 
who are lazy will leave, those who stay will be active;"480 this also reflects a feeling 
expressed in many interviews that some among the settlers do not exert themselves or 
481 carry their weight. 
It has been noted that there is a general trend, worldwide, for agricultural 
households to depend in part on income from non-agricultural activities. Many of the 
telling of these was a young couple in Moita Redonda which had been doing very well until the husband 
suffered a motorcycle accident, approximately ten months prior to our visit. The couple was very hard 
pressed and living off of donations from their extended family. 
479 Interview, March 15, 2006. 
480 Antonio speaks from the relatively privileged position of a healthy, single 35-year-old man with no 
dependents and a title holding of his own. 
481 The question has been asked as to whether there are cultural/social factors that incentivize the "lazy." It 
has been argued (e.g., Alvarez 2009) that the bolsa escola/bolsa familia may have this affect, but we did 
not witness it as such; in most cases, it seemed to provide the families with a safety net that enabled them to 
stay on the land and work it (rather than the husband migrating in search of work, as often happens in the 
Northeast). The oil revenues in Nova Lusitania did seem to have the effect of causing many of the families 
to become acomodadas (roughly "complacent"), i.e., not working the land as hard as they might, although 
this occurred in tandem with the severe disappointment of discovering that the land was unsuitable for the 
orange trees they wanted to raise. But we saw no other factors that would incentivize laziness. 
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households interviewed have some non-farm income, common sources including the 
hiring out the men's labor (in many cases this is agricultural related labor), freelance jobs 
(bricklayers, electricians, a barber), municipal jobs (teacher auxiliaries, school bus 
drivers, health assistants), and small commercial activities (small stores, bars, selling 
cosmetics, etc.). Those who receive a government pension - either for retirement or 
disability - earn a minimum monthly wage, which places them in a position of relative 
affluence and security. Many families mentioned the importance of income received 
from the Federal Bolsa Familia/Bolsa Escola, and it is our opinion that subsidy has 
enabled many of the families to remain on the land during difficult stages when resources 
are scarce. 
Closely related to this is the attempt, within the communities - on either a 
community or private basis - to capture a greater share of agricultural income by 
engaging in some type of agricultural processing. Veneza has equipment for extracting 
fiber from sisal, adding to the value of the end product. Boa Vista III is the community 
that has most seriously pursued, with limited success, small industrial activities to capture 
a greater share of the value of their produce. A few of the other communities are thinking 
along these lines, although most seemed to focus on establishing manioc processing 
facilities ("casas de farinha"), an economically questionable investment. 
Natural Reserves. One of the tertiary research questions posed in this study was 
"To what extent have environmental reserves been provided for on the land?" We found 
that, in all cases, at least the legally required twenty percent of land had been set aside as 
ecological areas. 
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Attitudes toward the ecological reserves varied. At one extreme, a few 
interviewees stated that they would like to do away with the reserves to allow for 
expansion of the communities - in one case, for opening land for grown children of 
settlers. But most settlers had a relatively benign view of the reserves - repeatedly 
interviewees told us that the reserves were good for preserving wild animals or for 
avoiding drought - some said that they "call" (chama) the rain. Generally use of the 
reserves was limited to grazing a few animals, bee raising, and/or collecting dead wood 
for cooking. 
The one exception was Biritinga, where respect for ecological reserve was the 
highest we encountered. Three settlers there told us that, in addition to the legally 
required reserves, they had each set aside a portion of their own land as a reserve. It is 
probably not a coincidence that Biritinga is the settlement with the highest percentage of 
organic farmers. 
Intangibles. While it is valid to attempt to objectify the reasons for success, it is also 
clear that there are certain intangibles that are difficult to capture. Berta Veloso, a highly 
respected government official who has worked with the Cedula da Terra program since 
the beginning, told us that for years she has been asking herself why some land 
settlements succeed and some fail. There is no real explanation, she feels, except the 
people. Her colleague, Antonio Fernando da Silva (Fernando) agreed. They noted that 
Fernando has been accompanying a settlement which, by any objective standard, should 
have failed - having poor land and other disadvantages - but that the people are so 
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determined they are making it work 482 Rafael of CELANOR noted the importance of 
capacity for resilience (capacidade de resilianga) - the ability of a group to recuperate 
483 from negative or even disastrous events. 
These observations verify our own experience with land reform settlements, 
community organizations, and human organizations of various kinds. The morale of the 
group often makes the difference as to whether a project succeeds. Certainly many of the 
items discussed above - leadership, group cohesiveness, group organization and history -
can affect morale, as can settler attitudes, satisfaction levels, and dozens of other 
factors 484 But it is important to recognize that morale can go beyond (at times transcend) 
these factors. While difficult to quantify or submit to objective tests, it can often be 
sensed by experienced observers. 
Tertiary Questions 
Our research proposal also set forth five tertiary questions that warrant very brief 
discussion: 
Does the Cedula da Terra program promote a concept of land as a 
commodity, rather than as a non-renewal environmental resource with which 
humans live in a stewardship relationship? 
482 Interview, January 31, 2006 with Berta Veloso dos Passos and Antonio Fernando da Silva 
483 Interview, March 27, 2006 at Rio Real. He noted that resilience can be aided by outside circumstances; 
for instance, he attributes some of the resilience of the settlers at Boa Vista III to the fact that some of them 
retained small lands with fruit trees in their former area of residence, and were able to draw on these 
resources when hard times arose. 
484 Settler attitudes and satisfaction levels reflect morale as well as affecting it; there is a feedback loop 
here. 
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The Cedula da Terra program was born during at a time when neo-liberal thought 
- i.e., that the world's problems could be resolved through market forces - was sweeping 
the political world and a certain portion of the international development community. 
The name "market-based" land reform, together with some of the literature that 
accompanied that movement, gave rise to a concern that this program was intended to 
and/or would further push the concept of land being a commodity, bought and sold with a 
capitalist attitude, rather than being an essential part of the eco-system, a resource to be 
lived with in a relationship of stewardship and caring. 
I have a great deal of sympathy with this concern. To my mind, much harm has 
been done by viewing land as a commodity or simple production resource, to be used in 
accordance with short-range economic objectives. In the United States, ownership of 
land by large corporations has been seen as one factor contributing toward this negative 
attitude, and some states have taken steps to limit such ownership. An ideal is often 
presented such as that in portions of Switzerland, where the same family lives on the land 
for generations and, knowing the land will constitute the family's source of livelihood for 
the long-range future, cares for the land in a way that helps it to maintain, and even 
improve, its fertility. 
On the other hand, as discussed in Chapter III, Brazil has a long history of abuse 
of land by large hereditary landowners, who have used it over the generations to draw off 
income and who have repeatedly, until relatively recently, failed to reinvest in it. Even 
485 e.g., Domingos (2002, 3) "...implementation of 'market-assisted agrarian reform' can only be 
understood as the extension of neo-liberal concepts introduced by [the World Bank]." Similarly, Germani 
and Carvalho (2002, 89-93): MBLR is "a program of undisguised neo-liberal style." 
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among small landholders, practices such as slash and burn agriculture have proved 
detrimental to their land. 
As originally envisioned by Deininger (1999) and others, the MBLR concept 
proposed that the land holdings gained through the programs would be fairly easily 
transferable. This was in contrast to traditional expropriation land reform programs in 
Brazil, which usually prohibited resale of the land by the original recipients without 
government permission. 
Within the Cedula da Terra program, however, there are a number of factors that 
affect transferability. First, the land is owned by the Association, not by the individual 
titleholders - it is, in essence, a type of condominium - and any transfer of lots requires 
(at least in theory) Association approval. Second, at least until the land is fully paid for 
(20 years after the contract date), any such transfer of land has to be approved by CDA -
the State agency that serves as guardian to the program. 
Settlers who do not actually live on the land can be - and have been -
dispossessed of their land by CDA. Although in Biritinga there were a few titleholders 
who did not live on their land (and this issue had been taken up with CDA), we did not 
find this in any other community.486 This rule severely limits anyone buying a lot and 
holding it for speculative and investment purposes. 
With the major attrition in most communities, there were many transfers of lots. 
As noted above, in some cases this entailed purchase by the incoming party of the 
improvements that had been made by the outgoing party and/or assumption of the 
486 In Vila Canaa, one of the better homes seemed to be closed up and the owners were not present, but we 
did not fully examine whether this was a temporary or permanent situation. 
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outgoing party's debt, but it did not generally include payment for the land itself (the 
reason being that, in most cases, few land payments had been made and that most of 
those were made, at least in part, by the Association). But these transfers generally 
resulted in changing ownership from a party who did not want and/or could not maintain 
the land to a party who very much did want to own and work it. 
We found no evidence among the settlers of their viewing the land as a 
commodity. On the contrary, most talked about staying on it long term, and many spoke 
of it as a heritage that they hoped to pass on to their children. The growing interest 
among many of the settlers in organic agriculture was also based, in large part, on the 
conviction that organic agriculture is best for the long range viability of their land. 
Is the Program's emphasis on land purchase contradictory to the idea that 
the landless farmers have a right to land, which right must be asserted, and, if so, 
does this constitute a significant problem? 
Domingos (2002, 5) sums up this critique admirably: "By passing the 
responsibility to democratize land to the market, political leaders intend to relieve the 
State of its essential legal responsibilities as outlined in the Brazilian constitution: the 
distribution of land for social interests." To what extent is this true or meaningful? 
In Chapter III we discuss the Brazilian Constitution and the problems incurred in 
trying to translate general constitutional statements into an enforceable expropriation law. 
Suffice it to say here that effort has been continuously frustrated and that expropriation 
has had very limited success in Brazil. 
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Critiques such as that made by Domingos seem to me to overestimate the 
importance of the term "market" when used in this context. Under the Cedula da Terra 
program, the government subsidizes approximately 70% of the cost of obtaining land. 
The government provides guidance, supervises negotiations, must approve the land price, 
funds the entire infrastructure, and has veto power over who can be a beneficiary to the 
program. It does not seem to me that the government has reneged on its responsibility to 
help landless farmers obtain land, but simply has found another instrument for doing so. 
Nor do I read the Constitution as requiring that the land be freely distributed - that 
farmers have to pay a certain amount (on highly subsidized credit) seems to me to be both 
fair and wise policy. 
Does the program significantly impair other forms of land reform through 
transfer of political focus and/or funds? 
One argument in favor of MBLR is that it offers another tool for landless farmers 
to obtain land, and that it is best seen as an arrow in a quiver of policies, rather than as the 
single primary solution to the land reform issue (see, e.g., Deininger, et al. 2003, 14; 
Lambais 2007, 25; El-Ghonemy 2007). In this respect, the government retaining its 
power to expropriate land - and in fact doing so - provides an added incentive for 
landowners to consider a willing sale under an MBLR program. 
I believe there is merit in this position. However, given limited resources for 
agrarian reform, there is evidence that MBLR has drawn focus and funds away from 
other land reform measures. Wolford (2007, 249-250) notes that, between 1997, when 
the Cedula da Terra program started, and 2001, INCRA's budget for traditional land 
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reform was cut from US$2.6 billion to about half that amount, and by 2003, it was cut an 
additional 39%. However, she fails to note that the INCRA 1997 budget was unusually 
high - in 1995 it was US$1.3 billion and in 1994 only US$0.4 billion (Deininger 1998, 
23). 
In any case, this reduction can be only in part attributed to the growth of the 
MBLR programs. The direct cost of the Cedula da Terra program was estimated at 
US$150 million, $90 million of which was a loan from the World Bank; the Credito 
Fundiario system, which built upon that program, was US$450 million, about half loaned 
by the World bank (Borras Jr, 376; Childress and Munoz 2008, 2). These totals, spread 
over a period of approximately eight years, do not fully account for the decrease in 
INCRA spending. 
Be that as it may, to what extent is this shift in focus important? Unlike some 
other countries (see Borras Jr., 376), Brazil maintains an active expropriation program, 
and it would thus seem that the goal of having various instruments to carry out agrarian 
reform is being realized. It is our tentative conclusion from the evidence reviewed that 
MBLR, in the Brazilian context, is probably a faster and less expensive way to obtain 
land for the landless poor than is expropriation. If this is the case, it makes sense to shift 
resources from expropriation efforts to MBLR. 
One step was taken in 2000 by the Government and the World Bank in an effort 
to maintain a balance between expropriation and MBLR. In general, lands purchased 
through the Cedula da Terra had been relatively small and medium sized farms rather 
than large latifundios, although in theory any land could be acquired. In 2001, in 
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response to critiques from the proponents of expropriation, the program was expressly 
limited to acquiring lands of up to fifteen modules.487 Brazilian law expressly prohibits 
expropriation of land below this limit, thus the Cedula da Terra was prohibited from 
purchasing land that could be acquired through expropriation. (Oliveira, Olalde, and 
Germani 2006, 3). 
Does the program tend to reinforce the power of local elites who have been 
historically opposed to land reform? 
One of the concerns with the Cedula da Terra program - a concerned our 
research team shared as we began this study - was that it decentralized agrarian reform to 
the states and municipalities. Traditionally Northeastern states and rural local 
governments have often been dominated by groups that identify with large landowners, 
with electoral corrals being run by local politicians under the system of coronelismo 
discussed in Chapter III. It was our concern that the programs would come under the 
control of elites who oppose land reform and would thus be made ineffective. Did this 
occur? 
Borras Jr. (2003) is a critic of MBLR. Many of his comments are based on early 
evaluations carried out by Navarro (1998) and Buainain et al (1999). Borras writes 
(378): 
487 This policy allowed CONTAG and other civil society groups to support MBLR (Lambois 2007, 25). 
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To a large extent, the beneficiary (self)-selection process has been manipulated 
by local government officials, interested church people and elite peasant 
leaders. These local elites controlled the information about the project and 
selected by themselves the beneficiaries (Navarro 1998, 19). In fact, Navarro 
finds that, in some regions, 'the friars are who decided who could or could not 
be part of the association to be formed', as he points to 'the manipulation of the 
local peasants induced into forming associations, not knowing the conditions of 
the process' (Navarro 1998, 15, 19). 
This critique is, to say the least, an odd one, mixing local government officials 
(who may or may not be tied to landholding interests) with the Church - which has for 
the last thirty years been the primary advocate of land reform. Indeed, the Navarro quote 
is taken entirely out of context - turning to the original document in Portuguese, we 
discover that Navarro (14) was pointing out that the friars intervened to remove people 
who already had considerable patrimony from the land reform associations, so that the 
land could be available to poorer people who really needed it! 
Part of Borras' objection seems to be connected with his statement (378) that "the 
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beneficiaries are generally from the rural poor, but not the poorest of the poor." 
However, in almost forty years of working with community organization and social 
programs in Brazil, I have found that it is almost never the poorest-of-the-poor who lead 
any grass-roots movement or social change. Our case studies did indeed confirm that the 
communities were generally developed and led by people who were not among the 
488 Perhaps it is these not-poorest-of-the-poor that Borras means when he speaks (378) of "elite peasant 
leaders" and "rich peasants." 
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poorest of the poor. These leaders, together with NGO organizers, technical advisors, and 
the state agency - CDA (which last had final decision power over the inclusion/exclusion 
of any beneficiary), definitely did influence the selection of candidates. It is our 
impression that this selection process was generally a reasonably fair one, and that 
problems developed where - as in Moita Redonda - it was to some extent ignored. 
To state that beneficiary selection is influenced by these persons and groups is a 
far cry from our initial concerns that the process would be controlled by landowner 
groups or others who are opposed to land reform. In only one community, Moita 
Redonda, did a local politician have an inordinate amount of influence in forming the 
community - and even there, she seemed to be acting out of populist motivation and not 
in the interest of local landowners. 
Minor interference by local politicians in community life is a factor in several of 
the communities, where certain persons in the community are rewarded with municipal 
jobs (teacher auxiliary, school bus driver, etc.), usually in return for their political 
support. But this is common throughout Brazil, and in no case did the interference seem 
to stem from pressure from large landowners. We found no evidence in our case studies 
that decentralization led to domination of the Cedula da Terra program by large 
landowners or other groups opposed to land reform. 
To what extent has the program been used to undercut the action of landless 
movements such as the MST? 
One of the chief charges against the market-based land reform movement was that 
it had been adopted by the Cardoso government to undercut the power of movements 
4 5 2 
such as the Movimento Sem Terra (MST). This charge was clearly to some extent 
justified - the MST and Cardoso were strongly opposed, and finding another mechanism 
for carrying out land reform was advantageous to the president.489 But to what extent 
was the program actively used to undercut the MST and similar movements? 
Interview questions dealt with settler attitudes toward the MST. These attitudes 
were largely negative, but no more so than the attitudes of most Brazilians at the time 
who gained their information primarily from Globo television - the main source of 
information for the majority of settlers. While the MST had enjoyed considerable 
popularity in the late 1990s,490 by 2006 it had lost much of that support - due largely to 
such actions as invading and trashing President Cardoso's farmhouse in Minas Gerais 
(images of the wrecked furniture and filthy rooms were on everyone's television screen) 
and invading and destroying specimens in an Aracruz botanical laboratory.491 
Settlers generally rejected this type of approach. However, there were some 
settlers who stated that the MST had been important in raising consciousness of the need 
for land reform, others who stated that the movement did some good, and a few who were 
frankly positive toward it. We saw no indication that the program had inculcated 
attitudes toward the MST one way or the other. 
489 Fernandes (2006, 13-16) provides a good summary of the conflict between the Cardoso administration 
and the MST. He notes that, while the Cardoso administration initially thought that settling families on the 
land would reduce pressure from the landless, the opposite occurred: "...geographers can document that for 
each settlement created, the number of landless workers carrying out grassroots action multiplied..." (14). 
"In the Cardoso government, agrarian reform was treated as a problem left unsolved in the past and 
formulated as a compensatory policy in line with a conservative model of agricultural modernization.... 
The compensatory policy is a form of minimizing socio-economic problems without solving them." (6-7) 
490 Wolford (2007, 243) states that, at the end of the 1990s, 85% of urban middle-class Brazilians had 
favorable attitudes toward the MST. 
491 This latter action was actually carried out by a small splinter group not under the control of the MST, 
but in the minds of most Brazilians, the MST was identified with it. 
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Perhaps most telling were comments of those settlers who had actual experience 
with the MST. Founded in the South of Brazil, the movement has never been as effective 
in the North and Northeast, and comments reflected this, and were generally critical. 
Closely related to the issue of the MST was the overall level of socio-political 
consciousness among settlers. With a few exceptions, we found this to be similar to the 
general level of rural Northeasterners who are not actively involved in social justice or 
union movements. There seemed to be little awareness of or interest in class issues. 
Although Lula was immensely popular and the great majority of settlers had voted for 
him and said they would do so again, there were very few who identified with the 
Workers' Party.492 Local political identification was based on personal relationships and 
local practicality as it is in most of rural Brazil, with little concern with the ideology of a 
candidate's party on the national level. 
I personally believe that most of the settlers would benefit from the type of 
training provided by the CPT, socially conscious NGOs, and land reform groups - and 
could learn a good deal from the MST, especially in such areas as rural education. It 
would be interesting to see these groups reach out more to the Cedula da Terra and 
Credito Fundiario settlers who are, in some respects, natural allies in building a society 
that is more supportive of small scale agriculture. By, to a certain extent, anathematizing 
the MBLR programs - and hence, by implication, the beneficiaries of those programs -
the MST (if not the Church and other agencies) creates an unnecessary barrier between 
potential allies. 
492 The exception was in Biritinga, where Jurandi Nilo is a committed PT member, originally from Sao 
Paulo; he and his wife, Josi, are leaders in the settlement. Eleven interviewees (out of 33) in Biritinga were 
affiliated with the PT, and two more said they usually voted with the PT. 
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Other Key Factors 
In Chapter I, we noted nine Key Factors to development projects generally. We 
briefly touch upon those here in connection with the Cedula da Terra program as it 
developed in Bahia. 
1) Authenticity of participation. As noted in Chapter IV, the Cedula da Terra program, 
when implanted at the national level, had very little input from civil society. In 
Bahia, early involvement of CELANOR - a clearly legitimate association of existing 
small landholder communities - was one factor that helped to allay this. CELANOR 
essentially designed the first communities, developing the agro-vila concept that 
became standard, and orienting the first steps in the program. There were also 
indications in various localities of interaction between state officials (CDA/CAR) and 
rural workers unions, church groups, and other components of civil society. Thus the 
authenticity of participation at the state and local level exceeded that nationally. The 
authenticity of the settler associations in themselves has been discussed at length 
above. 
2) Ownership. Once again, viewed at the state level, we were impressed by the degree 
to which state officials involved in this program and technical advisors (both those 
from NGOs and those from private groups) took ownership of this program. They 
were clearly involved and concerned. Officials at the state level, such as Dr. Penedo, 
Berta Veloso, and Antionio Fernandes da Silva, knew these communities personally 
and were concerned with their problems. For instance, meaningful efforts were being 
made - within the limited resources available - to bring in experts to study the 
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compacted soil problem in Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista III.493 In some of the 
municipios, most notably Esplanada (the location of Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista 
III), the municipal governments were also interested and involved. The ownership of 
the settlers themselves has been discussed - to summarize it, settlers had a strong 
feeling of owning the program and their settlements, despite issues as to the role of 
the associations and collective areas. 
3) Adequate statement and communication of goals. It seemed to us that, by the time of 
our study, state officials, technical advisors, and the associations themselves had a 
good sense of the program's goals. This had admittedly grown over time - in the 
beginning, as Maria Djalma remarked, nobody really knew what they were doing or 
how to go about doing it 494 It also seemed that feedback from the Cedula da Terra 
program - and a certain continuity of personnel - helped to improve the Credito 
Fundiario program that followed it. The Cedula da Terra program nationally had, by 
2002, exceeded its goal of settling 15,000 families on the land; the Credito Fundiario 
program aimed at settling 50,000 families in three years (Teofilo and Prado Garcia 
2003, 30). 
4) Adequate time frame. Having worked for major international funding agencies, I was 
impressed by the extent to which the Cedula da Terra program seemed to be 
493 But the following should be noted: "The State is trying to resolve issues, such as the case of purchase of 
inappropriate land, but - almost always - this remains an intention. In assuming its responsibility and 
seeking ways of resolving the problems, there are costs that are never passed on to the responsible people 
involved in the negotiation process - especially the [former] landowners and the professionals - but to 
society at large and, principally, to those most harmed, the beneficiaries who believed in a Project 
legitimized by the State." (Oliveira, Olalde, and Germani 2006,4). 
494 Early mistakes, especially regarding the quality of land acquired, caused the State of Bahia to increase 
state oversight of the program; originally the state oversight had been planned to be minimal (Oliveira, 
Olalde, and Germani, 3). 
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relatively free from artificial time pressures. Funded in 1997, it was allowed to 
function over a five year period - a reasonable time frame for development - with 
SIC funds being disbursed even later, at an organic pace that seemed to coincide with 
the various communities' capacity to absorb them. Thus as late as 2006, several of 
the settlement areas still had SIC funds that had not been fully spent.495 It is unusual 
to find a large program which is as willing as this to recognize the slow pace of rural 
development and the necessity to allow programs to unfold in accordance with 
cultural and seasonal rhythms. 
5) Awareness of local social, cultural, and political complexities. One of the advantages 
of decentralization of the Cedula da Terra program is that it allowed the program to 
be adapted and carried out by people who more fully understood the local milieu. 
Both CDA and CAR officials seemed to be strongly aware of the realities and 
complexities of life in the semi-arid and north coastal regions of Bahia. Technical 
advisors were all local people with a history of working with communities in these 
areas. Input from community leaders was taken seriously. 
6) Internal workings of aid industry and government. The relative flexibility with time 
has been noted above. This reflects generally a characteristic noted by Deininger 
(1998, 24) in comparing the Cedula da Terra with similar programs, that "the process 
[in Brazil] is considerably more flexible and agile." 
495 This contrasts with what Deininger (1998, 9 n.15) says of the process in Colombia: "This failure to 
proceed more swiftly with implementation of the negotiated model of land reform was not due to resource 
constraints but rather institutional rigidities and resistance. In fact, resources available for market assisted 
land reform were accumulated until the end of the year and then disbursed in a rushed process that bore 
little relationship to the regulations of the law, using the argument that it would be better to spend the 
resources imperfectly than losing them." 
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At the same time, certain internal procedures, especially on the part of the World 
Bank, seemed to work in favor of the program. Audit mechanisms were almost 
undoubtedly a factor in avoiding overcompensation of landowners (as had previously 
occurred under government expropriation programs). Feedback mechanism -
especially as the World Bank was in the process of developing greater sensitivity to 
beneficiary concerns and social/environmental impact of programs - helped to bring 
about improvements in the subsequent Credito Fundiario program. 
7) Resources - human, technical, financial. Resources in development programs are 
almost never truly "enough." However, in this program, initial financial resources 
seemed to be adequate to program needs. SIC funds provided a valuable means of 
providing for initial infrastructure, agricultural inputs, and small productive projects. 
These funds were substantially supplemented with funds from the CAR PRODUZIR 
program and other sources. More concern for ongoing working capital and project 
funds arises as the communities move beyond SIC and initial PRONAF-A funding. 
Human and technical resources are more limited. As pointed out, the quality of 
technical assistance was quite good, but a concern arises as communities pass out of 
the SIC/PRONAF-A stage as to how that technical assistance will be provided. Even 
in the initial stages, we have noted a number of areas where additional training and 
accompaniment could be provided - where a small investment in "capacitation"496 
would result in a disproportionately large benefit to the communities - for instance, in 
496 "Capacitagao" - the Portuguese word goes beyond the sense of training, and implies that one is truly 
helping people to become capable of doing something on their own. 
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the area of helping communities (either singly or, more likely, in small groups) to 
conceive of and develop small facilities to partially industrialize their produce. 497 
8) Ongoing monitoring. During the period up until "emancipation" - i.e., the moment 
when all of the SAT and SIC funds have been spent and accounted for - CDA seemed 
(in all cases except Moita Redonda) to be doing a good job of monitoring ongoing 
progress. Periodic visits were made to communities by CDA (including to Nova 
Lusitania, which had been informed verbally that it was "emancipated"), during 
which CDA personnel dealt with questions and issues raised by the communities. 
Association accounts were subject to audits. Banco do Brasil (BB) and Banco do 
Nordeste do Brasil (BNB), respectively, were responsible for SIC and PRONAF 
loans, and the latter made fairly regular visits to the communities. 
9) Provisions for maintenance. As noted above, maintenance both of the program itself 
and the land settlements it created is a concern. Deininger (1999, 25) expresses 
concern that, in Brazil, the high level of subsidy of the program (c. 70%), together 
with the probability that many of the loans made will not be folly repaid, could hinder 
the continuation/growth of the program. In Bahia in 2006, we began to see signs that 
CDA was overburdened, and concern that it might not be able to continue to 
accompany the programs to the degree that it would like to. 
Additional Questions 
At the beginning of this Chapter, I mentioned that case studies often suggest 
further research. I come away from these case studies with a strong desire to return to the 
497 I am currently discussing with my fellow researchers, Daniel Carvalho and Brenda King-Powers, 
establishing a small program to provide this type of support to land settlement areas in northern Bahia. 
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field and further examine many issues, not only (or even primarily) as an academic 
researcher, but as a community organizer long engaged in empowerment evaluation (see 
Chapter II). Within the wealth of potential research, I would raise especially the 
following: 
1) What lessons can be learned from Association formation, leadership, and 
participation? What are some of the best practices that have been developed 
(both in the MBLR programs and elsewhere) and how might they be made 
available/useful to the settlers - and to new groups engaging in programs? 
2) What are the true statistics and real causes of attrition in MBLR settlements? 
Is attrition due to weak associations, poor selection, and/or inadequate 
orientation of candidates? Is it (as seems to be the case from our studies) a 
winnowing process in the initial years that resolves itself as the communities 
become established? What steps can be taken to reduce attrition and to 
ameliorate its consequences (e.g., through the smooth, well-regulated transfer 
to new titleholders)? 
3) How have the collective areas been handled in other settlement areas? Have 
structures or mechanisms been found that make them more feasible? Or has 
the division of the collectives into individually administered lots tended to 
become the norm? Where the collective areas are individually administered, 
have they been completely "privatized" or do sales/income still run through 
the association? 
4) What small-scale industrialization or other income-producing projects are 
viable for these and similar communities? Do these work best when 
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administered by families, communities, or groups of communities (e.g., via 
cooperatives)? Through past experience, I have ideas of some that might 
work - small scale cashew nut processing, for instance - but I would like to 
expand upon and update this information. 
5) With respect to the younger generation, what steps (if any) do their schools 
take in preparing them for possible rural life? How can access to genuine, 
participatory agricultural education be increased? How can young adults be 
absorbed into communities with limited numbers of lots and/or how can 
adequate new settlement areas be established for them (and does the number 
of young people interested in an agriculture life warrant such an effort)? 
In addition to these questions, there are a number of questions that researchers 
with different qualifications could examine. Among these are best agricultural practices 
for appropriate crops in the region, alternative crops that might be grown to supplement 
income (ginger, peppers, etc.), alternative technologies applicable to the region and the 
settlers, water usage and conservation, maximizing the viability of the environmental 
reserves, best methods for soil treatment of purchased lands. 
Conclusion 
Years ago there was a debate in Brazil centered around Paulo Freire's work with 
adult literacy training. Teaching Northeast Brazilian rural workers to read, Freire came 
to the conclusion that the process of literacy training itself could be more or less 
liberating, and he developed methods by which the workers truly participated in their 
own learning process, becoming more fully conscienticized (a word invented by Freire) 
as to the socio-economic realities which caused the poverty they experienced and 
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developing the attitude that they could work together to make changes. The military 
regime sent Freire into exile and his approach was essentially banned (except for a few 
holdouts such as the Church's MEB program). 
Freire himself was never doctrinaire, but there developed toward the end of the 
dictatorship and thereafter, a feeling that only a Freire-style approach was valid in literacy 
training, that more traditional or less participatory approaches were co-opting the learners 
into the dominant system. The trouble was that, beyond small pilot programs, it was 
difficult to train and run programs in the Freire style. Most adult literacy teachers were 
poorly paid public school teachers or volunteer parishioners, and they taught the way they 
had learned: by putting letters on the board and having the students copy them down, 
going through the phonetics... ba, be, bi, bo, bu. Should such training be allowed? 
Portions of the Church and other "good faith" sectors of society reached the conclusion 
that, whereas Freire's methods were clearly preferable, when working with adults,498 
learning to read was in itself a liberating and empowering experience, and that the literate 
adult could go on to grow. 
In much the same way, I believe that ownership of land is, in itself, liberating and 
empowering for the adult rural worker.499 This is not to say that the newly landed farmer 
cannot be enmeshed in an undesirable commercial structure, overburdened with debt, 
take wrong paths, give up, fail. All of those things can happen to new farmers, however 
498 Brazil's rote education system, when working with children, can be very negative. The difference in 
attitudes between students/graduates of participatory rural schools, such as the cooperative Family 
Agricultural Schools, and the standard public schools, is notable. 
499 It is interesting in this light to note Gomes de Alencar's finding (2002, 26) that the greatest value settlers 
in the Ceara Cedula da Terra program cited was liberdade (liberty, freedom). Lambais (2007, 19) notes 
with respect to studies of the program that "The freedom of the peasants from the economic rent imposed 
by landowners enables them to use land and labor to arise from poverty even if the economic efficiency 
levels are not satisfactory yet." 
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they obtain their land. They are perhaps less likely to happen to farmers who have 
participated in MST, CPT, or similar programs. Like Freire, these groups may, in some 
respects, have better methods of consciousness raising, but they are not reaching 
everyone. 
On initial analysis, in the Brazilian context, market-based programs seem capable 
of getting more farmers permanently settled on the land more quickly than either 
expropriation or land occupation/invasion. As structured under the Cedula da Terra, 
with SIC support and subsequent access to PRONAF credit, the programs also seem able 
to give the settlers a good start toward productivity and the possibility of better 
income,500 although additional technical assistance, educational opportunities, and access 
to working capital seem to be needed. 
As Teofilo and Prado Garcia (2003, 23) state, "Land distribution is only the first 
step in the process of increasing opportunity and improving the lives of the rural poor," 
but it is a vital first step.501 Once on the land, small farmers will be better able to 
constitute a political force capable of fighting for their needs - including credit, technical 
assistance, and debt relief.502 
Critical oversight of the programs on the part of civil society must continue. The 
important questions need to be continuously asked: are these programs meeting their 
500 "-pjjg performance of MBLR is overall satisfactory - the income has increased significantly with the 
peasants rising from poverty, which is one of the main arguments of the MBRL - poverty alleviation" 
(Lambais 2007, 25). 
501 "Property rights are just one constraint on agricultural productivity. The state must ensure through its 
policies that the squatters have access to other markets, including credit, products, inputs and technology 
markets." (Teofilo and Prado Garcia, 23) 
502 This process had begun in the communities we studied. Settlers in Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista III 
participated in an occupation of INCRA offices in order to get SIC funding released; they also were 
negotiating with the state and municipality regarding the soil problem. Associations in several of the 
settlements had or were in the process of negotiation extensions of loan repayments. 
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own criteria? are the community organizations representing beneficiary and small farm 
interests? are local elites attempting to co-opt the process? is the government 
manipulating the World Bank and/or the programs for its own political goals vis-a-vis 
MST? Monitoring and accompaniment can help rural communities critique neo-liberal 
values that periodically are in vogue at the Bank. 
Critics rightly point out that MBLR cannot carry out a truly redistributive land 
reform "in the same way that the state can" (Borras Jr., 390). But forty-six years of the 
Estatuto da Terra have demonstrated that there is little likelihood that the Brazilian 
government is going to carry out a major redistributive land reform through expropriation 
- indeed, given constitutional, legislative, and judicial barriers, it would be almost 
impossible for the President of Brazil to do so even if he wished to. To reject MBLR as a 
tool on the basis that it will not bring about truly redistributive change is to make the 
perfect the enemy of the good. 
In my opinion, it is vital for groups such as CPT and MST to engage MBLR 
programs and use them to the full extent possible for the benefit of Brazilian landless 
workers. To do otherwise is to throw away a valuable tool for carrying out agrarian 
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Interviews 
Almeida, Sergio Ricardo Matos, March 27, 2006; telephone interview March 10, 2006. 
Technical advisor for Boa Vista - Biritinga, also assists at Passos de Esperanga. 
Andrade de Abreu, Maria Djalma, March 15, 17, 20, and 21, 2006. Technical advisor for 
Vila Canaa, Fazenda Veneza, and other MBLR settlements. 
Arcanjo, Miguel, April 27, 2006. Founder of CELANOR and leader of Rio Real 
communities that gave rise to first Cedula da Terra projects. 
Brito Batista, Edna, March 27, 2006. Technical advisor for Passos de Espran9a. 
CAR - interview with technial advisor Marcos, March 17, 2006 in Euclides da Cunha. 
He supports work in Vila Canaa and Fazenda Veneza. 
CDA - interview with agronomist, Dr. Penedo, April 26, 2006 in Salvador. He is familiar 
with all the settlements we visited, and is particularly knowledgeable with respect 
to the sub-soil issue in Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista III. 
CELANOR - interview with director Rafael, April 27, 2006. Interviews with technican 
Eduardo Carlos - in field at Nova Lusitania April 5, and at office April 27, 2006. 
Frei Chico, April 5, 2006. Franciscan friar actively supporting land reform movement in 
the Esplanada area (Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista III). 
Reys, Benone March 29, 2006. Church activist and former mayor of Inhambupe, aware 
of the political situation of Moita Redonda. 
Rocha Reis, Jose Eduardo, March 29, 30, and 31, 2006. Technical advisor for Moita 
Redonda. 
Silva, Antonio Fernando, January 31 and April 26, 2006. CDA agronomist who has 
accompanied all of the settlements that we visited. 
Sussuarana, Marcos, August 18, 2001. A sociologist who founded CPPTCunia - an 
NGO working with rural populations in Rondonia. He proposed a master's thesis 
based on his observations that land reform areas in Rondonia resulting from MST 
occupations are better located, and therefore more potentially sustainable, than 
those resulting from government oriented expropriations. 
Veloso dos Passos, Berta, January 31 and April 26, 2006, plus prior phone contact. CDA 
agronomist who worked with Cedula da Terra since its inception. 
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List of Interviewees from Settlements 
The following list names, nicknames, and ages of interviewees. Numbering is tracked to 
the interview form of each set of interviewees. 
Case Study 1: Nova Lusitania (April 5-6, 2006) 
1) Edivaldo Rodrigues (36) 
2) Elenice Rodrigues dos Santos (30) 
3) Antonio Nascimento dos Santos (55) 
4) Ivanete Maria de Jesus (37) 
Almir Rodrigues (17) - son 
Renasey Santos Rodrigues (18) - son - (socio trabalhador) 
5) Vagner A. de Jesus (21) 
6) Cosme Aurelio Silva (70) 
Filomena Honora de Jesus (61) - spouse 
7) Antonia Ferreira dos Santos (55) 
8) Jocimaria Alves dos Santos Paixao (33) 
9) Maria Lucia da Paixao (48) 
Jose Viana da Paixao (48) - spouse 
10) Jose Martins da Cruz (43) 
Rosenilda Araujo Oliveira da Cruz (34) 
11) Petronilio Dias de Oliveira (59) 
12) Wilson Bastos Guirmaraes (36) 
13) Judite de Concei<?ao Lago Ferreira (54) 
14) Eliezer Martins da Cruz (59) 
Isabel Martins (57) - spouse 
15) Anselmo Nunes Rodrigues (25) - (socio trabalhador) 
Zelia Nogueira Luz (16) - spouse 
Case Study 2: Boa Vista III (April 28-30, 2006) 
1) Edmundo (Mico Preto) (59) 
Ma Lourdes (44) - spouse 
Branca (20) - daughter 
2) Jose Renato de Aquinos (Ze de Roque) (59) 
Delmina (56) - spouse 
3) lane Pinto Menezes (34) 
4) Waldemar Correia de Jesus (55) 
Alice Prima Aguiar (55) - spouse 
5) Antonio Souza (Antonio Gago) (39) 
Luciana Jesus de Souza (31) - spouse 
6) Jose Perreira de Anunciacao (Del) (44)) 
Ana Ma Souza Santos (Ana) (43) - spouse 
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7) Renato Edison da Costa (49) 
8) Jose Primo dos Santos Irmao (Adilson) (46) 
Maria Lucia Cruz Santos (44) - spouse 
9) Anatalia Santos Souza (Natalia) (44) 
10) Roque Mendes de Jesus (Dede) (47) 
Maria de Concei9&o Santos de Oliveira (Concei9ao) (44) - spouse 
11) Manuel Ferreira da Costa (Ze Sande) (44) 
Elneide Roza Rebeiro da Costa (Neide) (43) - spouse 
12) Fausto Rodrigues da Souza (43) 
13) Jose Pereira Filho (Galego) (42) 
14) Nilton Cesar dos Santos (35) 
15) Luiz Carlos da Silva (Presidente da Associacao) (30) 
16) Adilson Souza de Almeida (Gamelas) (31) 
Marzia Nascimento dos Santos (24) - spouse 
17) Jose dos Santos Reis (Ze Reis) (47) 
18) Joao Bosco de Souza (Bosco) (47) 
Maria Souza Santos (Santinha) (34) - spouse 
19) Jose Isidoro de Santana (Isidoro) (49) 
Josefa Alves de Goise (Meninha) (46) - spouse 
Carla (20) - daughter 
Case Study 3: Vila Canaa (March 16 & 19, 2006) 
1) Jose Hilton Araujo Santana (Galego) (47) 
2) Jose Domingo Santos Reis (46) 
Marilene Gois Reis (42) - spouse 
Gedione Gois Reis (16) - son 
3) Adilson de Silva Souza (42) 
Veraluce Santana Souza (40) -spouse 
Renato (16) - son 
4) Antonio Andrade Silva (46) 
5) Ernesto Riveiro da Silva (Milho Assado) (48) 
6) Antonio Costa Santana (Tonio) (35) 
7) Gerson Felix de Jesus (52) 
8) Cecilio Lopes Dantas (55) 
9) Carlos Joao dos Santos (32) 
Aliene Macedo dos Santos (34) - spouse 
10) Jose Rodrigues de Gois (Ze de Messias) (42) 
11) Decio Jose dos Santos (56) 
12) Antonio Andre de Oliveia (Toninho) (56) 
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13) Jose Anesio da Silva (Zequinho) (68) 
Josefa Anajoaquim da Silva (55) - spouse 
14) Josevanda Pereira dos Santos (Jo) (37) 
15) Sonia Aleixo da Silva Santos (38) 
16) Marineide Macedo da Silva Jesus (39) 
17) Adelia Souza Santos (35) 
Joice Souza Santos (15) - daughter 
18) Isacale Daniel da Costa (Sossego) (30s - unspecified) 
Catya Macedo da Costa (33) - spouse 
Jaqueline (15) - daughter 
19) Jose Moraes de Souza (Ze Nelson) (56) 
Ana Francisca de Nascimento Souza (48) - spouse 
20) Jose Gois da Silva (Ze Bebenuto) (48) 
Nilza Santos Reis da Silva (42) - spouse 
21) Antonio Santos Reis (Boca Crente) (60) 
Teresa Rodrigues Reis (Tete) (58) - spouse 
22) Jose Nilson Araujo da Silva (Ze Nilson) (33) 
Ivaneide Jesus Santana (26) - spouse 
23) Maria Josefa de Jesus (Preta) (38) 
24) Valdinho Jesus dos Santos (Caboquinho) (32) 
25) Osvaldo Santos dos Reis (Dada) (49) 
26) Ari Souza (Nenzao) (49) 
Eilane (15) - daughter (interviewed at the home of her uncle, Adilson) 
27) Manoel Costa Santana (Nego Velho) (47) 
Case Study 4: Moita Redonda (March 28-31, 2006) 
1) Maria Angelina de Concegao (Maria de Gilo) (51) 
Augusto Alves de Souza (Dudu) (54) - spouse 
2) Marcos Roberto Santis Silva (28) 
Maria Jose Ferreira dos Santos (28) - spouse 
3) Benival Pereira de Santos (52) 
Maria Wilma Martins dos Reis (33) - spouse 
4) Raimundo Jesus Rodrigues (39) 
Gedilsa Ribeira Nascimento Rodrigues (31)- spouse 
5) Jose'Walmir Martins Reis (Walmir) (36) 
Irelice Souza de Franca (29) - spouse 
6) Jose Batista de Souza (29) 
Anuncieta de Espirito Santo Souza (28) - spouse 
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7) Jose Ribeiro dos Santos (63) 
Dominga Alves de Silva (52) - spouse 
Edivania da Silva (26) - daughter 
8) Pedro Xavier dos Dantos (59) 
9) Hilda Silva dos Santos (Miudinha) (39) 
Jose Vincente Irmao (Ze de Beti) (62) - spouse 
10) Tarcila Pereira Andrade Oliveira (Daci) (44) 
11) Jose Correia dos Santos Irmao (Coho) (46) 
Josefa Correia dos Santos (45) - spouse 
12) Edivaldo Rodrigues dos Santos (Dadinho) (49) 
13) Cecilia Souza dos Santos (43) 
14) Walter de Souza (26) 
15) Irandi Serra Santos (38) 
Jose da Conceiijao (39) - spouse 
Evailton (18) - son 
16) Lindoval de Concei^o (46) 
17) Antonio Pereira Lima (Liazinho) (65) 
18) Antonio Alves Santos (59) 
19) Aldemir de Goes Santos (Pipio) (32) 
20) Renivaldo Dias dos Santos (Reninho) (34) 
21) Israel Xavier dos Santos (Real) (52) 
22) Joseneide Rodrigues dos Santos (Neide) (42) 
23) Maria Olga Santana Reis (Olga) (59} 
24) Lucineia Lima de Souza Santana (Neia) (20) 
Case Study 5: Passos da Esperanca (March 27-28, 2006) 
1) Valdina de Oliveira (41) 
2) Josefina Santos Cavalho (44) 
3) Donice Reis (37) 
Adeladio Cardoso Souza (Bolero) - 46) - spouse 
4) Denicio Antonio dos Santos (Barrudo) (33) 
Gilvaneide Concei^ao dos Santos (Neide) (31) -
5) Josefa Almeida da Silva (51) 
Jose Bispo de Jesus (59) 
6) Joao Ferreira Firmo (46) 
Angelita Pereira de Souza (41) - spouse 
7) Americo Anatole dos Santos (Anatole) (55) 
Martinha Reis de Jesus (54) - spouse 
8) Jose Nascimento dos Santos (28) 
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Marivalda Reis Silva (21) - spouse 
9) Edilson Emilio Ferreira (32) 
Joselita Conceigao Santos Ferreira (28) - spouse 
Desiane (13) - daughter 
10) Railda Dantas Oliveira (40) 
Eduardo Alves da Silva (42) - spouse 
11) Jierson Secundino dos Reis (30) 
Eurides Maria de Jesus Santos (26) - spouse 
12) Josenito Oliveira Santana (59) 
Maria Ilza dos Santos Santana (Ilza) (57) - spouse 
13) Jose Figueira Almeida (Uga) (46) 
Josefa Luziana dos Santos (29) - spouse 
14) Mauricio Batista de Santana (32) 
15) Domingo Vieira dos Santos (Bob Sponja) (62) 
16) Gabriel Lopes dos Santos (Bie) (48) 
Miriam Silva Santos (Mira) (42) - spouse 
Lauravania Lopes Santos (21) - daughter 
17) Antonio Luiz Ramos (Tonho de Valdete) (31) 
18) Jose Fernandes Moreira da Silva (Fernando) (37) 
19) Jose Pereira de Jesus (Ze da Gracia) (51) 
Case Study 6: Boa Vista (Biritinga) (April 18-20, 2006) 
1) Josenilda de Gois Bento (Josi) (33) 
Jurandi Ferreiro Nilo (55) - spouse 
2) Jacira Assis de Jesus (43) 
3) Juraci Ferreira Lima (Jura) (56) 
Josefa Silveira de Jesus Lima (Zefina) (38) 
4) Manoel de Silva Santos (Leso) (38) 
Luciene de Almeida (27) - spouse 
5) Janilda da Silva (Jane) (25) 
6) Joao Rocha (65) 
Maria Delunda Guimaraes Oliveira (Del) (40) -
Jailson (16) - son 
7) Maria Elena de Souza (Dede) (50) 
8) Antonio Sales da Silva (46) 
Maria das Gramas Silva e Silva (Gracinha) (44) 
9) Jose Osmari Motta de Carvalho (Nininho) (41) 




10) Julia Jesus Ramos (34) 
Jose Carlos de Jesus (Cabeludo) (33) - spouse 
11) Jose Rubens Mata de Carvalho (35) 
Juviane Maria Silva Carvalho (19) - spouse 
12) Lourival Ferreira Lima (Lolo) (58) 
13) Jose Firmino dos Santos (Firmino) (63) 
14) Evandro Martins de Lima (Arroz) (35) 
Vanusa da Silva (Cigana) (29) - spouse 
15) Eugenia Rodrigues de Souza (Jenice) (53) 
16) Jose Marivaldo Lima Pinheiro (Marivaldo) (48) 
17) Sebastiao Binas Santos (Bastiao) (46) 
18) Isidora Maria de Jesus (Dorinha) (62) 
19) Jair Barbino Pereira de Santana (29) 
Vanusia Jesus dos Santos (Nusia) (21) - spouse 
20) Paulo Carmo Lima (43) 
Maria Jose Capistrano Lima (Zefinha) (37) - spouse 
21) Miguel Ferreira Santiago (49) 
Case Study 7: Fazenda Veneza (March 18 & 20, 2006) 
1) Jose dos Santos (Del?o) (34) 
2) Raimundo Ferreira Silva Moraes (35) 
Ivone Ferreira dos Santos (47) - spouse 
3) Edeon Ferreira de Melo (35) 
4) Walter Dantes de Oliveira (59) 
5) Claudio Dantes de Carvalho (38) 
6) Francisco Ferreira Dias (37) 
Rosenilde Jesus Silva (37) - spouse 
7) Ines Ferreira da Souza (29) 
8) Jose Carlos Correia de Souza (28) 
9) Renan Gonialves Teixeira (61) 
Francisca Vasco da Silva (Chica) (51) - spouse 
10) Duvalina Rodriques de Souza (Duva) (51) 
Douglas Souza (Boca) (18) - son 
11) Jose Tancredo Melo (Ze de Chico) (60) 
Marcio Souza Melo (32) - son 
12) Adenor Bittencourt da Silva (60) 
Raimunda Santos da Silva (39) - spouse 
13) Telso Costa Santos (64) 
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14) Rogerio Xavier (34) 
Menicia Cardoso e Silva Xavier (30) - spouse 
15) Erico Dantas de Souza (28) 
Dominga Gama (28) - spouse 
16) Raimundo Aleixo dos Santos (Raimundinho) (31) 
Monalisa Cardoso e Silva (31)- spouse 
17) Mancileide Souza Melo (24) 
18) Ireneide Aleixo de Moraes (37) 
Joao de Deus de Carvalho (Jojao) (70) 
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APPENDIX A 
WRITTEN CONSENT FORM 
The following is the form as actually used in the field. This was adapted for the sake of clarity 
with the input of local native speakers. The English translation follows. 
The consent form was read by (or to, where reading skills were limited) and explained to all 
interviewees in the settlement areas. All interviewees waived confidentiality. 
Formulario de Consentimento 
Estudo de Cedula da Terra 
Esta pesquisa tem como objetivo uma avaliagao do programa Cedula da Terra. A pesquisa esta sendo realizada por 
Arthur George Powers em preparagao da sua tese doutoral na Universidade de New Hampshire, E.U.A. 
A participagao de entrevistados e voluntaria. O entrevistado pode, a qualquer momento, recusar de responder a 
qualquer pergunta ou pode parar a entrevista. A entrevista deve durar mais ou menos uma hora. 
As informagoes compartilhadas na entrevista sao confidenciais no sentido que o entrevistado (menos que ele/ela 
concorde ao contrario) nao sera citado o nome, em qualquer maneira que deixara que ele/ela possa ser identificado 
como a fonte da informagao. O risco que esta confidencialidade pode ser violado e muito pouco. 
A finalidade desta pesquisa sera uma avaliagao que beneficiara trabalhadores rurais e outros que apoiam reforma 
agraria, como tambem agendas de desenvolvimento, possibilitando um melhor entendimento dos pontos fortes e 
fracos deste modelo de reforma agraria, e providenciar informagoes que possam melhorar a situagao de pessoas 
participantes deste programa e de outros programas semalhantes. 
O responsavel para a pesquisa e Arthur George Powers: (Oxx 21 9615 0330 ou arthur_g_powers@yahoo.com) 
Se voce tiver perguntas sobre os seus direitos referente a esta pesquisa, entre em contato com Julie Simpson no 
Secretariado de Pesquisas da Universidade de New Hampshire: julie.simpson@unh.edu 
Anota qualquer renuncia de confidencialidade e suas condigoes: 
Assinatura do entrevistado 
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Appendix A: English Translation 
Consent Form 
Cedula da Terra Study 
This study has as its objective an evaluation of the Cedula da Terra program. The study is being 
carried out by Arthur George Powers in preparation for his doctoral dissertation at the University 
of New Hampshire, U.S.A. 
Participation by interviewees is voluntary. The interviewee may, at any time, refuse to respond 
to any question or stop the interview. The interview lasts more or less one hour. 
Information shared in the interview is confidential in the sense that the interviewee (unless s/he 
agrees to the contrary) will not be cited by name, in any manner that will allow him/her to be 
identified as the source of information. The risk that this confidentiality can be violated is very 
small. 
The purpose of this study is an evaluation that will benefit rural workers and others who support 
agrarian reform, as well as development agencies, making possible the better understanding of 
the strong and weak points of this model of agrarian reform, and to provide information that can 
better the situation of people participating in this program and other similar programs. 
The person responsible for this study is Arthur George Powers (Oxx 21 9615 0330 or 
arthur_g_powers@yahoo. com) 
If you have questions regarding your rights in reference to this study, enter in contact with Julie 
Simpson at the Secretariat of Studies of the University of New Hampshire: 
julie.simpson@unh.edu 
Note down any waiver of confidentiality and the conditions [of the waiver]: 
Signature of the interviewee 
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APPENDIX B 
INTERVIEW FORMS 
PORTUGUESE AND ENGLISH 
For each household interviewed, a family information form (cadastro) was filled in. For each 
interviewee, an interview form was available (though in practice, for logistical reasons, 
interviewers often noted the responses of family members on the same form, indicating which 
family member the response came from). In some cases, family members were interviewed 
jointly, in others separately. Family member interviews were then brought together with the 
cadastro and randomly assigned a number for records purposes. 
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PROJETO DE ESTUDO 







Cidade e estado: 




Cidade e estado: 
Grau de instrugao: 
Dependentes: 




Zona rural ou urbana: 
Continua estudando? ()sim ( ) nao 
Estado civil: 
Zona rural ou urbana: 
Continua estudando? ()sim ( ) nao 
Nome 
Idade 
Estuda Qual Serie Parentesco 
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3 CAP ACID APE PRODUTIVA 
A terra tern quantas hectares (ou tarefas)? 
Planta? Oque? Percentagem? 
Quais fruteiras tem (tipo e numero)? 
Criatorios: 
Cria? 0 que? Quantos? 
4 RENPA 
Trabalha em que? Renda anual: 
Tem aposentados(as) em casa? Quantos? 
Tem assalariados em casa? Quantos? 
• Os assalariados trabalham em que? 
Tem alguem que ganha como diarista ou biscateiro? Quantos? 
• Ele(s) trabalha(m) em que? 
Tem renda que vem atraves de produ^ao artesanal? 
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5 CONDICOES DE INFRA-ESTRUTURA 

















Carro pipa publico 














Semente de lirio branco 
Clora^ao 





Posto de saude 
Agua encanada 
Tern reservatorio de agua? ()sim ()nao Quantos? Tipo? 
Qual a distancia para busacar agua? Quern vai buscar? 
Onde pega a agua? ( ) barreiro ( ) a^ude Outros: 
Qual a qualidade da agua? ( ) salobra ()+magnesio ()barrenta () l imo ()poluida-dejetos 
( ) boa qualidade outros: 
Existe lavandaria comunitaria? Onde: Origem da agua: 
Quais as principals doen^as que afetam sua familia? 518 
Pesquisa referente a "reforma agraria a base do mercado" 
Arthur George Powers, disserta^ao de Ph.D. - Universidade de New Hamphsire 
Para moradores nos assentamentos 
Data: 
Nome do entrevistado: 
Apelido: 
Outras pessoas presentes: 
Confidencialidade: 
• Completa (a informa^ao nao sera atribuida ao entrevistado) 
• Parcial (indique os itens confidenciais) 
• Desnecessaria 
Aplique flcha de cadastro familiar 
1) Quero saber de voce: 
a) famiiia de origem/regiao: 
b) que fez antes da reforma agraria: 
2) Como foi que chegou a morar aqui? 
3) Me conta como foi que voce adquiriu esta terra. 
4) Quem teve a ideia de comprar esta terra? 
5) Voce ou alguem de sua famiiia [quem?] participou na decisao de comprar esta terra? 
6) Quem foram os lideres na compra da terra? [Eles residem no assentamento? Que e que voce pensa 
deles?] 
7) A quem pertencia a terra? Fale sobre ele: 
8) Voce ou alguem da sua famiiia participou nas negocia9oes da compra da terra? [Em que maneira? 
Voce acha que sua participagao foi importante?] 
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9) Voces tiveram assistencia tecnica na compra da terra? De quem? Como foi? 
10) Atualmente, voce participa nas atividades/funcionamento do assentamento? De que maneira? Que e 
que voce acha de sua participa^ao atual? 





12) Quem sao os lideres atuais do assentamento? 
13) Sao grandes diferen9as de opinao entre moradores do assentamento? Sobre que? Como e que estas 
diferen9as sao tratadas? 
14) Fale sobre a associa9ao. [Como foi que come90u? Quem foi que comegou? A associa9ao representa 
bem os interesses de sua famiiia? Das outras familias?] 
15) Voce participou na organiza9ao da associa9ao? Como foi sua participacao? 
16) Voce particpa atualmente na associa9ao? (Se nao, porque?) Como e sua particpa9ao? 
17) Se voce pudesse conseguir credito sem a associa9ao, ainda continuiaria de se manter associado? 
18) Em quais programas de credito sua famiiia tem participado? 
19) Se voce pudesse conseguir outro lote de terra nesta regiao, igual ou melhor do que a sua, voce sairia 
do assentamento? 
20) Se voce pudesse vender sua terra, venderia? 
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21) Como e que voce sente sobre a vida que voce e sua familia tem aqui no assentamento? 
22) Quais sao as coisas que voce gosta aqui? 
23) Quais sao as coisas que nao gosta? 
24) Que precisa para que a sua vida (e de sua familia) seja melhor? 
25) Como sao as escolas? (acesso, nivel, qualidade) 
26) Como e o servi^o de saude? (acesso, disponibilidade de medicos, qualidade) 
27) Quando voce mudou para o assentamento, sua vida: 
a) Ficou melhor? 
b) Ficou pior? 
c) Ficou mais ou menos no mesmo nivel? 
28) Daqui a dois anos, a vida no assentamento sera melhor ou pior? E em dez anos? Porque? 
29) Quais sao suas esperansas para o seu fiituro e de sua familia? Em 10 anos? Em 20? 
30) Fale sobre a sua terra e lavoura: 
a) A terra e fertil? 
b) Como e o preparo do solo para a plantagao? 
c) Voce usa adubo - que tipo? 
d) Voce usa pesticides - que tipo? 
e) Que tipos de pragas tem na lavora? 
f) Voce pratica rotaijao das lavoras? De quanto em quanto tempo? 
g) Que tipo de assistencia tecnica voce recebe? 
h) Voce vende uma parte da sua produsao? Qual percentagem? Onde vende? Qual 
preco? 
31) A renda da familia e suficiente para suas necessidades? Explique. 
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32) Quais sao os pagamentos que voces tem que fazer para a terra? Voce se preocupa com eles? 
33) Quais sao as coisas que mais preocupa? 
34) Os assentados aqui sao unidos ou divididos? Porque? 
35) Que e que une mais as pessoas no assentamento? Que e que mais os divide? 
36) No seu ver, quem e que apoia (esta a favor do) o trabalhador rural? 
37) No seu ver, quem e que esta contra (dificulta a vida do) o trabalhador rural? 
38) Que e que voce pensa do Movimento Sem Terra (MST)? 
39) Voce votou na ultima elei<?ao para presidente? (Em quem? - primeiro e segundo turno) 
40) E na eleitpao deste ano, voce pensa de votar em quem? 
41) Voce tem um partido politico de preferencia? (Qual?) 
42) Voce votou nas elei9oes para prefeito? 
43) Voce ajudou algum candidato? 
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44) Voce participa nas seguintes organiza^oes: 
Organiza9oes Muito Mais ou 
menos 
Pouco Nao Qual Fun9ao? 
Associa9ao do assentamento 
Cooperativa 
Partido politico 
Grupo de mulheres 
Sindicato 
Igreja ou grupo religioso 
Grupo de esporte 
Grupo de jovens 
Associa9ao de paes e mestres 
Outros 
Observa9oes da equipe: 
• Condi9oes da casa e limpeza, presen9a de outras consft^oes no lote, disponibilidade de agua, 
disponabilidade de comida 
• Animais, lavora, padroes de produao, infraestrutura produtiva 
• Intera9ao entre vizinhos, sinais de conflito, sinais de divergencia de renda/riqueza dentro do 
assentamento 
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Appendix B - English Translation 
Information Form 
Study Project 
Cedula da Terra 












Rural or urban? 





City & State: 
Schooling: 
Marital state: 
Rural or urban? . 
Still studying? ( ) yes ( ) no 
Name Age Studies What grade? Relationship 
5 2 4 
3. Productive Capacity 
How many hectares (or tarefas) does your land have? 
What do you plant? Percentage? 
What fruit trees do you have (type & number)? 
Livestock: 
What do you raise? How many 
4. Income 
What do you work at? Annual income: 
Are there pensioners in the family? How many? 
Are there salaried people in the family? How many? 
• The salaried workers do what? 
Does anyone earn as a day laborer or freelance worker? How many? 
• They work at what? 
Is there any income from artisan work? 
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5. Infrastructure Conditions 
Type of house construction 
brick 
_ adobe 
_ taipa with plaster 
_ unplastered taipa 
wood 








public water truck _ passed through a cloth 
private water truck _ white lily seed 
_ chloration 






_ Open sky 
_ public sewage 
_ privy 
_ septic hole 
ditch 
Garbage 






_ medical attendant 
_ sanitation 
health post 
_ piped water 
Do you have a water reservatory? ()yes ()no How big? Type? 
What is the distance to go for water? Who fetches it? 
Where do you get water? () dam () reservoir Other: 
What is the quality of water? () salty ()magnesium ()clay ()lime ()polluted 
() good quality ()other 
Is there a community laundry area? Where: Source of water: 




Study of "market-based land reform" 
Arthur George Powers, Ph.D. dissertation - University of New Hampshire 
For dwellers in settlement areas 
Date: 
Name of interviewee: 
Nickname: 
Other persons present: 
Confidentiality: 
- Complete (the information will not be attributed to the interviewee) 
Partial (indicate the confidential items) 
Unnecessary 
Fill in the Family Information Form 
1) I would like to know from you: 
a) Family and region of origin: 
b) What you did prior to agrarian reform: 
2) How did you come to live here? 
3) Tell me how it was that you acquired this land. 
4) Who had the idea of buying this land? 
5) Did you or anyone in your family (who?) participate in the decision to buy this land? 
6) Who were the leaders in the land purchase? (Do they still reside in the settlement? What do 
you think of them?) 
7) To whom did the land belong? Talk about him: 
8) Did you or anyone in your family participate in the negotiations to buy the land? {In what 
way?) Do you think that your participation was important?) 
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9) Did you have technical assistance in purchasing the land? From whom? How was it? 
10) Presently, do you participate in settlement activities/functioning? In what way? What do 
you think about your present participation? 




d) Family matters? 
12) Who are the present leaders of the settlement? 
13) Are there big differences of opinion among the settlement dwellers? About what? Who are 
these differences dealt with? 
14) Talk about the association. (How did it begin? Who started it? Does the association 
represent well the interests of your family? Of other families?) 
15) Did you participate in the organization of the association? How was your participation? 
16) Do you presently participate in the association? (If not, why not?) How is your participation? 
17) If you could obtain credit without the association, would you continue to be a member? 
18) In which credit programs does your family participate? 
19) If you could obtain another lot [of land] in this region, equal or better than yours, would you 
leave the settlement? 
20) If you could sell your lot, would you do so? 
21) How do you feel about the life you and your family have here in the settlement? 
22) What are the things you like here? 
23) What are the things you don't like? 
24) What is needed for your life (and that of your family) to be better? 
25) How are the schools? (access, level, quality) 
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26) How is the health service? (access, availability of doctors, quality) 
27) When you moved to the settlement, your life: 
a) Got better? 
b) Got worse? 
c) Stayed more or less at the same level? 
28) In two years, will life in the settlement be better or worse? In ten years? Why? 
29) What are your hopes for your future and that of your family? In 10 years? In 20? 
30) Talk about your land and crops: 
a) Is the land fertile? 
b) How do you prepare the soil for planting? 
c) Do you use fertilizer - what type? 
d) Do you use pesticides - what type? 
e) What type of pests do you have in the crops? 
f) Do you practice crop rotation? How often? 
g) What type of technical assistance do you receive? 
h) Do you sell a part of what you grow? What percent? Where do you sell it? At what 
price? 
31) Is your family income sufficient for your needs? Explain. 
32) What are the payments you need to make for the land? Do you worry about them? 
33) What are the things that most worry you? 
34) Are the settlers here united or divided? Why? 
35) What is it that most unites people in the settlement? What most divides them? 
36) In your opinion, who supports (is in favor of) the rural worker? 
37) In your opinion, who is against (makes life difficult for) the rural worker? 
38) What do you think of the Movimento Sem Terra (MST)? 
39) Did you vote in the last election for president? (For whom - first & second balloting) 
40) And in the election this year, you are thinking of voting for whom? 
41) Do you have a political party that you prefer? (Which?) 
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42) Did you vote in the elections for the municipal prefect? 
43) Did you help any candidate? 
44) Do you participate in the following organizations? 












Condition and cleanliness of home, presence of other buildings on lot, availability of 
water, availability of food 
Animals, crops, production patterns, productive infrastructure 
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Durham, NH 03824 
IRB # : 3279 
Study: Market-Based Land Reform in Brazil 
Approval Date: 05/23/2005 
The Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research (IRB) 
has reviewed and approved the protocol for your study as Exempt as described in Title 
45, Code of Federal Regulations-(CFR), Part 46, Subsection 101(b). Approval is granted 
to conduct your study as described in your protocol. 
Researchers who conduct studies involving human subjects have responsibilities as 
outlined in the attached document, Responsibilities of Directors of Research Studies 
Involving Human Subjects. (This document is also available at 
http://www.unh.edu/osr/compliance/IRB.html.) Please read this document carefully 
before commencing your work involving human subjects. 
Upon completion of your study, please complete the enclosed pink Exempt Study Final 
Report form and return it to this office along with a report of your findings. 
If you have questions or concerns about your study or this approval, please feel free to 
contact me at 603-862-2003 or Julie.simpson@unh.edu. Please refer to the IRB # 
above in ail correspondence related to this study. The IRB wishes you success with your 
research. 
cc: File 
Mimi Larsen Becker 
Research Conduct and Compliance Services, Office of Sponsored Research, Service 
Building, 51 College Road, Durham, NH 03824-3585 * Fax: 603-862-3564 
